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THE PREFACE 
"Pray thee, take care, that tak'st my book in hand, 
To read it well: that is, to understand." 
(Ben Jonson) 
The rapidity with which humanity has achieved so much since prehistoric times, 
can be accounted for, I think quite simply by the fact that there are many 
more of us upon whose talents and experiences, humanity can draw, and more 
important still, human achievements are, by virtue of our powers of reason 
and memory • accumulative. 
to make conscious changes, 
for the furtherance of the 
Man's genetic inheritance not onJ.y enables him 
but also to undertake unprecedented challenges 
human race as a whole. Infinitely he is still 
a part of nature and as such, must work with it and not against it in any 
way,. but so too, I believe, he has the ability to determine what happens 
to himself and therefore · the race as a whole. Thus, as man is · awakened to 
s peculation and concept ua 1 i sation , he be comes the chan ge-tnake r, and not a 
pawn to be dictated to by capricious Nature. Civilisation has been one of 
the great accelorators of change: when skills and natural facts come together 
to make possible a new order of life based on a better understanding of the 
world at large and a common aim· of harmony. 
As civilisation is born and developed, there are new hazards and one inherent 
difficulty is to find a niche for each individual member of the conglomerate 
mould, It was not - and indeed is still not - easy. Categorisation does 
not fit humanity like a mantle - there will always be those unruly elements 
which defy the best efforts, It is still man's greatest challenge to live 
harmoniously, side by side with his bretheren. 
A society proves its maturity by the degrees of hurnaness it shows in the 
treatment of those who do not conform to rigid rules entirely. A civilised 
society has for. its guideline of behaviour, civilised in most cases­
principles and rules enabling the existence of a cohesive, rnut�ally beneficial 
background. Laws are necessary for the continuance of communal life and 
need to be acceptable in the first instance, to be truly effective. It makes 
sense therefore, to base a society's laws - by and large - upon community 
convications and mores. There is therefore no need for laws governing those 
matters which do not, and cannot, undermine the strength and security of 
the social structure. 
Over a very large area, the law is indifferent to sex - by this I do not 
include sexual activities, but mean simply the designation of a 'sex 
classification' to a particular person. Sex is irrelvant to most relationships 
which give rise to contractual and delictual rights and obligations and, 
in fact, also to the greater part of the criminal law. Perhaps, in response 
to an instinctive social ordering, or because of relatively infrequent sexual 
aberrations, most cultures have regulated social conduct in such a way as 
to protect the supposedly unique sexual bipolarity, in spite of'its fallacious 
nature. In the light of medical progress, it would be improper now for the 
law to continue to rely on the outward appearance for sex determination, 
considering that such determination has very important future implications. 
A careful analysis should be made of the parameters of human sexuality the 
object of such analysis would be to arrive at an administerable and equitable 
legal standard, by which to test a person's sex, while preserving the 
traditional sexual dichotomy, as a basis. (
l
)
"The law is a living thing: it adapts and develops to fulfill 
the needs of the living people whom it both governs and serves. 
Like clothes, it should be made to fit people. It must never 
be strangled by the.dead hand of long-discarded custom, belief, 
d t . . . 1 " (2)oc rine or princip e .  
One of the reasons why I chose this specific subject-matter, is that I am 
more interested in the plight of individual human beings than that of humanity 
as a whole. To disregard the so-called trivial problems of isolated people 
for the greater cause of the human race as a unit, is to lose sight of 
individualism: the common 'wood and trees' syndrome. It is always a dangerous 
thing to catalogue and regiment. The transsexual is as much a person with 
hopes, fears, loves and hates, as the 'normal' person: all go to make up 
the colourful mosaic that is the genus homo sapiens. If we have laws to 
protect the nasci turus - . an uncertain ·entity, a being not yet born - how 
much more important that we have laws to protect responsible, but suffering 
members already in society, or at the very least not have laws contrary to 
the happiness of such individuals. 
1. D.K. Smith 'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law' {1971)
56 Cornell Law Review 464.
2. Midland Bank Trust Company v Green (no. 3) ( 1981) All ER 744, per Sir
George Baker, at 751.
It is said that charity begins at home. It is indeed both idle and fatuous, 
to speculate on global scales of famine, nuclear disarmament and civil wars 
in foreign states. The duty of a governing body is primarily to its country 
and thus, to each and every individual of which it is comprised. This is 
what the function of the law should be: the continued harmonious living of 
diverse people in the community. Laws that are archaic, out of· contemporary 
step with other disciplines, unjust and arbitrarily discriminatory, should 
have no place in a civilised and aware society. A system of too many laws 
is just as inefficious as one with too few. The principle of 'live and let 
live' is a sound one to which to adhere - no one should encounter unnecessary 
interference and be denied rights of action. provided that those actions 
in no way consciously harm anyone else. 
The topic then of this thesis, is the transsexual's right to undergo corrective 
surgery and the concommittant right to subsequent post-operative legal 
acceptance for all purposes. All this work consists of the author's O'Wn 
submissions, unless othe.rwise indicated. 
"When in disgrace with fortune and man's eyes 
I alone beweep my outcaste state, 
And trouble deaf Heaven with my bootless cries, 
And look upon myself, and curse my fate, 
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope, 
Featured like him, with friends possessed, 
Desiring this man's art and that man's scope, 
With what I most enjoy contented least, 
Yet in these though myself almost despising, 
Haply I think on thee and then my state 
Like to the lark at break of day arising, 
From sullen earth, sings hymns at Heaven's gate; 
For thy sweet love remembered, such wealth brings 
That then I scorn to change my state with kings." 
(W. Shakespeare Sonnet 29) 
PART A 
1 
1"BE MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
CHAP TER I 
THE TESTS USED IN OETERMIBING SEX 
I INTRODUCTION 
"Perhaps with the overcoming of woman's oppression, the 
woman in man will be allowed to emerge." (Betty Roszak : 
Masculine and Feminine) 
Although there is a tacit assumption in legal systems of the majority of 
civilised countries that there are two distinct sexes, and only two, medical 
science has long since discovered that one's sexual classification cannot 
be ascertained so easily. Doctors have devised many factors for the 
determination of sex and have divided the concept into several categories: 
1. the sex chromo'some constitution - the most fundamental;
2. the sex of hormonal patterns - the chemical balance;
3. the anatomical sex which is separated into:
a} genitalia - the most obvious;
4. 
5. 
b) CfOnads;
c} internal organs other than gonads�
d) secondary sex characteristics;
sex of rearing - usually the apparent sex; and 
( 1) 
psychological or assumed sex role. 
While most people are clearly identifiable as either male or female by 
employing these criteria as a guide, there are persons who fail to slot into 
either end of the spectrum, exclusively. The problem i s  not necessarily 
solved by choosing a single test to govern, since no one test works in all 
( 2)
cases. 
1. Dr John Money's list in 'The 
Differentiation': The Sex Chromatin 
Bromwell 'MT v JT An Enlightened
6 Capital Law Review 403.
Sex Chromatin and Psycho sexual 
(K. Moore ed. 1966) cited in D.K. 
Perspective on Transsexualism• (1977) 
2. Although it is submitted that one's psychosexual identity does work in
every case: 'normal' people are psychologically and physically in accord,
and transsexuals are given psychological preference by the fact that
corrective surgery is performed on the basis of this gender identity.
2 
II CHROMOSOMAL CONSTITUTION 
In the 1890's, microscopists noticed that male and female animals often showed 
chromosomal differences, and they began to suspect that these differences 
were related to sex.determination. 
The reproduction of livirig matter depends upon the ability of a parent cell 
to divide in such a way that an exact copy of the genetic . inforrna tion is 
made to ensure continuity of inheritance in the daughter cells. Genes, which 
are tiny specific portions of the DNA structure, are the units of genetic 
activity. Because the chr omosomes exist in matching pairs with the 
exception of the sex chromosom'es - the genes are correspondingly paired. 
Genetic influences are .transmitted to the child by elements of DNA contained 
in the parent germinal cells. 
In man, the normal number of chromosomes in the body is 46, or 23 pairs. (
3
)
The basic chemical structure of the chromosomes appears to be remarkably 
stable. This stability is no doubt the result of natural selection over 
a very long period of evolution, during which less-stable genetic material, 
and consequently, 
'weeded' out. ( 
4
)
time with effects 
the possibility of deleterious effects occurring, has been 
Nevertheless, changes or mutations do occur from time to 
( 5) 
that are usually harmful. 
3. To maintain this number, in mitosis somatic cell division each
chromosome divides length-wise into daughter chromatids. These separate
from each other and pass into the two respective daughter cells derived
from the dividing cell. In the daughter cell - by means of DNA replication
each chromatid becomes a whole chromosome identical to that from which
it was derived. In this way, the chromosomal number is kept constant.
To produce the germinal cells, there is a further di vision known as
meiosis, during which the nUI11ber of chromosomes is halved so that a
resulting zygote would not have a double complement thereof. There is
also a process of crossing-over and by this means the chromosomes are
not exact replicas of their parental derivation. This mechanism is
important in bringing about hereditary variation with the species. H.
Curtis Biology ( 2nd ed. 1976); V. A. Cowrie 'The Shape of Things to Corne'
(1979) 149 Nursing Mirror 16.
4. Ibid
5. Mutations occur constantly. The average spontaneous mutation rate for
a given gene has been estimated to be 1 or 2 mutations per 100 000 genes,
per generation� This means that in every 100 000 sperm cells, 1 or 2
can be expected to carry a new mutation £or a particular gene. Natural
mutations most probably arise through faulty replications of a small
segment of DNA, so that the sequences of the bases are changed in that
region. As a result, instructions from that part of the genetic code
are altered: Curtis op cit 203.
3 
A newly fertilised human egg (zygote) has 23 pairs of chromosomes, half from 
the mother and half from the father. In the female zygote one of the pairs 
is denoted by XX karyotype and in the male, by XY karyotype. It is on this 
pair that the whole differentiation of sex -depends. The sex of the child 
is a totally male-determined factor as it depends on the chromosome pattern 
in the sperm. On average, brothers and sisters have half their complement 
of genes alike, and may grow to be very similar. However, external influences 
such as environment, as well as psychological influences, may cause siblings 
to develop into very dissimilar people. Build, personality and psychological 
makeup are largely inherited factors, but are subject to immense influence 
' ( 6) 
from the environment, 
It requires a complicated and difficult procedure to examine visibly the 
chromosome pattern of an individual and this is usually not a very practical 
test, A relatively simple test was discovered in the early 1950's, primarily 
by Dr Murray Barr. When human cells - usually scraped from the membrane 
of the mouth ( buccal smear) - are stained and examined under a microscope, 
darkly stained areas can be seen in female cells but not in male cells. This 
darkly stained area is the sex chromatin which is formed by the fusion of 
two X chromosomes and is now known as the Barr Body, The presence of the 
Barr Body therefore establishes the presence of two X chromosomes, or a female 
pair. The absence of the Barr Body shows that only one X chromosome is 
present, and it is assumed that a Y chromosome is also present, indicating 
a male person. The test is adequate for simple assessments but it will show 
(7) 
various results as indicated by the chart overleaf. 
6. Vide chapter three infra.
7. D. L. Hawley 'Legal Problems of Sex Determination' (1977) XV' Alberta Law
Review 122 at 129.
4 
SEX 
CHROMOSOME 
FORMATION 
NO. OF 
CHROMATIN 
BODIES 
(PHYSICAL 
APPEARANCE) 
PHENOTYPE 
(NUCLEAR 
SEX) 
GENOTYPE 
ANOMALY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
1. XY 0 Male Male Normal Male 
2. XY 0 Female Male Feminized Male 
3. XO 0 Female Male Turner's Syndrome 
4. xx 1 Female Female Normal Female 
5. XXY 1 Male Female Klinefetter's Syndrome 
6. xx 1 Male Female Masculinized Female 
7. XXXY 2 Male Female Klinefetter's Syndrome 
8. XXX 2 Female Female Metafemale 
9. XX/YY 1/0 Both Both Hemaphrodi te 
This chart shows that al though the determining presence or absence of a Barr 
Body will easily establish the sex of a normal male or female, it does not 
assist in determining the sex of any of the variations of the normal sex 
types. Thus, the test may show a sex classification that is in conflict 
with the apparent or assumed.sex role of some individuals. The uncertainties 
of this test for individuals who are other than normal XX females or XY males 
necessitates the use . of other tests for sex determination. Clearly, the 
test fails with thdse persons who are afflicted. : with chromosomal mutations. 
The author is of the opinion that the chromosomal pattern of an individual 
may be regarded as the ·manifold around which other important components are 
structured, such as hormonal quantities, physiological and psychological 
considerations and environmental influences. 
"The 'chromosomal sex' is merely of abstract, scientific 
and theoretical interest in the case of the transsexual .•• 
To insist that a person must live and be legally classified 
in accordance with his/her chromosomal sex, violates common 
sense as well as humanity� It reduces ·science. to a mere 
technicality, and an absurd one at that. With the same 
justification, one may insist that Rembrandt's works 
are not paintings, but pieces of canvas covered with 
paint. Accurate but asinine".(B) 
8. Letter from Dr Harry Benjamin to Cornell Law Review, January 6, 1971
cited in Smith, op cit 965.
5 
III THE GONADAL TEST
The primary sex organs are the gonads in which the gametes are formed. In 
the male, they are the testes which develop in the abdominal cavity of the 
(9) 
embryo, and descend into an external sac, the scrotum. The · testes are 
tightly packed with seminiferous tubules, between which are interstitial 
cells that produce androgens, the male hormones. (
l
O) The gamete-producing
organs in the female are the ovaries, each a solid m ass of cells about 3cm 
1 d d . h bd ' 1 
. (ll)
ong, suspen e 1n t e a  om1na cavity. 
Simply then the gonadal test ascertains whether a person has testes or ovaries. 
rt•involves an exploration of the abdomen and in some cases will include a 
histological examination of the gonad itself, to determine if its microscopic 
. (12) 
structure is characteristically testicular or ovarian. This standard 
too, has its drawbacks and is as inadequate on its own as the previous test, 
for it leaves the hermaphrodite - a person with the gonads of both sexes -
unclassified. Furthermore, the same would be true of a person suffering 
( 13) 
from gonadal agenesis - a person who lacks gonads altogether, 
IV GENITALIA 
Genitalia are the external sex organs: 
the female. {1
4
) The appearance of the 
a penis in the male and a vulva in 
genitalia is used · to determine the 
sex of a new born infant and for this reason, is an important test. A child 
is raised in a particular sex role based on this sex assignment at birth. 
This test is also the perfunctory standard used for legal classification. 
9. Curtis op cit 520.
10. Ibid. For more details regarding hormones, see later in this chapter.
11. Curtis op cit 531,
12. Hawley op cit 129.
13. G. W, Bartholemew 'Hermaphrodites and the Law' ( 1960) 2 Malaya Law Review
83 at 89.
14. This is the collective term for the female organs. The . clitoris, which
corresponds to the penis in the male in early embryogenesis the
structures are identical - is composed chiefly of erectile t.:/.ssue. The
clitoris itself, consists of the la bia minora and majora Curtis .Q.E.
cit 531.
6 
Judge Ormrod stated that if the three primary factors - chromosomal, gonadal 
and genital - were incongruent, precedence should be given to the genital 
factor as this is the very criterion by which society classifies us. It 
is ironic however, that in the very case in point, the respondent had the 
external genitalia of a female, yet Ormrod J ignored this and proceeded to 
base his sex determination on the chromosomal factor. (
l5
)
The problem with this test is that a cursory examination of the genitals 
on the birth of an· infant, would result in the possibility of assigning 
(16)
feminised males, masculinised females and hermaphrodites to the wrong sex. 
V THE SEX OF REARING 
"The birth of any child is a momentous event, for it 
is the beginning of a new person. It brings with it 
joy, frustration and the responsibility of adulthood. 
Children are prepared to love and be loved. It is through 
acting, interacting and reacting that the child learns 
its role in life thus the parental relationship and 
the environment are crucial for the development of the 
child. " ( J. 
7
)
15. Corbett v Corbett ( 1970) ( 2) All E R 33.
more details of this case.
Vide Chapter eight infra for 
16. One case has arisen, regarding the possible liability of a doctor or
hospital for an incorrect determination of . sex at birth. In Kaufmann
v Israel·· Zion Hospital 83 Kise 714, 51 NYS 2d 412 (Sup Ct 1944), a
physician .incorrectly· informed the parents of a new born infant that
their child was female. Several days later the parents were informed
of the error.. The parents sued for the mental anguish they had suffered
due to this mis-information and because they felt that the child given
to them was somehow not really theirs. Justice Daly, following the
traditional approach, ruled that there was no course of action for
negligently-induced mental suffering, in the absence of physical injury.
Although the rule stated in Kaufmann is still the law in America, there
is apparently a trend towards allowing recovery at least where there
is clear and convincing proof of genuine mental suffering: W Prosser
Handbook of the Law of Torts ( 3rd ed. 1964) section 55. Smith op cit
967 is of the opinion that due to the damaging psychological effect an
incorrect diagnosis of sex could have on a child - assuming the error
remains undetected for a length of time - the law may impose liability
in cases such as Kaufmann.
17. Nursing Mirror Oct. 1982, 155 no. 17 p 17.
7 
The sex of rearing then is the sex - after being assigned at birth - in which 
a person is socialised. It is a more useful criterion of sex determination 
because it conforms to the social reality in that the individual has been 
trained in one sex and has normally adopted that sex vis-e..-vis society. 
Likewise, society has accepted the individual in that role. 
Normally, an individual retains a sex role throughout life and his social 
sex can be determined to a certain extent by such things as dress, occupation, 
sport preferences and other activities and attitudes. The sex of rearing 
might be relevant in the determination of the sex of an hermaphrodite (and 
other mutations for that matter), because the biological· sex ambiguity could 
. ( 18) 
be resolved by development and social adjustment, in one particular sex. 
However, th e sex of rearing fails completely in the case of the transsexual, 
because in most instances, this individual has been reared in his anatomical 
sex which is of course in conflict with the desired sex role. 
VI THE HORMONAL BALANCE 
In the human body are glands which manufacture substances known as hormones. 
. ( 19) 
There are about thirty of them from eight ductless glands. Some hormones
can now be synthesised in the laboratory and even minute amounts are very 
(20)
powerful, 
18. Smith op cit 968. 
to the medical staff 
It is often the practice in hospitals - according
to whom I have spoken - for the doctor to ask the
mother of a new born hermaphrodite to choose the sex, in accordance with
her pr e.f eren ce •
19. John Garratt The Human Body (1972) 63.
20. DES (diethylstilbestrol) which is used in the 'morning after' pill, is
a potent synthetic oestrogen. For a time it was used commercially to
fatten cattle, but this practice is now forbidden by Government regulation
since the hormone was found to cause cancer in experimental animals when
administered in high doses: Curtis op cit 534.
8 
. ( 21 J
Hormones control birth, pregnancy, sexual activity, growth and metabolism. 
Most hormone manufacture is under the control of the pituitary gland, the 
anterior part of which influences other glands such as the adrenals, thyroid 
and sex glands, to manufacture and secrete hormones them.selves. The posterior 
lo be of the pit ui ta ry stores hormones which are produced in the part of the 
. ( 22) 
brain known as the hypothalamus. 
As an embryo develops, its genetic potential unfolds. In the human embryo, 
germ cells - those which will later give rise to egg or sperm - can be traced 
( 23) 
to a little cluster of cells in the endoderm of the yolk sac. If these 
cells are destroyed, no gametes are ever produced by the individual. It 
is hypothesised that the germ cells are set aside -so early in development 
in order to minimise the possibility of copying 'mistakes' which might occur 
during many cellular divisions, and so help to ensure that the genetic material 
. ( 24 l 
is passed on. Such minor mistakes might be of no consequence in somatic 
cells, but could be of major importance in a germ cell which must carry the 
genetic instructions for the whole organism. 
In humans, the influence. of genes determining sex is not seen in the embryo 
until about the fifth week of foetal life. During the first weeks, all embryos 
are morphologically identical. ( 
25
) The sex hormones control the development
f h d h d 
. . ( 26) h . . o t e sex organs an t e secon ary sex characteristics. T e principal 
male hormone is testosterone, produced, as previously stated, in the 
interstitial cells of the testes. Testosterone _ and other chemicals with 
testosterone-like effects are collectively known as androgens. Androgens 
produced in the male foetus are important in the development of the external 
genitalia. When· the human male is ten years old, renewed androgen production 
is associated w:ith the enlargement of the penis, testes and prostate gland, 
seminal vesicles and -·other accessory organs, as well as the development of 
. 11 1 - d ha · · ( 
27
)typica y ma e secon ary c racteristics. 
21. Garratt op cit 63.
22. Ibid,
23. Curtis op cit 572.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. For more details see later in this chapter.
27. Curtis op cit 527.
9 
The production of testosterone is 
hormone called Lutenising Hormone 
regulated by a gonadotrophic (stimulating) 
. (28)
( LH), produced by the pi tuatary gland. 
LH acts on the interstitial cells to stimulate the output of testosterone, 
which in turn inhibi ta the release of LB. This type of regulatory system 
involving this 'shut off' mechanism is known as negative feedback. However, 
human testosterone production has also been shown to fluctuate measurably 
. . l . l. ( 2
9)
in response to environmenta stimu 1. 
In the female, oogenesis is also under hormone control. Oestrogens are the 
female sex hormones and a variety of them - of · which estradiol is probably 
the most important - are produced by the ovarian follicles, under the 
stimulation of Follicle Stimulating Hormone {FSH). Both oestrogen and 
progesterone are required to produce the endometrium (thickened lining of 
(30)
the uterus) for t�� implantation of the embryo. 
The whole human body consists of different inter-relations of physiological 
fun.ctions. The neural and hormonal mechanisms of sexual behaviour are examples 
thereof. (J
l
) One aspect.· is the importance of male and female hormones in
the critical stage of growth in the brain. Tests have shown that when 
testoterone has been injected into pregnant animals to produce masculinised 
female offspring, these pseudo-hermaphrodites are most likely to exhibit 
male sexual characteristics as adults, even though they had a female chromosomal 
pattern. Similarly, .male rats, when castrated at birth - which cuts off 
testosterone supply are. feminised, and cannot be made to exhibit male 
behaviour, even with testosterone injections as adults. 
28. The pituitary's production of LH is controlled by the hypothalamus. Ibid.
29. Curtis op cit 524. Hormonal influence is a suggested cause of
transsexualism, vide chapter three infra.
30. Curtis op cit 534.
31. The following data are taken from a survey made by psychology students
at the University of Natal, Durban, in the late 1960's, in a collection
of unpublished articles. · Experiments with hormones, on animals is also
discussed in chapter three infra.
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It is therefore apparent that in the absence of testosterone, the brain 
develops with a dominant circuit for female behaviour, . and in the presence 
of testosterone at a critical stage in growth, dominant circuits for male 
. ( 32) 
behaviour are formed. Therefore the relationship of hormones in neural
(brain) growth is of vast importance for the future adult's sexual 
behaviour. ( 
33
)
According to John Money, male and female hormones are not equally significant 
in affecting the hypothalmic pathways that will subsequently influence certain 
aspects of sexual behaviour. Rather, he states, it is the presence or absence 
of androgens which is the most determinative. Until about the fifth week 
of conception, as has been mentioned above, the embryo does not begin to 
differentiate sexually. 
adrogenic hormones: 
Biological femaleness results from all absence of 
"In the particular context of neonatal (or prenatal) 
hormonal effects, the antithesis of androgen is not 
. ( 34)estrogen, but noth1ng.n 
During the fifth week of embryonic life, the germ cells migrate to the gonads. 
Animal experiments indicate that if the foetal gonads are removed in this 
critical developmental period, the infant will appear to be a normal female 
even if genetically male, and if the appropriate hormones are administered 
in adolescence, he/she will be a normal-appearing, (though sterile) female. <
35
)
In Money's opinion, adrogens regulate both the development of the external 
genitalia and certain forms of behaviour and intelligence. 
external organs are concerned, 
As  far as the 
32. These findings do to some extent, support both Money and Ramey's points
of view as regards causes of transsexualism (chapter three infra), although
each writer has interpreted them according to his and her sexual slant.
33. The extent to which hormones influence the sexual behaviour of vertebrates
varies along the psycho-genetic scale. In human beings, the goals of
sexual desire appear to be much more variably determined than merely
by hormones, due to the impact of cultural and sociological factors,
as well as the existence of a higher degree of psychological development.
34. J Money and A Erhardt Man and Woman, Boy and Girl 10, cited in J Raymond
The Transsexual Empire (1979) 51.
35. This supports Estelle Ramey' s hypothesis that all people are female, and
only when androgen is introduced do some become male.
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"Feminine differentiation requires only the absence of 
androgen. It does not require the presence of a feminising 
(36)
substance". 
If male hormones are administered to a genetically female foetus during early 
development, or even neonatally, the reproductive structures, including 
(37) genitalia, become masculinised. Mary Jane Sherfey points out that the
use of this one hormone for sexual differentiation in the embryo, was probably 
an evolutionary adaptation to intra-uterine life. In reptiles and birds 
the foetus is essentially masculine and foetal . oestrogens are required to 
produce the female pattern. If the mammalian embryo were sensitive to 
oestrogen however, all male embryos would be feminised by the oestrogens 
circulating in the mother's bloodstream during the long sojourn in the 
(38)
uterus. 
Money claims that the presence or absence of androgens, affects behaviour. 
The absence of androgen - either at the prenatal critical period, or other 
critical periods - results in a brain 'organised' to.produce so-called feminine 
. (39 l behaviour and response. Portions of the foetal brain affect not only
hormonal and reproductive functions, but also behaviour such as tomboyism. 
"The most likely hypothesis to explain the various features 
of toroboyism is fetally masculinised genetic females, 
in that their tomboyism is a sequel to a masculinisin9 
. ,.(40 leffect on the fetal brain. 
Whereas Money stresses the 'overriding effects of androgen' in prenatal sex 
determination, the androgen principle has been stated in a contrasting way. 
"For the little it is worth as a commentary on Adam's 
rib it is the female sex that is primal. The early embryo 
is female until the fifth or sixth week of fetal life. 
A testicular induction substance must be generated at 
this point, to suppress the growth of ovaries. No ovarian 
induction is requir�d for the female differentiation 
because all mammalian embryos of either genetic sex have 
. . f 1 ,.( 41) the innate capacity for ema eness. 
36, � note 34 supra. 
37. M.J Sherfey The Nature and Evolution of Female Sexuality (1973) cited
in Curtis op cit 527.
38. �-
39. Vide page nin� supra for the experiments done in this line.
40. Raymond op cit 108.
41. E Ramey Sex Hormones and Executive Abili t'i_ ( 1973) cited· in Raymond �
.£il. 58.
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Whichever way one views the problem - whether patriarchally or ferninistically -
one cannot escape the fact that every individual is an interaction of both 
male and female hormones, 
. . (42)
transsexualism. 
which is a logical suggested cause of 
Another important area of research - and especially pertinent to the question 
of transsexualism - is whether the male and female roles are reversible. 
Evidence suggests 
the other sex if 
that members of either sex 
treated . when young with the 
can perform the behaviour of 
(43) 
'opposite' hormones. It
has further been demonstrated that isolation or separation from the opposite 
sex has some effect on sexual behaviour. Thus, socialisation or interaction 
in a situation with members 0f the opposite sex during childhood has some 
effect on later sexual behaviour exhibited by the individual concerned. (
44
l
Furthermore, social restrictions affect male and female sexual behaviour, 
and in our society, ca use differentiation even though the hormonal state 
supposedly dictates the actions. 
nThe development of maleness is a complex and precarious 
process - a continuing struggle against the basic trend 
(45)towards femaleness". 
Science is now shedding a good deal of new light on how the male foetus's 
Y Chromosome affects maleness: until recently, no one knew exactly how the 
h f . . . 1 · . . (46) h Y c romosorne en orces its insistence on maacu inisation. Dr Step en
Wachtel <
47) has apparently found its chief 'deputy enforcer' - a Y-induced
histocompatibility antigen (H-Y) that appears to · occur on the surface of 
all male mammalia'n cells, and in fact, seems to be present in determining 
42. Vide chapter three infra.
43. This obviously brings into question the role of 
and if· one has artificial aids - as are supplied
it is submitted that one has not changed sex if
are administered.
each sex in marriage, 
by corrective surgery -
the requisite hormones 
44. Further discussio·n on this point will be found in chapter three infra.
45. Ralph E. Peterson cited in D. Leff 'Genes, Gender and Genital Reversal'
(1977) 18 Medical World News 45.
46. Leff op cit 46.
47. Of New York City's Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Centre.
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h h b h 1 (48) sex t roug out the verte rate p y a. Dr Wachtel claims that the mission 
of H-Y during embryogenesis, 
" .•• seems to be directing the indifferent gonad to develop 
. (49)towards the hetero-garnete sex - in mammals, the male." 
He suggests, that from the cell surface, it acts as a 'cell recognition signal' 
which causes the bi-potential gonad to turn into testes, thus launching the 
f · · 1 · ' ( 
50
) · 11 ( 
51
) 11 h . " h 1 ' t process o viri 1sat1on. Dr J Mi er ca s t e antigen, t e u tima e
determinant of maleness". 
{52)
"If H-Y antigen is really the long-sought product of 
mammalian testis-determining gene, then its expression 
on the cell surface should always be associated. with 
the formation of at least, rudimentary testes, regardless . 
( 53)of phenotype or apparent karyotypen . 
Thus, if a woman's blood tests indicate that she has H-Y antigen, she must 
be presumed to harbour cryptic testicular tissue, despite her XX karyotype 
48. Leff op cit 46. Dr Wachtel' s discovery of the sexuality strategic H­
y antigen was initiated by . the need to explain male-female tissue graft
rejections in genetically uniform strains of mice. The female-male skin
grafts on the other hand,· were successful. Scientists reasoned that
the only possible histo-incompatibility resided in their oppositeness
of sex. The females were literally allergic to some cell-surface factor
inherent in maleness. Hence, the factor must be related to the Y
chromosome since this was the only thing they did not share.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid,
51. Of Columbia University.
52. Cited in Leff op cit 46. The 'new' antigen has already been put to work
clinically to hel.p decide in which direction ambiguous genital4"a should
be modified. It can al.so help to determine whether· laparotomy should
be performed to remove cryptic testicular tissue that may be carcinogenic.
53. Dr Wachtel, speaking at a symposium on 'The Genetic Mechanisms of Sexual 
Development', in Albany New York State, cited in Leff op cit 46. 
d l f 1 
. l . ( 54)an norma erna e genita ia. 
In California, Susumu Ohno
(55> 
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has apparently supported Dr Wachtel' s 
. ( 56) 
hypothesis. M,eanwhile, Wachtel 's group has adduced evidence lately that
the testis-inducing gene really does reside on the Y chromosome. They showed 
that in XYY men, the double dose of Y chrornosonie is matched by an extra amount 
of H-Y antigen in the cells. (
57
>
54. Wachtel found support for his hypothesis in the wood lemming, a
Scandanavian - rodent. The female of the species is almost as likely to
carry an XY karyotype as an xx. Despite this chromosomal masculinity,
XY female lemmings are anatomically quite female and fertile. Wachtel
found further that their Y-linked maleness gene yields no H-Y antigen,
presllJllably because_ of some other gene - probably a mutation on the X
chromosome effectively switching off · the Y, thus preserving the XY
females from development of testicular tissue in utero. Dr Wachtel
suggests further that a similar X-linked mutation perhaps explains some
forms of gonadal dysgenesis in human females with an anomalous Y
chromosome. Similarly, in a rare variant of Klinefetter's syndrome,
there are human anatomical males with two X chromosomes and no apparent
Y chromosome, who test positively for H-Y antigen. It is presumed that
they have at least a fragment of the missing Y, translocated to some
other chromosome from which it activates the creation of testicular tissue
during gestation. This all goes as evidence to show how fallible the
chromosome test for sex is, and that it should never be used on its own.
55. A cystogeneticist at the City of Hope Medical Centre, Pasadena. 
56. Dr Ohno smashes, .separates• and interrupts the growth of . the testes of
new born mice. In vitro the cells re-aggregate to form testicular tubules.
But when he blocks the H-Y antigen by adding specific antiserum to the
culture, the cells grow into ovarian follicular aggregates instead : Leff
op cit 46.
57. Ibid.
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The clinical test of the H-Y antigen was first tried in 1976 when Dr New ( 
58
)
told Wachtel of a two-year old patient with the ambiguious genitalia, including 
an elongated clitori�, but an apparently normal female karyotype. This child's 
endocrine responses implied that she harboured cryptic testicular tissue, 
although she was being reared as a girl. Her white blood cells tested 
positively for H-Y antigen and surgical exploration after 26 months confirmed 
the suspected diagnosis of true Hermaphroditism. 
left, co-existing with an ova-testis on the right. 
She had an ovary on the 
Even after the removal 
of all the testicular tissue, she continued to test positive for H-Y antigen 
showing the gene to be present in at least some of her somatic cells. (
59
)
Dr Miller holds that the H-Y antigen test is a better index of the male­
determining gene function, than the presence of the Y chromosome itself. As 
the tiniest chromosome in the karyotype, a Y can easily be overlooked, 
(60)
especially if translocated to another chromosome. 
VII SECONDARY SEX CHARACTERISTICS 
These are the hormone-induced external features peculiar to either males 
or females. In the male, they include an enlarged pharynx �nd a corresponding 
deepening of the voice; muscle development;· larger skeletal size and facial 
. (61) 
hair growth. In the female, the secondary characteristics include stimulated 
breast development; growth of pubic hair and the distribution of adipose. 
58. A Cornell paediatrician.
59. Leff op cit 47.
60. Vide chapter two infra for the many variations on chromosomal pattern,
thereby refuting the supposed dichotomy of XX female and XY male.
61. In animals other than man, androgens are responsible for the lion's mane,
the powerful musculature and fiery disposition of the stallion, the cock's
comb and spurs, and a variety of behavioural patterns and various forms
of aggression. Since almost the beginning of organised agriculture,
domestic animals have been castrated in order to · make them fatter, or
more manageable, or both. As recently as the eighteenth century, selected
boys were castrated before puberty in order to retain the purity of their
soprano voices for Church and opera choirs. As a consequence of these
early practices, the effects of testosterone - . or the lack thereof -
were the first·. hormonal influences to be recognised and studied : Curtis
op cit 527.
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VIII THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SEX OR ASSUMED SEX ROLE 
This is the remaining determinant for sex considered medically relevant. 
Psychologists will rate as important, the role a person plays or seeks .to 
play, and the image a person has as regards his sexual identity. Thus, they 
urge that sexuality is a combination. of sex and gender. They . point to the 
existence of abnormal psychological conditions which demonstrate themselves 
to be ambivalent, to a greater or lesser extent, to the biological sex. The 
t t f th h 1 . 1 1 . .· 1 
. ( 6 2 )mos ex reme o ese psyc o ogLca anoma ies 1s transsexua ism. 
A court of law is likely to shy away from such a standard as it is necessarily 
subjective. 
and humane. 
This test is however appealing, because it is at once practical 
In the case of the transsexual, the test gives recognition to 
his personal belief, which is usually not substantiated by any of the other 
t t { 63) es s. 
IX SUMMARY 
Any, or all of the above tests could be used to test the sex of the average 
'normal' person and for �he 'normal' person they would all be in accord. But, 
as each of these tests is based on only one criterion, they are by themselves, 
inadequate for cases of anomaly. As has been seen, the chromosomal test 
can be fatal if used on its own as there are so many variants of the normal 
karyotype. Similarly, .the character of the gonads is largely irrelevant 
as a determinant of sex in the social context. Even though the test of 
genitalia is used as· the social sex determinant at birth, it too has proved 
inadequate in the case of abnormality or ambiguity. As regards the hormonal 
test it would appear that by artificial induction, the nature of biological 
characteristics can be altered. so this does not appear to be a very accurate 
gauge of sex. As far as the secondary characteristics go, -they are usually 
in agreement with chromosomal, gonadal and genital tactors but still would 
be fallible if used on their own. Thus, the tests are, by themselves not 
conclusive in determining sex in cases of anomaly and therefore all factors 
cannot be required to coincide for a legally accepted test. A simple majority 
thereof, is also inadequate because it presupposes that all the factors are 
of equal importance and as the chromosomai anomalies have indicated, this 
cannot be the case. 
62. I McColl Kennedy 'Transsexualism and Single Sex Marriage' { 1973) Anglo­
American Law Review 112.
63. Vide Chapter three infra for more details on transsexualism.
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One work purports to establish a system for the legal determination of sex. (
64
>
Simpson categorises the secondary characteristics of sex as 'presumptive 
evidence', while external characteristics such as genitalia are said to be 
'highly probable evidence' . Chromosomal sex and gonadal sex are considered 
to be 'certain evidence' ·of an individual's sex. Such a system is clearly 
unacceptable in the light of current medical knowledge. 
It has also been stated that: 
"It is clear ••• that sexual differentiation is a relative 
rather than an absolute matter and as any classification 
of mankind for legal purposes into but two sexual 
categories must therefore be a purely arbitrary 
classification, it seems to follow that any attempt to 
define sex for legal purposes must take into account 
_the specific purpose for which the classification is 
required, for it does not follow that what is a suitable 
criterion for one 
. bl 
" (65)
suita e ••• • 
purpose, will necessarily be 
This ad hoc app�oach is, to this author, untenable. Not only is it illogical, 
but such a schizophrenic legal treatment can only have a detrimental effect 
on those individuals already plagued with instability and uncertainty. 
Consistent legal recognition of sex is imperative in order at least, to 
facilitate treatment of such individuals but this has not been forthcoming, 
in South Africa at least. 
'66)
There is a growing body of opinion that the more important criterion is 
psychological orientation, especially where this is the dominant factor,(
671
an hypothesis with which this author concurs. 
64, I Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence { 12th ed. 
Simpson 1965) cited in Smith op cit 969. 
65, Bartholemew op cit 89, 
66. Vide _chapter six infra.
67. S A Strauss
International
'Strauss (5)') 
'Transsexualism 
Law Journal of 
348. 
and the Law' 
South Africa 
(1970) 3 Comparative and 
{ he re inaf ter ref erred to as 
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The author believes that the psychological orientation should have precedence 
for a number of reasons: 
1. 
(68)
that the mind is innately superior to, and master of the body; 
2. that with nor:mal peopie the psychological sex will be congruent with
the other anatomical features, thereby presenting no problem as regards
determination on a. psychological basis, and with the true transsexual
and those belonging to the category of 'intersex', the psychologic�l
factor is the desired sex and the one with which the individual identifies
and with which he feels most comfortable. Furthermore, the fact that
he is going to live in that particular sex role should afford him the
benefit of deciding what.is best for himself� and
3. That the operation which is now performed throughout the world and is
. (69) 
by and large, considered therapeutic, is performed solely on the
psychological choice of the transsexual, and by virtue of this fact,
the psychological criterion is in essence, accorded the greatest status
of all the tests. Common sense therefore dictates a recognition of a
psycho-social criterion, at least after surgical intervention.
"As judges pride themselves on common sense above all 
things, I do not think that it is impossible that this 
situation could not be provided for in terms of case 
law... if the doctor certifies that this ,_(sex) change 
has taken place , it should be recognised as a matter 
f 1 .,(70) o aw. 
68. Romans I, 7-14.
69. Vide chapter five infra.
70. R Green cited in Smith op cit 971.
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CHAPTER II 
CLASSIFICATION OF SEX TYPES EXCLUDING TRANSSEXUALISM 
I INTRODUCTION 
"O ! Mankind, 
Have in thy mind 
My passion smart, 
And thou shalt find 
Me full kind -
Lo! Here is my heart." (fifteenth century anonymous lyric). 
In the preceding chapter, the tests for sex determination were discussed. 
This chapter will now deal with those sex types that do not conform to the 
rigid norm of maleness and femaleness, and for which the sex tests are 
ambiguous, to say the least. 
The dichotomy of male and female is not absolute: in fact there is a spectrum 
of sexuality ranging from predominantly male to predominantly female. One 
commentator explains that 
"it can well be said that actually we are all 'intersexes' 
anatomically as well as endocrinologically. But we are 
male or female in the anatomical or endocrinological 
sense according 
(1)
hormones." 
to the predominant structures or 
Generally, individuals do fall easily within a male or female sex pattern 
and are· so classified. Some individuals, although basically in the range 
of normal types, exhibit characteristics which take them beyond the normal 
range in one way or 
at the meiotic stage, 
another. From time to time, usually due to mistakes 
(2) 
homologues may not separate. In this case, one
of the sex cells has one too many chromosomes and the other has one too few. 
Th. h ' k d . t . ( 
3 
) Th 11 ' th t f 1.s p enomenon 1.s nown as non ysJunc 1.on. e ce wi one oo ew
autosomes cannot produce a viable embryo, but the one with one too many, 
sometimes can. 
1. Dr Harry Benjamin cited in W Scott Cole 'Transsexuals in Search of Legal
Acceptance: The Cons ti tutionali ty of the Chromosome Test' ( 1978) 15 San
Diego Law Review 331 at 338.
2. Curtis op cit 221.
3. Ibid.
The result 
b d (4) o y. 
is an individual with one 
Nondysjunction may also 
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extra chromosome in 
produce individuals 
every cell of his 
with extra sex 
chromosomes. The XY combination in the 23rd pair is associated with maleness, 
but so are the combinations of XXY, XXXY and even XXXXY. These males are 
usually sexually underdeveloped and sterile. So too, other than the XX pattern 
for females, one may get XXX which sometimes produces normal females, but 
many of the XXX females and all of the XO females are sterile. 
II VARIATIONS OF NORMAL TYPES 
a. Xlinefetter's Syndrome (XXY)
This individual is a sterile male having 47 chromosomes instead of the usual
46, and thus an XXY pattern instead of the normal XY male pattern. The Y
chromosome produces testes and testosterone but the second X chromosome may
cause some breast• development and a feminised body form. Dr Betty Steiner
of the Clark Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto, is of the opinion that those
people with Klinefetter's syndrome commonly exhibit such gender identity
bl 1. d . . ( 5)pro ems as transsexua ism an bisexual1ty. 
b, Supermale syndrome (XYi') 
The individuals here are males who again have 47 chromosomes but the extra 
one this time is another Y, thus giving the Xi'Y pattern. Once referred to 
as 'supermales' · these people are taller than average and exhibit all male 
physical criteria. The major factor which sets them apart from normal males 
is the apparent psycho-personality disorders which are present. These males 
are usually mentally retarded and extremely aggressive, which behaviour is 
impulsive and uncontrolled, and often results in criminal convictions and 
imprisonment. It has been discovered that white males with the extra Y 
chromosome are found. in a ·higher percentage in institutions for the mentally 
(6)
disturbed or criminally· insane, than among males studied at random. 
4. Ibid. The presence of. the additional chromosome often produces wide­
spread abnormalities. Among those who survive, many are mentally
deficient. In fact, studies of abnormalities in human chromosome numbers
among living subjects are usually carried out on patients in mental
hospitals. These patients often have abnormalities of the heart and
other organs as well, for example, Down's Syndrome.
5, Hawley op cit 124. 
6, Curtis op cit 223. 
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They are also generally loners, and may have homosexual or bisexual tendencies. 
It is estimated that about 1 in every 1 000 males is XYY. (
7
) The psychological
problems associated with this problem appear to be capable of reversal by 
( 8)
psychiatric treatment. 
c. Turner's Syndrome (XO)
This person is a sterile female lacking a chromosome and thus exhibiting
an XO pattern instead of the normal XX. Because of the absence of one of
the sex chromosomes, the ovaries fail to develop, no menstruation occurs
and usually no secondary sex characteristics develop. Other congenital
abnormalities are o£ten present, including small stature, malformation of
fingers and toes, heart disease and a webbed (short, thick) neck. Cyclic
doses of oestrogen can be administered to produce the development of secondary
h 
. . (9)
sex c aracteristics. 
d. Metafernale (XXX)
Here we have a female with an extra X chromosome causing her pattern to read
xxx.·(
l
OJ As with their male counterparts, these individuals were once referred
to as 'superfemales' but this term has now been rejected for the more
appropriate one of 'metafemale'. Such women exhibit characteristics such
as infantile genitalia, a ceasing of the menstrual . cycle at an early age,
underdeveloped breasts and below normal intelligence. 
to be rare. 
(ll)
7. Ibid.
8. Hawley op cit 124.
9. Ibid.
This condition appears
10. R Green and J Money TranssexuaJ.ism and Reassignment Surgery (eds 1969)
487. 
11, Ibid. 
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e. Sexual Precocity
This is the phenomenon of complete sexual growth and development in children.
The etiology reznains unknown, but the condition may be caused by hereditary
(12) 
factors, brain tumors, or tumors of the gonads. Girls under nine - and
often as early as four - have early breast development, pubic hair and mature
external genitalia, and may even have menstrual cycles. Boys under the age
of ten, undergo rapid bodily growth, develop pubic and facial hair, adult
external genitalia, a deepening of the voice, the possible presence of acne
and the occurence of. erections and nocturnal emissions. 
not be the production of sperm.
There may or may
Both boys and girls with such early sexual development, mature into normal 
adults. The only problem with this condit;i.on appears to be the social one 
associated with having a young child who seems to be a fully sexual adult. (
l3
)
f. Eunochoidism
This condition occurs in both males and females and results when individuals
fail to develop sexually at puberty. One. frequent cause of this, is the
failure of the pituitary gland to produce gonadtrophic hormones, and the
second cause, is the failure of the gonads themselves, to function normally,
Affected males usually have a very small penis, and marked growth in their
1 h. ' f f . ' ' (
l
4) ong bones, w 1.ch results 1.n a arm o g1.gant1.c1.sm. Affected females
have an infantile vagina and uterus, lack other sex characteristics and are
taller than average. Endocrine treatment can cause such individuals to develop
(15)
according to a normal pattern.
III SEXUAL ANOMALIES 
Sir Roger Ormrod has compiled a chart setting out the relationship between 
h 
. 
1 1 · (l
6
) h" h ' d h f 11 ' t e various sexua anoma ies, w 1.c is represente on t e o owing page,
12. Hawley op cit 124.
13. Ibid.
14. Hawley op cit 125.
15. Ibid.
16. R Ormrod 'Medico-legal Aspects of Sex Determination' (1972) Medical Legal
Journal 78.
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SEXUAL ANOMALIES 
ANATOMICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MASCULINIZED FEMALE HERMAPHRODITE 
TRANSVESTITES 
FEMINIZED .MALE 
TRANSSEXUALS 
TESTICULAR FEMINIZATION TESTICULAR FAILURE 
Thus, there are two types of sexual anomaly the anatomical and the 
psychological. The former can be discerned by an examination of the person, 
who may display any number of sexual characteristics normally associated 
with either male or female. 
The psychological anomalies usually cannot be determined by any physical 
tests, but are based on the belief or desire of the individual. ( 
17
) It is
important to note that this classification does not include homosexuals, 
the reason being that homosexuality is not based on a physical or mental 
'mix up' in the person's gender identity, but ie rather based on a sexual 
(18)
preference for a sex partner of the same sex. 
A. Anatomical Anomalies
These then are physical variations in an individual's body which exhibit
some characteristics of both male and female, to some degree. These can
. (19) 
be caused by various hormonal or genetic influences and result in a number
of recognised conditions that fill the spectrum between normal males and
{20)
females.
17. Ibid.
18. This phenomenon will be dealt with in greater detail at the close of
this dlapter.
19. Vide chapter one supra.
20. Hawley op cit 127.
24 
A(a) Hermaphroditism 
An hermaphrodite is a person born with the sexual organs of both sexes, one 
of which is usually predominant. The hermaphrodite has been known since 
the earliest times as a person who has some of the sexual characteristics 
of both sexes. As was cited in Corbett v Corbett, in all cases of intersex 
or hermaphroditism, there is a discrepancy between the first three sex 
d . ( 
22
) H hr d. . ' h f eterminants. ermap o itism is t ere ore a
" •.• congenital condition of ambiguity of the reproductive 
structures so that the sex of the individual is not clearly 
defined as exclusively male or exclusively female ... ". <
23
>
True herrnaphrodi tes are generally considered as persons who are chromosomal 
mosaics, having both XX and XY cells, thus, both testicular and ovarian tissue 
(24) 
is present. Al though herrnaphrodi tism is rare, it is not a condition
which manifests itself in exactly the same way in each affected individual. 
A vagina may or may not be present and this feature is sometimes used to 
assign the person to the female sex. Other individuals are orientated as 
females during early childhood but at puberty, when changes in the testicular 
element produce more androgen, a masculinising effect results. This may 
be the first recognisable sign of the condition and may lead to problems 
[25)
in sex role assignment, and the subsequent necessity for treatment. 
22. Viz: chromosomal, gonadal and genital. For more details of this case, 
vide chapter eight infra. 
23. Green and Money op cit 487.
24. Hawley op cit 127.
25. Smith op cit 970 note 40. This raises the interesting question of the
age at which an hermaphrodite should be allowed to select his/her own
sex. It is' reasonable that the age of puberty should be chosen and in
such a case, court approval might be sought before corrective surgery
is undertaken. Whichever age is finally selected does not detract from
the fact that people with sex ambiguities should be entitled to make
the personal choice. In facilitating this, it is submitted by this author,
that a birth certificate should be a temporary document, subject to later
alteration if necessary.
25 
A(b) Mascu linised Females 
These are victims of 
1, . t
. . , ( 26)
mascu 1n1sa ion . 
normal female gonads, 
to excessive amounts 
what is known as 'adrenogeni tal 
They are chromosornally normal 
syndrome' or 'adrenal 
XX females and have 
This condition is caused when a female foetus is exposed 
{27) 
of testosterone produced by tumors in the mother 
or the foetus, or possibly due to inappropriate medication during pregnancy, 
The result is the masculinisation of the external genitalia causing a large 
clitoris to develop which has the appearance of a penis, and in fused labia 
which appear to be an empty scrotum. These changes naturally lead to a wrong 
sex assignment at birth. ( 
28
) Such children are then usually raised as boys
and their true sex may only be discovered when menstruation occurs at puberty, 
but some individuals may never discover their true sex and may simply regard 
themselves as sterile males because of the absence of testes. 
These individuals are then medically female, and effective treatment is 
available. Adrenal suppression will result from steroid therapy and surgery 
will remove traces of maleness by reconstructing the perineum and then 
constructing a vaginal opening. Such correction is effective in children 
(29) 
but may produce psychological and legal problems, if performed on adults. 
26. Hawley op cit 127.
27. Vide chapter one supra and chapter three infra for the suggested effects
of hormones as a cause of transsexualism.·
2B. Vide this author's comment in note 25 supra. 
29. Rawley op cit 127. Thus, in these cases the sex o f  rearing is ignored,
and precedence is ·given to the medical sex. It is submitted that this
is all very well in those instances in which the child manifests feminine
traits and is therefore considered to be transsexual in nature, but as
the issue of the etiology of sexual identity confusion is by no means
clear cut and a person may identify more fully with the role in which
he/she is reared, it would be fatal to proceed to change him/her into
the medical female he/she has proved to be. Be that as it may, it is
submitted that until definite evidence is found, to prove that
transsexualism is simply a mental delusion and there are no other
biological and/or environmental causes, it would seem applicable to regard
the corrective surgery in the case of masculinised females as the same
as that demanded by a transsexual, and, it is submitted further, since
the one has legal effect, why not the other?
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A(c) Feminised Males 
There are two types of feminised males, both types being chromosomally and 
gonadally males: 
1. testicular feminisation - this is also known as androgen insensitivity.
,. 
Here a person is born with the conventional XY male karyotype, but the cells
of the body do not respond to androgen and the embryo develops as an apparent
female. The· Y chromosome causes the development of testicular tissue, but
the testes remain in the abdomen. This is the only. masculine result of the
Y chromosome. These individuals do not develop male genitalia, nor do they
develop any male secondary sex characteristics. Instead, they appear to 
be female, with some breast development, female-type genitalia - which
include a somewhat shortened vagina and in some cases, an infantile uterus,
but they do not menstruate as there are no ovaries present. The cells, also
respond to oestrogen which - al though produced in everyone to some extent -
is ordinarily associated with females. Some of these individuals are capable
of sexual 
themselves 
intercourse as women and are usually raised as women and believe
to be women. 
(30) 
There is no known remedy for this condition,
but it does not appear to lead to problems, since the individual is classified
at birth in the female role and usually no question is posed as regards 'his'
. 
h . 'h. ' . . d h · 11 ( 
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)sex, since t e signs of 1s true masculinity o not appear p ys1ca y. 
2. testicular failure - this syndrome is similar to testicular feminisation
except that evidence of masculinity may appear at puberty. This may lead
to a re-classification of sex, at that time, depending upon the role which
the individual has assumed and wishes to retain and the degree of
masculinisation or feminisation exhibited. <
32
>
30. D Federman Abnormal ·Sexual Development (1967) 105, cited in Scott Cole
op cit 355. It is submitted that this is a clear case evidencing the
fact that the chromosomal pattern of a person should not be accorded
the importance, which some courts of law have seen fit to do.
Furthermore it is submitted, that the fact that a supposed male can live
successfully as a female, substantiates the sound theory involving the
principle of yin and yang: the dual sexuality of every human being, which
renders the phenomenon of transsexualism a natural-type occurence.
31. Hawley op cit' 127.
32. Hawley op cit 128. It is submitted
classification in such- instances,
be available to the transsexual
especially since the .ultimate result
that if one is permitted tardy re­
then such re-classification should 
with all its attendant legalities, 
is usually a happier individual. 
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B. Psychological Anomalies
Psychological sexual anomalies are those conditions under which a person
has a mental image of himself which conflicts - to a greater or lesser degree -
with his physiological sex. The etiologies of these anomalies are largely
unknown, but some authors attribute them to genetics, hormones or the
. . h 1 , . b
" . (33)
envirorunent, eit er separate y, or in varying com inations. 
B(a) Transvestitism 
The transvestite is one who experiences psychological relief and sexual arousal 
. (34} from cross-dressing. The term 'transvestite' actually means dressing 
as the opposite sex, and covers inter alia transsexuals, some homosexuals, 
costume fetishists, female impersonation entertainers, deviant prostitutes 
and certain psychotics who suffer from delusions. (
35
)
Transvestites are nearly - if not always - men. The phenomenon is apparently 
very rare in females. The aberration is intermittent in character, and it 
is not accompanied by the corresponding urge to live or pass as a member 
of the opposite sex at all times. Transvestite males are usually heterosexual, 
often married and have no wish to cease playing the male role in sexual 
, . ( 36) 
activity. 
nMost of. the male transvestites live more or less normal 
masculine lives, many . are married and have children and 
indulge in cross-dressing only occasionally. They have 
no wish ,to become female, and are anxious to retain their 
roasculini ty, but they retain an intense excitement from 
wearing full -female clothing and going about in public 
dressed as women. The condition is not by any means 
closely associated with homosexulaity, as is clearly 
demonstrated by those who lead apparently normal or fairly 
normal heterosexual livesn . ()
7
)
33. Hawley op cit 12�-c�apter three infra.
34. H Benjamin and c Ihlenfeld 'Transsexualism' (1973) 73 American Journal 
of Nursing 453. 
35. J Taitz 'The Legal Consequences of a Sex Change' (1980) 97 South African
Law Journal 66,
36. Hawley op cit 127, Dr Benjamin (The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966) 29)
has stated that "transvestites with their more or less pronounced gender
indecision may actually all be transsexuals in varying degrees of
intensity".
37. Ormrod op cit 78.
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This condition generally does not lead to the knowledge or involvement of 
any persons outside the individual's family, except by accidental discovery 
when the individual is 'picked up' by a stranger or the police. <
39
>
B(b) Transsexualism 
This phenomenon will be discussed at great length in the following chapter. 
IV HOMOSEXUALITY 
In closing this chapter on sexual anomalies and variants of the normal sex 
types, a word about homosexuality is in order. The homosexual has no gender 
identity conflict, but is simply psycho-sexually attracted to another person 
. ( 39) 
of his/her own sex. As many as 1 in 10 people are homosexual, according
( 40) 
to the most recent study. 'I.WO main factors regarding homosexuality are:
i) that whatever the incidence, it remains a minority preference; and
l.·1.·) 't . . . .  d d d d b  h · ·t (
4l
)1. 1.s cr1.t1.c1. se an con emne y t e maJori y. 
"From a religious viewpoint it is -regarded as sinful 
and unnatural� •• and from a socio-legal stance it is 
. (42)
legislated against - in males". 
The classic familial constellation reported for the male homosexual, includes 
a close-binding, intimate mother and a hostile, detached father. ( 
43 
l More
than four fifths of the fathers of the group studied were either physically 
or at least psychologically absent from the home, and in addition, they rarely 
took measures to protect their sons from the influences of a seductive, overly-
(44)
close mother. 
38. Ibid.
39. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 454.
40. Statistics supplied by Mrs L Woolfson (psychologist), The Natal Witness
17 August 1978 at 3.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid. Mrs Woolf son points out that the laws of moat countries ignore
the fact of female homosexuality : only four countries legislate against
lesbianism - Austria, Greece, Switzerland and Finland. In South Africa,
it is common knowledge that males can be charged under the Immorality
� f,or homosexual activity.
43. Bieber et al Homosexuality : A Psychoanalytic Study ( 196 2) cited in G A
Rekers 'Family Correlates of Male Childhood Gender Disturbances' ( 1983)
142 Journal of Genetic Psychology 31 at· 33, This has a·lso· been proffered
as a cause of transsexualism; chapter three infra.
44. Ibid.
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Characteristics of a father that foster normal psycho-sexual adjustment -
nurturance, affection,. active involvement in the family, dominance - are 
notably lacking in the 
described · by their sons 
fathers of homosexuals. These fathers have been 
. (45) 
as "indifferent and uninvolved". Only 13% of
homosexuals, compared with 66% of the heterosexual control group, identified 
. h h . f h 
( 46)
wit t eir at ers. 
Recently there has been a controversial study in the United States which 
disputes the 'hostile father domineering mother' etiology of 
. ( 47) 
homosexuality. After interviewing 979 homosexuals, the Kinsey Institute 
for sex research at Indiana University, has revealed that homosexuality may 
be determined at birth, by biology. The study rejected the belief that 
homosexuality was generally caused by some early influence - that of a weak 
father, seductive mother or traumatic 
. (48 l 
sexual experience. · It maintained 
that homosexuality was usually, although not always, a deep-rooted trait, 
present from infancy, and that it may well be biological and the result of 
. ( 49) 
hormone malfunction. Two years prior to this research, the renowned sex
research team of Masters and Johnson studied 300 homosexual men and women. 
(50)
Their findings were completely at odds with the Kinsey study. Masters 
and Johnson found that homosexuality was neither an illness nor a biochemical 
disorder but rather, a 'learned behaviour' that 2 • out of 3 homosexuals could 
unlearn. (
5l) They estimated that there were as many as 21 million homosexuals
in the United States alone, and that 1 man in every 3 and 1 woman in every 
. · ( 52)
5, had at some time had a homosexual experience. 
45. Soghir and Robins Male and Female Homosexuality
Investigation (1973), cited in Rekers op cit 33.
46. Ibid.
A Comprehensive 
47, The Daily News 25 September 1981 'They don't choose to be homosexual'.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. This still appears to be the more accepted theory, but the mere
fact that these two theories are so divergent, is evidence ·of the
difficulty in defining and classifying sexual identity disorders.
52. Ibid.
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CHAPTER I I I 
TRANSSEXUALIS8 AND ITS POSSIBLE CAUSES 
I INTRODUCTION 
As we 
"Every night and every morn 
some to misery are born 
Every morn and every night 
some are born to sweet delight -
Some are born to sweet delight 
Some are born to endless night." (W Blake 'Auguries of Innocence') 
"It is a fine thing to be independent in life, and a 
proud sensation to know yourself unique: but a person 
who stands all on his own, utterly detached from his 
fellows, may come to feel that reality itself is an 
illusion - just as the poor convicts of the nineteenth 
century silence system, so isolated from their ·comrades 
that they were never allowed to see or hear another soul 
fer years at a time, sometimes lost all grasp of their 
own existences 
( 1} 
thernsel ves ". 
( 2) 
have seen, every 
and became 
newly-born child 
non-persons even to 
is usually classified at birth 
in one of the two sexes. Because most people's sex criteria are in harmony, 
it is difficult for the layman to empathise with, and understand the 
transsexual's dilemma; at best, the idea of a biologically sound male/female 
being tortured by the belief that he/she is a member of the opposite sex, 
is a paradox. Although this problem has been classified only recently, it 
. f 1 . (Jl1s o course no nave issue. 
1. J Morris Conundrum (1974) 41.
2. Vide chapter one supra.
3. The term transsexualism has taken only 30 odd years to become a household
word. It was coined as a medical term by Dr Cauldwell who used it to
classify a girl whom he described as obssessively wanting to be a bey.
He called her condition psychooathia transsexualis. Before the publication
of the famed Christine Jorgensen case in 1953, most people had never
heard of the word, let alone the condition which it signified : Raymond
op cit 20.
Transsexualism 
d ·t· (4) con 1 ion. 
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or 'gender dysphoria 
It has been described as 
syndrome' is a rare, psychological 
II a passionate, lifelong conviction that one's psycho-
gender that indefinable feeling of maleness or 
femaleness-is opposite to one's anatomical sex n . (S) 
Transsexualism is also known as 'gender identity disorder' and 'cross-gender 
identity' and al though an outsider regards it as a psychological problem, 
the sufferer himself, views it as a physical problem. In this condition 
a male individual for example, feels that he is truly female and is t rapped 
by some accident of nature, in a male's body. The condition also affects 
women, who feel that they are really men in women's bodies, but statistically 
these are fewer. (
6
) Several hypotheses are advanced for this:
(7) 
l. that the greater publicity· given to male 'sex chsnges' has influenced
more males to undergo the surgery;
2. that society affords the female more latitude for cross-sexed expression,
masculinised clothing, male hobbies, etcetera are by and large not frowned
upon when evidenced in females, therefore there is less social alienation.
One author is of the opinion that one must blame the patriarchal society
we live in, wherein men are supposed to be 'macho ' and not exhibit any
feminine tendencies, thereby denying an integral part of their make up
and furthermore, as females are regarded with condescension, they try
1 h . 1. 
( 7a)
to emu ate t eir mascu ine counterparts. 
3. that possibly the male-female surgery is easier and more practicable1
and
4, This is the general medical consensus although a biological etiology 
has been hypothesised as is discussed later on in this chapter. 
5. Tait2 op cit 65.
6. Green and Money op cit 267.
7. Ibid.
7a Raymond op cit 25. 
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4. that it may be that transsexualism is a phenomenon which simply occurs
f 1 . 1 (8)more requent y in ma es. 
8. The number of transsexuals is not insignificant. One estimate is that
there are 10 000 in the United States alone, including ·both pre-operative
and post-operative transsexuals: Wall Street Journal 28 January 1977
at 1. There are about three to four times more male transsexuals than
female transsexuals. Money suggests that this preponderance also reflects
the fact· that men are more vulnerable to 'psycho-sexual disorders I than
women, Raymond op cit xvi offers her own solution. She suggests that
the male recognises the power that a woman has by virtue of 'human biology'
or 'birthing' and that transsexualism may be one way by which man attempts
to possess the female's 'creative abilities'. In further support, she
adds that transsexualism offers a unique perspective on sex-role
stereotyping in a patriarchal society. The gender identity clinics at
which transsexuals are counselled, reinforce this stereotypical behaviour.
To some extent, this author concurs, as it is believed that society
encourages sexual confusion by its too-rigid classification of 'male'
and 'female' on the all too vulnerable visual test at birth. It is
interesting to note the analysis of the male-female transsexual phenomenon
given by Ralph Greenson in an address to the American Medical Association
( cited in Raymond op cit 2 9 ) and which brings to mind the sen ti men ts
expressed by the Argentinian judge in the case of Dr Ricardo San Martin
123 La Ley 605 (CN Crim y Carree Argen 1966), discussed in greater detail
in chapter eight infra). Greenson states that "it is horrifying - a
danger to the human race - our only hope is that basic instincts will
eventually win out... Men have contempt for women only on the surface.
Underneath is a repressed envy ••• A man is never quite sure he is a man.
He has to prove it over and over again.n This author finds it incredible
that educated and supposedly intelligent people can regard transsexualism
as a threat to the continuance of the human race. Even though there
are large numbers of transsexuals, there is of course an even greater
number of pe.ople who are perfectly satisfied with their sex. It is
submitted that_ it is highly unlikely that our existence is in jeopardy
due to the transsexual. It is submitted further that the above views
of both Raymond and Greenson reflect a dogged, feminist outlook and
although interesting, are not of any great importance. for the purpose
of this work.
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The typical transsexual is morphologically and physiologically normal. However, 
he harbours - with constant and persistent conviction - the desire to become 
a member of the opposite gender, and he progressively takes steps to become, 
and live in society, as a member of that sex. Transsexuals may in fact live 
their lives in the chosen gender, and this is often done quite successfully, 
on external appearances, but it does not always satisfy the transsexual 
himself. He may even engage in sexual activities with the persons of the 
same anatomical sex as himself but he does not consider this to be homosexual 
behaviour as he believes that he himself is in fact a member of the opposite 
(9) 
sex. 
" ••• transsexualism.. • in its classic form is as distinct 
from transvestitism as it is from homosexuality. Both 
transvestites · and homosexuals sometimes suppose that 
they would be happier if they could change sex, but: they 
are generally mistaken. The ·transvestite gains 
his· gratification from wearing the clothes of the opposite 
sex: he would sacrifice his pleasure by joining that 
sex: the homosexual by definition, prefers to make love 
with others of his own sort, and would only alienate 
himself and them, by changing. Transsexualism is something 
different in kind. It is NOT a sexual mode or preference. 
It is not an act of sex at all. It is a passionate, 
lifelong, ineradicable conviction, and no true transsexual 
has been disabused of it ••• ". (
lO)
Transsexualism can be such a serious problem with the individual concerned, 
that he can develop suicidal tendencies, or at least, become subject to bouts 
of severe depression. 
9. This fact compounds the problem of differentiating between transsexuals,
homosexuals and transvestites. Thus, to the casual observer, a transsexual
is both a transvestite and a homosexual. But transsexuals do not identify
themselves with the latter, as they are looking for heterosexual partners.
Al so, unlike homosexuals, transsexuals do not club together. They regard
themselves as patients seeking a cure, not socio-sexual variants pursuing
a life-style: Leff op cit 56.
10. Morris op cit 10.
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"I was born with the wrong body, being feminine· by gender 
but male by sex, and I · could achieve completeness only 
. .(11)
when the one was adJusted to the other. 
There is no known cure for this condition, but surgery often has the effect 
of reducing the conflict in the individual's mind. A transsexual does not 
(12) 
appear to respond favourably to any psychological treatment. The belief 
of the transsexual is constant and inflexible. 
"No true transsexual has yet been persuaded, bullied, 
drugged, analysed, shamed, ridiculed or electrically 
shocked irito acceptance of his physique. It is an 
. 
t bl : n (13) irnmu a e state.,.. • 
Most transsexuals report 
(14)
as they can remember. 
that they have had their conviction for as long 
Two thirds of a group studied, (
l
S) felt that they
belonged to the other sex by at l east the age of five, and the cross-gender 
identification strengthened with time. 
It is important for society to recognise that the transsexual who undergoes 
corrective surgery should be regarded as a person with a genuine conviction 
that he/she now belongs to the desired sex. There is a strong need to 
establish the ·credibility of . the transsexual condition. Most people do not 
. (16) 
take the phenomenon seriously and regard the sufferer as some kind of
'freak'. Homosexuals have also been the recipients of ridicule and scorn 
in the past, but as this predeliction has become increasingly publicised 
11. Ibid. Psychiatrist Don · Angus in Alberta, recalls a seventeen year old
boy who ·carried radio-active charges in his pockets to destroy his
testicles. Once encouraged to dress as a woman, he became a model citizen,
and went onto hormones: Leff op cit 56.
12. Vide chapter four infra.
13. Morris op cit 10.
14. I Pauly 'Adult Manifestation of Female Transsexuals' cited in Green and
Money op cit 86. ·
15. I Pauly 'The Current Status of the Sex Operation' (1966)Journal of Nervous
ahd Mental Disease 460.
16. Most people
transsexuals
the _expense
Furthermore,
to whom this author has spoken, have suggested that perhaps 
undergo the operation as a perverted sense of fun. Considering 
and pain involved, this proposition is highly unlikely. 
the surgery _is irreversible. 
and 
(17) understood 
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it 
pleas for more humane 
has been taken more seriously with the result that
treatment of homosexuals have been made. (
l
B) It is
important for the transsexual that a parallel development occur in the 
acceptance of his condition. 
Studies on 
"Transsexualism touches the boundaries of many of the 
existing academic disciplines in such a way as to raise 
fundamental questions about the territorial imperatives 
of biology, psychology, medicine and the law, to name 
but a few. Questions about the causes of transsexualism 
and the proper method of treatment have been hitherto 
. d h d ' f h 1 d d 
· · n C19)restricte to t e  orna1n o psyc o ogy an me icine ••• , 
h . . hr d 
· · ( 20 
l h l d h 
. d b ' dl ermap o 1t1sm ave e to t e  view expresse y Bie ,
n that there is no such thing as pure male or. pure 
female, but that each contains the elements of the other 
11 ( 21)sex. 
In 1915 Freud said, 
"there is no such thing as pure masculinity or pure 
femininity, either in the psychological or the biological 
sense. On the contrary, we find in every individual a 
combination of the characteristics of his or her sex, 
as biologically determined, with the biological traits 
(22)
belonging to the other sex." 
17. Vide dtapter two supra.
18. Scott Cole op cit 814.
19. Raymond op cit 1.
20. Vide chapter two supra for details of this phenomenon.
21. S Grothman The Human Body (1964) 537 cited in T Parschin-Rybkin 'Notes'
(1972) 5 Ottawa Law Review 583.
22. Boehm The Femininity Complex in Men in Psycho-analysis and Male Sexuality
120 (H.M. Rutenbeck ed. 1966) cited in ·parschin-Rybkin op cit 584.
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A third authority has said that, 
" the attitude of 'assuming as much as possible of 
sexuality' does not mean that psycho-sexual dimorphism 
is not as real and as important as biological dimorphism, 
which is its basis. In recognising osmosis one does 
not need to deny cellular individuality and differences ••• 
We are bisexual throughout life and therefore in each 
th . d . h II ( 
23)man ere is a woman, an in eac woman, a man. 
It was possibly the eighteenth century which first imposed upon western 
civilisation, rigid conceptions of maleness and femaleness and made the idea 
of sexual fluidity in some way, distasteful. Certainly, earlier centuries 
did not require the male to be so unyieldingly virile and the female so 
passive, as is evidenced by the comedies of ShakespeaJ
24
l and to some extent, 
h. h' . 1 1 d h' d. ( 
25
) h d b is 1.storica portraya s an 1.s trage ies. T ere appeare to e more
'give and take' in those days and the word 'manly' had not acquired the 
intoleran.t connotation .that the Victorians were to give it. Our contemporary 
world has still to shake off some of those shackles imposed on conscious 
and aware thought. 
"Myths and history alike, I discovered, were full, if 
not of precedents at least of parallels - men who lived 
as women .•• hermaphrodites, transvestites ••• almost nobody 
has ever conformed absolutely to the conventional criteria 
of male and female •.. God, said Jewish chroniclers, created 
man in . His own androgonous image 'male and female He 
created them' for in Him both were united... The Hindu 
pantheon is frequented by male-female divinities, and 
h 1 . f 
. . ... ( 26) Greek myt o ogy too is full o sexual equivocations. 
In recent years, Dr .Bern has developed theoretical arguments and presented 
empirical research supporting the 
measurements of mascu�inity and 
re-definition of 
f . . . (27) em1ninity. 
traditional concepts and 
In brief, Bern considers
23. David 'A Masculine Mythology in Female Sexuality' cited in Parschin­
Rybkin op cit 584 .
24 . Twelfth Night is an ideal example of cross-dressing. 
25. For example, Othello.
26. Morris op cit 44.
27. S.L� Bern 'The Measurement of Psychological Androgeny' (1974) Journal
of Consulting Clinical Psychology 42 cited in M. Fleming et al 'Questioning
Current Definitions of Gender Identity' ( 1980) 9 (1) Archives of Sexual
Behaviour 13 at 14 (hereinafter referred to as 'Fleming (l)'J.
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these concepts of two logically independent dimensions - each with distinctive 
correlates which have been obscured by traditional bipolarity. This forced 
relationship has made it impossible to consider hypotheses about androgeny, 
which is the possession of both masculine and feminine personality 
characteristics, in 
associated with the 
relation to sex-typing and the inhibition of behaviour 
t d Sex role.(
2
S) B l d h l 11 non- ype em cone u es t at cu tura y
imposed sex role definitions act as a 'restricting prison' for human 
(29)
personality and should be abolished: nbehaviour should have no gender." 
Through the words of a post-operative transsexual, one is brought face to 
face with the dilemma caused by the attitudes of Church and State, which 
insist upon the exclusive bipolarity of sex: 
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
" ••• a male or a female? I felt that, despite my great 
social confusion in early years, the question was settled 
in the subconscious long before doctors entered my life, 
perhaps even before birth. The subject is still very 
contentious because it raises fundamental questions such 
as the relationship between mind and matter ••• I started 
out life as a boy. As I grew up, I turned into a feminine­
looking boy. Perhaps I should have accepted by androgenous 
nature ••. but I couldn't .•• I felt myself to be 
essentially female. Why, I don't know ••• My early life 
had been such agony that it seemed that the psyche had 
said to itself,' this life is shaping up into no shape 
at all. Something has got to take charge, so I'm going 
to', which resulted in great strength of purpose. Little 
wonder that among less single-minded transsexuals, self-
mutilation and suicide are so co1IU11on ••• The horror of 
a life in ambiguity and disguise, the constant fear of 
being exposed - one could not live with it and remain 
sane ••• You may feel that oh terms like intersex and 
transsexualism, they're only words, they don't really 
38 
"mean anything. And you would be wrong. Of course they 
are words, but that is a tremendous encouragement because 
it means that instead of my being a freak, modern knowledge 
had identified syndromes... to deal with conditions such 
as mine... One is a rarity, which makes learning to cope 
a very hard lesson, but one is not outside the discernible 
(30)
laws of Nature." 
II CAUSES OF TRANSSEXUALISM 
"My conviction of mistaken sex was still no more than 
a blur ••. I felt a yearning for I knew not what, as though 
there was a piece missing from my pattern ••• Nobody really 
knows why some children ••• discover in themselves the 
inexpungable belief that, despite all the physical 
evidence, they are really of the opposite sex. It happens 
at a very early age... and it is generally profoundly 
ingrained as it was with me by the fourth or fifth year. 
Some theorists suppose the child to be born with it: 
perhaps there are undiscovered constitutional or genetic 
factors, or perhaps, as American scientists have lately 
suggested, the foetus has been affected by misdirected 
hormones during pregnancy. Many more believe it to be 
solely the result of early environment... I have tried 
to analyse my own childish emotions, and to what I meant 
when I declared myself to be a girl in a boy's body .•• 
but for me it remains a riddle. So be it ..... <
3
1J
To put it in the words of Dr Armstrong 
(32)
" •.• a transsexual is an individual convinced from the 
earliest recollection usually two to seven years, that 
he/she has been endowed with the wrong anatomical body." 
30. D. Fallowell and A.Ashley April Ashley's Odyssey (1982) 14-17.
31. Morris op cit 12-14,
32. C Armstrong 'Transsexualism: A Medical Perspective'
of Medical Ethics 90.
(1980) 6 Journal 
39 
Since there are no criteria by which such a belief could claim factual basis, 
it would seem logical to describe the transsexual's problem as a delusion. 
However, the literature has been chary on this term, pointing out that 
transsexuals have no general tendency to delusion, but are, in all other 
respects, well-organised, and in touch with reality. Accordingly, the 
condition comes to be described in terms that make no reference to the 
patient's belief, but only to the discomfort and unhappiness with the gender 
role demanded by the body, and a deep-seated desire to be a member of the 
(33) 
opposite sex. So in transsexualism, we have to deal with a condition
which has no real known treatment, and no all-encompassing cause. 
Perhaps the earliest commentator on the possible cause of the phenomenon 
(34) 
was Herodotus. He explained the origin of what he referred to as 'Scythian
illness' by resorting to divine causation. Apparently Venus, enraged by 
the plundering of her temple at Ascetos, changed Scythian males and their 
posterity into women, as a divine punishment for their misdeeds. 
Herodotus notwithstanding, speculation and research focus upon two main 
categories of possible causes, one - comparable to that which has found favour 
among students of homosexuality - lies in the psycho-dynamics of the patient's 
home and early childhood. <
35
) The other is biological, based on the idea
that a hormonal disorder may influence the nervous system at a certain point 
. (36)in foetal development, creating a disposition to gender disorder. . It 
must be stressed however, that both etiologies have only the status of 
hypotheses. One fact which remains certain is that there is a group of 
persons, perhaps 1 in 50 000, whose anxiety about the incongruity of their 
bodies is 
treatment 
so great that their suffering is 
which appears to have any effect 
it is generally regarded as successful. 
33. Ibid.
. ( 37} "beyond belief". The only
(38) 
is corrective surgery and
34. R Green 'Mythological, Historical and Cross-Cultural
Transsexualism' cited in Green and Money op cit 14. 
Aspects of 
35. O O' Donovan 'Transsexualism and Christian. Marriage' (1983) XVI Journal
of Religious Ethics 134.
36. Ibid.
37. Leff op cit 48.
38. � chapter four infra. The term 'corrective surgery' will be used
in place of 'conversive surgery' 'sex reassignment surgery' etcetera,
as this author believes that in the case of a · true transsexual, there
is no change, merely a re-affirmation - through the operation - of the
real sex.
40 
A. Biological Causes
The earlier theorists linked anatomy directly to destiny. Straightforward
links between hormonal factors and 
Set forth. (39) J h h o n  Money owever, 
behavioural results, were simplistically
considers the connection to be indirect.
He insists upon the mediating factor of the brain - more specifically the
hypothalamus - which, when activated by specific sex hormones, sets up neural
pathways for gender identity, which is developed later by post-natal 
. 1 · t. 
( 40)
socia isa ion. 
"In the theory of psychosexual differentiation it is 
now outmoded to juxtapose nature versus nurturer the 
genetic versus the environmental; the innate versus the 
acquired; the biological versus the psychological or 
the instinctive versus the 1 earned • Modern genetic 
theories avoid these antiquated dichotomies and postulate 
a genetic norm of reaction which for its proper expression 
requires phyletically prescribed environmental boundaries. 
If these boundaries are either too restricted or too 
diffuse, then the environment is lethal, and the genetic 
code cannot express itself, for the cells carrying it 
are non viable." ( 
4
1)
39. Raymond op cit 46.
40. Dr Ray McKensie considers the fundamental cause to be "biological, probably
subcortical"; cited in Leff op cit 56.
41. J Money and A Ehrhardt Man and Woman, Boy and Girl (1972) cited in
Raymond op �it 47� "It takes a specifically programmed protoplasm
subjected to life circumstances to produce a transsexual".
41 
Money continues to state that hormonal influences act upon the brain and 
set up neural pathways to receive post-natal social gender identity signals, 
so that after birth, the biological programme shifts to one of psychological 
conditioning, and gender identity becomes largely a matter of biographical 
. ( 42) 
history. Money and Ehrhardt admit that the social factors are the most 
influential part of gender identify differentiation, but that pre-natal 
h 1 f 
. 
h d 
. . { 43 ) 
ormona actors are necessary to set t e 1rect1on. 
Benjamin and Ihlenfeld
( 44> 
suggest that for the anatomical male, transsexualism
may result from a form of testicular feminisation during the foetal period, 
in which a 
masculinising 
biochemical 
effects on 
defect prevents 
the sex-specific 
androgens 
areas of 
from working their 
( 45)
the hypothalamus. 
In the anatomic female, it is theorised that androgenic influences on the 
foetal hypothalamus are increased at a critical stage in the development 
(46)
of the sex-specific structures. 
42. Vide later in this chapter for psychological causes.
43. Money and Ehrhardt op cit note 41 supra.
44. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 456.
45. Ibid, chapter one supra for hormonal tests.
46. Ibid. Dr Armstrong states that the amount of androgen required for
rnasculinising the brain· is greater than that required to masculinise
the genitals, so that sufficient androgen may be present in the foetus
to produce an anatomical male, but still leave the brain improperly
differentiated: Fallowell and Ashley op cit 198. This produces some 
argument against the proposition that the differences between male and 
female outlook are essentially due to cultural environment and 
conditioning. There is a case in America, of a normal baby boy whose 
penis was accidently cut off by a doctor during circurnsision. After 
discussion, it was decided that the best thing to do would be to convert 
him into a 'girl'. However, on reaching puberty, this 'girl' is revolting 
against the feminine role which was impcieed, with the masculine gender 
strongly asserting itself: Fallowell and Ashley op cit 230. Thus it 
would appear that one cannot simply interchange human sexuality without 
any regard to the psychological gender, because for the successful 
transformation one requires the necessary psychological· identification, 
as the true trans.sexual has. There is also a recent case of two siamese 
twins having been separated and one of them being turned into a 'girl' 
(vide chapter six infra J. It will be interesting to see how this •girl' 
will react when 'she' too reaches the age of puberty. 
42 
Erhardt believes that the pre-pubertal years are the ones most crucial to 
the psyche's gender identity, and that the lack of a competent vagina is 
not troublesome to a girl, whereas to a young boy, a diminutive penis could 
b d 
· <47l 
h. ·1 d f t h b d' d . h 1 e evastat1.ng. T is peni e e ec as een stu ie in t e transsexua s
11 . h ' . bl . ( 
48
)of a re mote va ey in t e Dom1.n1.can Repu 1.c. 
These guerodoces are born with a clitoris-like phallus, a labial-like scrotum, 
a blind vaginal pouch and labial testes, All have the normal male XY karyotype. 
At about the age of twelve, their voices suddenly deepen, muscle mass 
increases and the phallus enlarges to a functional penis. The Cornell team 
concluded that the bizarre defect is caused by a deficiency of the enzyme 
Sa-reductase, which converts testosterone into dihydro-testosterone, (DHT) 
in utero and again at puberty,· in specific androgen-dependent target tissues. 
During normal embryogenesis, DHT causes the evolution of the external male 
genitalia. At puberty the hormone produces facial hair and enlarges the 
prostate. gland. It is concluded therefore that since the Dominican Republic 
post-pubertal men lack these secondary characteristics, it is the lack of 
DHT that has attenuated the Y chromosome's effects. Despite their upbringing 
as girls, these 'involuntary' transsexuals have unequivocally male psycho-
! . ' d . d . 1 ( 
49
)sexua orientation and gen er 1. entity as adu ts. 
"Even in 1977 we know precious little of how little boys 
and little girls grow up to be - and feel like - men 
(50) 
and women". 
47. Leff op cit 47.
4B. Until puberty, these transsexuals seem like normal girls, but then they 
become psychologically and physically male. In four tiny villages south­
west of the Island's capital, Cornell research teams have identified 
38 of these queredoces ('penis-at-twelves'): 1 in every 90 births in 
the area is affected. This phenomenon has been traced back to a single 
genetic founder (ibid) - a suggestion that perhaps the cause of the 
syndrome is genetic. 
49. Leff op cit 51.
so. Pauly cited in Leff op cit 51.
43 
In 1979, as has been previously 
( 51) 
stated, it was announced that the H-
Y antigen present in normal skin tissue was perhaps a significant factor 
. fl . h h 
(S2l 
h in uencing t e Y c romosorne, Many factors can attenuate this c romosorne's 
control over foetal sexual development. One of these, rare thought it is, 
is microphallus. When a child is born with a fully formed but miniscule 
penis, "legitimate concern should arise" about whether the boy will be able 
to perform sexually as a male when he grows up. This, to some extent, goes 
hand in hand with the theory of Erhardt expressed earlier, However, if one 
exposes the infant to testosterone, one can obtain the growth of the phallus. 
Therefore it is obviously essential to know whether one is in fact dealing 
with microphallic penile tissue, or macrophallic clitoral tissue. Thus, 
the discovery of the H-Y antigen could prove the most important step in the 
diagnosis of transsexualism, The research in the subject still continues. 
51. Vide Chapter one supra.
52. Leff op cit 47. Dr Smith of the University of Washington claims that
a "small penis may provide a clue to the foetal testosterone deficiency"
(ibid). The surgical alternative to the testosterone treatment is of
course the removal of the phallus and gonads and the fashioning of the
labia, with the creation of a neo-vagina later. With life-long oestrogen
supplementation after puberty, "expectations of normal breast development
and normal female identity are excellent": Dr Kulin cited in Leff .2E.
cit 47. It is this author's submission that to take the rash steps of
either hormonal treatment or surgery in childhood, should be delayed
until the person himself, manifests psychologically with which gender
he identifies. If the H-Y antigen is going to point exclusively to a
masculine gender despite biological features to the contrary, then this
will be a major breakthrough in the diagnosis and treatment of gender
dysphoria. As recently as March, 1985, a new test for sex has been
evolved. At a conference on gender identity disorders at the University
of Natal, Pietermaritzburg in December 1985, this author had the
opportunity to speak with Dr J Grace of the Bloodbank, Durban, who
disclosed that geneticists are at present working on the 'gene probe
test' which with luck, will be able to show conclusively whether an infant,
despite his apparent karyotype, will develop into a boy or a girl. The
test involves a microscopic analysis of the genetic material of the Y
chromosome - the masculini sing traits of which are contained in the very
tip of the chromosome. It is theor ised that during crossing-over in
meiosis, the X chromosome which is much larger than the Y probably 'bu�gles'
the genes at the tip of the Y - for these two chromosomes, being dissimilar
pair · end to end and not side by side as all others do - and therefore,
even though· a chromosome examination may show a Y chromosome present,
this chromosome may in fact be genetically inert, because the K chromosome
has taken over its genetic material. Only time will tell if this test
will in fact be successful in sex determination, or not.
44 
.Money and Ehrhardt, although devoting themselves to the theory of hormonal 
factors in transsexualism, are careful to paint out that thesa factors are 
. (53)
"imperfectly understood". 
"There may well be an as yet undiscovered fetal metabolic 
or hormonal component which acts to induce a predisposition 
to ambiguity or incongruity of post-natal gender identity 
differentiation. There may be a special disposition 
in the organisation of the brain towards the acquisition 
of roles and their disassociation in the manner of multiple 
personality ••• a pre-natal disposition is probably 
insufficient in itself, and needs to be augmented by 
post-natal social history."<
54
)
Much of the theorising concerning hormonal activity is based on animal 
experimentation. On a scientific level, commentators have criticised such 
theories. Am Oakey ( 
55
) for one, has stressed that animal research can only
be applied hypothetically to humans, particularly in the field of sexual 
behaviour. Animals are subjected to a much more direct control mechanism 
than humans: the latter impose an additional control of learning. She 
concludes that although androgen may be significantly related to sexual 
behaviour, the social context of the monkeys used in the experimentation 
was of great 
. ( 56) 
importance. As far as these animals are concerned, the 
role of sex hormones in instances of sexual arousal, is clearly outweighed 
• ( 57 J by environmental factors. 
53. Money and Ehrhardt op cit note 41 supra.
54. Vide note 60 infra.
55. Ann Oakey Sex, Gender and Society (1972) 113 cited in Raymond op cit 54.
56. For example, female rhesus monkeys injected with androgen· show an increase
in the male practice of 'mounting' but only if they are dominant members
of their group initially. If subordinate- females are injected, the
incidence of mounting behaviour remains the same. Likewise, when dominant
male monkeys who secrete testosterone in excess, are placed in a social
environment where their dominance is not recognised, they become inferior
members of the group and their testosterone output lessens considerably:
ibid.
57. Ibid.
45 
1 . b h dk ' ( 
5 8 
) E iza et A ins in her turn has pointed to a number of factors in animal
experiments which make human comparisons from animal data highly d ubious. 
For example, the majority of the animal experiments use copulating behaviour 
. (59)
as an example of sex differences. None of the human experiments do. 
nThe primary effect of early exposure to androgen in 
the female rat is that the capacity to display lordosis 
(the receptive posture) is impaired. Yet there is no 
human behaviour homologous to lordosis and in fact, human 
sexual behaviour is not particularly controlled by sex 
hormones at all." 
It is of course also difficult to generalise about animal behaviour as there 
is such a marked species differentiation. Thus, analogies to human behaviour 
are all the more difficult 
additional controls on any 
to make. Human a , to a greater extent irnpos e 
. ( 60) 
hormonal experiments, socio-cultural factors
in general, and it is the human ability to rationalise and learn that makes 
generalisations from other species suspect to say the least. 
"The analogy becomes increasingly ridiculous when we 
add that the non-human female primate has no hymen (or) 
menopause ••• the males of these species are dominant, 
aggressive and show no desire or ability to give the· female 
pleasure." 
(61)
In conclusion, even though biological data have been put forward as etiologies 
of transsexualism, they are neither conclusive, nor infallible. Be that 
as it may, these factors may, and probably do influence the 'fixing' of gender 
in the developing human being. 
58. E Adkins 'Genes, Hormones and Gender' cited in Raymond op cit 55.
59. Ibid.
60. Observers have pointed out that human hormone levels vary according to
environmental circumstances - many forms of stress have been correlated
with a drop in testosterone level: J. W. Ma.SQn 'Psychologic Stress and
Endocrine Function ' cited in Raymond op cit ·5 7.
61. Oakey op cit note 55.
b. 
. (62)
Psychological Causes 
46 
If biology begins the programme of gender identity, social factors set the 
direction of that behaviour. Basically, a social problem exists when there 
is a sizeable discrepancy between what is and what people think ought to 
b 
(63)
e. Social problems can be categorised into two broad classes:
1. social disorganisation - which refers to the inadequacies in the social
system that keep people's individual and collective purposes from being
realised.
Th f 
' 
f . l d ' . t . ( 
64 
)ere are our main sources o socia 1sorgan1sa ion: 
a) conflicting interests and values;
b) conflicting status and role obligations;
c) faulty socialisation;
(6S) 
.and
d) faulty social communications.
62. T Szatz The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), describes psychotic disorders
as 'problems in living'. He does not view psychiatry as dealing with
illnesses in the traditional sense, but rather as dealing with the
inability to cope with the problem of being human. J Schafer Humanistic
Psychology (1978) states that "a source of existential anxiety is
individualisation, which guarantees that despite the possibilities of
communication and empathy, we can never fully discover what it feels
like to be somebody else. We are born alone and . we die alone" : cited
(March 1983 l 156 Nursing Mirror 9. It is submitted that this sobering
thought makes it all the more vital that there should be understanding
in our communication with others - to lift the scales of prejudice from
our eyes and to allow compassion into our hearts.
63. R Merton and R Nisbet (eds) Contemporary Social Problems (4th ed 1976) 7.
64. Ibid.
65. Socialisation is
knowledge needed
ibid.
the acquisition of the attitudes, values, skills and 
to fulfill social roles, or to modify them effectively: 
47 
2. deviant , 
(66) 
behaviour. Whereas social disorganisation involves the 
defective arrangement or breakdown of systems of statuses and roles, 
deviant behaviour involves significant departures from norms socially 
assigned to various roles� (
67
>
Two groups of deviant behaviour must be distinguished: 
a) 
b) 
non conforming behaviour: 
. (68)aberrant behaviour. 
and 
Non conformers announce their dissent publicly. They challenge the legitimacy 
of social norms and their applicability to certain situations. Aberrants, 
on the other hand, try to hide their departures from social norms. They 
also acknowledge the legitimacy of the norms they violate: 
th f . d . t d . . 1 th 
( 69 l T 1 ey in 1 expe ient to vio ate em. ranssexua s
first group, homosexuals into the second. 
it is only that 
fall into the 
Illness, whether physical or mental, is not only a misfortune, but a source 
. ( 70) of deviance. The ill person cannot meet normal expectations. But we
do not as a general rule, regard people who are ill to be at fault for their 
illness. In contemporary society, we respond to illness by providing health 
services: it is generally assumed that the medical profession will bring 
knowledge and technical skills to bear, in order, either to cure the 'disease' 
1. "t · ' ' t (?1)or imi its impairmen . 
66. Merton and Nisbet op cit 25.
67. 
68. 
69. 
The term 1 deviant 
of moral censure. 
norms do not work 
or even society at 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
behaviour' has become swollen with the connotation 
Yet frequently, departures fro� the established social 
against the interests and values of significant groups, 
large. Ibid. 
70. Merton and Nisbet op cit 105.
71. The problem should be in the doctor's hands. If he intimates a course
of treatment, this decision should be respected. The practitioner should
not be thwarted by old-fashioned legal attitudes. It is submitted that
the law - in its service of the C0111Dtunity - should follow closely in
the footsteps of the medical profession when the issue at stake is the
particular concern of the latter.
48 
Mental disorders vary in type and severity, just as physical illnesses do. 
When we speak of a mental disorder, we mean to denote significant departures 
from normal cognitive and emotional functioning, so that the individual is 
i.mpaired. The impaired individual may not see himself as ill, even though 
. ( 72} he may be desperately miserable. Regardless of the cause of the disorder, 
the behaviour of the person will express not only distortions in thought 
processes or emotional upset, but also something of the normal personality 
and concerns of the person. Some mental disorders result from organic 
functions and some from stressful psychological experiences - often coupled 
with personality vulnerabilities - and some primarily reflect faulty strategies 
that have been learnt earlier in life.C
73
)
Most studies advocating the psychological etiology of transsexualism, emphasise 
disturbance in early childhood. <
74
> Although the new born infant may be
in a 'pre-psychological' state for several weeks following birth, the child 
begins to receive gender identity signals as the vital maternal-infant bond 
is developed.. It is within the context of this bonding that the infant's 
social and psychological potentials unfold. If the bonding is delayed or 
. ( 75) impaired, the likelihood of later disorders in the child, increases. 
72. Merton and Nisbet op cit 222.
73. Ibid.
7 4. R Green 'Sexual Identity and Conflict in Children and Adults I cited in 
E Halle et al 'The Role of Grandmothers in Transsexualism' (4 April 1980} 
137 American Journal of Psychiatry 497. 
75. Schwartz and Schwartz, Vulnerable Infants: A Psychological Dilemma (1977)
108. The incidents of neurological and psychological abnormalities
occurin9 during the first year of life is 4 times greater for premature 
babies as it is for· full-term infants. ·on birth, not only the child 
suffers from separation from the mother during incubation, but so too 
does the mother suffer. The most pronounced examples manifest themselves 
in the guilt of and . depression from producing an 'inadequate' child, 
which may lead to· emotional rejection of the infant, or a dangerous 
lowering of maternal self-esteem. All of these are detrimental to the 
normal development of the child. Doctor Stoller too particularly 
emphasises the cause of disonance between anatomical sex and psycho­
social gender as the disturbance of the mother-child bond, early in life: 
Leff op cit 56. 
49 
Money states specifically that the critical period for gender identity is 
between the ages of 12 to 18 months. This is so because child-rearing in 
our culture is sexually distinctive, and from the date of birth the child 
receives gender . d . . l f . ( 
76
) H dd h t h 1. entity s1.gna s rom 1.ts parents. e a s t a t ere
are exceptions to this age ceiling but that this is due to confused gender­
rearing practices, for example, when parents are given conflicting diagnoses 
of their infant's sex. But he maintains that in the normal process of gender 
identity, the locking tight of the process occurs at an incredibly early 
age. 
"When the gender identity gate closed behind you, it 
locked tight. You knew in the very core of your 
consciousness that you were male or female. Nothing 
short ot disaster could ever shake that conviction ••• 
Once a sex distinction has worked or been pressured into 
the nuclear core of your gender schema, to dislodge it 
. 
h . d . ' d l . th d t 
· 0 ( 77 )1.s to t reaten you.as an 1.n 1.v1. ua wi es ruction. 
Obviously the theory that 'core' gender identity is locked tight by the age 
of 18 months has utmost relevence, for causation theories on transsexualism. 
The limit of lB months may be a little arbitrary, but what is certain is 
that such gender identity is formed at a very early age: 
"I was three or perhaps four years old when I realised 
that I had. been born into the wrong body, and should 
really be a girl... What triggered so bizarre a thought 
I have long forgotten but the conviction was unfaltering 
(7B) 
from the start." 
76. Raymond op cit 62.
77. J Money and P Tucker Sexual Signatures on being a Man or a Woman ( 1975)
119 cited in Raymond op cit 64.
78. Morris op cit 9.
50 
By the time one is eight years of age 80% of one's brain cella have developed. 
There is the same rate of development in the human brain from the age of 
eight to eighty years, as there is between the age of seven and eight 
(80) 
years. Thus,• one's concept of oneself will have become embedded firmly
by the time one reaches the age of eight: one's identity has formed. Any 
conceptions formed during these critical years are consequently so much harder 
to break than any other conceptions formed later. Thus, if someone has been 
raised consciously or subconsciously in the role. of a member of the opposite 
·t ld t b · t 11 
· 
·bl t alter thi's state.<
8
l)sex, 1 wou appear o e vir ua y 1mposs1 e o 
Robert Stoller, psychoanalyst, has probably done the major work in developing 
psychological theories about causes of transsexualism, in the study of nine 
cases of male-female constructed transsexuals. (
82
) He refers to his basic
approach as 'mothers feminised phallus' or 1 blarning the mother'. Be attributes 
male transsexualism to a classic mother-child relationship that occurs within 
h f d ' b d . ( 
83 
) h i ' 1 t e context o a istur e marriage. In t e cl nica cases under mention,
the mothers were generally unhappy women, who often in early life wanted 
to be males themselves, and who in their marriages, were dominant and 
assertive. The child serves the mother as a phallus for which she has 
supposedly yearned. Masculinity is consequently not developed in the son. 
The transsexuals' fathers were supposedly passive men who were consistently 
absent from home, either physically or emotionally. The child himself did 
not pass through the normal formative atage of separation from the mother 
and subsequent individualisation. 
BO. Information supplied by members of ·staff in the Department of Psychology, 
for the degree of BSc Nursing, University of Natal, Durban. It was also 
imparted to this author that consequential to this data, the De Lange 
Commission is advocating that compulsory pre-primary school should commence 
at least one year prior to school - i.e. at about the age of four - because 
of the fact that the most important years of a child's life are those 
till the age of eight. Therefore, any culturally or environmentally 
deprived children would not suffer such a disadvantage if they were 
stimulated through the school environment during the most critical 
developmental stage : Joan .Beck How to .rai.se a Brighter Child { 1976). 
81. There is only slight hormonal production until puberty and by that time
one has identified oneself sexually, mainly through environmental
influences. It is unlikely therefore, according to members of staff
(note 80 supra) that the pre-pubic period is important for any hormonal
malfunction as regards .sexual identity, except where chromosomal
aberrations occur, or where the individual has been subjected to external
hormonal influences.
82. R Stoller The Transsexual Experiment (1975) 38, cited in Raymond op cit 76.
83, Ibid. 
51 
The mother turned to her son for continuing fulfillment, concentrating totally 
on him and encouraging him to identify with her. ( 
84) According to Stoller,
given this extreme mother-son symbiosis which sometimes lasted into pubertal 
years, th� boy began to feel that he was a woman despite the evidence of 
his senses that he was anatomically male. Having thus developed the 'core' 
gender identity in the early years of life, the boy cannot develop later 
on, along culturally dictated, masculine lines. 
"The similarities of the findings are probably beyond 
coincidence; it appears, as has been noted often before 
in other males with . strong feminine identification that 
the femininity of these males is the result of too much 
mother and too little father. These data do not point 
to a genetic, hormonal or other· physiological element 
significantly contributing to the boy's gender identity ••• 
my thesis, to be better tested in the future, is that 
the degree of femininity that develops in a boy, and 
the form it . takes, will vary according to exactly (not 
approximately) 
childhood.''( 
85
)
what is done to him in earliest 
Although there are males who have a strong symbiotic relationship with their 
mothers in early childhood, and who do not emerge as transsexuals, it is
because the quality of the relationship was different. Most probably, the 
mother did not have the same kind of physical relationship with her male 
child. Generally, in the transsexual's family, the marriage was held together 
in name only: al though parents · existed under the same roof, the marriages 
. (86)
were sexless, and by and large, emotionally barren. 
84. Ibid.
85. R Stoller 'Parental Influences in Male Transsexualism' cited in Green
and Money op cit 166.
86� Ibid. 
52 
Although there are differences between male and female transsexuals, Stoller 
again, in dealing with female transsexuals, blames the mother. (B
7
) The female
infant who lacks feminine grace, and who is not 'cuddly' has a mother unable 
to show any emotional tone largely due to depression. Again, the father 
is rather passive and has little or no emotional rapport with his wife and 
child. As a result, the girl is used by both parents as a fa ther-substitute 
to alleviate the mother's depression. The child's acting out of masculine 
characterisitics is encouraged and becomes self-perpetuating as a sense of 
1. , . ( 88)
mascu ine identity. 
Harry Benjamin also subscribes to the 'blaming the mother' syndrome. 
"Typically, the mother keeps the male infant to herself. 
She gratifies his wishes instantly whenever possible. 
She enjoys and encourages actions which keeps the child 
close to her, and discourages attempts to move away. 
However, as the child grows, the mother may not be able 
to handle aggressive and active play and directs the 
male child to quieter companions, possibly girls. 
Gradually the child learns that the feminine actions 
bring a positive response from the mother and other members 
of the farnily�C8
9) 
N. Lukianovicz (
9
0) suggests that the issue of 'castration anxiety' is one
cause of transsexualism. (Obviously, this has no bearing on the female 
transsexual.) He· maintains that the male transsexual attempts to overcome 
the anxiety of castration by creating an imaginary 'phallic .woman' and 
subsequently identifying with and becoming her. This fantasy of a phallic 
woman, is a substitute for phallic exhibition which is inhibited by the 
castration anxiety. 
87. Stoller op cit note 82 supra.
BB. Ibid.
89. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 454.
90. N Lukianovicz 'A 
of our Present 
Disorders 458.
Survey of Various Aspects of Transvestism in the Light 
Knowledge• (1959) 128 Journal of Nervous and Mental 
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Another psychoanalyst's explanation blames transsexualism on separation 
anxiety. 
"To alleviate this anxiety, the child resorts to a fantasy 
of symbiotic fusion with the mother. In this way, mother 
and child become one and the danger of separation is 
nullified. We believe this reparative fantasy to be 
a psycho-dynamic basis for transsexualism in the male, 
and the transsexual phenomenon can be understood clinically 
as attempts to ward off any threats to the psychic fusion 
with the mother • .,
(9l) 
According to this explanation then, the transsexual literally becomes the 
mother and to sustain this fantasy, he seeks to reverse his anatomical sex. 
Henry G (92) uze offers 'experience deprivation' during er i ti cal periods of
childhood development, as a primary cause of transsexualism. He maintains 
that as a rule, boys will develop psychologically in a feminine direction 
unless a male model is present in some way. "A boy child is superficially 
(93)more like a girl ••• until he reaches pubescencen . 
91. L Oversey and E Person 'Gender Identity and Sexual Psychopathy in Men:
A Psychodynamic Analysis of Homosexualism, Transsexualism and Transvestism'
(1973) l Journal of the American Academy of Psycho-analysis 54.
92. H Guze 'Psycho-social Adjustment of Transsexuals: An Evaluation and
Theoretical Formulation' cited in Green and Money op cit 179 .
93. Thie is similar to the line of thought of Ramey and other commentators
of the same school, that all foetus's are female, and only with strong
administration of androgens, is there masculinisation.
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(94) 
Lately it has been suggested, that the father is the parent whose role 
behaviours may be the most likely to generate sex appropriate behaviours 
in children. <
95
) Paternal characteristics that foster the development of
normal gender identity in children include paternal nurturing and 
. (96) 
dominance. In contrast, the sex role learning process is adversely affected 
. (97)
when fathers are either physically or psychologically absent from home. 
Thus, the impact of paternal deprivation on psychosexual adjustment is moat 
(9B) 
conspicuous in homosexuals and transsexual men. Family dynamics of the 
male transsexuals studied here are also characterised by an overly-close 
relationship with the mother - as other research has shown - and by the 
. (99) 
passive, absent father. In. a study of 43 Swedish transsexuals, parental 
deprivation - as defined by divorce, death, illegitimacy, or placement away 
from home 
54% of the 
- was significantly higher 
( 100)
in the transsexual group, occuring in 
cases. 
94. B I Fagot 'Sex Differences in Toddlers' Behaviour and Parental Reaction'
(1974) Developmental Psychology 10.
95. In the context of a review of adult cases of gender disturbance, a clinical
study was pursued on the status of the father or father-substitute for
46 boys with deviations in male role development. Significantly fewer
male models were found in the family backgrounds of· severely · gender­
disturbed boys, as compared to mildly gender-disturbed boys. Ma.le
childhood gender.disturbances was also found to be correlated with a higher
incidence of psychiatric problems in both the mothers and . the fathers
and with atypical patterns of the boys involvement with their parents:
(ibid).
96. E M Hetherington and J L Deur 'The Effects of Father Absence on Child
Development' (1971) cited in Rekers et al op cit 32.
97. Mead and Rekers 'The Role of the Father in Normal Psychosexual Development'
cited in Rekers et al op cit 32.
98. Ibid. However, as the majority of this research has had to rely on
retrospective reports of the adult homosexuals, etcetera, one has to
combat the influence of distorted memory. The person, usually to some
extent, superimposes his adult outlook on his childhood feelings. So
this father study is used to avoid some of the limitations inherent in
the retrospective research; (ibid).
99. Ibid.
100. J Walinder Transsexualism
et al op cit 34.
A Study of 43 Cases ( 196 7) cited in Rekers 
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Again,' on the basis of clinical observation of 38 boys, boyhood femininity 
has been associated with the absence of an older ma.le model during the boys' 
first years of life; maternal dominance, early rejection by the fathers and 
the indifference to or encouragement of, feminine behaviour by either 
(101)
parent. 
Stoller believes that the familial constellation of male homosexuals differs 
from those of male transsexuals in several respects. While the mothers of 
both groups are domineering and over-protective, the mothers of the 
transsexuals were, in addition, more competitive with males in their own 
childhoods and early adolescence and were more likely to encourage 'blissful 
closeness' with their sons. While the parents of homosexuals are more likely 
to divorce, the parents of transsexuals are more likely to remain married 
(102)
despite their psycho-physical estrangement. 
In the latest study on the 
. (103) causes of transsexualism, 46 male children
were referred to the child gender identity clinic of the University of 
California. Data on the psychiatric histories of the families were available 
for 30 of the 46 subjects. In 80% of the cases, mothers had a history of 
mental health problems and/or treatment, while the corresponding figures 
for the fathers was 45%. These findings suggest that the parents - especially 
the mothers of gender-disturbed boys, have a history of less than adequate 
. (104) psychiatric adJustment. 671 of the biological fathers of the subjects
were physically absent from home. 801 of the boys were under five years 
of age when the separation occured. For the entire group, 3B% had no male 
1 . the ·home. (
l
0
5) Wh f th f" h . 11 t ro e present in en a a er- 1.gure was p ysica y presen ,
he was often psychologically remote from his family. In 82% of the cases 
the mother was the likely parent to which the child turned for sympat.hy. 
101. Green op cit note 74 supra.
102. Cited in Rekers et al op cit 34.
103. Rekers op cit 35,
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
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In addition, these boys were more likely to object to any separation from 
(106) 
their mothers. The various sources of clinical evidence above, suggest
that · fathering variables are correlated with male-role disturbance: this 
implicates a critical relationship between male gender-disturbances affecting 
the male-role model deprivation in the family. 
(l07) 
Another line of research studies the role of the grandmother in the lives
. ( 108) 
of gender-disturbed people. Halle et al reported that after a course 
of six years evaluation of gender dysphoric subjects, a number of the patients 
spontaneously divulged that their maternal grandmothers had played a 
significant role in raising them during early childhood. (l0
9
) The grandmothers
were described as "supportive, loving, and accepting of the patients' early 
feminine behaviour and cross-dressing". In addition, the grandmothers were 
admired for being strong and firm, yet willing to teach traditionally female 
homemaking skills. The mothers were characterised as capable, 
self-sacrificing, hard working and affectionate individuals who were often 
absent because of the need to work. 
(llO) In every case in which the 
grandmother was alive at the time of the evaluation, she was reported as 
. (lll) 
being supportive of surgical reassignment. Almost one third of a year's 
sample of patients diagnosed as transsexuals, were reared in a family setting 
in which the maternal grandmother was an important parental figure during 
early childhood. The presence of grandmothers per se does not · lead to the 
development of transsexualism. However, the data suggest that the behaviour 
and attitudes of the grandmothers, played a role in the development of the 
. ( 112) 
disorder. 
106. Rekers et
107. Rekers et
al op cit 38. 
al op cit 41. 
108. Halle et al op cit ·497.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Halle et al op cit 498.
112. Ibid.
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According to the psychological theories, if the individual fails to adjust 
to his/her 'native' body and role, then he/she should be treated. If all 
forms of family and personal therapy fail to adjust the transsexual's mind 
to his/her body, then the transsexual's own solution of adapting the body 
h ' d h ld b ' ' 'd 
' (HJ) 
to t e  rru.n s ou e given serious consi eration. 
Whichever psychological theory is one's personal preference, it is submitted 
by this author, that however one views the problem both parents are to blame 
equally. One, for over-passiveness and the other for over-activeness. 
Although there is no clear-cut cause for gender dysphoria, it is nevertheless 
apparent that the envil'.'omnent and family relationships play crucial parts 
in the development of that very special and highly susceptible entity - the 
child. As every human being is, by nature, a combination of male and female 
- the yin and the yang - and as the balance between the two is so very fine
in the formative ··years - and of course, also subject to possible hormonal 
and other'metabolic· influences - it is, to this author, no easy task to avoid 
gender disturbances in the precarious occupation of raising a child. 
113. Raymond op cit 70. There are basically two types of male-female 
transsexual:
1. the male may alternate between female and male roles for years, but
eventually the female personality becomes the stronger, demanding final
repudiation of the male role. A forceful, persistent demand arises to 
be rid of the offensive-appearing male genitalia� 
2. a boyhood of being a 'sissy'. He has an interest - and is usually 
encouraged - in pretty things, especially as regards feminine activities. 
Greater sexual pleasures arise from playing a feminine role and satisfying 
a man; E, Crovitz 'Treatment of the Transsexual and Medicolegal Issues' 
(1976) 1 Forensic Science s. 
I INTRODUCTION 
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CHAP T ER IV 
THE TREATMENT FOR TRANSSEXUALISM 
"Oh, who shall from the dungeon raise 
A soul enslaved so many ways? 
With bolts of bones that fettered stands 
In feet, and manacled in hands ••• " (A. Marvell; A Dialogue Between 
the Soul and the Body). 
Since transsexuali ty captured the limelight in the 1950' s, (l) it has become 
both a dilemma and a controversy in medicine and law. Basically, the 
phenomenon emerged into an interdisciplinary void and today, both scientists 
and lawyers are being asked to fill that void with acceptable answers. Having 
discussed in the preceding chapters the medical issues for tests for sex 
determination, various classifications of �ex types and the possible causes 
of transsexualism, it is the object of this chapter to deal with the treatment 
available to the transsexual. By and large, the true transsexual does not 
respond to any form of psycho-analysis and therefore, t:he only 'curative' 
route open to him seems to be corrective surgery. 
11 
• • •  if we cannot alter the conviction to fit the body, 
should we not in certain circumstances, alter the body 
to fit the conviction?... I had reached the conclusion 
myself, that sex was not a di vision, but a continuum, 
that almost nobody was altogether of one sex or another, 
and that the infinite subtlety of the shading from one 
extreme to the other was one of the most beautiful of 
Nature's phenomena. Sex was like a biological pointer, 
but the gauge upon which it flickered was that very 
different device, gender. If sex was a matter of glands 
or valves, gender was psychological, cultural, or in 
my own view, spiritual. If one's sex, I reasoned, fell 
into the right place along the scale of the gender, well 
and good; 
conundrum. 
if it fell anomalously ••• then came the 
But, if one could not shift the scale, one 
could surely move the pointer. Gender might be beyond 
definition: sex, science could understand. 11 (
2) 
1. Principally due to the sensational case of Christine Jorgensen.
2. Morris op cit 50.
II THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
59 
History is littered with instan ces of auto-castration and genital mutilation: 
the manifestation of an individual's intense desire to 'change sex' • 
Sophocles' Tiresias, Virginia Woolf 's Orlando and Gore Vidal's Myra 
Breckinridge have explored the idea of gender transformation in the context 
of literary fantasy. Such fantasy has given way to reality as advances in 
biomedical technology have allowed transsexuals to acquire opposite sex primary 
and secondary characteristics. (
3
)
Cultures both ancient and contemporary, have freely recognised a no-man' a 
land between male and female and have allowed people to inhabit it without 
harassment. ( 
4
) The physicians of Anatolia for instance, castrated men who
felt themselves to be female, permitting them henceforth to live in the female 
role. Hippocrates too, reported the existence of 'un-men' amongst Scythians: 
they bore themselves as women, did women's work and were generally believed 
to have been feminised by divine decree. ( 
5
) In ancient Alexandria, we read
of men nnot ashamed to employ every device to change artificially their male 
t . t f 1 " h t t' f th . . li 
( 6)
na ure in o erna e - even to t e  ampu a ion o eir genita a. 
Among more primitive peoples as recorded by Sir James Frazer in the Golden 
Bough, 
"there is a custom widely spread ••• in accordance with 
which some men dress as women and act as women throughout 
their lives. Often, they are dedicated and trained to 
their vocation . h d"(?) from child oo . 
So too, we 
sex and ·are 
find the Sarombavy of Madagascar, who al together forget their 
d d . 1 f 1 ( S ) Th regar e as entire y ema e. e 'soft men' of the Chukchee 
Eskimo were ordered into the assumed sex by the elders at childhood, were 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7-
B. 
Fleming (1) op cit 
Morris op cit 
Vide chapter 
Morris op cit 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 
45.
three 
468.
14. 
supra. 
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permitted to marry men and lived as women for the rest of their lives. We 
also hear of · Andean sorcerers obliged - by tribal laws - to change roles; 
of Mo hare Indian boys publicly initiated into 'girlhoo_d' 1 of young Tahitians 
encouraged in infancy, to think of themselves as members of the opposite 
sex. The examples are endless, and it is a common trait among 
less-sophisticated peoples, that to straddle the sexes was not a disgrace, 
but a privelege and often was accompanied by supernatural powers and priestly 
functions. (
9
)
Perhaps the first sex conversion operation occured at the command of the 
Roman Emperor, Nero. It is believed that Nero, in a rage, kicked his pregnant 
wife in the abdomen and killed her. He attempted to find someone else whose 
face resembed hers, and the person who came closest to filling the order 
was a young male, ex-slave, named Sporum. Nero reportedly ordered his surgeons 
to transform Sporum into a woman and after the conversion, the two were 
, ( 10) formally married. 
While Ab h 
(ll) 
ra am reported on
transvestites in 1931, it was 
controversial autobiography 
(12)
the first sex reassignment 
not until the publication of 
that corrective surgery became 
a practical solution for the transsexual's dilemma. 
9. Ibid.
of two male 
Lily Elbe's 
popular and 
10. Bromwell op c'it 404. Nero notwithstanding, it has been suggested that
the first known instance of real sex reassignment was that of a young
Danish painter, Einer Wegener, who came to· think of himself as two people
- male and female. Haunted and confused by .the situation, he found his
way. in 1930 to the clinic of a pioneer Dresden sexologist, and there,
in a series of operations, his male physique was altered, and an attempt
was made to substitute female organs. Nothing was known of hormones
then and the doctors even tried to transplant ovaries into his body,
But although for a time, he was able to live happily in his new sex role,
his moment of release was brief, for he died the following year; Morris
op cit 47.
ll, F Abraham 'Genitalunwandlung an zwei maenlichen transvestiten' (1931) 
18 Zeitschrift fur Sexualwissenschaft 223. 
12. N Hayer Man into Woman (1933) cited in L M .Lothstein 'Sex Reassignment
Surgery: Historical, Bioethical and Theoretical Issues' (1982) April
139 American Journal of Psychiatry 417 at 418.
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In the years between 1931 and 1952, sporadic and piece-meal reports of 
transsexuals undergoing operations came forth, primarily fro.m Germany and 
. ( 13) 
Switzerland. In 1951 an American George Jorgensen, managed to obtain 
surgery in Denmark,<
l4
) under a team of Danish physicians headed by Christian
. ( 15) 
Hamburger. Since the publication of her autobiography, many fellow-
sufferers have attempted to emulate her. But doctors were still very against 
the surgery mainly on account of possible adverse publicity, 
( 16
) and they
were also repelled by the thought of being pestered by all kinds of 
h'b' . . 
(17)
ex 1. 1tion1.sts. 
The operation has only in the last three decades, become 'respectable'. Up 
till the 1960' a, it was considered by most surgeons to be a cross between 
a racket and a very expensive placebo. It was, wrote one London practitioner 
in the late 1950'e, as though when a man said he was Nelson, you were to 
ff . 
. 
h. . 11 
. ( lB)
cut o his arm to satisfy is i ueion. 
13. Raymond op cit 21.
14. At the time that Jorgensen was transsexed, there were ._few places which
offered the surgery - Istanbul, Casablanca, Germany and Switzerland were
the roost frequent locations to which transsexuals travelled, provided
they could afford the cost and were willing to risk little, if no medical
follow-up (�).
15. C Jorgensen A Personal Autobiography (1968).
16. Vide Dr Pauly's · survey in ch.apter five infra. See also M 'M Belli
'Transsexual Surgery: A New Tort? 1 {1978) Journal of Family Law 487 at
489.
17, Morrie op cit 115. 
18. Ibid. There have been forty four
England since 1900. Before 1954
psychotic individuals with organised
in Transsexuals' (1979) 135 American
cases of auto-castration reported in 
reports, all publications were of 
delusions:M A Haberman 'Autocastration 
Journal of Psychiatry 437. 
62 
Then in the late 1960'e, Dr Harry Benjamin began treating transsexuals and 
pub licising his research. With the founding of the Harry Benjamin Foundation 
in 1964, Benjamin brought together a group of professionals from rnany 
(19) 
specialities, to do systematic research on transsexuals. A major expansion 
of research in this field occured in 1967 when the Johns Hopkins Gender 
Identity Clinic in Maryland announced that it would be the first American 
institution to devote 
a select but serious 
itself to the performance of transsexual surgery, on 
(20) 
scale. It was not until this institition began 
that ·corrective sµrgery gained acceptance and was begun t9 be performed in 
h d d, .1 
. . . ( 21)
ot er respecte me 1ca institutions. 
By 1972, when Jan Morris underwent the surgery, the climate of medical opinion 
had shifted largely due to the persuasion of Dr Benjamin. The old psychiatric 
treatments had been discredited and more doctors conceded that surgery might, 
after all, be the right approach to the problem which by now was not 
uncommon. 
(22) 
19. 
nPsychotherapy, with the aim of curing transsexualism ••• 
is a useless undertaking with present available methods. 
The mind of the transsexual cannot be changed in its 
false gender orientation. All attempts to this effect 
. (23) have failed." 
Raymond op cit 21. Although 
since _ the early · 1930' s the 
refined and made public until 
the operations have been possible surgically 
hormonal and surgical techniques were not 
the 1950 's. 
20. Ibid. This institution has subsequently closed, but the reasons therefor 
do not appear to be clear cut. 
21. There are now an estimated 30 institutions: Raymond op cit 22.
22. Morris op cit 115. Experts in the field of transsexualism have concluded
that in every reported case, the psychological treatment of trying to
cure the transsexual of his/her belief, is futile.
23. Scott Cole op cit 331.
III THE PROCEDURE 
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Gender identity clinics have been instituted in America among ether countries, 
to counsel and refer candidates for surgery if they are judged to be real 
(24) 
transsexuals. The Johns Hopkins Hospital has served as a model for others 
(25) 
of the same nature. It consisted of a team of psychiatrists, 
plastic surgeons, gynaecologists, urologists and psychologists, 
endocrinologists. A potential patient is extensively tested, interviewed, 
evaluated and scrutinised by this selected team. Only when this evaluation 
indicates that this individual is, in all likelihood, a true transsexual 
and is physically and mentally suited to treatment, can he proceed to 
(26)
surgery. 
In treating the transsexual according to the Johns Hopkins method, there 
are four general areas of managment which the medical practitioners must 
observe: (27)
1. evaluation of motivation for corrective surgery;
2. evaluation of the patient's understanding of the practicalities of changing
(28)
. Sl!X; 
3. implementation of an extensive pre-operative trial period; and
4. for those who undergo the surgery, a period of post-operative 
. ( 29)adJustment.
24. There are no such institutions in South Africa, as far as this author
could ascertain and no set prescribed regulations.
25. Raymond op cit 21.
26. Ibid. This evaluation
in many jurisdictions,
taking the example cf 
thorough.
27. Ibid.
is very important and unfortunately is not followed 
including South Africa. This author is therefore 
the American clinics, as they appear the most 
28. Which obviously involves the legal issue of consent,
29. R Green Human Sexuality A Health Practitioners Text (1975) cited in 
Bromwell op cit 407. This is crucial, as it affords the patient a feeling
of belonging, and not having simply been a guinea pig.
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A. Pre-operative Screening
Screening to eliminate those with serious mental problems, is but one phase
. ( 30) 
of the psychological evaluation. The assessment of transsexualism has 
(31) 
taken many forms. . All have focused on either establishing standardised 
procedures that will differentiate transsexuals from non-transsexuals, or 
attempting to predict who, among a group of transsexuals, will receive surgical 
. (32)correction. 
The 'Draw a Person Test' (DAP) is one of the most frequently used projective 
measures employed in this area of research. Since 1949 and the early work 
( 33) 
of Machover, it has been argued that the sex of the first figure drawn 
on the DAP reflects the drawer 1 s sexual identity. The assumption is that 
if the sex of the fir st figure drawn is opposite to that of the drawer's 
anatomical sex, there is a strong likelihood that the subject is sexually 
maladjusted. Although there have been criticisms levelled at this proposition 
in the past, 
. (34) contention. 
transsexual men 
there 
In a 
and 
is also more recent, moderate support 
recent 
women, 
study which 
Fleming and 
examined DAP drawings 
. (35) associates found 
for 
of a 
that 
the 
few 
male 
transsexuals drew female figures first, significantly more often than a 
population of non-transsexual men. Similarly, but to a lesser degree, female 
transsexuals drew male figures first, more often than the control group of 
non-transsexual women. 
30. Most gender clinics report that many applicants for surgery are actually
sociopaths seeking notoriety; rnasochistic homosexuals, or borderline
psychotics: Belli -=-o.,._p___;:c.:::.i..::ct 49. 
31. M Fleming er al I The Use of A0DT in the Assessment and Disposition of 
the Transsexual' ( 1982) 38 Journal of Clinical Psychology ( hereinafter 
refered to as 'Fleming {2)' 408. 
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
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It has been noted that one of the inherent problems with the DAP is that 
it requires the drawing of a human figure which must be either male or female 
and it is felt that this may 
. . (36) d . proJection. Because gen er 1.s 
interfere with an important aspect of 
a crucial variable in the assessment of 
transsexualism, it is important to have a measure that does not rely on a 
choice based on sex, but allows for the fullest and most accurate assessment 
. (37) of the underlying core gender. 
The 'Animal and Opposite Drawing Technique' (AODT) - first introduced by 
Koocher and Simmons in 1971 - requests that the subject draw one animal and 
then another which he considers to be the opposite of the first. (JB) The 
presence or absence of sexual opposites in an AODT protocol is therefore 
a valuable variable because gender is only one dimension along which two 
(39)animal figures can be opposed. 
Nineteen transsexuals of Boston Gender Identity Service were administered 
the DAP and the AODT tests. At the end of the evaluation process, ten were 
(40) 
recommended for, and· subsequently underwent, surgery. In order to 
establish the sex of the animals drawn in the AODT, (
4l
) eighty normal controls
- matched on age and· education of the subjects - were asked to rate each
37. Ibid.
38. It is important to note that, unlike the DAP, the AODT does not instruct
the subject to draw a second figure which is opposed in�, and therefore
allows the subject to oppose drawings along a variety of dimensions (ibid).
39. In addition, sex must be projected onto the animal drawings, because
animal types are not clearly representative of any gender,
40. Fleming (2) op cit 421.
41. Ibid.
animal as either masculine 
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, . (42) or f em1.n1.n e • A content analysis was then 
performed on the transsexuals' responses tci the question of why the animals 
. (43) drawn were opposite. An example of each response category is presented 
by the Table (
44) which is exhibited below.
RESPONSE CATEGORIES ON AODT TECHNIQUE 
CATEGORY 
1. Domesticity
2. Physical characteristics
3. Sex
4. Predator-prey
5. Natural habitat
6. Disposition
7. Active-passive
8. Size
9. Myth-.reality
10. Conventional Comparison
ll. Other
12. Total no. of .responses
EXAMPLE 
one animal tame, other is wild 
one animal furry, other is slimy 
one animal male, other is female 
one animal hunts, other is hunted 
one animal lives in water, other in air 
one animal courageous, other is timid 
one animal aggressive, other is passive 
one animal large, other is small 
one exists, other doesn't really 
one animal always opposed to the other 
(e.g. dog and cat fight) 
one animal graceful, other clumsy 
one animal intelligent, other dumb 
Count of no. of responses by subject 
Tests were performed on all twelve of the response categories, which were 
carried out in order to examine differences within the various dimensions 
along which the transsexual subjects opposed their two animal drawings. All 
ten of the "biological" females drew male animals first, and all ten of the 
post-operative subjects {5 men and 5 women) drew first figu.res opposite to 
their "biological" sex. Only the non-operative male-females drew first figures 
that were congruent with their "biological" sex. 
42. Those animals not rated either male or female were designated 'neuter'.
Animals designated feminine were: cat, swan, angelfish, bird, goldfish,
pig, mare and rabbit. Those rated masculine were: dog, horse, turtle,
hampster, donkey, hippo, rooster, dragon, tom cat, pug dog, sheep dog,
and wire-haired terrier. The only neuter animal was a spider (ibid).
43. Twelve categories were created, vide the table above.
44. Fleming (2) op cit 422,
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In short, it appears that successful candidates for surgery, drew first animals 
opposite to their own "biological" sex, using as their basis of opposition 
mainly the criteria of sex, Those transsexuals who are viewed as unlikely 
candidates for surgery, do not use the animal's sex as a basis for their 
, , (45 l
opposition. 
The motivation for corrective surgery is another important factor. Some male 
psychotic homosexuals and transvestites might feel the need to become females 
to facilitate their sexual enjoyment in a less hostile setting. Males with 
these disorders would be poor candidates since their sexual identification 
. 
d l has been - male. (
46) Th 1 f h t· is- an a ways e ma es or w om correc i ve surgery 
should be most successful are those who, from an early age, were femininely 
identified and behaved as girls. They also probably belong to a female circle 
of friends, do not find cross-dressing sexually arousing 
transvestites- and are sexually attracted to heterosexual males 
(47)
homosexuals. 
as do 
unlike 
Motivation for women differs somewhat. There is no female equivalent to 
the male transvestite. No females report arousal by wearing men's 
clothing. C
4
e) The women who make the best candidates for the surgery are
those who behaved as tomboys and retained masculine traits during adolescence. 
These females must be distinguished from 'butch' lesbians - very masculine 
acting homosexual females - who 
(49)not men, 
45. Fleming ( 2) op cit 424
46. Bro mwell op cit 407.
47. Ibid.
4B. Ibid.
49. �-
consider themselves very masculine, but 
68 
For the doctor attempting to help the potential transsexual, historical 
analysis differs from the average patient. Since potential transsexuals 
appear to be greatly affected by accounts of their biological features, 
clinical emphasis has shifted from evaluating their history, to evaluating 
their present and future. Thus the patients are obliged to live in the chosen 
sex role for a period of time. 
B. Pre-operative Treatment Period
This living in the desired sex role is  to assess the measure of success hoped
to be achieved after actual surgery has been undertaken. This obviously
brings with it, a number of legal problems and social difficulties. < 50l A
most important consideration is the length of time in which the patient is
observed, prior to surgery, Dr Randell of Charing Cross Hospital, London,
requires 
prior to 
his patients 
(51) surgery. 
there has been
to live in the desired 
He does not consider 
sex 
the 
for at least six months
surgery justified unless
" ••• unequivocal demonstration that they are markedly 
better adjusted in the role they desire than the role 
(52)
they have left." 
During this pre-operative period, contra-sex hormones are usually 
d · · d ( 
53 
) S . th d . £ h 1 
. th h a m1n1stere • 1nce e J.Scovery o ormones ear y J.n e century, t ey 
(54) 
have been successfully isolated and produced. For males, the 
administration of the female hormones oestrogen and progesterone, is 
prescribed. This is referred to as 'hormonal castration'. <
55
> This hormonal 
treatment has two effects: 
50. Vide chapter five infra, which deals with such legal issues.
51, Smith op cit 978. 
52. Ibid.
53. Bromwell op cit 408.
54. Morris op cit 100. She reveals that the pills she took. thrice-daily, 
were manufactured in Canada from the urine of pregnant mares (ibid). 
55. Raymond op cit 32.
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1. it suppresses the existing physiological characteristics1 and
2 d l d . • h . . 1 h . . ( 56) • eve ops an maintains t e opposite anatomica sex c aracteristics.
"This femininisation of the male patient can be 
accomplished by female hormones ••• which develop the 
breasts, soften the skin, reduce the body hair, diminish 
erections and decrease libidinous conflict by suppressing 
. (57) testicular androgen production." 
In addition, the gonads are inhibited, the testes atrophy, the distribution 
of the subcutaneous fat is altered in the female direction and muscular 
strength diminishes. Very often, beard growth hardly diminishes and for 
this reason, the transsexual is obliged to undergo a costly and discomforting 
f 1 · ( 
58 
) d h ' h 
' 
1 ' 1 process o electro ysis. As regar s t e voice, t ere is very itt e 
• ( 59) alteration, and many of the transsexuals seek speech therapy. 
Hormones are administered in diverse ways: the oestrogens of 17B estriol
and esterone can be taken orally. Estradiol-monobenzoate can be 
intramuscularly injected, biweekly• The oestrogens can also be applied as 
. 1 h l' . d b b d h h h k' (
6
0J S hointments or a co o 1c solutions an a sor e t roug t e s in. uc 
hormonal treatment is long-term and in many cases, lifelong. 
For the female, androgen is prescribed during the trial period. This 
masculinising hormone will lower her voice and will promote the growth of 
facial hair. Androgen also cause the ceasation of menses, promotes general 
corporal hair growth and causes cliteral hypertrophy. Another result of 
adrogen administration 
t ·t· . (61)gra i 1cat1on • 
may be the increased desire for sexual 
56. C Hamburger 'Endocrine Treatment of Male and Female Transsexuals' cited
in Green and Money op cit 291.
57. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 454.
5B. Bromwell op cit 409. 
59. Ibid.
60. Raymond op cit 32.
61. Bromwell oo cit 409.
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"The transexual cannot have accurate knowledge or feeling 
of the experience of living and being treated as a member 
of the opposite sex until he spends sufficient time living 
in that role... Present data indicate that the length 
of time spent by a patient in actual experience in the 
opposite sex role prior to surgery is of critical 
importance in our determining the extent of the possible 
future cases." 
(62)
After the stage of living as a member of the opposite sex has been completed 
successfully, surgery becomes a medical confirmation of what has by now, 
become a social fact. 
C. The Actual Surgery
a. Male to female construction
The surgery requires the combined techniques of a gynaecologist, urologist 
· 
( 63) 
and a plastic surgeon. The total procedure takes place in three stages,
although all of them may not be desired by �he patient. These are penectomy, 
orchiectomy(removal of testes) and vaginoplasty {creation of an artifical 
vagina). Some transsexuals only undergo the first and second steps and indeed, 
(64)
some writers recommend this approach. 
The vagina is constructed by creating a cavity between the prostate gland 
and the rectum. An artificial vagina is formed from a skin graft from the 
. ( 65) 
thigh, and lined with penile or scrotal tissue. Thus orgasmic sensation
is possible. The shape of the artificial vagina is maintained by a mould 
that is worn continuously for several weeks following surgery. Once healing 
has occured, manual dilation or penile in'sertion at least biweekly, is 
necessary to prevent narrowing which can result through the contraction of 
the scar tissue. 
(6G) 
62. N Knoiret al 'Psychiatric Evaluation of Male Transsexuals for Surgery'
cited in Green and Money op cit 132.
63. Morris op cit 102.
64. For example, Hamburger op cit note 56 supra.
65, N Block and A Tessler 'Transsexualism and Surgical Procedures' (March 
l 9.7l.) ,-.6 urgery, �ynaecology 
, 
and • Obstetrics 13 2 •
66. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld op cit 645.
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"After the operation, a speculum had been inserted in 
the vagina (a beak-like instrument that can be screwed 
open and closed). This is to prevent the vagina from 
closing up, and to guarantee the smooth healing· of the 
vaginal walls, which are heavily clotted with blood while 
the blood vessels re-align themselves. Every morning 
the speculum had to be removed, to allow for examination, 
and this in itself was another painful procedure.•1
671
The next most common step is the enlargement of the breasts -:- usually with 
inserted implants. This is often followed up with increased oestrogen 
(68) 
therapy. Following surgery, the transsexual receives oral maintenance
doses of oestrogen thus becoming a medically-managed individual. 
nwithout these hormones, post-operative patients would 
experience climacteric symptoms, including hot flushes 
d ' . f 1 d " ( 
69
)and eter1orat1.on o genera bo y tone. 
Surgery often does not end with vaginal construction. Secondary operations 
are often sought - by the patient, usually for aesthetic reasons and/or to 
correct real or psychologically felt complications. This cosmetic surgery 
frequently has nothing to do with refashioning the genitalia themselves. It 
ranges from limb surgery to eye surgery, to skin revision and even tattoo 
excisl..-on. (70) "11 th d d t k b th t l " n ese proce ures are un er a en y e ranssexua 1.n
the hope of conforming more to the fashionable, stereo-typed bodily image. C
7l)
67. Fallowell and Ashley op cit 88.
68. Raymond op cit 33.
69. Benjamin and Ihlenfeld
70. Raymond op cit 34.
71. Ibid.
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She consulted a psychiatrist and psychologist who referred her to a 
gynaecologist. The latter firmly concurred with Lauren's decision to undergo 
corrective surgery, and he stated that it was really the only choice she 
had for reaffirming her 'womanhood 1•
176
)
"I was in hospital for four days and had the corrective 
surgery completed in one session. Physically it was 
almost like having a nose job: I was in pain but didn't 
feel like I'd undergone a dramatic transformation. It 
wasn"t exactly a pleasant experience, but I survived 
and left hospital feeling exactly the same person - except 
with more confidence and an overwhelming sense of 
release ••• After all those years, I really was a woman ••• 
Physically, I've never encountered any problems ••• I 
function totally successfully as a woman 
. (77) 
emotionally and mentally." 
sexually, 
The gynaecologist who performed Lauren's operation has, in fact, performed 
most of these operations in South Africa, and he commented an Lauren's case: 
"I first met Lauren when she was seventeen ••• Even at 
that young age, she was exceptionally emotionally mature. 
She was extremely feminine ••• in every way it seemed 
right that she should be a woman. She was also 
anatomically very well suited to corrective surgery ••• 
corrective surgery is a highly complicated business: 
it is not just a question of creating a vagina. In women, 
the bones of the pelvic arch are fairly wide open, so 
that a baby's head can go through. A typical male pelvis 
however, is· very narrow, often making it very difficult 
to create a vagina in an acceptable position... Lauren 
was lucky. She is anatomically very feminine... She had 
no adverse masculine features that could handicap a 
surgical approach, and presented none of the problems 
associated with the more anatomically masculine patients. 
She doesn't even have any problem with body or facial 
h 
. n ( 78) air. 
76. Ibid. Lauren was seventeen years of age, and one of the youngest people
in South Africa to undergo the treatment. There is little regulation
and no state control in any way in the treatment as the Department of
Health and Welfare informed this author.
77. Note 74 supra. Lauren claims that most of her boyfriends never suspected
that she was anything but a woman.
78 • .lli.2_. 
73 
Bleeding can be a problem in the breast area. The lack of overlying breast 
tissue covering the implants, offers little protection from even the slightest 
• · {?2) h · . b . h . inJury. Sue inJury may cause su sequent expulsion of t e prosthesis,
again necessitating further surgery. As far as the genitalia are concerned, 
problems may also arise. It has been reported that surgical complications 
are uncommon, but the most recurrent ones include the narrowing of the vagina, 
recto-vaginal fistulas and the narrowing of the urethra. 
been said that, 
Overall, it has 
"••· the final external appearance of the genitalia varies, 
not only from patient to patient, but with the surgical 
technique employed. Few patients are truly satisfied. 
(73) Many seek corrective changes •. " 
One very satisfied post-operative transsexual, is the South African model, 
(74) Lauren. She was born a boy into a conservative and sheltered family 
life. By the time she was eleven years old she realised she was more female 
than male. 
"I started thinking about where I was going and what 
I wanted to be, and becoming increasingly convinced that 
being a boy was definitely not the correct path for me ••• 
By the time -I had matriculated I'd rea lised that I was 
always going to want to be a woman. That in almost every 
II ( 75) 
way I� a woman. 
72. Raymond op cit 35.
73. Creighton, Belinder and Govilian cited in Raymond op cit 35.
74. 'Beautiful Lauren was born a.Boy' (1 June 1984) Scope Magazine 36.
75. Ibid. She studied Beauty Culture and Physiology and qualified as a Beauty
Therapist in Durban.
74 
The proof of the success of the operation in this case, is that Lauren is 
. (79)one of South Africa's top models. 
b. Female to male construction
Tai tz ( 
80
) is of the opinion that the operations for the female transsexual
are not as complicated as • those for the male transsexual. However, because
of the inherent difficulties in construc.ting a functional penis, experts . 
(81)
are hesitant to suggest surgery for the female transsexual. 
Again, the surgery usually involves several steps, all of which are not 
necessarily undertaken. Mastectomy, hysterectomy and ooporectomy (removal 
of the ovaries) are the surgical procedures which most female transsexuals 
(82)
undergo. 
Since testosterone causes only ·moderate reduction in the- breasts, the patient 
usually undergoes a mastectomy. The hysterectomy and the removal of the 
ovaries constitute the following step. The vagina remains. Phallus 
construction, when undertaken, begins in conjunction with the hysterectomy. 
It is- technically possible to construct a penis surgically, by rotating a 
tube flap of skin from the left lower quadrant of the abdomen and closing 
the vaginal orifice. A urinary conduit can be led through such a phallus, 
so that the constructed penis may be used for urination. (SJ) But the new 
penis lacks senei ti vi ty and can become erect only through the insertion of 
certain stiffening material that remains in the penis all the time or can 
b . d d d h h i 
' h k' (S4)
e inserte an remove t roug an open ng in t e s  in. 
79. Ibid.
80. Taitz op cit 66.
81. R Green 'Sexual Identity Conflict in Children and Adults' cited in Scott
Cole op cit 337,
82. Raymond op cit 36.
83. many surgeons have decided against 
can be used for urination. Instead, 
its existing position beneath the 
However, because of complications, 
constructing the phallus so that it 
the female urethra is maintained in 
constructed penis: Raymond op cit 36. 
75 
Phalloplasy is still far from perfected. Penile construction was developed 
War I by the pioneer British plastic surgeon, Sir Harold during World 
Gillies. 
(BS)
Little progress has been made since the Gillies classic tube-
in-tube 
. ( 86) 
pedicle flap operation. Every attempt must compromise between 
fashioning a pseudo-penis long enough to appear adequate and one short enough 
to permit passing the urethra through the middle. 
. ( 87) 
continue to elude the surgeon." 
"Sensation and erecti li ty 
Many patients accept that the neo-penis typically remains an alien appendage 
while the artificial vagina in the male-female counterpart becomes a part 
of her body image. 
nr feel satisfied with the fact that my new penis is 
cosmetically good. I'm glad to have a penis after 32 
years; if and when something better comes along, I'll 
. ( 88) 
be the first on the doorstep to get 1..t." 
85. Lerf op cit 58. Gillies would show his students slides of a convincing
neo-penis, pieced together from abdominal skin flaps, with the umbilicus
converted to a meatus and exclaim: nyou see gentlemen, a thing of beauty
- but alas, no joy forever."
86. Ibid.
87. c Horton, cited in Leff op cit 58.
88. A female-male transsexual who attended a Norfolk conference with his
wife, cited in Leff op cit SB.
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Many female-male transsexuals stop treatment after obtaining hormone treatment, 
mastectomy and hysterectomy, feeling that they do not wish to undergo the 
(89')
multrstaged procedure of .Phalloplasty. 
(90) 
The last stage has now been reached. The transsexual now maintains his
new sex status for life. 
a member of his chosen sex. 
He appears, behaves and functions in society, as 
(91) 
Both males and females are capable of orgasm. 
There is also obviously no dual sex role after surgery has been performed. 
The individual is no longer of his original sex physically and is also sterile. 
"Post-operatively, transsexuals are able to have 
satisfactory sexual relations as members of their newly 
. ( 92) 
aligned sex." 
89. It is submitted that this is a strong rebuttal to the suggestion that
transsexualism is sex-centred, or in fact, a sexual deviance. The patient
is prepared to accept little rewarding sexual activity, at the price
of appearing as a member of the desired sex. However, some transsexuals
do undergo phalloplasty. In fact there is a report of one patient who
underwent thirty three operations in an attempt to obtain a satisfactory
penis: Raymond op cit 37. The strength of the urge was apparently
encouraged by the 'fear of discovery'. Most transsexuals express anxiety
about· being placed in an uncontrolled environment, through accident or
illness and thereby being unmasked: Raymond op cit 38.
90. On average, the male-female surgery and hospitalisation can cost from
. $3 000 to $6 000. The . female-male operation involves more surgery and
can cost up to $12 000: Raymond op cit 22.
91. One follow-up study reported a 95% post-operative orgasm success and
a 26% marriage ra.te among male-female patients: Leff op cit 45.
92. J Money 'Sex Errors of the Body' cited in Scott Cole op cit 338. Post
operatively, the male transsexual does not experience the typical 'penis
phantom' as is found in amputations. The penis was not the centre of
erotic stimulation and seems expenda�le. This disregard of penile
eroticism represents an inhibition of . functioning, sustained by the
feminine gender identity, which the patient describes as his 'mental
femininity": Crowitz op cit 1.
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.Aa Dr Randell commented in regard to male-female transsexuals, 
"••• typical comments after the operation include feelings 
of deep satisfaction at having achieved, as they felt, 
a true f ernale status, despite adrniss ion that they were 
in fact only castrated, feminised males. They reported 
an absence ·of self-consciousness and a feeling of being 
at ease and having ultimately achieved a happy state 
with more peace of mind. Increased feelings of femininity 
occured, along with the development of a sense of identity 
with all . women. They began to think of themselves as 
women, rather than disabled males. The fear of detection 
and being suspected disappeared, despite the fact that 
several were not entirely credible. as females. Several 
described a- sense of release and a change of mental 
attitudeJ they felt that it was now impossible to prove 
that they were not women. Most expressed a level of 
satisfaction in their new castrated status, far superior 
to anything they had experienced as men. .Acceptance 
as women by other women and by the world at large was 
the ultimate satisfaction. The possession of a female 
1 f d . t th . II ( 93 )vu va was o secon ary importance o is._ 
After surgery has been performed, it is desirable, and in fact, necessary 
to have a post-operative follow-up, which is aimed at the total assimilation 
of the individual into society, in the 'new' role. 
D. Post-operative Assessment
The beginning of serious research was 
Benjamin I s classic follow-up study on 
initiated with the publication of Dr 
(94) post�operative transsexuals. Of 
73 men and 20 women who underwent the surgery, 85% of the men and 951 of 
the women, showed satisfactory outcomes. These assessments were based on 
impressionistic evidence; patients' personal reports and anecdotal material 
in respect of the patients' socio-biological and psychological statuses. There 
were as yet, no attempts to obtain standardised data from each patient. <
95
)
93. Green .and Money op cit 374-5. Self-image, more than
be the underlying motivation for corrective surgery:
not display usually strong sex drivesz Leff op cit 58.
94. Benjamin op cit 128.
95. Ibid.
libido, seems 
transsexuals 
to 
do 
78 
Later, in 1966 , Benjamin published further findings on fifty one post-operative 
transsexuals. 
"Assessment 
considered 
of 
'good' 
post-operative status was made and 
if the total life situation was 
successful and with good integration into the world of 
women and an acceptance by society and the patient's 
family ••• If the result lacked one of these features, 
including the ability to experience orgasm, the result 
was considered 'satisfactory' ••• Where appearance and 
functions were unsatisfactory, 'despite relief from 
unhappiness in . the male role, the result of the operation 
was disignated 'doubtful' ••• "
<96) 
There were seventeen cases designated 1 good'1 twenty seven as 'satisfactory': 
five as 'doubtful'· on this assessment. 
having a totally unsatisfactory result. 
Only one patient was regarded as 
Money and Brennan' s (97)study of six post-s.urgical women corroborated 
Benjamin's findings. They concluded that, 
In 1968, 
" ••• the evidence to date, is that sex reassignment does 
indeed improve the human condition of the afflic ted 
individual." (
9B) 
in a review of 121 cases Pau1y
<99> 
concluded that a group of
transsexuals who underwent corrective surgery was ten times more likely to 
have a satisfactory outcome in terms of social and emotional status, than 
a group who did not. 
97. J Money and
Transsexuals'
at 499.
98. Ibid.
J Brennan 'Sexual Dimorphism in 
(1968) 147 Journal of Nervous 
99. I Pauly cited in Lothstein op cit 418.
the Psychology of Female 
and Mental Disorders 487
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John Randell reported on post-operative results of 29 men and 6 women. 
(lOO)
According to the rnale and female adjusting ratings, 72% of the men and 83% 
of the women, had satisfactory outcomes. Although two of the men committed 
suicide, Randell concluded that the patients as a whole, demonstrated lessened 
environmental conflicts; significantly decreased levels of anxiety and 
improvements in family relationships and employment. 
The 
"The post-operative results reported above indicate that 
the majority of males and females undergoing the operation 
for sex reassignment are subjectively improved both in 
their adjustment to their environment and in their own 
feelings of 
1 
,. .(101)ro e .  
� 
well-being and 
follow-up studies throughout 
satisfaction in the gender 
the 1960's focused on gross 
socio-psychological measures of improvement, entirely. The consensus of 
was that the surgery was a treatment of choice for the these studies 
patient. 
(l02) 
. h f . 1 . ( 1
0
3) . . t. Despite t e ew negative cone usions, most investiga ions
were optimistic about the surgery. Citing an 80% 'cure' rate for the surgery, 
the investigators were in accord that traditional psychiatric intervention 
was to no avail in the treatment of transsexualism, whereas the operative 
intervention was. 
(l04)
Throughout the 1970's, an increasing number of transsexuals sought corrective 
surgery. Encouraged by the changing societal views as regards sex roles, 
many of them were given external support to change their sex, rather than 
h . h f h i h l · d' 
( l05)
t e internal probing as to t e nature o t e r psyc o ogical i stress. 
Lacking a formal scheme for the diagnosis of the syndrome, and lacking 
standards in medico-surgical care, the profession of psychiatry was unprepared 
100. J Randell 'Pre-_operative and Post-operative Status of Male and Fem.ale
Transsexuals' cited in Green and Money op cit 156.
101. Ibid.
102. Lothstein op cit 419.
103. For example, cases of suicide, psychiatric disturbances and role-reversal.
104. Lothstein op cit 419.
105. Ibid.
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to respond adequately to the transsexual's plight. Furthermore, follow-
up became increasingly difficult as the surgery was 
initial 
now widely 
studies in 
(106) 
offered. Desp1.te these procedural difficulties, the 
the 1970' s widened the field of investigation and continued to contribute 
(107) 
significantly to advances in knowledge of the syndrome. 
The first apparent study of the 1970' s was that of Money and Ehrhardt. 
( lOS) 
They investigated seventeen men and seven women and compared the patients' 
pre-operative and post-operative adjustment along five dimensions: 
L capacity for a lasting relationship with a partner; 
2. adjustment to work:
3. criminality;
4. mental state; and
5. patient's subjective opinion of the result.
Only one woman was reported to have been dissatisfied with the cosmetic results 
but she nevertheless stated that she would undergo the procedure again. The 
patients' general satisfactory adjustment, prompted the investigators to 
conclude that, 
� ••• if one is able to stipulate specific criteria for 
sex reassignment surgery, then it can be seen that the 
outcome of the sex change, that is, the psychological 
and social situation of the transsexual, is often times 
better than worse." (
l09) 
In the second study in the 1970 's, Hoenig et al 
(llO) 
reviewed the literature 
on sex reassignment surgery and reported on a follow-up of eight of their 
own patients. Although one of the patients was judged to have a·poor outcome, 
none of them expressed regret over the surgery, and the authors concluded 
that, 
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. J Money and A Ehrhardt 'Transsexuelle nach Geschlechtswechsel' cited
in Lothstein op cit 419.
109. Ibid.
110. J Hoenig et al 'Surgical Treatment for Transsexualism' (1971) 47 Acta
Psychiatra Scandanavia 106 at 133.
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n • • •  the treatment helps the majority of patients, both 
subjectively and objectively ••• But the operation can 
. (111) in no sense be regarded as a cure."
This was the first study to acknowledge that high incidence of psychopathology 
among post-operative transsexuals and to challenge the notion that the surgery 
can cure the transsexual. 
Ihlenfeld' s 
i ( 112)
rev ew of Benjamin's findings, indicated that most aduli; 
transsexuals achieved good results with sex reassignment surgery. Bis optimism 
led him to consider the possible surgical benefits for patients in their 
fifties and sixties, 
Wall..nder and ThuL•e
{ll3) h d t d th t · f 11 t d .. ave con uc e e mos extensive o ow-up s u y
to date. They examined the socio-psychiatric histories of twenty four 
reassigned transsexuals and expanded on Money and Ehrhardt's five-fold 
· · ( 114) 
b 1 b 
. 
h . 1 l f . d . 1criteria y e  a orating on t e socia aspects, p ace o res1 ence, socia 
security benefits, alcoholism, criminality, periods of certified sickness 
and disability pensions. Other adjustment criteria included sexual life, 
attitudes of relatives, work records, patient's subjective opinion and 
(115) 
investigators assessment. By studying their patients for at least three 
years post-operatively, they attempted to eliminate the usual immediate post-
surgery adaption effect. They found that the 'biological _females generally 
had a better outcome: overall, 91% of the. women and Ggi of the men had 
satisfactory outcomes. '.J'hese results were consistent with those of Benjamin, 
Randell, Money and Ehrhardt, and Walinder and Thuwe concluded that 
111.�.
112. c Ihlenfeld 'The Outcome of Hormonal-surgical Intervention in the
Transsexual Condition' cited in Lothstein op cit 421.
113. J Walinder and I Thuwe A Social Psychiatric Follow-up Study of 24
Reassigned Transsexuals cited in Lothatein op cit 421.
114. � note 108 supra.
115. � note 113 supra.
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" ••• taking the men and women together, the outcome was 
clearly favourable in 80% of the cases. The proportion 
of unsuccessful cases in our series is about the same 
as that found by Hoenig et al ••• When we considered 
the severe suffering and the many difficulties experienced 
by untreated transsexuals in various fields of life, 
the treatment programme appears to be fully justified 
both mentally and ethically."
(ll6) 
Lothstein (
ll 
7) studied two groups of patients after the surgery: group one
consisted of seven biological males who had undergone the operation before 
the establishment of the gender identity clinic at the Western Reserve Medical 
School while group two - eight biological males and six biological females -
had had surgery after .intensive evaluation and long-term psychological and 
medical treatment. The average follow-up period was one to nine years. This 
was ostensibly the first research study in · which patient data were 
systematically collected and assimilated and in which each patient was required 
(118) 
to participate in intensive psychological treatment. The results
suggested moderate post-surgical sexual and social gains, accompanied by 
:marked depression and psychological confusion. All patients reported however 
on being satisfied subjectively with the surgery. It was· concluded that 
character structure and neurotic functioning were not permanently altered 
by sex surgery. Moreover, it was stated, that all patients should be provided 
with counselling and psychotherapy to enable them to adjust to their new 
socio-sexual status. Corrective surgery does not in itself, cure the patient's 
dilemma: it merely facilitates its resolution. The integration of gender 
l d . d t . d h th 
( 119 ) h . t . b . t d h h ro e an .1 en 1ty nee s psyc o erapy. T us, l. .1s su mit e t at t e
116 • lli.g_. 
117. Lothstein op cit 547.
118 • .!lli· 
119. It is therefore important that the treatment should not stop at the
operation·, but for maximum efficacy, should include post-operative
counselling. It is submitted that even though a person has believed
indefatigably that he is a member of the opposite sex, he has usually
been treated socially as a member of his obvious sex: this crust of imposed
idertity needs to be whittled away with psychiatric assistance, to reveal
the person as a successful participant in his 'new' role.
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germain conclusion of this study was that all pre-operative and subsequent 
post-operative transsexuals should undergo extensive psychotherapy. <
120>
120. This author will be so bold as to opine that this is not only !audible,
bu.t very necessary. The pre-operative analysis should be utilised to
separate those candidates who will receive surgery utlimately, from those
who, it is concluded, . will not benefit from such intervention. Surgery
should be the la�t resort and once performed, post-operative psychotherapy
is vital to enable a firmer and more successful adaptation to the chosen
role.
I INTRODUCTION 
B4 
PART B :  THE LBGALITY OP THE TREATMENT 
CHAPTBR V 
THE PRE-OPERATIVE TRANSSEXUAL. 
"We live in an age which hae more need of good examples 
than of precepts". 
George Herbert 
As has been seen with the preceding chapter, there are various stages of 
treatment the transsexual must undergo, and only the very last is the 
corrective surgery itself. Before that, the pre-operative transsexual 
is obliged to live in the desired role for a length of time. This of course 
brings him within the ambit of special problems, as inherent in the syndrome 
are behavioural patterns that are likely to bring the transsexual into 
contact with the police. In rnany jurisdictions, a person is liable for 
prosecution for cross-dressing and homosexual activities, both of which 
the pre-operative transsexual may encounter to a greater or lesser extent. 
II CROSS-DRESSING 
A. Comparative law.
l. The United States of America.
The laws of at least eleven states in America could be used to prosecute 
l h d . (l) N Y k transsexua s w o cross- +ess prior to surgery. • In ew or , a vagrant
was formerly described as: 
II a person, who having his face painted, colored, 
covered or concealed or being otherwise disguised in 
a manner calculated to prevent his being identified, 
appears in a road, public highway, or in a field, lot, 
(2) wood or enclosure". 
1. These states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon:, Texas, Utah and Washington. One such law was 
originally enacted over one hundred years ago, to deter farmers who 
had been attacking officers who enforced unpopular rent laws. The 
farmers dressed as Indians to disguise themselves. The statute 
accordingly made it illegal to appear publicly, with the· face painted 
or to be otherwise disguised in such a way as to prevent identification: 
New York Penal Law s24O 35 (McKinley 1967). 
2. New York Code of Criminal Procedure sBB7(7) (McKinley 1958).
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The present penal code of New York holds a person guilty of loitering when 
he: 
II being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual 
or unnatural attire or facial alteration, loiters, 
remains or congregates in a public place, except in 
connection with a masquerade party or like 
. " ( 3) entertainment • 
However, the courts have, in many instances taken a different view of the 
problem. In the following cases, ordinances prohibiting cross-dressing 
were held to be prima facie invalid as unconstitutionally vague. In Collllllbus 
(4) 
v Rogers a city ordinance which stated that:
"No person shall appear upon any public street or other 
public place in a state of nudity or in a dress not 
belonging to his/her sex, or in an indecent or lewd 
dress", 
was held to be unconstitutionally vague on the grounds that it failed to 
give fair notice of the conduct forbidden by the ordinance and to provide 
guidelines to law-enforcement officers. The court noted that modes of 
dress for men and women are historically subject to changes of fashion. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon today, for individuals to purposefully, but 
innocently, wear apparel which is int�nded as the attire of those of the 
opposite sex. The defect then, is that the term of the ordinance, when 
considered in the light of contemporary dress habits, makes it too vague 
so that nmen of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its ·application". 
A similar statute was held to be vague in Cincinati v Adams. ( 
5
) Here,
the defendant moved to dismiss a complaint in which he was charged with 
violating a city ordinance providing that: 
"No person within the city ••• shall appea r in a dress 
or costume not customarily worn by his/her sex, or 
in a disguise when such dress, apparel or disguise 
is worn with the intent of co:mmitting any indecent 
or immoral act or of violating any ordinance of the 
city •.. or law of the state ••• ". 
3. Cited in Smith .2E. cit 990.
4. (1975) 41 Ohio St 2d 161 12 ALR (4th) 1250.
5. (1974) 42 Ohio Misc 48 71 12 ALR (4th) 1250.
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The court rejected the defendant's contention that a transvestite's mode 
of dress is an expression protected by the First Amendment. Although 
recognising that freedom of expression is not limited exclusively to speech 
and could include one's manner of dress and personal grooming, if truly 
representative of a philosophy, idealism or point of view, the court held 
that there was no evidence to support the defence contention that his costume 
represented a philosophy or ideal. However, the court did hold the ordinance 
to be unconstitutionally vague and violative of the defendant's right to 
due process, as it failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that his contemplated conduct was forbidden by the statute. The 
court noted further, that the ordinance not only limited one's mode of 
dress in public, • but that its prohibitions also extended to the privacy 
of one's own home. 
In the following cases, . ordinances specifically dealing with cross-dressing 
- although not found to be unconstitutionally vague - were held to be
or invalid as applied to the· particular defendants. In Doeinapplicable 
(6) 
v Mcconn - an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by 
transsexual defendants who cross-dressed in preparation for corrective 
surgery - the court. declared a city ordinance making it illegal to appear 
in public areas "dressed with the designed intention to disguise his/her 
sex as that of the opposite sex" unconstitutional as applied to the 
particular defendants. The court noted than an integral part of pre-surgical 
treatment requires the transsexual to wear the clothes of the desired sex,
throughout the pre-operative stage, and that the ordinance in question 
directly inhibited treatment of the transsexual. The court noted that 
no exception· for the transsexual had in fact been made under the ordinance 
in question, even when such person was under a doctor's care. 
Similarly, in Chicago v Wilson ( 
7
) the court held that a city ordinance
prohibiting any person from appearing in a· public place "in a dress not 
belonging to his/her sex with the intent to conceal his/her sex"
(S) 
was 
unconstitutional for the two male defendants who were required to wear 
female clothing and adopt a female lifestyle as part of pre-operative 
therapy. The court stated that the city had asserted four reasons for the 
total ban on cross-dressing in public: 
6. (1980 SD Tex 489F Supp 76 12 ALR (4th) 1251.
7. (1978) 75 Ill 2d 525 12 ALR (4th) 1251.
B. Municipal Code of the City of Chicago sl92-8.
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1. to protect citizens from fraud�
2, to aid in the description and detection of criminals1
3. to prevent crimes in washroomsi and
4. to prevent inherently anti-socia1 behaviour which is contrary to
the accepted norms of society.
The court stated that finding that the Constitution provided the individual 
with some measure of protection with regard to his choice of appearance, 
answers only the initial issue. The second issue is to determine the 
circumstances under 
(9) 
Johnson suggests, 
which 
the 
the interest can be 
degree of protection 
infringed. As 
to be accorded
Kelly V
to an 
individual's choice of appearance is dependant on the context in which 
the right is asserted. It is therefore encumbent on the state to analyse 
both the circumstances unde.l:" which the right is asserted, and the reasons 
which the state offers for its intrusion. 
The court found no evidence to support the four reasons put forward by 
the city and .noted that neither of the defendants were engaged in deviant 
sexual conduct or any other criminal activity and that without evidence 
to the contrary, it could not. assume that individuals who cross-dress for 
purposes of therapy, are prone to commit crimes. 
The court, in dismissing the charges, also pointed out that the state had 
enacted a statute authorising the . issuance of a new birth certificate 
following surgery (lO) and that the legislature therefore had recognised 
impliedly the necessity and the validity of the surgery. It would be 
inconsistent therefore, to allow the surgery yet at the same time impede 
the necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery. It is submitted 
9, (1976) 425 US 238,96 S Ct 1440 12 ALR (4th) 1251. The Supreme Court 
was confronted with the issue of whether one's choice of · appearance 
was constitutionally protected from government infringement. The court 
acknowledged that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
�affords not only a procedural guarantee against deprivation of 'liberty' 
but likewise, protects substantive aspects of liberty against 
unconstitutional restrictions by the state", The court observed however, 
that it assumed that the population at large does have some sort of 
liberty interest in. matters of personal appearance. Powell J (at 1447) 
stated that: "when-the state has an interest in regulating one's personal 
appearance there must be a weighing of . the degree of infringement of 
the individual's liberty interest against the need for the regulation". 
10. Vital Records Act (Ill Rev Stat 1977) ch 111¼ para 73 sl7 (l)(d),
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that one could extend this recognition of the validity of the surgery as 
to the recognition of status of the person thereafter, because it is just 
as inconsistent to allow the surgery and then to give little, or no legal 
effect thereto. 
The court went on to state that it had long recognised restrictions upon 
the state's power to regulate matters pertinent to one's choice of lifestyle 
which has not been demonstrated to be harmful to society's health, safety 
or welfare. 
{ll) 
"The notion that the state can regulate one's personal 
appearance, unconfined by any constitutional strictures 
whatsoever, is fundamentally inconsistent with values of 
privacy, self-identity, autonomy and personal integrity that 
(12) 
••• the constitution was designed to protect". 
In Columbus 
(13) 
v Zanders, , unlike the Mcconn and Wilson cases, the court 
did not hold the ordinance in question to be unconstitutional, but held 
instead that the defendant could not be criminally responsible for violating 
the ordinance where, because he was a true transsexual suffering from a 
mental defect over which he had little control, his conduct, in dressing 
and posing as a female, was more the result of an irresistible impulse 
or loss of will power than a deliberate act cif violation of the ordinance 
in question. The court rejected however that the ordinance deprived the 
defendant of the right of expression, or of privacy, or of due process, 
noting that the ordinance had a very real relation to public safety and 
general welfare. It is submitted that the rationes of this case will not 
be fol,lowed readily, as there is ample evidence to the contrary, that a 
transsexual is not suffering from a 'mental defect'. 
11. Haller Sign Works v Physical Culture Training School (1911) 249 Ill
436, 94 NE 920. In this case, which involved the. regulation of 
billboards for aesthetic purposes, the court noted "the citizen has 
always been supposed to be free to determine the style of architecture 
of his house . . . the style and quality of the clothes that he and his 
family will wear and it has never been thought. that the legislature 
could invade private rights so far as to prescribe the course to be 
pursued in these and other matters, although the highly cultured may 
find on every street in every town and city, many things that are not 
only open to criticism but shocking to the aesthetic taste n (at 923 
of the report). 
12. Kelly v Johnson supra.
13. (1970) 25 Ohio Misc 144 54 Ohio Ops 2d 142, 266 NE 2d 6021 12 ALR (4th)
1251.
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B. South Africa.
In South Africa, there is no Parliamentary enactment directly in paint
on the issue of cross-dressing. However, a person can he convicted of
public indecency if his conduct either tends to deprave or if it outrages
(14) 
public decency. It would appear that cross-dressing could fall under
this broad tenet. However, the circumstances under which the conduct is
performed, must be taken into account, as has been stated in R v M ( 
15
)
in which it was concluded that
"(although) courts of law certainly discountenance 
anything immoral there (must be) some acts of an 
Milton 
immoral nature which they cannot reach". 
(16) 
submits that it must be a serious affront to public decency 
before the law will step in. Otherwise, the person's conduct should be 
regarded as a piece of private iinmorali ty, unless of course it constitutes 
some other common law or statutory offence. In various provincial 
. (17) 
ordinances it has been stated that
"Any person who is 
. {1B) 
in any street 
(19)
offence". 
guilty of . d b h 
. (lB) 
in ecent e aviour 
or public place • . . commi ta an 
It is submitted that although these enactments conceivably could be extended 
to include cross:-dressing, the state would have to prove conclusively that 
such behaviour is offensive to the public mores, or in fact is illegal 
because it is accompanied by other behaviour such as soliciting, which 
is punishable by law, on its own. 
14. J. Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol II (2nd ed 1982)
257. This tenet was reaffirmed iri S v F 1977(2) SAI(T) at 4F.
15. 1915 CPD 384 at 340.
16 • .Q£ cit 28B.
17 Police Offences Act 1882 (Ch Police Offences Ordinance 1902 ( 0) and
Natal Law No. 15 of 1869.
18, For a definition of what constitutes 'indecent behaviour', vide 
R v Stewart (1910) 27 SC 42 at 43. 
19. s9(Cl and s27(0).
III HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT. 
A. Comparative law.
1. The United States of America.
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At present, there are provisions against homosexual behaviour in at least
(20) 
thirty two of the states.- Statutes prohibiting the commission of lewd
and lascivious acts in an unnatural manner, were ruled constitutional in 
. (21) 
Arizona v Bateman. This decision renders certain acts between consenting
adults - even if married and in the privacy of their own homes - a felony
and subject to imprisonment for up to twenty years. Al though this case
did not deal specifically with the transsexual, it conceivably could apply,
for the court held that the police power of a state may intrude into the
bedrooms of even consenting, heterosexual or homosexual adults and that
the legislature could separate those relations it found 'distasteful' and
. 
· ( 22)
make them subject to punishment. 
In U s v Collins ( 23) the District of Columbia Superior Court indicated
that at least one court was aware of the transsexual's special problems 
l (
2
4
) 
as regards the criminal aw. The court described the police acts
enforcing a sexual exploitation statute against a transsexual, as violating 
the individual's constitutional rights. The defendants were arrested for 
soliciting. In each case, the alleged victims were under cover police 
officers and the solicitations involved words and nothing more. Al though 
the decision revolved around the deception on the part of the police 
officers, the court intimated its cognizance o'f the unique position of 
the transsexual and distinguished this case from those involving solicitation 
for prostitution or for lewd or immoral purposes. The court described the 
police actions as depriving the transsexual of liberty by "exploiting their 
. bl 1 b'l' . " < 25>immuta e vu nera i ities . 
20. For example, New York Penal Code, section 130 (McKinley 1967); s. Twardy
'Medico-Legal aspects of Transsexualism' (1980) Medical Trial Technique
Quarterly 249 at 300.
21. 429 US 1302 50 LED 2d 97 S Ct l ( 1976).
22. It is sul::mitted that such a ruling smacks of militarism which is
totally out of consonance with the values for which the United States
supposedly stand. ·
23. 17 Crim L Rpt 2013 (1975).
24. "Transsexuals are not all hookers, panderers and female impersonators n 
though some· practice these occupations to amass the large sums of money
needed for the hormonal and surgical treatments, Leff� cit 56.
25. 2014 of the report.
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In a survey undertaken by Dr Money at Johns Hopkins, twenty four cases 
were studied in an effort to determine objectively the results of corrective 
(26) 
surgery performed, in social terms. Al though six of the group had
been arrested prior to surgery, - the arrests stemmed from charges of cross­
dressing, impersonation and soliciting - only two were re-arrested. Dr 
Money found it significant that 
n no patients acquired a police record for the first 
time, following reassignment. 
into law-abiding obscurity 
The majority melted 
The cost to society 
for policing and jailing transsexuals did not increase 
it more likely decreased". (
27
)
2. The United Kingdom
(28) 
In 1967, as a result of the Wolfenden Committee Report, the law relating
to homosexual behaviour in England was amended. The Sexual Offences Act <
29> 
now provides inter alia that
"(l) A homosexual act in private shall not be an offence 
provided that the parties consent thereto and have 
attained the age of twenty one years". 
B. South Africa.
In South Africa, a male may be prosecuted under the Imrnorali ty Act <
3
0)
for homosexual conduct. Section 20A states that,
" ( 1) A male person who comrni ts with another male person 
at a party an act which is calculated to stimulate 
sexual passion or to give sexual gratification, shall 
be guilty of an offence". 
(31)
It is interesting that from this wording, female homosexuality is expressly 
excluded, and furthermore, the conduct is only criminal if performed at 
a party. Section 20A(2) defines a 'party' as 
"any occasion where more than two persons are present". 
Thus, the statute does not prohibit such behaviour when performed in private 
and in this regard is similar to the English enactment. In fact the court 
26. Cited in Smith .Q2. cit 977.
27. Ibid.
28. Repo_rt of the Committee of Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957)
. Cmd 247. 
29. (1967) s1.
30. Act 23 of 1957.
31. As inserted by s3 of the Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969.
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in S v C <
32
) held that the object of section 20A was not to punish acts
performed in private. As long as there were no more than two persons 
present, the state had failed to prove its case. 
IV CRITICAL EVALUATION 
In spite of the fact that there exist in the United States statutes which 
prohibit cross-dressing, the courts in general, while interpreting such 
statutes, have found the enactments to be either constitutionally vague 
or inapplicable to the plaintiff concerned. A statute such as that in 
Columbus, should not be permitted to stand as it is. Not only is it vague, 
but it is also impractical as it offers no guidelines and no restrictions 
on the ambit of cross-dressing. The Cincinati statute too, is unacceptable 
as it extends its application to the domain of the home, and as such is 
a gross violation of· the individual's right to privacy. On the wording 
of such statutes it is virtually impossible for a person to know whether 
h J.• s 'tt' ff t Th t ( 
33) h ha b e comm1 1ng an o ence or no • e cour s owever, ve een
aware of the problem which faces the transexual under treatment and have, 
in such cases, decided in favour of the defendant transsexual, at least 
affording him some measure of protection. In South Africa, as has been 
shown, there is no direct enactment in issue, but the law against public 
indecency, could be utilised to prosecute the transsexual who cross-dresses. 
It is submitted, however, that it serves no purpose in today's age of 
androgenous apparel, and all such statutes are impractical in the extreme. 
It is admitted that it is necessary to protect society from any fraud likely 
to be perpetrated against it where a person cross-dresses with the intention 
of er iminally concealing his/her identity, but where such cross-dressing 
is a reflection of cultural fashions or in fact, a necessary part of treat­
ment as with the transsexual, the enactment loses sight of the reason for 
its existence - the protection of society against fraud.
While cross-dressing in publ.ic is also presumably offensive to the general 
public's aesthetic preferences, this preference of society must be balanced 
against the individual's well being. The fear of fraud, washroom crimes, 
and the like, enumerated as reasons for the existence of such statut�a <
34
)
32. 1983 (4) 344 (T).
33. Doe v Mcconn and Chicago v Wilson supra.
34. Chicago v Wilson supra.
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cannot be said to apply to the transsexual under treatment. There is in 
fact no evidence that cross-dressing when performed as part of therapy 
is harmful to society. It is the author's submission that the reason for 
cross-dressing is in fact to facilitate the adaptation of the transsexual 
into society in his new role, and as such, is ultimately beneficial for 
society if such adaptation is successful. Therefore, there can be no logical 
bar against cross-dressing on the part of the pre-operative transsexual. 
Although there are enactments prohibiting homosexuality too, in various 
jurisdictions, in most of them it is only a crime when practiced in public, 
(35) 
with the notable exception of the Arizona statute. With the advent 
of the Wolfenden C .ommittee in England, and the decriminalisition of homo­
sexuality in many of the United States
(36) however, the potential hazard 
with which the pre-operative· transsexual is faced, has been lessened. It 
could of course be argued that a transsexual is not a homosexual, but in 
fact heterosexual in both desire and outlook, and therefore these statutes 
which are aimed · primarily at homosexuals are not applicable to the pre-
operative transsexual. If there is a necessity for such statutes - which, 
it is submitted there is not, as, if adults are consenting they should 
be free to indulge in whatever activities they choose, provided they do 
not harm anyone else - then at least they should not extend to the privacy 
of one's own home. 
V SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
It is submitted that such enactments - where deemed necessary by the social 
mores of the comrnuni ty - which categorically prohibit homosexual behaviour 
and cross-dressing, should be am.ended and made subject to the very real 
exception of the pre-operative transsexual under treatment. Furthermore, 
h t t t t i · t d 
· 
as they stand,<
37
_l serve nosue s a u es per a ning o cross- ressing 
practical purpose as they are too broad to be applied fairly and reasonably. 
Courts then should continue their narrow· ·interpretation of the wording 
as was done in Columbus v Rogers, precluding·such exceptions as transsexuals 
from the ambit of application. From the above decisions dealing with cross­
dressing, it would appear that the courts in the ·United States are going 
out of their way to· find either little, or no application for these statutes 
35. In this day and age, and in a supposedly free country as the States
professes to be, this statute is a gross violation of the individual's·
right to privacy.
36. For example, Conn Gen. Stat Ann section 539-87, SSa-65 (1972).
37 Those mentioned in the United States, and the possible application
of the South African enactment against public indecency. 
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and thus it would appear that the most sensible line of action to adopt 
would be to repeal such statutes, or at least amend them to render them 
practicable and unambiguous, and to make exception for the transsexual. 
If such amendment is not deemed advisable to suit the relatively few trans­
sexuals who come into contact with these various laws, then emphasis should 
be placed on methods to prevent such contact with these laws. 
of John Hopkins advocated that 
" the most obvious guide-line is that if you' re going 
to cross-dress don't be obvious about itn. (JS) 
Dr Meyer 
Another preventative measure is the carrying of a card or letter from the 
doctor, describing the individual's condition and stating that the mode 
of dress and behaviour is required for the purposes of. proper treatment. 
Such a permit has been issued to a pre-operative patient by the Pennsylvania 
. (39) 
Bureau of Special Health Services. The Erickson Foundation will also 
supply such a card upon request and the certification of a physician. The 
authority of such cards is questionable but as one commentator noted, 
" ••• because · generally there is so little law in this 
area, whoever presumes to fill the void is likely to 
have at least some influence". <
4
0)
It is therefore the author's submission that in those jurisdictions in which 
cross-dressing and/or homosexuality are criminal activities including 
South Africa - and in which the legislature cannot see its way to amending 
such laws, then the transsexual should be able· to obtain a certificate from 
his doctor to• advise law enforcement officers of the true position. Such 
certificate then, will be effective proof nullifying the � rea for the 
crime, and as such, the person cannot be said to have committed the crime. 
It is submitted further that such certificates be given legal re·cognition, 
if they are issued after extensive evaluation and the doctor is satisfied 
that the activity involved is necessary for the treatment of the pre-operative 
transsexual. As the ope_ration is performed legally in most jurisdictions (
4l) 
it only seems sensible that all the treatment be legally recognised. 
38. Smith .2.2, cit 990,
39. Ibid.
40. Twardy .2.2, cit 303. Police in Hamburg, Germany, upon a doctor's certifi­
cate issue special cards to transvestites. These cards do not give
permission to cross-dress per � but as a practical matter, make the
transsexual relatively immune from arrest: Smith .2.2, cit 991.
41. Vide chapter six infra for more details in this respect.
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C B A P T B R VI 
THE OPERATION 
I INTRODUCTION 
"Life is not a spectacle or a feast; it is a predica­
ment". 
George Santayana. 
Before discussing the legal position of the post-operative transsexual 
- the subject matter of the next section - the first step is to investigate
the aspects of the operation itself. Therefore it is necessary to decide
from the outset whether or not the operation can be rega+ded as legal. If
the answer is in the negative, then that is the end of that, for the basic
illegality of· 1;:he su.rgery would render any consequences thereto illegal
as well. If on the other hand, the answer is in the affirmative, then
one must take a strong stand for consistency and demand that judicial
cognizance be taken of the post-operative situation, for all purposes. To
prove and sustain the basic legality of the operation, it roust be shown
that corrective surgery is performed for therapeutic purposes.
The second step after the former issue has been decided, is the issue of 
valid consent to such an operation, should it be regarded as basically 
legal. This consent is necessary in order to vitiate any criminal or 
delictual liability on the part of the doctor involved. 
II THE BASIC LEGALITY OF THE SURGERY. 
A. General.
f! priori, any form of bodily harm - including medical operations - is an 
assault, for which one can be liable bot:ti criminally and delictually. In
South African criminal law, an assault is defined as:
" ••• (consisting) in unlawfully and intentionally 
(1) applying force to the person of another or
( 2) inspiring a belief in that other that force is
immediately to be applied to him". (l)
1 • Mil ton £E. cit 466 
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A single a ct �ay constitute both a crime and a deli ct. In general terms, 
a delict can be described as wrongful and blameworthy conduct which causes 
(2) 
harm to a person. The element of wrongfulness constitutes the fundamental 
requisite for delictual liability. (
3
) Conduct is wrongful if it either
infringes a legally recognised right of the plaintiff, or constitutes a 
breach of a legal duty owed by the defendant · to the plaintiff. ( 
4) 
Various
formulations have been offered as criteria for wrongfulness: 
( 5)
1. reasonableness; 
2 l 1 . t· £ h. . (5) d• ega convic ions o t e community; an 
3 b . 
(7)
• � mores. 
Policy issues - weighing up conflicting interests such as history, morality 
and justice - have become recognised increasingly as playing a role in 
( 8)the issue of wrongfulness. 
'"n Handeling is wederegtelik nie alleen wanneer di t 
in stryd met 'n wet of die gemene reg is nie, maar ook 
wanneer dit in stryd is met die redelikheid soos aangewys 
en bekragtig deur die natuurreg."
(9l 
It is an open debate as to whether the objective of corrective surgery 
falls into the category of justifiable non-therapeutic treatment, or if 
it in itself could be considered as therapeutic. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
I  Surgery is lawful provided its object is to cure the 
patient." 
(lO)
Voet Cornmentarius 41.1.l; Whittaker v Roos and Bateman; Morant v Roos 
and Bateman 1912 AD 92 at 113, The general principles of the modern 
law of delict in South Africa essentially are derived from the Roman­
Dutch law: J,c. Van der Walt Delict: Principles and Cases (1981) 11.
Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A). 
Van der Walt £12_ cit 21: Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommy Meyer Films 
{Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T). 
Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (l\D) at 111-
112. 
6. Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3} SA 590 (AD).
7. Meskin v Anglo-American Corporation 1�68 (4) SA 793 (W) at 807.
8, Administrator, Natal v Trust Bank 1979 (3) SA 824 (AD).
9. Strauss Toestemming tot benadeling as verweer in die Strafreg en die
Deliktreg (1961) (hereinafter referred to as 'Strauss (l)') 217.
10. P.H. Winfield On Tort (6th ed 1954) 29. Therapy per � has covered
a multitude of medical sins: the 'welfare of the individual or society'
has often provided a camouflage for the worst forms of experimentation,
for example, pre-frontal lobotomy.
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There are many uncertainties inherent in a nebulous term such as 'therapy'. 
How, for instance, is the therapeutic value of treatment to be decided? 
Is the overriding consideration the success of the operation; the opinion 
of the surgeon or the subjective report of the patient? Take for instance 
the case of plastic surgery. This form of medicine is a growing branch 
of the profession and in great demand, not only in emergencies, but 
cosmeticall.y as well. What of the patient with a perfectly acceptable 
nose who nevertheless wishes it to be converted into 'the perfect nose'? 
There may be no objective therapeutic value to such procedure yet it may 
result in profound and lasting subjective changes in the confidence and 
( 11) 
self-esteem of the person concerned. It is submitted that a transsexual 
is seeking very similar treatment. Corrective surgery can be seen to include 
a very elaborate f orrn of plastic surgery, and in these cases, the urge 
for the change is not due to supposed 'vanity' but to a desperate attempt 
to attain social acceptance, and thus, happiness. 
In America the interest in beauty should be accepted 
as a warrant for doing surgically sanctioned procedures, 
if not attended by appreciable risk of death", 
{l2)
and 
"Toestemming tot die kosmetiese operasie kan nie 
sander meer as sederstrydig aangesien word nie, tensy 
die operasie 'n bedreiging vir die lewe of gesondheid 
van die benadeelde inhou. Selfs ernstige ingrypings 
van kosmetiese aard kom as geregverdig voor, waar die 
oogmerk is om h nadelige psigiese toestand van die 
(13)
benadeelde te bekamp". 
Criticism of the controversial subject of corrective surgery focuses on 
two main points: 
1. the questionable appropriateness of surgery, to bring a healthy body
into conformity with the demands of a psychological disorder: a
. (14) paradoxical use of the healing art; .and
11. M.T. Edgerton . 'A new Male-Female Surgical Technique' {1973) 61
Procedings of the Second Interdisciplinary Symposium on Gender Dysphoria
Syndrome ·139 (hereinafter referred to as 'Edgerton {l)').
12. Strauss {1) .2E. .£!..t. 468 citing Smith 'Antecedent Grounds ..• in Surgery'
(1942) 14 Rocky Mt Law Review 233.
13. Ibid. It is submitted that having the 'wrong' body for one's 
psychological sex can be regarded as "� nadelige psigiese toestand." 
14. O'Donovan .QE. cit 137.
2. 
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(15)
The questionable long-term benefit to the patient. 
The medical 
corrective 
profession 
(16) 
surgery. 
is not 
Most 
in complete 
clinicians 
concord as to the wisdom of 
who recommend the surgery as
treatment of choice also tend to believe that psychotherapy is useless 
with gender dysphoric patients. On the other hand, those clinicians who 
consider the surgery as an illegitimate form of treatment, usually 
h t . ' t " . 1 
. 
d t . th 
. " ( l 7 ) 
Th . t t c arac erise 1 as muti. ati.ve an an 1.- erapeutic • ey pain o
the complex psychological, legal, medical and bioethical issues that are 
neglected or by-passed by the reassignment procedures. They argue that 
the surgery leads to mistreatment and mismanagement of the gender dysphoric 
. (18) 
patient. In one study, the majority of the 300 physicians questioned 
opposed 
(19) 
corrective surgery for the transsexual. In support of their 
view, the clinicians cited studies indicating that various modes of 
psychotherapy can stabilise the gender dysphoric patient successfully, 
(20) 
without recourse to surgery. 
(21) 
Dr Pauly undertook a survey in 1966 and concluded that neither a majority 
of psychiatrists, nor the general practitioners questioned, would approve 
of the operation, despite the fact that only one in four was actually of 
the opinion that. such surgery would be detrimental to the patient. 
led Pauly to conclude that other factors influenced their decisions. 
"It appears that the primary deterrent is a practical, 
self-protective one, wherein the physician is reluctant 
' 'd. h. h d . d · · 11 
( 22)
to Jeopar ise is ar -earne reputation . 
This 
15. Studies indicate a high vulnerability to depression in post-operative
transsexuals, although there are of course many who report a greater
contentment. A disturbing minority wish . to return to their original
sex role, (ibid). It is submitted that perhaps in these instances
pre-operative evaluation had not been thorough enough.
16. Smith ..QE. ill 973, vide_ chapter four supra for more details on post-
operative assessment.
17 Smith .2.E. cit 973.
18. Lothstein _2£ cit 417.
19. R. Green 'Attitudes towards Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment' in
Green and Money� cit 14.
20. L. Lothstein and S. Levine 'Expressive Psychotherapy with Gender
Dysphoric Patients' cited in Lothstein £E_ cit 417.
21. Pauly 2E. cit 460.
22. Th!!!-
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He justified this conclusion on the basis of the answers supplied by these 
practitioners regarding a legal change of sex after surgery has been 
performed. 75% recommended a 'legal change of sex', 80% favoured legal 
permission for the patient to be identified and to marry in the 'new' role 
. (23)
and 50% would even allow the converted transsexual to adopt a child. 
Two years later, Dr Pauly administered a second test and found more 
(24 ) 
favourable results. He concluded that
" it is possible that this represents a real 
trend in the last few years towards more acceptance 
of the transsexual's problem, related to the influence 
of numerous publications and presentations from 
(25) 
.the institutions (performing the surgery) ••• ". 
A corollary of the main issue of therapy is the question as to whether 
or not, medicine is obliged to alleviate all suffering and to render the 
world 'disease-free'. There are many ethical issues to be considered, 
especially in the instance of transsexualism. It has in fact been suggested 
, (26) 
that a 'change of . sex' would be aga1.ns t the laws of God and nature. 
This is an illogical absurdity: man, having been endowed with supposed 
free will, wisdom and intelligence - the mere biological terminology of 
'homo sapiens' speaks for itself - is now, according to the propounder 
of such a view, unable to utilise these qualities to rectify 'mistakes 
of nature'. If such inter£ erence on the part of God I s 'own images' were 
contra natura, this would cause all a dvancements in the field of science 
and medicine to be against God's wishes. The malformed baby then should 
be denied corrective surgery; the siamese twins condemned to a life of 
bondage; and so forth - hardly in keeping with the Christian doctrine of 
a benign, omniscient God. The author can find no religious authority 
suggesting that man is not entitled to meliorate his lot. On the contrary: 
23. Ibid.
24. Cited in Smith £E_ cit 976.
25. �-
26. The Irish Times 23 April 1983, reporting on a case concerning
homosexuals. 
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"Were you a slave when called? Never mind. But if 
you can gain your freedom, avail yourself of the 
. (27) opportunity." 
If one is to subscribe to the doctrine of free will one must do so for 
all purposes. God only decreed Ten Commandments: all other human actions 
should he left necessarily to individual discretion. 
" ••• the current availability of reputable physician 
teams who offer sincere efforts to understand and treat 
the .. transsexual patient, may represent the greatest 
progress that medicine has made over the past decade 
in dealing with gender disorders ••• certainly it offers 
doctors unrivalled opportunity to study and understand 
the dynamics .of gender as it relates to human function 
. (28) 
and self-imagery h . 
27. l Corinthians 7. 21. While on a religious tangent, the author would
like to make mention of several views of the established Church. Jewish
law prohibits' sterilisation, and as the corrective surgery includes
sterilisation it would appear that a doctor should refuse the
transsexual's request, because the primary prohibition falls on the
doctor. B.A. Brody, E.F. Healy 'Marriage, Morality and Sex Change'
(August 1981) Hastings Centre Report 8 at 9. But if neither patient
or physician is· Jewish, logically there can be no prohibition. From
the Catholic point of view, it would appear that the surgery is approved
of for certain forms of hermaphroditism as a remedy for 'nature's
defects': Brody 2E. cit 10. But it is a totally different matter where
"psychic hermaphroditism" - as Healy puts it - is concerned. "Exising
the testes and penis would constitute a grave mutilation of the human
body" (ibid). Two points are apparent from Healy' s approach: 1. That
basic gender is determined by genitalia and 2. mutilation is morally
permissible only when "it is necessary to preserve the body's health
or integrity". Healy, along with other commentators (B.M. Ashley
and K.D. O'Rourke (1977) 'Health Ethics' cited in Brody .£2_ cit 10),
believes that the treatment is not properly psycho-therapeutic because
it yields to the neurotic "illusions of the patients, rather than 
attempting to ameliorate them". (sic: this is precisely what corrective
surgery aims to do. Furthermore, it has yet to be proven that
transsexualism is an illusion and not in fact biologically based}.
N. Mason ('The Transsexual Dilemma: Being a Transsexual' (1980) _§_
Journal of Medical Ethics 85 at 88} states that "... as far al? I am
concerned ,' there is no doubt of the rightness of my deci_sion to change
roles ••• One priest did think that I should.have remained in my former
role and 'borne my cross' I cannot subscribe to this theology.
Is it really being Christian to reject the offer of help, especially
if it enables one to become more of a whole person?"
28. .M. T. Edgerton 'Transsexualism - A Surgical
54 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery 448
as 'Edgerton (2)').
Problem?' (October 1978) 
(hereinafter referred to 
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B, Comparative Law. 
1. The United States of America.
It is common cause that 
corrective surgery as a 
called 'sex reversal' 
some courts in 
possible type 
the United States have considered 
(29) 
of mayhem. A New York Court
II an experimental form of psychotherapy by which 
mutilating surgery is conducted on a person with the 
. f ' h . . d " ( 
30) 
intent o setting is min at ease . 
The history of the law in this area in the United States is interesting, 
and sheds illumination on the reasons for the particular approach to the 
problem. The starting point was the introduction of the crime of mayhem 
into early American common law, which crime is committed by inflicting 
an injury which reduced the victim's ability to fight, (Jl) The common 
law penalty was biblical justice: an eye for an eye. However, it became 
apparent that retaliation in kind was inadequate since the offence could 
be repeated, but the punishment could not. <
32
> Mayhem gradually evolved
into a more personal and less combative offence, and soon embraced 
disfigurement which did not necessarily decrease pugilistic might. c
33l
Today in the United States it is generally a statutory offence with the 
emphasis having shifted from 
29 Belli 2E. cit 493. Castration is undeniably mayhem, yet effective 
corrective surgery depends on castration (ibid). In a case involving 
voluntary, non-therapeutic sterilisation, a Californian court ruled 
that vasectomies do not constitute mayhem, since they do not render 
the patient impotent or 'unable to fight for the king': Jessin v County 
of Shasta 274 Cal App 2d 737, 79 Cal Rptr 359 (1969). 
30. Hartin v Director of the Bureau of. Records 75 Misc 2d, 229 347 NYS
2d 515 (sup Ct 197 3 l. This court considered the surgery as no better
than mutilation and disapproved of resolving a person's 'unhealthy
mental state' by drastic physical means.
31. Wilful maiming was a crime against the king as well as the victim,
since the victim was rendered useless in combat. Blackstone
(Commentaries on the Law in England ( 1803) at s205) defined the crime
as "violeri'tly depriving another of the use of such of his members
as. may render him less able in fighting, or depriving him of those
parts, the loss of which in all animales, abates their couragen .
33, Belli .2J2. cit 492. 
33. US v Cook 462 F 2d 301 (D.C.Cr 1972).
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" mi1itary and combative effects of the injury, 
to the preservation of the human body in normal 
functioning ••• what is important now is not the victim's 
capacity for attack or defence, but the integrity of 
. ( 34) 
his person". 
Many mayhem statutes are in existence now which prohibit any act unlawfu1ly 
and maliciously depriving a human being of a member of his body, or disables, 
disfigures or renders it useless, and castration is implicitly included, <
35
J
In the criminal law field an authority, after reviewing the law as regards 
surgical operations concluded that the law is 
" in an uncertain state and one depending very much 
on the views of the judge as to what is desirable and 
. (36)
what is undesirable conduct". 
Furthermore, the criminal law and medical licencing boards forbid treatment 
without sufficient medical indication, and the unwarranted removal of bodily 
(37)
parts, 
The civil law position is less problematical - the position being that 
any operation performed by a surgeon is prima facie an assault, rendered 
(38)
lawful by voluntary, informed consent. 
It has been suggested that a theory which could distinguish corrective 
surgery from mayhem is the right to privacy as protected. by the Bill of 
Rights, It was contended that the transsexual has the same right to privacy 
as a pregnant woman contemplating abortion to make her personal decision 
in privacy, without interference from the state. 
(39
>
34. Ibid.
35. For example, Cal Penal Code section 203.
36. J.C. Smith and B. Hogan Criminal Law (1st ed 1965) 268.
37. Belli� cit 491.
38. McColl Kennedy _Q.E. cit 118.
39. Belli .£e_ .£ll. 498. The case of Roe v Wade 410 U S  114 (1973) recognised
the right of personal _privacy in decisions regarding marriage, pro­
creation, contraception and even abortion. Later cases even included
voluntary non-therapeutic sterilisation within this zone of privacy:
Jessin v County of Shasta supra. It is submitted that by logical
extension, this case could cover corrective surgery, which entails
such voluntary sterilisation.
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Furthermore, it was found in Doe 
. (40) 
v State Dept of Public Welfare that 
the only medical treatment known to be successful in treating the problem 
of transsexualism is the "radical sex conversion surgical procedure 
requested". But this is not all on the issue of the legality of the 
oper�tion in the United States, as to date there have been several cases 
in which it was decided that corrective surgery could be considered as 
treatment covered by the federal medical aid program, which surely would 
not be considered if the treatment were illegal. In Rush v Parham ( 
41
)
corrective surgery sought under the recommendation of the patient's 
psychologist and surgeon, was held to be allowable under the governing 
medical provisions. The patient had been diagnosed by at least two 
physicians as a true transsexual and the court noted that even though there 
is a state prohibition against expenditure of funds for this purpose, 
it held that it was a prohibition against the federal requirements that 
assistance be rendered to all eligible parties in a11· circumstances of 
medical necessity, and the court .stated further that the governing physician 
was the proper party to determine whether the requested surgery involved 
a medical necessity. 
B k ( 
42 
) h 
. 
f 
. 
d 
. 
d h 
. . f ' In v Lac ner t e Superior Court o San Francisco enie t e pla1nt1 f s
. . . f d . d. 
. 
d' C 1 ( 
43
) th . petition for a writ o man ate irecting Me 1- a to au orise treatment 
for corrective surgery. The plaintiff had consulted a plastic surgeon 
who had diagnosed that she was suffering from transsexualism, and determined 
that it was medically necessary and reasonable to perform the surgery. The 
Director of the Californian Department of Health refused the application 
for Medi-Cal to finance the operation, stating that such an operation was 
a cosmetic one which was not covered by the medical program. The Californian 
Court of Appeals reversed this 
impossible to regard corrective 
decision, concluding. that it was clearly 
(44)
surgery as merely cosmetic in nature. 
The defence counsel stated that the state's refusal to consider the 
appellant's evidence of medical need, was 
. l d h ' h 1 · ( 
45)
vio ate er rig ts to equa protection. 
arbitrary and capricious, 
Dr. Liebman asserted that 
40. (1977) Minn 257 NW 2d 816, 819 sup Ct Minn.
41. (1977) ND Ga 440 F Supp 383.
42. (1978
) 
{1st Dist) 80 Cal App 3d 64, 145 Cal.
and 
43. The state of California's plan for participation in the federal Medic­
aid.
44. Cosmetic surgery, under the program is defined as "surgical procedure
to alter the texture or configuration of the skin and the skin's
relationship with contiguous structures of the body".
45. See also the case of Brown v Merlo ( 1973) 8 Cal 3d 855, 106 Cal Rptr
388 at 392. 
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the plaintiff 
must have this (corrective .surgery) to alleviate 
her erncitional problems, prevent t;hem from exacerbation 
and to rehabilitate her to the point where she can 
function as a normal person and participate fully in 
(46)
society".· 
Dr Crewes concluded by stating that 
2. Canada.
"As a general· rule, transsexuals have an improved 
psychological, social and vocational adjustment after 
surgery Numerous attempts by way of therapy, 
pharmacology, behavioural and disciplinary approaches 
have generally been 
(47)
transsexual". 
unavailing in treating the 
There are no cases directly in point, but section 45 of the Criminal Code
{4
B)
protects doctors fro111 criminal liability when surgery is performed for
the benefit of the patien t with reasonable care and skill, and with regard
(49) 
to the health of that person. There is in fact such a medical case
at present in which a doctor has had to decide on assigning a new sex to
a siamese twin.
"Canadian surgeons plan to separate siarnese twin boys 
in an operation which will turn at least one of them 
into a girl The twins share the same liver, 
intestinal and urinary tracts, some bones, and a single 
(50)
set of male sex organs". 
It is submitted therefore that since the operation has been performed as 
a matter of necessity in this case, there should be no reason why a 
transsexual should not be able to choose to undergo the same operation, 
bearing in mind his adult status and the fact of his valid consent thereto. 
46. B v Lackner supra at 64 145 Cal.
47. Ibid.
48. Canadian Criminal Code (Martin 1970).
49. Hawley 9£_ cit 124.
50. The Natal Witness 21 July 1984.
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At least in the latter case, one would be certain of the patient's gender 
identity, whereas with the siamese · twin there is no guarantee that 'she' 
may not later reject 'her' imposed feminine role because the male impulses 
{51) 
within are stronger. It is arguable also as to whether or not the 
corrective surgery for the transsexual is in fact not a necessity too, 
as in the case of the siamese twins, especially if it is performed in order 
to alleviate manic depression and avoid suicide attempts. 
3. The United Kingdom
Here too, there has been no case directly dealing with the legality of 
corrective surgery. However, in a dictum· delivered by Judge Ormrod in
Corbett v Corbett
<52> 
it was observed that
ftThere is obviously room for differences of opinion 
on the ethical aspect of such operations, but if they 
are undertaken for genuine, therapeutic purposes, it 
is a matter for the decision of the patient and the 
doctors concerned in his case. The passing of section 
1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 seems to have removed 
any legal objection which there might have been to 
(53)such procedures". 
Section 1 of the said Act provides: 
"Notwithstanding any statutory or common law provision 
••• a homosexual act in private shall not be an offence 
provided that the parties consent thereto and have 
attain.ed the age of twenty one years." 
It is not clear as to exactly what relationship exists between legislation 
on homosexuality and corrective surgery, but presumably the analogy which 
the learned judge was attempting to draw was that such decisions concerning 
sexuality and which therefore include the issue of· corrective surgery, 
should be left in the private arena to be of concern only to those directly 
involved. Al though this sentiment is laudable, Ormrod J however, did not 
in fact give it any substance at all with his final decision on the sex 
51. Vide chapter three supra for a similar case.
52. (1970) 2 All E R 33.
the next section.
5 3. At 43 of the report. 
This case is dealt with in greater detail in
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of the post-operative transsexual, in the ·case before him. Furthermore, 
in making this comparison, the judge is in fact equating transsexualism 
with homosexuality, which is medically incorrect. According to this tenet 
it is inferred that a transsexual who has undergone the operation has 
nevertheless not changed sex, but when having what he considers to be a 
heterosexual relationship with a person of the anatomical opposite· sex, 
he will escape prosecution for homosexuality by virtue of section 1. This 
leads us to conclude that the use of an artificial vagina - supplied by 
the operation is homosexual in nature, which hardly fits the usual 
description of homosexual behaviour. 
Be that as it may, it would appear that the operation is lawful in the 
United Kingdom, if undertaken for therapeutic purposes. The subsequent 
refusal to recognise this fact however, makes the acceptance of the surgery 
ridiculous. 
4. Argentina.
In Argentina in the case of Dr Franciso Defazio ( 
54
) the accused had been
convicted of aggrevated assault on three charges brought as a result of
corrective surgery. The first charge involved a person who was diagnosed
as a pseudo-hermaphrodite: he had a male karyotype, testicular tissue,
female libido and female sex hormones. The court held that the operation
was not injurious to the patient as it did not involve the removal of any
useful organs and that the surgery was intended to adapt the patient to
his psychological sex. The conviction was accordingly set aside.
The second case involved the brother of the first patient who had normal 
male genitals, but whose behaviour was distinctly that of a female. The 
forensic physicians however concluded that 'he' was male because of his 
karyotype. The defence physicians on the other hand, testified that the· 
patient was "intersexual" and · that the operation successfully orientated 
his "bio-psychological sex", socially. 
The third case involved a person who had shown signs of femininity since 
childhood. He had been subjected to male hormone treatment, but without 
54. 138 La Ley 592 (C N Crim y Correc Argen 1969}. See also S.A. Strauss
Doctor, Patient and the Law (1980) (hereinafter referred to as 'Strauss
(2) I) 216.
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favourable results. He had marked female characteristics such as wide 
hips, lack of facial hair, and feminine bone structure, but normal male 
genitals. (It must be remembered that although .transsexualism may be a 
psychologically based syndrome, this by no means precludes the possibility 
of physical abnormalities and this in fact substantiates the psychological 
belief of the transsexual. { 
55
) This third case was considered to be even
more feminine than the two previous ones. 
The court came to the conclusion that the convictions had to be quashed. 
Even if one were to assuroe that the operations had in fact been injurious 
to the patients there had been no proof of dolue or awareness of such a 
(56) 
possibility, on the part of the doctor. The court, per Judge Victoria
pointed out that the conflicting evidence was understandable, as the subject 
matter was one fraught with difficulty and one in which recent scientific 
discoveries had led to rapidly changing criteria. 
"The physician is under a duty to proceed according 
to what he considers best for his patient and we as 
judges must be extremely cautious in passing judgment 
on this". !
57
>
Judge Esteves in his turn observed that all surgical operations can be 
said to cause bodily injury of some sort or another, and that criminal 
liability can only be based either on culpa or dolus. He stated that much 
had been made of the designation of the sex of the patie.nts on their birth 
certificates, but that male and female are the only designations in fact 
accepted by the Registry, and these are based on external criteria. This 
leaves no room for any sex in between. He continued to say that it was 
not simply a q.uestion of the actions performed by the accused but of very 
compliqated scientific problems regarding diagnosis and therapeutics and 
it is not judicially feasible to solve· a medical problem. With this the 
author concurs. Esteves J continued in a most sensible way to insist that 
cognizance be taken of medical progress and that the greater internal influ-
55. As was noted in the case dealing with the South African model, Lauren
supra.
56. If the doctor had been negligent, which he was not, then there could
have been a delictual case. As it was there was the defence of volenti
non fit injuria in operation. It must be noted that no mention was
made of the intrinsically unlawful nature of the operation "'" as there
was in the earlier case of Dr Ricardo San Martin infra so it must
have been accepted as therapeutic.
57. Strauss ( 2) .£12. cit 217.
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ence of one factor relating to sex classification in contrast with another 
external factor, renders diagnosis of 'true sex' difficult. The appellant 
had diagnosed the three patients as transsexuals in the light of his medical 
knowledge and therefore his decision to operate cannot be regarded as 
irresponsible since his specialised technique and ability had been thought 
of highly. This decision was a breakthrough in enlightened thinking. 
c. south Africa.
In South Africa, although there is no legislation against the surgery or 
any law in fact on the legality of the operation, it is practiced freely 
and without set regulations. 
(58)
Strauss 
(59) 
in fact contends that such 
surgery which would relieve the psycho-neurotic condition in unmarried 
transsexuals, should not be considered as categorically contra bonos mores. 
This author is in agreement with this submission and would also go so far 
as to say that despite the dearth of case law on this point, the fact that 
the 1974 legislation envisaged the operation's occurrence and made provision 
for its legal recognition as far as the alteration of documents is concerned, 
is tantamount to,· sanctioning the medical procedure. 
III THE ISSUE OF CONSENT 
A. General.
Having discussed the_ basic legality of the operation, on therapeutic grounds, 
one must deal with the requirements of a valid consent, which is necess ary 
in order to 
1 . b ' 1 . t 
( 60 l 
I.a J. J. y.
exonerate the doctor from delictual and/or 
"We are aware of no rule or principle of law which 
could. extend to (the surgeon l free licence respecting 
. 1 
. n (61) 
surgica operations . 
criminal 
58. Letter dated March 1ge4, to this author from a renowned Durban gynae­
cologist, who has been responsible for the majority of the operations
performed in South Africa.
59. S.A. Strauss 'The Sex Change Operation:
(1967) 84 South African Law Journal 15
'Strauss ( 3) ' ) •
Two Interesting Decisions' 
( hereinafter referred to as 
60. Proof of the existence of a recognised ground for justification such
as self-defence, necessity, volenti or statutory authority conclusively
demonstrates the reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness of the
defendant's conduct: Van der Walt .212. cit 22.
61. Mohr v Williams 95 Minn 261 ( 1905 l •
( 4 ) S A 7 48 ( W) • 
See also Ex Parte Dixie 1950 
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Consent to the infliction of harm can be a ground of justification, but 
. ( 62) 
such consent in the first instance, must be permitted by law. In respect 
of one's property, the law allows one to do with it as one pleases, but 
not so with one's own body. What one is permitted to do with one's body 
depends largely on the mores of the situation. Thus the consent to being 
killed or to serious injury without the presence of a serious social purpose 
would be contra bonos mores. <
63
> So, although the law does permit a person
to consent to a surgical operation reasonably necessary to save his life 
or health, it does not sanction experimental treatment in which a person 
. ( 64) 
is a 'guinea pig' in the interests of science. Similarly, it would 
. ( 65)appear that any drastic operation of a non-therapeutic nature is unlawful 
unless a legally justified purpose is sought to be attained thereby. 
Obviously, with the development of medical science and technology, many 
problems are created in the area of consent. As Strauss puts it, 
" kan die versoek en toestemming van 'n pasient tot 
sogenaamde plastiese sjirurgie met die oog op verhoging 
van sy · liggaamlike skoonheid, sender dat dit enige 
geneeskundige doel dien, die sjirurg van aanspreeklikheid 
vrywaar? Kan die arts wat 'n ongehude op l<l;asgenoemde 
versoek steriliseer horn op die toestemming van die 
paeient beroep ten einde aan aanspreeklikheid teenoor 
d. ,. k 7
"(66)
ie pas1.ent te ant om. 
A person who willingly consents to the defendant's act, in the form of 
either a specific harmful act, or an activity involving a risk of harm, 
1 ' h d 1" h b ' d 
' 
h' ( 
67) 
Th. cannot comp ain t at a e ict as een comm1.tte against im. is
62. s.A. Strauss 'Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent' (1964) 81
South African Law Journal (hereinafter referred to as 'Strauss ( 4) ' } ,
179. 
63. Van der Walt .£E_ cit 54.
64. Except per s3 of · The Post Mortem Examinations and Removal of Tissues
Act 30 of 1952: A. v. Lansdown 'Guinea Pigs of Hippocrates and the
Criminal Law' (1960) 77 South African Law Journal 117.
65. For example, the law has ruled that a dentist who undertakes general
extraction to enable a person to accept ah appointment as a circus
clown would be guilty of assault with intent to do grievious bodily
harm: per Lord Denning in Bravery v Bravery (1954) 3 All ER 59 at 67.
66. Strauss (1) 2E. cit 91.
67. Lampert v Hefer (1966) (2) SA 507 (A).
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(68) 
principle - well known to Roman and Roman-Dutch law 1s expressed commonly 
in the maxim volenti non £it injuria, although the maxim was not expressed 
. h. f . h l ( 
69
) d. . f. ld ( 
7
0) h 
' 
in t is orm in t e Roman aw. Accor ing to Win ie t e maxim was
. ( 71)
reported in an English decision in 1305 precisely as it is used today. 
Whatever its precise historical origin, the fact remains that the principle 
f 1 . . f h f . 1· h d 
· 1 {?2) 
o vo enti is a part o Sout A rican, Eng is an American aw. 
In Roman 
consent. 
law vol lllltas has several 
. (73)
meanings intention, free 
"Hierbenewens is voluntas ook in die volgende besondere 
betekenisse gebruik: bedoeling of opset, vrye wil, 
'11 
· ·1 ' d' n <74l wi ekeur, goeie wi ••• toesteJ11I111ng aanvaar ing ••• 
Black's Law Dictionary defines consent as
"Voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and 
exercise of sufficient mentality to make an intelligent 
choice to do something proposed by another", 
and goes on to state that consent is 
(75)
"an act of reason". 
will, 
There is apparently a distinction between will and consent. 
it was held that; 
(76)
In R V  Dee 
"Where the will does not accompany the act, there is 
no consent"; 
and Strauss: 
(77)
" k 
. 
d ·1 
. • (78)
Daar an geen toestemming son er wi wees nie . 
68. D. 9.2.11 pr; D. 47 .10.1.5; De Groot Inleiding 3.35.B; Voet Coll'Dtlentarius
9.2.24.
69. Strauss (1) £.E!.. cit 2.
70. In Strauss (1)£.E!.. cit 2.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. D.44.7.3.2; D.50.16.21.9.
74. Strauss (1) _2E cit 17.
75. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines consent as "the power of mind which
directs the actions of a man" in Strauss (1) 2E cit 23.
76. 15 Cox CC 579 at 599.
77. Strauss (ll £E. cit 23.
78. This is stated more fully in the requirement of voluntary consent.
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Although certain authorities do distinguish between what Strauss calls 
'volkorne wil' and 'minder volkome wi 1 ' ( 
79) he himself does not agree with
this tenet. 
"Hierdie teenstelling is m.i. regtens onjuis. 
het iemand 6f wil 6f nie gewil nie". 
(BO)
Regtens 
It is submitted that this is the correct view. Strauss does however subscribe 
to the view that one must make a distinction between the concepts of 'against 
. . · ( 81) 
the will' and 'without consent'. 
The defence of volenti although recognised in South African law, is applied 
defence. h 
. 
d 
. . {82) 
wit great caution an circumspection. Volenti as a general 
can take two forms: 
1. consent to a specific hannful act of the defendanti and
2. the assumption of the risk of harm connected with the activity of the
defendant. 
(93
)
An example of the first type is the consent to undergo surgical 
. ( 84)
operations. In the so-called 'risk cases' the plaintiff does not consent 
to a specific act and in jury 
ha ( 
8
5)involving a risk of rm. 
but deliberately exposes himself to an act 
So besides the defence of volenti non fit 
injuria there is also 'voluntary assumption of risk'. A typical such 
situation is the patient undergoing a specific operation - to which he has 
consented - who 
consents thereto 
is 
as 
made a ware of the possibilities of 
11 
( 86) we Although this . principle 
complications and 
has been used 
occasionally in criminal law, it has remained more a part of the private 
law. The nature of the doctrine unfortunately has not always been dealt 
(87) 
with lucidly and succintly by the courts so there is no clear cut formula. 
79. Strauss (l) _Q£ cit 25. See Matthaeus Prol 2.i4 who mentions plena 
et perfecta voluntas and minus plena voluntas. 
BO. Strauss (1 l £E_ cit 25.
81. Ibid. See also R V  Z 1960 (1) SA 739 (A).
82. Netherlands Insurance Co of South Africa Ltd. v Van der Vyfer 1968
{ 1) S · A 412 · (A) at 421; Santam Insurance Co Ltd. v Vorster 1973 (4)
SA 764 (A) at 778.
83. Van der Walt� cit 51.
84. Esterhuyzen v'Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) S A  710 (T); Stoffberg
v Elliot 1923 CPD 148.
85. Lampert v Heter supra.
86. Lampert v Hefer supra; Alberts v Engelbrecht 1961 (2) S A 644 (Tl;
National Meat Suppliers (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City Council 1938 C P
D 498; R.J. McKerron Law of Delict (7th ed 1971) 62.
87. Strauss (1) _Q£ cit 60. According to him, voluntary assumption of risk
is just consent to a certain liability. One must distinguish however,
voluntary assumption of risk from agreement not to sue': Essa v Divaris
1947 (1) SA 463 (A).
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There has been a measure of English law influence in the South African law 
. . . f . {
88
) d h pertaining to the issue of voluntary assumption o risk an one sue 
influence is the 'duty of care'. <
99
> Innes CJ in Jameson Minors v CS AR (
90l
stated that, 
Similarly 
"The term negligence as used in our courts simply means 
a f�ilure to exercise the degree of diligence which 
the law requires under the circumstances of each case". 
"Voluntary assumption of risk does not of course absolve 
the defendant from any duty of care in respect of the 
creation of risks which the injured party neither 
n (91) expressly nor impliedly consents to run . 
(92) 
As Greenberg JP stated in Mordt NO v Union Government, 
"The duty of such persons however is ordinarily discharged 
if the manufacturer warns his purchaser of the dangerous 
nature of the article. Probably the reason why this 
is sufficient is that there is no negligence on his 
part because he has done what a reas.onable person would 
do to prevent injury, or because a reasonable person 
would not anticipate that the purchaser would not pass 
the warning on". 
It has been held that the duty of care in voluntary assumption of risk cases 
does not fall away, but that there ceases to be an actionable breach thereof. 
"I think there is a duty though I agree that there is 
no actionable breach of that duty, if the person ·injured 
••• voluntarily elects to encounter (harm)" (
93) 
88. Strauss (1) � cit 308.
89. Strauss (1 l .2£ cit 309; see also Burnett and Taylor v De Beers Cons.
Mines Ltd. 11.885) 8 H C 65.
90. 1908 TS 575 at 586.
91. SAR v Cruywagen 1938 T PD 219; Lampert v liefer supra.
92. 1938 T PD 589.
93. Yarmouth v France (1887) 19 QB D 647 per Lord Esher.
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Once consent has been obtained, it remains for the defendant to exercise 
such skill and knowledge required by law. Lack of skill per � is not 
negligent, but it is negligent to engage in any potentially dangerous activity 
unless one has the skill usually associated with that activity. (
94
) A doctor
therefore, can only be held liable delictually if he was in fact negligent 
after obtaining the necessary consent, as he is expected to conform to the 
standard of the reasonably competent and experienced practitioner at that 
{ 95).
time, in that country. 
"The standard of care required of a medical practitioner 
who undertakes the treatment of a patient is not the 
highest possible degree of professional skill, but 
reasonable skill and care". <
96
)
(97) Strauss goes further to state that,
"Where a patient .consults a doctor who undertakes to 
treat him, the doctor assumes no greater duty than to 
treat the patient with due care and skill, unless the 
doctor has expressly guaranteed that the patient will 
be healed by his treatment - something which the prudent 
doctor will generally not do. 11 
The ability to consent is an 
II eKpression of the individualistic, philosophical 
premise that each man is master of his fate, and therefore 
is allowed to limit his rights as he pleases.n(9S)
94. Mitchell v Dixon 1914 (AD) 519: Imperitia culpae adnu:meratur - a person
engaged in a calling which demands special knowledge must not only
exercise reasonable care, but also measure up to the standard of
competence of a reasonable man professing such knowledge and skill.
95. Van Wyk v Lewis .1924 AD 438. Here the· defendan t doctor performed an
operation on the - plaintiff who afterwards complained of stomach aches.
On investigation, it was discovered that a swab had been left inside
him. It was held that the doctor was not liable for negligence because
it is not the general practice of a doctor himself to check swabs and
instruments.
96. Brits and Another v Tsatsovolakis 1976 (2) S A  891 (T).
97. Strauss (2) 2.E. cit 20.
98. Van der Walt � cit 51. It is submitted that an extension of the
person's initial right, is the other concommitant right of the individual
to choos e the course of treatment he thinks best suits his needs.
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"It is a fundamental principle of the common law (England) 
that volenti non fit injuria - to one who consents no 
harm is done. The attitude of the courts has not been 
one of paternalism. Where no public interest is involved, 
they have left the individual to work out his own destiny, 
and are not concerned with protecting him from his own 
folly in permitting others from damaging him". c
99
)
Legally, the doctor's right to operate on or treat a patient, is based 
(100) 
entirely upon the patient's co nsent: 
relationship between doctor and patient 
therefore essentially, the legal
is a consensual one. 
( lOl) 
In the
normal course of events obtaining a legal consent does not present practical 
difficulties. By consulting a doctor in the first place, the patient tacitly 
consents to such treatment as in the doctor's opinion, is medically 
. d' d 
(102)
1.n icate • 
nay going into a hospital ( a man) does not waive or 
give up his right to absolute security of the person 
he still has the right to say what operation he 
will submit to, and unless his consent to an operation 
is expressly obtained, any operation performed upon 
him without his consent is an unlawful interference 
with his right of security and control of his own 
b d II ( 
103)�-
There are four golden rules relating to the issue of consent by the 
, (104) 
patient: 
1. the doctor must obtain an INFORMED CONSENT;
2. the patient must have THE CAPACITY TO CONSENT;
99. Prosser 2.E?. cit 82.
100. Apart from those cases where a patient is under a statutory duty to 
submit to vaccination or an examination for the purposes of public
health and apart from emergency cases where the patient is brought
to the doctor in an unconscious or semi-conscious state: Strauss ( 2)
21?. cit 3.
101. Ibid. See also Stoffberg v Elliot supra.
102. Ibid.
103. My underlining. This, it is submitted, is tantamount to sanctioning
corrective surgery, because the law .recognises a person's right to
control his own· body, and therefore a person should be free to choose
what he deems best for his welfare.
104. Strauss (2) 21?. cit 20.
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3. the consent must be FREE AND VOLUNTARY; and
4. the consent must be COMPREHENSIVE.
1. Informed consent.
In order to operate as a defence, consent must be real, based on knowledge
of the materia 1 facts allegedly consented to by the plain tiff. 
( lOS) In
this context, we use the expression 'informed consent'. This doctrine of
in formed consent has spanned untold controversy in the courts, among legal
scholars, and within the medical profession. Although often condemned by
medical practitioners as a nmyth and a fiction",(
lOG) it is received
favourably by legal scholars in general. Informed consent is an ethical
(107) 
command, It has - as has been mentioned previously - deep and strong
roots in the individualistic tradition of the common law. 
comprised of two legal duties imposed on physicia ns:
1. to inform patients about the treatment; and
2. to obtain their consent to it. 
(lOS)
The concept is
The physician's role in decision-making is to determine, from a medical 
perspective what the patient's problem is (diagnosis), how, if at all, it 
may be ameliorated, and then what the possible pitfalls of the treatment 
may be. Next, the doctor's role is to communicate this information to the 
patient, who will then utilise it in the context of his/her own personal 
(109)
values and subjective preferences. 
Basically, there is little dispute as to the kind of information the physician 
�ust impart to his patient - the so-called elements of disclosure. 
(llO)
The plaintiff must have a clear knowledge of the harm and risk in volved 
in the conduct of the defendant. 
( 111) 
As was held in Esterhuysen v Adminis-
105. S .A. Strauss and Strydom Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg ( 1967)
211.
106. H.K. Beecher 'Consent in Clinical Experimentation - Myth and Reality'
(January 1966) 195 Journal of American Medical Association 34-5.
107. M.D. Hillier Medical Ethics and the Law {1981) 197.
108. In addition to safe-guarding the right of self-determination, informed
consent encourages patients to make intelligent decisions about medical
care, Hillier £I?_ cit 197.
109. Ibid.
110. Hillier .2.E. cit 200.
111. Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Matthee 1917
AD 688; Alberts v Engelbrecht supra; Netherlands Insurance Co of SA
Ltd v Van der Vyfer supra.
trator, Transvaal, 
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( 112) 
"A therapist who knows beforehand of the serious 
risks to which his patient will be exposed by 
treatment, must explain the situation and the risks
to the patient, otherwise consent to undergo the 
medical treatment will not be considered consent 
in the legal sense of the word. The mere fact that 
a patient agrees to be admitted to a hospital for 
an operation or treatment does not in its elf imply 
consent to any operation or treatment which the 
hospital or doctors consider beneficial. To operate 
without consent would be justified only in a case 
. ( 113) of urgent necessity." 
The central information component is of course the possible negative results 
that may occur from undergoing a particular procedure. The physician must 
also explain the nature of such procedure and closely related to this, is 
the benefit which the patient may expect to gain reasonably therefrom. 
Finally, the patient is entitled to be informed of any possible alternative 
(114) 
treatments that might be employed, as well as the consequences thereof. 
1 d f h h 
· ff·
 · ( ll 5) h 1 ' . ff 1 h Know e ge o t e arm is not su 1 c1.ent. T e p ainti must a so ave 
. 
d h f h h d h · · 1 d 
(ll6) 
appreciate t e nature and extent o t e arm an t e r1.sk invo ve . 
"Mere knowledge is not a conclusive defence. There 
may be a perception of the existence of a danger, 
without comprehension of the risk", 
(ll7)
Also, 
"In die moderne reg word algemeen geleer dat 
toestemming gegrond moet wees op kennis en begrip 
118 
aan die kant van die toestemrnende." 
112. 1957 (3) SA 710 (T).
113. See also Stoffberg v Elliot supra; and Ex Parte Dixie supra.
114. Hillier .£E. cit 201.
115. Van der Walt QP_ cit 52.
116. Rosseau v Viljoen 1970 {3) SA 410 (C); Lampert v Hefer supra; Santam
v Vorster supra. 
117. Thomas v Quartermaine (1887) QB D 685 at 696.
118. Strauss (1) .£E. cit 108. (My underlining).
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Thorough knowledge of 
. {119) 
something is not tantamount to consent thereto 
and consent to an action is not necessarily consent to its consequences. 
"A person manifesting assent to the conduct of another 
b . k 
. II (120) may e m1sta en to its ••• consequences. 
Obviously too, consent to one action of which the plaintiff is knowledgeable 
is not regarded as consent to another action or 
is unaware even if the two actions are very 
Furthermore, mistake or misrepresentation, makes 
consequence of which he 
. ( 121 } 
similar in nature. 
consent unlikely. (
l22)
But not every misrepresentation has the effect of defeating the consent: 
the error must be germain to the action. Strauss 
(123) 
feels that the 
contention in R V h 11(
124) As we viz: "in order that there may be consent,
a man must be under no mistake as to that to which he consents" - is too 
strongly stated. Rather, he concurs with the view held in R v Clarence
{ 125) 
that it is not necessarily true that consent obtained by fraud is no consent 
at all. Furthermore, the mistake must be a legal one to vitiate consent. 
"Volgens ans skrywers moet error gebillik (iustus) 
wees ten einde as gro nd vir restitution in interum 
ld II 
(126) 
te ge . 
Obviously there can be no consent where a person is fully misrepresented 
{127) 
to about the deed and/or its consequences. 
Describing the elements of informed consent is facile in comparison with 
the issue of how much information the physician must disclose. Legally, there 
. 
d t d . f ' t 'f 11 ' f h d' 
' ( 128) 
J.s no u y upon a actor to 1.n arm a patien u y o t e 1.agnos1.s.
There are several reasons for this inter alia that some of 
119. Ibid.
120. Cited in Strauss (1) .212. cit 109; See also Donn v Hamilton (1939) 1
K B  509 at 517; Stoffberg v Elliot supra.
121. Mandelbaum v Bekker 1927 CPD 375.
122. Strauss (1) £E. cit 121.
123. Strauss (1) .2.2. cit 122.
123. (1885):16 Cox CC 1 14.
125. (1888) 16 Coxcc Sll at 515.
126. Strauss (1) £E. cit 142, referring to Huber 4.41.6.; Voet 4.1.26.
127. Coombs v Mason 1931 NPD 105; Alberts v Engelbrecht supra.
128. Strauss (2) £E. cit 6.
of the case on the
experience".
The diagnosis involves the "scientific assessment 
basis of the doctor's knowledge, skill and 
118 
what the physician knows is too complex to be relayed meaningfully to the 
1 
(129) 
ayman. It is more important to inform the patient as to the treatment
and its expected results. The patient should be informed in unequivocal 
terms of those results which are inevitable. (
l30
l A problem that may arise
is that no matter how accurate the prognosis is, 
of the operation, new facts may come to light. (
l3ll
to tell· the patient of all atypical consequences 
under the circumstances 
The doctor is not obliged 
which· might occur. 
(132)
It is obviously for the doctor's own protection as well, that he make the 
(133) 
patient aware of all the attendant consequences. If it is not possible
to make a final diagnosis before the operation is commenced, then the doctor 
. (134) 
must bring this to the attention of the patient. If the patient has 
not been informed prior to the operation or treatment of the eventual conse­
quences thereof, or even of previously unlikely consequences which now seem 
possible, then there is simply no consent. 
(l3Sl 
The nature of the proposed
medical procedure should be described in simple terms in nsuch detail that 
he may apply his mind intelligently to thesen . 
(l36l
"The patient's interest in information does not 
extend to a lengthy polysyllable discourse on all 
the possible complications. A mini-course in medical 
. . . dh (13
7)science is not require • 
The courts then have agreed that the physician need not make total disclosure, 
but must make a reasonable disclosure of the information that is material 
to making a decision about the treatment. 
129. It may be impractical to attempt to give the patient a reliable account
of this assessment: Strauss and Strydom .2.E. cit 175.
130. Strauss .2E. cit (2). He goes on to state that in giving such information
it is wise for the doctor to under-estimate rather than over-estimate
the intelligence of the patient.
131. Strauss (1) .2E. cit 134.
132. Ibid.
133. Strauss (1) .2E. cit 137.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid,
136. Strauss (2) .2.E. cit 6.
137. Cobbs v Grant 502 P 2d Ill (Cal 1972).
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"The duty of the physician to disclose ••• is limited 
to those disclosures which a reasonable medical 
practitioner would make under the same or similar 
. (138) 
cir cums tan ce s" • 
A problem arises when the doctor's decision to inform the patient of the 
seriousness of his ailment would in fact affect the latter so adversely 
as to be detrimental to his treatment. In Richter and Another v Hamman' s 
Estate
(l39> 
Watermeyer J said;
"A doctor whose advise is sought about an operation 
to which dangers are attached - and there are dangers 
attached to most operations - is in a dilemma. If 
he fails to disclose the risks, he may render himself 
liable to an action for assault, whereas if he 
discloses them he might well frighten the patient 
into not having the operation when the doctor knows 
full well that it would be in the patient's interests 
to have it". (
l4D)
Smith
C14ll 
suggests that the doctor is privileged to withold on therapeutic
grounds, the diagnosis of a serious ailment such as cancer, from a patient 
who is unstable, temperamental or neurotic, and if his/her condition would 
be placed in danger if he/she were enlightened as to his/her problem. In 
the event of a mishap the doctor must rely on grounds other than consent 
. (142) 
for his defence. 
In the last analysis - in the instance particularly of corrective surgery 
it is the patient who should, and does exercise the final decisional 
authority, whether or not to undergo the operation, once he has been·evaluated 
and found a suitable candidate for it. This is necessarily so, because it is 
138. Natalson v Kine 360 P 2d 1093, 1106 (Kan 1960). This court rejected
the subjective, patient-orientated standard. Hence the physician
is not obligated to disclose what the particular patient would have
wanted to know, but rather, what the reasonable patient would expect
to know.
139. 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) at 232G.
140 In this case, the likelihood of any complications was so uncommon
that the court held that the fact that the defendant had not mentioned
the possibility thereof; did not constitute negligence.
141. Cited in Strauss (ll .2E. cit 139.
142. Ibid.
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the patient who will in the most personal way, reap the ultimate benefits 
of the surgery, and also experience any of the subjective failures thereof. 
The corrective surgery is as yet imperfect, but this may of course be 
insufficient to deter a determined transsexual, and as such even though 
he chooses to undergo the treatment, he may in some way still be disappointed 
with the final result. This is of course the risk that has to be faced: 
which in many cases is considered more acceptable than living a life of 
subterfuge. 
2. Capacity to consent.
As consent is a legal act, it requires in principle that the party to the
h h 1 1 
. 
f • . . (143.) h act as t e ega capacity to per orm a Juristic act, T e consenting
person is deemed to have the necessary legal capacity if he has the mental
capability and maturity to evaluate responsibly, the nature, extent and
. ( 144)
implications of his consent. 
The existence of legal capacity in this sense therefore is relative to the 
particular circumstances of the case, and more especially to the nature 
of the interests involved and the seriousness of any potentially harmful 
(145) 
conduct. An adult must be in "sound and sober senses" in order to
• 11 l , d 
., ( 146)
give va J. consent . 
It must be borne in mind that a person suffering from a mental disability 
cannot enter into contracts and from the point of criminal and delictual 
liability, cannot consent to actions which - if it were not for his consent 
- would constitute a criminal offence or a civil delict. (l
47
> The test
applied in practice is whether the person concerned was capable of
appreciating and understanding the nature of the transaction into which
(148)
he purported to enter. 
143. Van der Walt £Q_ cit 54.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
146. Strauss ( 2) .2E. cit 4. If the person is intoxicated, strongly under
the influence of drugs or pre-medication, unconscious or in a complete
state of shock, he is legally incapable of giving consent.
14 7. Strauss ( 2) .2E_ cit 16. Generally, an insane person cannot consent 
to any juristic act. See also R v S 1951 ( 3) SA 209 (K); R v M 1953 
(4) SA 393 (A)� R v Oosthuyzen 1954 (ll PHH 70 (A).
148. Van der Walt £Q_ cit 55.
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3. Voluntary consent.
. (149)For consent to be valid, it must have been freely and voluntarily given. 
Whether the consent has been freely given in fact, depends entirely on the
circumstances of the case, and in particular, on the moral, social and
. ( 150)economic pressures restricting the plaintiff's freedom of choice. 
"It (volenti non fit injuria) does not apply to 
consent by any pressures whether social, economic 
or simply habit". 
C 
. . (151) .
h In Insurance ommission v Joyce it was eld that: 
The general 
"Under modern authority, consent or voluntary 
assumption of risk is not to be implied where, 
notwithstanding knowledge, the person concerned 
has exposed himself to the danger only because of 
the exigency of the situation in which he stands. 
If he has no real or practical choice, he does not 
. (152)
volu�tarily consent. 
opinion of the writers in criminal law seems to be 
gedwonge wil geen wil is nie". (
153) 
S 1 d(l54) a rnon also states that
obtained by duress "is no real consent". 
(155)
"A man cannot be said to be truly 'willing' unless 
he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom 
of choice predicates not only full knowledge of 
the circumstances upon which the exercise of choice 
is conditioned but the absence from his mind 
of any feeling of constraint in order that nothing 
shall interfere with the freedom of his will". C
l 56)
149. R v McCoy 1953 (2) SA 4 (SR).
that "'n 
consent 
150. Imperial Cheen Industries v Shatwell 1965 AC 656 at 686, per Lord
Pearce.
151. 77 CLR 39 (1948) at 57.
152. See also Bravery v Bravery 154 (3) All ER 59; Amin v Ebrahim 1926
lat 7.
153. Strauss (1) .£.E, cit 166.
154. Salmond On the Law of Torts (17th ed R Heuston 1977) 46.
155. See also R v McCoy supra; Minister of Justice: In re R v Gesa, R v
De Jongh 1959 (l) SA 234 (A).
156. Bowater v Rowley Regis Borough Corp. (1944) l KB 476.
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To claim - as some have, that the consent of the transsexual to corrective 
surgery is not voluntary because he is under severe mental stress, is an 
anathema. Mental stress does not, in the first place, connote incapacity, 
and in the second place, the fact that the candidates for surgery are selected 
(157) 
on the basis of the absence of substantial psychopathology, is strong
evidence in the patient's favour that his consent is indeed voluntary. In 
no way is the transsexual forced to undergo surgery: in fact, he desires 
it in order that he may bring his offending physiology into line with his 
inner gender id entity. To claim that the transsexual is forced into the 
decision regarding surgery because he has no viable choice, is to say that 
the person who has a physical malformation which can be rectified surgically 
is forced into having such surgery even though he does not want it. This 
is not so: we all have to, at some time. or another take a major decision 
in the pursuit of personal fulfilment. 
to him, and him only. 
Each person's decision is peculiar 
4. Clear, unequivocal consent.
Al though the legal relationship between doctor and patient is consensual,
as has been stated previously, the law does not require a formal contract
for all cases. Ordinarily, sue h con tract is established tacitly when the
doctor, having been consulted 
d. . (158) C h 1agnos1.s. onsent, or t e 
by the 
assumption 
patient, 
of risk 
commences 
- although
to make 
permitted 
to be tacit - requires a clear intention of .restricting one's rights. 
EnticG!ment; a request; a provocative challenge; encouragementi acquiescence 
and submission
( l
S
9
l reflect states of mind which are not necessarily
reconciliable with such an intention. 
(lGO) Wharburton
( lGl) commenting on
English law states that 
"Mere submission is not consent, for there may be 
submission without consent and while the feelings 
are repugnant to the act being done." 
157. Belli � cit 491.
158. Strauss (2) £e. cit 8.
159. R v Z 1960 (1) SA 739 (A) at 745; R v swiggelaar 1949 (4) SA 235 (C);
1950 P HH 61 (AD).
160. Van der Walt £e_ cit 52.
161. Cited in Strauss (1) op cit 33.
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As Strauss puts it (
1621 
"Toes temmin g is meer as bl ote kenni s en 
. . k . f (164) . 
b , en is 1ets a tie s. Dit moet na u1te 
b . {163) 
egr.1.p 
blyk. 
(165) 
. (166 ) 
All that is important, is that the intention is made obvious. Although 
. 
ffb 11' {
167 J • • d 
· . 1Watermeyer J 1n Sto erg v E 1ot ins1ste on express consent in medica 
operations, it 
(168) 
express. 
has been accepted that consent can be implied as well as 
(169) 
Strauss states that for the doctor's own safety there 
must be subsequently no question about what exactly the patient has consented 
to. He suggests, that where the treatment is very drastic or unusual -
as in the case of corrective surgery - it may be to the advantage of the 
doctor to take a written and signed consent in which the nature of the 
t 
' 
d . b d ' d t ' 1 
( l 70 J G 11 the 
' b reatment is escri e in e a1 • enera y, consent given y
the patient on the admission form in the hospital, should be reasonably 
specific and comprehensive. Consent to unspecified treatment would be ruled 
{171) 
as invalid on the ground of vagueness. 
As consent naturally must be unequivocal, the problem arises when a patient 
stipulates his own definite conditions for treatment. Although consent 
may be conditional, 
( 172 l 
where the conditions are such that the doctor is
162. Ibid.
163. Currie v Rhodesia Railways Ltd. 1928 SR 91; Stolzenberg v Lurie 1959
(2) SA 69 at 73.
164. R v Taylor 1927 CPD 11 at 20: "There must be an active consent". 
165. Esterhuyzen v Administrator, Transvaal supra; R v Mosago 1935 AD 32.
166 . Strauss (1) 2.E cit 34. 
167. 1923 CPD 148.
16B. R v M 1947 (2) SA 489 (N). 
169. Strauss {2) £12. cit 8.
170. Ibid.
171. Strauss ( 2) .Q2. cit 9. See also Verhoef v Meyer ( unreported case of
the Transvaal Provincial Di vision, November 1976) which illustrates
the advisability in drastic circumstances, for the doctor to set out
in writing, the essential nature of the operation, the risks involved,
and the necessity of taking a detailed consent, (ibid) ..
172. Strauss (1) 212. cit 202.
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precluded from practicing 'good medicine', there is usually one safe thing 
for him to do - refuse the 
(173) 
case. The important thing for the doctor 
to realise if he takes the case is that he simply may not ignore the 
conditions imposed by the patient: if he does so, the question of true consent 
(174) 
hangs in the balance. One last item that should be mentioned, is that
consent given subsequent to the infliction of injury is ineffective. However, 
it may amount to an agreement not to ins ti tu te an action on the ground of 
(175) 
the defendant's wrongful conduct - pactum de non petendo. 
If all the above requirements for consent are satisfied, then such consent 
is real, and a doctor - in the case of corrective surgery for example -
would have a legitimate defence to any action based on supposed assault. 
B. Comparative Law
1. The United States of America.
It is axiomatic that surgery without valid, 
(1 76) assault or mayhem. If the operation 
informed consent is technical 
is regarded as mayhem then of
course any consent thereto is invalid, because a criminal act amounts to 
a breach of public peace and one cannot consent to an act which disturbs 
(177)
the public peace. 
"Consent is immaterial when there is any hurt or 
injury calculated to interfere with the health or 
comfort of the victim". 
(l7B) 
173. Strauss ( 2) .212. cit 8.
174. Ibid.
175. Van der Walt .2.2_ cit 54.
176. Berkley v Anderson 1 Cal App 3d 790, 82 Cal Rptr 67 (Ct App 1970),
177. S v Fransua 85 NM 173, 510 P 2d 106 (Ct App 1973) - in which it was
held that one cannot consent to a shooting.
178. Commonweal th v Farrell 322 Mass 606, 78 NE 2d 697 ( 1949 l. If sex
reversal is considered unlawful then consent may preclude civil
liability as in the case of abortion, where some courts rave held that
consent to a er iminal abortion bars recovery for ass au 1 t and hat te ry :
Sayadoff v Warda 125 Cal App 2d 626,· 270 P 2d 140 (Dist Ct App 1954).
The court stated that anti-abortion statutes are primarily for the
protection of the unborn child and the public, and not the woman,
so there is no reason to compensate her for her voluntary act.
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However, most jurisdictions have held the operation to be lawful and therefore 
not mayhem. Although there have been no cases directly dealing with the 
capacity of the transsexual to consent to such treatment, it has been suggest­
ed that he lacks such capacity because the desire - which is regarded as 
an obsession - is in itself, a symptom of a complex, psycho-sexual dysphoria. 
In a Californian prosecution for assault and battery committed during the 
production of sado-masochistic films, the defendant pleaded the consent 
of his vi,ctim as a defence. The court held that the victim's consent to 
. . 
1 d 1 k d 1 l 'd · ( 
179
) h the _bizarre actions was on y apparent an ac e lega va 1. ity. T e 
court considered the masochistic victim to be suffering from a mental aberra­
tion that compelled him to submit to the beatings. 
nit is a matter of common knowledge that a normal 
person in full possession of his faculties does 
not freely consent to the use upon himself of force 
likely to produce bodily injury". 
Does this necessarily imply that anyone who seeks drastic surgery, is mentally 
incompetent? A transsexual should not be regarded as 'insane' simply because 
he has a gender identity crisis. It is submitted that in allowing corrective 
surgery, one would not be pandering to an insane delusion but merely assisting 
adjustment and the attainment of felicity. In every other sphere than his 
gender identity, the true transsexual is fully cognizant and appreciative 
and therefore he should not be categorised with those mentally incompetent 
(180) 
to consent. The types of questions normally asked as regards the consent
of a mentally disabled person, viz: are the patient's mental abilities such 
that he can take cognizance of the type of treatment? Can he appreciate 
the nature and consequences of the treatment? Can he form the desire to 
undergo the treatment or at least reconcile himself to the fact that he 
w il 1 undergo the trea trnen t? - can , and are, al 1 ans we red in the af £ i rma ti ve 
in the case of the true transsexual. As Strauss states 
"In this context, it is the mental abilities of 
the patient that are decisive, and not necessarily 
the exact classification or diagnosis of the type 
f 1 . '1' f ' h h . ff 
' " ( 181)
o menta disabi ity ram whic e is su ering. 
179. People v Samuels 250 Cal App 2d 501, 58 Cal Rptr 439 (1967).
180. Dr J. Grace from the Bloodbank in Durban,
dealing specifically with gender dysphoria
opinion too;
181. Strauss (2) � cit 16.
who has · completed his MSc 
and intersex, is of this 
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It is submitted that there is no comparison between the transsexual seeking 
corrective surgery, and a masochistic victim apparently suffering from a 
mental aberration. 
2. Belgiwu.
There has been one case reported in Belgium dealing with the legality of
corrective surger y. In Dr Fardeau et alii 
(lB2) the accused were charged
in consequence with the death of a transseKual who had undergone corrective
d h h d d · d lt f 1 · t · · · therefrom. 
( 183)
surgery an w o a ie as a resu o comp ica ions arising 
According to the evidence, the patient had male genitals, but female breasts,
and was living as a female. He had claimed that he was not homosexual,
but felt that he was transsexual. He was subjected to a thorough examination
by a panel of physicians. The prosecution contended that the accused could
not rely on the defence of justification because they had not acted with
a curative objective and that they had not obtained a clear and free
(184)
consent. It was further contended that the operation was performed
with t}:le sole objective of placating the desire of the patient and not with
the intention of bringing about a cure. The accused however claimed that
surgery had been undertaken to restore the patient's psychological equilibrium
and to facilitate his social re-acceptance, and as such the operation was
legally justifiable. Upholding the defence contention, the court confirmed
the view that the knowledge· which a judge possesses does not entitle him
to interfere with medical·methods and theories. It is this author 1 s submission
that this commendable attitude is the only acceptable one, when dealing
with issues which are primarily medical. It is a pity that such reasoning
has not been emulated by other jurisdictions.
The court also referred to the evidence of Prof Hastings, to the effect 
that in the majority of cases in which he had operated, the patient had 
afterwards lived a more harmonious life. The court further recognised the 
value of extensive pre-operative evaluation because: 
"The highly exceptional and irreversible nature 
of the operation and its repercussions upon the 
entire future of the patient render it imperative 
that recourse should not be had to such an operation 
. th 1 t 
. . . 
bl 
" ( 185)
wi out as comp e e an examination as possi e. 
182. 1969 Journal de Tribunaux 635. See also Strauss (2) £E_ cit 215.
1B3. Ibid. 
184. Ibid.
185. At 642 of the report
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In conclusion, the court ruled that the patient had given free and voluntary 
consent and that he had been quite an intelligent and balanced person, apart 
from his sexual maladjustment - thus offering legal proof of the fact that 
(186)
a transsxual is competent to consent. 
3. Argentina.
The case of Dr Ricardo San Martin (1
87
) which deals directly with the issue
of consent, was actually the first case on transsexualisrn in Argentina, 
coming some three years before the one of Dr Defazio. 
mention, the defendant surgeon emasculated his victim. 
In the case under 
According to the 
court, the patient was a homosexual, who did not manifest any female 
characteristics. Furthermore, his mental age was found to be that of a 
twelve-year old, and on the basis of this, his consent to the surgery was 
(188) 
negated. The accused was criminally charged with, and convicted of 
assault. 
The court adopted the chromosomal criterion for sex determination, in deciding 
whether the emasculated person could be regarded as female. 
"He was a man and will continue to be so until the 
day he dies. No female chromatin bodies were found 
l.'n h1."s 11 1 · 
1 ·· " (lS9) ce u ar nuc e1.1. 
In addition, the court suggested that sex was determined by the ability 
to procreate such contention, it is submitted obviously denies the 
characteristic of masculinity or femininity to anyone who happens to be 
sterile. 
186. Ibid.
"There is no scientific reason for the removal of 
a healthy penis from a physically healthy man 
nor the desire to placate the perverted sexual craving 
of the victim can justify such a removal The 
consent of the victim does not alleviate the crime 
•.• the perverted mind of the victim prevents him from 
187 123 Le Ley 605 (CN Crim_ Y Carree. Argeri 1966); �lso Strauss ( 2) �
,ill 216.
188. The court also negated the patient's consent because there was evidence
of wrongful intenton the part of the doctor. Although San Martin
alleged that the operation was performed because of cancer in the
patient's penis, - it was proven that the patient had not requested
any chemical examination beforehand. The doctor had also not preserved
the allegedly diseased penis, nor had he prescribed any post-operative
treatment. This, coupled with the plastic creation of a vagina,
indicated that· the surgery had not been performed because of cancer
(at 612 of the report).
1.89. Ibid. 
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rightfully disposing of his body The action 
of the accused absolutely defies all that nature 
imposes. 
a woman. 
He knew he could not change a man into 
He attempted to simulate this. However 
far medicine advances it can never violate the secrets 
. . d d h 
,.(190) 
of creation - procreation an eat . 
The decision of the court as it relates to the consent of the mentally 
incompetent, in this author's opinion, is justifiable per �• but, it is 
submitted that rather than resting its decision on sexual grounds, the court 
should have ruled the consent invalid due to the mental age of the patient. 
"The consent was invalidated by the mental 
incompetence of the victim, whose sexual craving 
distorted the real scope and significance of the 
. (19U operation even supposing the best results". 
It is submitted further that in the absence of· full details, it would appear 
that this was not a case dealing with a true transsexual and therefore the 
decision could not be seen as a bar against true corrective surgery. In 
any event, the court seemed to have been too complacent about its knowledge 
as regards medical progress. It may have been improbable in 1966, to imagine 
the advancements made today, but it was not impossible. Already this judgment 
is out of date because science can control both birth - by means of artificial 
insemination - and death - by sustaining people on machines when they are, 
for all intents and purposes, dead. Furthermore, it is submitted that the 
court made an alarmingly naive suggestion when it held that 
"Mankind would subsist although every man in this 
world were to have his arms cut off, were to lose 
his property, his honour and his fatherland. However, 
if an act such as this were allowed to go unpunished 
if it were not severely punished - a gap would 
be opened into which the whole human race could 
fall". 
C192) 
It is submitted in conclusion, that as only a small minority of people are 
diagnosed as transsexuals, and even fewer actually undergo the surgery, 
it is hardly likely that the whole future of the human race will be 
jeopardised, if the transsexual was to be allowed this measure of alleviation 
from the dilemma. 
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
-192. _At 6-13 of the report.
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c. South Africa.
There are no cases dealing with the consent of a transsexual to corrective
surgery. However, in both the criminal and delictual law, an action which
prima facie might constitute an assault upon another person, is palliated
in the case of the consent of the alleged victim. (
l39
) Although the defence
of volenti non fit injuria is of almost universal application in the field 
of deli ct, ( 
194
) :in the criminal law however, where it is in the interests
of the state that the public peace be kept and the lives and health of the 
citizens preserved, the doctrine of consent is permitted a very limited 
1. . (1
9
5) app ication. 
There have in fact been suggestions that the whole concept of volenti be 
limited in scope, and Strauss is of the opinion that it is due to "die kwyning 
van die laissez-faire gedagte en die opkoms van die sosialisme". {
l9Gl 
It
may even be said that apart from medical operations, sexual affairs in which 
consent prevents any incidence of criminal liability, and bodily contests 
that are not inimical to the interests of society, all other acts which 
. (197)
could constitute assault, do. 
"If an act is unlawful in the sense of being itself 
a criminal act, it cannot be rendered lawful because 
the person to whose detriment it is done, consents 
t 
. 
t
" ( 198)
0 l. • 
"Any person may waive rights conferred by law solely 
for his benefit ••• But public as well as individual 
interests are concerned where public policy requires 
the observance of a statute, then the benefit of 
its provisions cannot be waived by the individual 
. ( 199)
because he is not the only person interested�. 
Thus, along this line of thought, although corrective surgery might be 
considered as an assault, it has in fact not only been performed with 
regularity, but a statute has tacitly recognised its legality, by making 
193. Milton £12. cit 471.
194. The exception being the case of seduction.
195. S v Collett:·1978 (3) SA 206 (RAD).
196. Strauss (1) � cit 6.
197. R v McCoy·1953 (2) SA 3 (SR).
198. Strauss (1) £12. cit 290, quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd
ed 1957) 10.
199. Morrison v Anglo-Deep Gold Mines Ltd. 1905 TS 775.
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provision for the consequences of the operation. Thus the provisions of 
section 7B remove any prohibition there might have been to the surgery. 
Of course, this is only so in the event of the transsexual giving his legally 
required consent thereto. 
IV CRITICAL EVALUATION. 
It is submitted that the basic trend in The United States of allowing 
corrective surgery to be covered by the state medical aid sdlemes, is proof 
positive of its legality, and as indicated in B v Lackner the court subscribes 
to the view that such treatment is the only effective method available. 
Furthermore, the Belgian case of Dr Farde au et alii as well as the second 
case in Argentina, of Dr Defazio both decided along equitable lines and 
recognised the therapeutic value of the operation and therefore regarded 
corrective surgery as legal, if performed with the necessary consent, Both 
courts also concluded that the transsexual had the capacity to consent and 
did so voluntarily. It has been suggested that a transsexual should not 
be permitted ta consent to the surgery, and that the state has an interest 
in striking out such consent. 
<200) It is however the author's submission
that while courts should not be slow to protect the unwary from possible 
error, the transsexual is well able to understand what is involved, and 
has in fact usually undergone extensive screening, A· bar on the part of 
the state to his consent would be an unwarranted interference in his private 
decision. 
The two Argentinian cases, together with the Belgian cases are then the only 
ones directly dealing with the issue of the legality of the corrective surgery 
and it is refreshing to see that as far back as the late 1960s courts were 
handing down sensible and reasoned judgments in the issue of transsexualism. 
The case of Dr San Martin is then the only case deciding against the surgery 
and it is the author's submission that this judgment is now outdated and 
in fact erroneously decided upon and therefore precedence should be given 
to the later, more enlightened case of Defazio. 
200. Mc Coll Kennedy .212. cit 118.
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(201) 
Despite the contentions to the contrary, the medical theory has been advanced 
that the . justification of the surgery lies in the fact that it is indeed 
therapeutic, because where psycho-therapy has been known to fail, such 
treatment is the only viable alternative: to convert the suffer's external 
physiology to his internal psychological orientation, thereby bringing about 
.1.b 
. (202)
equi 1. rium. 
. (203) 
The cases deciding the issue of the legality of the treatment do not, 
it is submitted, establish any .definite trend towards either legal acceptance 
or rejection of the surgery, and in fact, by and large, the operation is 
unobjectionable in most jurisdictions, provided it is undertaken for genuine 
. ( 204) 
therapeutic purposes. It has even been suggested that since the surgery
is relatively common it should be socially and legally accepted on this 
b 
. (205)
as1.s. 
201. The Dutch Commission of Inquiry Gezondheidsraad Rapport Betreffende
Plastische-Chirurgische Geslachtstransformatie ( 1965) came to the
following conclusion: "There are insufficient grounds for treating
transsexuals surgically in the sense of sex transformation. Where
this is nevertheless undertaken, it must be realised that each operation
is attended by a great and uncertain risk, not only in the somatic
sense, but also and in particular, in the psychological sense and
there is no certainty whatsoever about its effect". It was pointed
out that experience in the field of plastic surgery generally shows
that the results are almost always disappointing. The fact remains,
the Commission continued, that there can be no true conversion of
sex, particularly as regards the procreative function. It is submitted
that this statement loses sight of the fact that the psychological
identity of a person is just as important - if not more so - than
the physical one. Furthermore this criterioi:i of procreation for sex
determination is as has been stated before, totally unrealistic. Cited
in Strauss (2) .9.E. cit 216.
202. Strauss (5) .2.Q_ cit 348.
203. There being only the three - two in Argentina and one in Belgium -
directly in point.
204. Taitz .2E. .£il 19.
205. Strauss (3) .Q.12. cit 215.
l32 
While the surgery has 
limitations,C
2
0
6
) there is 
definite medico-surgical and psychological 
insufficient evidence to warrant its prohibition.
There is undoubtedly evidence that patients do not benefit fully from the 
( 207 ) 
b h ' . d f h f h 1 surgery, , ut t ere is evi ence too, o t e act t at many transsexua s
have been enabled to lead a happier life due to surgical intervention. 
"All problems, real and imagined, have been 
worth tolerating in order to live a life freed from 
conflict, which was making existence so unhappy. 
No longer do I feel that I am acting a part but 
am free to be myself. The release from conflict 
has meant that I have, according to my friends, 
become more relaxed and confident. As a result, 
deeper relationships have been possible with old 
friends, and I have been able to be outgoing enough 
to make new friends My previous role may have 
been less fraught with the medical, legal and moral 
problems ••• but it was a life of extreme unhappiness 
and conflict What has been more important than 
becoming male socially has been the ability to become 
myself. It was a choice between existence and life. 
Given these circumstances, was there in fact a choice 
to be made? I think not." 
(20B)
206. Even though corrective surgery is far from established as a safe medical
procedure, and as such could be regarded as experimental, it is
submitted that this accusation could be levelled against many other
progressive, surgical methods, such as heart transplants. In fact
in this instance, the legislature actually pre-empted the occurrence
of this operation. Strauss ( ( 2) ..212 cit 121} states "The heart
transplants did not catch South African law altogether unawares. The
fiel.d had been prepared, legally speaking, as long ago as 1952. In
that year, The Post-Mortem Examinations and Removal of Tissues Act
( 30 of 1952) was placed on our statute book". It is the author's
submission that corrective surgery is potentially less dangerous than
other such drastic operations for the simple reason that the body
of the transsexual is usually healthy, and well able to withstand
the gruelling experience of paying this relatively small price to
obtain the .. desired peace of mind. On the other hand, the very necessity
of something like a heart transplant, is due to the fact that the
body is no longer healthy, and in essence, the operation is to enable
life to be prolonged, rather than simply endured, as in the case of
the transsexual.
207. It · is submitted that this is probably due to
insufficient pre-operative evaluation, rather
the part of the surgery itself.
208. Mason ..212 cit 87-89.
incorr�ct diagnosis on 
than to any fault on 
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Dr Randell also described most post-operative transsexuals - in hie experience 
- as reporting a greater well-being and improved adjustment, with a feeling
• ( 209) 
that they have been accepted as members of their 'new' sex. He concludes 
that 
"The future 
is somewhat 
of these surgically converted patients 
. ( 210) 
problematical but the immediate 
post-operative results suggest that the operation 
was justified in the light of the subjective and 
. ( 211) 
objective improvement in the life adJustrnent. 
V SUGGES.TED SOLUTIONS 
It is submitted that in the light of such reports as Randell's,a strong but 
rebuttable presumption could be created that the operation is beneficial 
to the patient and therefore in some degree to society as well. It is 
submitted further that the transsexual should have the personal right to 
decide for himself whether to undergo the treatment or not. Autonomy, or 
the right to self-determination, constitutes one of the most essential ethical 
. . 1 ' ( 212) h ld 
. 
. d 
. 
. princip es. Tony Honore o s than an important conei eration in western
society as regards personal decisions is the idea of human rights, especially 
the right of each human being to express and develop his/her own personality. 
As with most human matters, ethical questions are rarely solved: they are 
lived with. It is e ubmi tted that it is how we do this which makes the 
difference. Ethical issues can be divided roughly between those that address 
problems at a societal level, - those that represent broad social policies, 
usually involving· governmental action predicated on public demand or need 
- and those directed at concerns on the individual level - by contrast,
those which people commonly encounter at a perso nal level during ·the course of 
209 Cited in Green and Money £I!. cit 387.
120. It is submitted that this is largely due to legal stubbornness and
conservatism.
211. Green and Money 22, cit 387.
212. Sex Law (1978) 3-6.
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their lifetimes, and not infrequently relating to decisions regarding medical 
(213) 
treatment. It is submitted that the whole question of transsexualism 
falls into the latter category and as such is for decision on the private 
level alone. 
The historical connection between medicine and ethics is clear. In every 
medical decision - regardless of the skill and expertise employed on the 
part of the doctor - some value judgment is made. Every decision requires 
a choice between competing values, and every decision involves a risk, just 
d 
. . k ( 214) d 
' 
1 
. 
f as not to deci e also involves some ris • To ay s so ution may o 
course be tomorrow's problem just as today's problem might easily become 
tomorrow's solution. 
"with few exceptions, a solution to any problem 
will bring new difficulties. These may or may not 
be worse than the original problem and one must 
decide, not between problem and answer, but between 
degrees of difficulty. Is the new situation really 
going to be better than the last?"
C2I5) 
It is submitted that one has to take calculated chances, otherwise one might 
as 
few 
well exist in cotton wool. The field of medicine has, in the preceding 
years, len t more weight h . l . d 
. ( 216) 
to psyc ologica consi erations. It 
is submitted further that it would be incongruous for the psychological 
test to be accepted - which it should be, as man in a union of mind and 
(217) 
body with the former holding precedence - and then for the law to hold 
that the operation is illegal. After all · the surgery f s only performed 
on the psychological ground that it will meliorate the patient's condition. 
It is therefore this author's submission that· the surgery is justified if 
the patient finds· life intolerable, is emotionally and mentally stable in 
. ( 218) 
other respects and has given the necessary consent. 
213. Hillier .Q.Q. cit 8.
214. Hillier� cit 90.
215. Mason .QE. cit 85. such then is the 'choice' of the transsexual. 
216. The law in at least one jurisdiction has also given due weight to
the psychological orientation of the post-operative transsexual. Vide
infra for details on the American case of MT v JT 140 NJ Super 77
355 A 2d 304 (1976) 63 ALR 3d 1197.
217. "To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the
spirit is life and peace n : Romans 7; 6-9.
218. See also Armstrong� cit 90.
l
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"In modern western societies, personal inviolability 
and freedom of will are values which are very highly 
rated".<
219
>
Thus, it is submitted the state can have no legitimate interest in interfering 
with the rights of the transsexual to decide to undergo the surgery, if 
such surgery can . be shown to have a therapeutic purpose. Such a decision 
also cannot be regarded as contra bonos mores on the ground of possible 
fraud, because there is only the intention of the transsexual to become 
his true self, not to conceal his identity. Furthermore 
ftThe mentally competent individual's right to control 
his own destiny in accordance with his own value 
system, his 'selfbeskikingereg', must be rated even 
higher than his health and life n. (
220)
It is this author's opinion, that a decision of a person - whose existence 
is one of such misery that he has entertained thoughts of self-destruction 
or anti-social acts - to undergo corrective surgery in an attempt to alleviate 
his personal suffering and thereby attain some measure of happiness cannot 
be viewed as a contravention of social mores especially if such personal 
decision in no way affects others. The attainment of a unified identity 
through surgery is surely to the advantage of both the individual and society 
because a contented human being is far less likely to perform anti-social 
acts, than a person wracked with frustration and confusion. This is common 
sense. 
By and large, then, corrective surgery has . been accepted as justifiable 
legally in the jurisdictions under mention, due to its therapeutic nature 
and if properly consented to. It is submitted that this line of reasoning 
is the only sensible one to take. Although the surgery has not been perfected 
technically, it is, to date, the only form of treatment that has any measure 
of success with the transsexual. The medical profession has recognised 
its beneficial quality and it is not for the law to ignore such expert 
evidence. 
It is submitted also that although the transsexual should have a personal 
right to decide whether or not to undergo the treatment, this should not 
be an absolute right, as the choice must be dependant on the opinion of 
the medical screening team and furthermore, this right should also be limited 
219 Strauss (2) .2E. cit 50.
220. Strauss (2) � cit 51. 
136 
by the state's interest in seeing that the surgery is performed under safe 
conditions, with proper evaluation and medical care. This necessitates 
the enforcement of· strict pre-operative regulations, and it is submitted 
that such procedure should be instituted. in South Africa, as it has been 
in the United States, preferably under the auspices of the Legislature. 
This would not only minimise the possibility of error, but would ensure 
also that the operation is being performed upon a true transsexual and 
therefore with a therapeutic objetive. 
As regards the issue of consent, the procedure followed by the University 
of Minnesota could be adopted as a guideline for South African institutions 
f . h 
. H ( 
221 
) h l " . d per arming t e operation. ere t e transsexua is require ;
1. to be of ag e, but it is submitted that a minor with the necessary
parental or court consent should also be allowed to undergo the
treatment;
2. to be unmarried�
3. to retain independant counsel - or it is submitted, legal aid in the
case of indigents - to discuss the effect of the required consent
and to ensure that he is informed about the surgery adequately. The
legal advisor also witnesses the patient's signature to the consent
form, and stands ready to assist in post-operative legal, procedures
to eff ect a change in civil status. It is submitted that the latter
is very important, because at least the advisor can inform the
transsexual beforehand as to what l egal recognition he · is entitled,
thereby prewarning him against disappointment on later discovering
that he does not have full, post-operative legal effect.
As regards the requirement of single status, it is submitted that this is 
in fact imperative in order to obviate problems which will arise if the 
transsexual were still married. In this regard, the question arises as 
to whether or not the objection of the spouse to the operation is effective. 
A few religious commentators have considered the issue. Under Jewish law, 
neither spouse can unilaterally end those obligations which marriage 
b .  . 
. (222).
rings into existence. 
221. Prof Hastings 'Inauguration of a research project on the transsexual
in a University medical centre' cited in Green and Money .2E. cit 248.
222. Brody 2£ cit 9.
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The termination of the marriage must be based on mutual consent. Of course, 
this was basically t,he South African law before 1979. so the question is 
only of academic interest from this stance in South Africa, but in other 
countries, where religious laws other than Christianity have some weight, 
this might be a pertinent issue. Under Jewish law then, it would appear 
that a spouse could object to the decision of his/her partner, to undergo 
surgery, and therefore legally prevent such action. If the transsexual 
nevertheless decided to undergo the operation, this step would be illegal 
because he/she in effect, would be terminating the marriage unilaterally, 
which is not permissible. However, there are two options open to a person 
h . . . . · 1 11 
( 223) 
w o wishes to terminate his marriage uni atera y: 
1. he convinces the court that it should pressure his spouse to consent,
because of some fault on that spouse's part; or
2. he obtains the consent of the other spouse by inducement. It is
submitted, that if a person persists in undergoing the operation,
it probably would be better a 11 round to perrni t him to do so , but
h h d b 11 d ff· · t 
. · 
f h. f · 1 
( 224 l
e s  oul e compe e to make .su l.CJ.en provision or is ami y. 
Similarly, from a Catholic slant, marriage is seen as a sacramental covenant 
wherein reciprocal responsibilities are undertaken, and rights received. 
It is suggested therefore that the decision on the part of the married 
transsexual to undergo surgery would be viewed as an in justice to the wife 
. (225) and family. Furthermore, traditional casuistry would contend that there
in fact has been no change of sex and so even if the surgery were completed, 
the marriage would effectively still be in existence. This is much the 
same reasoning, and therefore illogical outcome of the decision in w v w. (2261
223. Ibid.
224. For more details in this regard vide chapter eight infra.,
225. Brody ..QE_ cit 11.
226. 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
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In traditional Protestantism, it is quite clear that the wife I s consent 
is irrelevant in the determination of the morality of the corrective 
(227) 
surgery. This is because the reformers held a fundamentally androcentric 
view of marriage. However, if the wife wished to undergo the operation 
the husband would have to approve her choice, as reproduction was always 
. (22 8) 
seen as one of the purposes of marriage. 
It is submitted, that over and above the requirements stipulated by the 
University of Minnesota, a further requirement of the Johns Hopkins Institute 
- while it was still in operation - is that the patient secure the consent
of his next-of-kin to the treatment. This will ensure against the giving 
of erroneous personal biography and also safeguards the surgeon against 
pas sibl.e law suits brought by the next-of-kin. It would also guarantee 
at least minim.al familial acceptance of the procedure, thereby facilitating 
. h b'l' 
. (229) 
post-operative re a i itation. 
If all these requirements, together with strict pre-operative screening 
were enforced by legislation, in South Africa, there would of course be 
less likelihood of errors occuring, and more likelihood of the surgery being 
performed for the proper objective of therapy. In allowing the operation, 
it is submitted that one is recognising the possibility of a 'change of 
sex' and therefore the result of the operation should be given full legal 
effect. Not to do so, creates the anomalies that are now evident in those 
jurisdictions which refuse to give the surgery its due recognition. 
227. Brody .2.E. cit 12.
228. Ibid.
229. J. Money 'Sex Reassignment' (1970) 9 International Journal of Psychiatry
249 at 258.
230. This will be dealt with in greater detail in the following section.
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PART C THE' CORRENT LEGAL STA'l'OS OF 'l'llE POS'l' OPERATIVE TlmNSSBXUAL 
I INTRODUCTION 
CHAP TER VI I 
DOCUMENTARY ALTERATION 
"Show me the prison, show me the jail 
Show me the prisoner whose life has gone stale, 
I'll show you a young man with so many reasons why, 
There but .for fortune, go you and I". (Phil Oaks : 'There but 
for Fortune' ) • 
In obtaining recognition for the 'change of sex' , the transsexual 's first 
step logically, is to effect alteration in his official documents. 
involves the re-registration in the new gender role. 
II COMPARATIVE LAW 
1. The United Kinqdom
This 
The question of a transsexual's birth record changes does not appear to
(1) 
have been the subject of litigation in England. Mason, in his personal
experience found that there was little difficulty in having his name changed
especially when the request was supported by his medical practitioner
(
.?) -
but there was an executive refusal to allow him to alter the sex designation
in his birth certificate • It is possible to have one's passport altered
in Britain, because it does not state gender, thus it would appear that
some documents are 
alteration does not 
permitted to be altered, but only in so far as such
( 3) involve sex. Armstrong suggests t;ti.at if a medical
practitioner is of the opinion that the transsexual - with or without surgery­
would be enabled to · 1ead a happier life in the assumed sex role, he would
be justified in recommending inter alia
" ••• re-registration by statutory declaration by two 
persons - his/her doctor and one parent or friend" 
in terms of section 29(3) of the Births and Deaths Registry Act of 1953. 
1. However, at present there is a case which has been referred to the Court
of Human Rights in Strassborg - No. 9532/81 v The UK - which deals with
the problem of having documents altered: J Norton 'The Transsexual and
the Law' (21 July 1984) New Law Journal 621.
2. Mason op cit 85.
3. op cit 90.
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He goes on to clarify that this re-registration would cover employment -
as it did with April Ashley - and certain contractual relationships in which 
sex is a relevant factor, but that it would not suffice to alter a birth 
certificate, as this has to be shown to have been incorrect at date of issue. 
Such changes by marginal error have been allowed, apparently at the request 
of the doctor, who must declare that there was an. error in the original 
(4) entry. The Registrar-General is empowered to order a complete entry 
to be altered when he is satisfied that there has in fact been an error 
of fact or substance, in relation to the birth. (S) 
The sole reported attempt to challenge this has been in Scotland. In the 
case of X Petitioner, (
6
) a request for a change of birth certificate and
name by a transsexual, was denied. X was born in 1907, and at the time 
of the petition, was· fifty years of age. At birth, he was registered as 
male, and subsequently raised as male. He married in 1939 and became the 
father of two children. In the medical evidence it was stated that since 
childhood, X's interests and attitudes were markedly feminine, and that 
he had "to make conscious efforts to play the role of a male and to suppress 
spontaneous behaviour which would betray his effeminacy and bring him into 
ridicule". ( 
7
) These characteristics later became more apparent and caused
the breakdown 9f his marriage. In the course of the ten years prior to 
the petition, there had been physical changes involving the development 
of breasts and the atrophy of the male genitalia. He also had begun cross-
dressing by this stage. In the infirmary where he was at the time of the 
petition, he was allowed to cross-dress and 'behave' as a woman. It was 
said also that his feminine behaviour, attitudes and general characteristics 
were most striking and consistent, and that any attempts to force him to 
live as a male, might now have serious consequences. Medical reports stated 
that X was absolutely and fixedly convinced that he should be a woman, and 
there was no evidence of unsound mind on his part. 
4. Mason op cit BS.
5. Births and Deaths Registration Act of 1953, s 29{3).
6. (1957) S L T 61.
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The first question that was considered was, that assuming that a change 
of sex had occured, whether Section 63 of the Act (
9
) could be invoked to
alter the sex designation in the birth register. In the opinion of the 
Sheriff-Substitute, the section could not be invoked for this particular 
purpose because it was felt that the section dealt only with the procedure 
th d . f ' h i h · { 
9
)on e iscovery o an error in t e entry n t e register. 
nr do not think it gives any sanction for recording 
changes which have subsequently occured. • • The situation 
would be different if, as sometimes happens, the sex 
of the child was indeterminate at birth, and it was 
later discovered that when the child developed, that 
an error had been made. 0 
The Sheriff-Substitute adopted the chromosomal test for the basis of his 
. (10)
decision that the petitioner was still of the male persuasion, 
nThe doctors are careful to stress that this is not 
a case of hermaphroditism, but is a genuine case of 
a very rare condition of transsexualism and that the 
changes which have taken place are irreversible. For 
the present purposes, I ••• accept that diagnosis, It 
is however stated that skin and blood tests still show 
X's basic sex to be male and that changes have not yet 
reached the deepest level of sex determination. It 
seems to me... that while X · could be described as an 
abnormal male, it would be impossible to describe him 
as a female." (
ll) 
8. Births, Deaths and Marriages Act (Scotland) 1854. Section 63 enacts
that "If any error shall be discovered to have been committed in the
entry of any birth in any register, it shall be lawful for the Sheriff,
upon coming to the knowledge of such erroneous entry, to summon before
him any person concerned in the making of such erroneous entry, and
if the Sheriff is satisfied that any error has been committed in such
en try, he shall direct a corrected entry of the birth... to be made
in a separate register book, to be called 'The Register of Corrected
entries'."
9. On its wording, the section is directed to a correction of an entry
which is erroneous as at the date on which the information was given.
10. At 62 of the report.
11. It would appear, that throughout legal systems there is a great tendency
to rely on terms such as 'normal' and 'abnormal' with regard to sexuality,
which practice, it is submitted, is blind to the fact that sex cannot
be defined accurately as a bipo.larity and that there are many types
of medical intersex, as shown in chapter two supra.
2. The United States of America
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At common law in the United States, changes of name have been relatively
easy, as long as it was apparent that there was no rnoti ve of fraud, or any
' d. h' d . . (12) 
preJu ice to t ir parties involved. Statutory enactments in most states
also makes provision for name changes, when reasonable grounds therefor are
shown, there is also no intent to defraud third parties and proper notice
is given to all creditors, by publication. (
l3
)
Courts too have recognised that the transsexual has a need for a name change 
and have granted such changes for the sole purpose of having the name match 
( 14) 
the transsexual's assumed role. In In Re Anonymous the court stated
that 
" ••• an individual may assume any name, in the absence 
of fraud or any interference with the rights of others ••• 
The civil rights law provisions establishing judicial 
procedure for changes of name are in addition to, and 
not in substitution for, the common law methods of 
change ••• The transsexual whose male organs were removed, 
was entitled to change name f rorn an obviously 'male' 
. (15)
name to an obviously 'female' one. 
In addition to this conclusion, the court took the opportunity to criticise 
both the chromosomal test for sex determination and the notion that the 
potential fraud outweighs the need for the transsexual to conceal his sex 
. (16)
by effecting a name change. 
12. Twardy op cit 265.
13. For example Ohio Rev Section 117.01 (Baldwin 1976).
14. 15 Misc 2d 813 293 NYS 2d 834 (1968) at 293 NYS 2d 837. This was the
first reported case in which the pos t-operative transsexual requested
a name change. 
15. At 293 NYS 2d 837 of the report. Twardy op cit 266 points out that
this change of name goes beyond the psychological gratification of
assuming the desired identity, as it. may be essential in proving the
continuity of land titles, inheritance, licences and the like.
16. Bromwell op cit 817.
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Again in · another case, the court rejected the argument that the potential 
fraud outweighs the need for the transsexual to change his name. 
(17) 
Re Anonvmous it was stated that
"Ordinarily, one has the right at common law to adopt 
or use any name so long as fraud or prejudice to others, 
is non-existent. Where it does not appear that any 
fraud or prejudice to others would result, 'transsexual' 
was authorised to have name changed from obviously male 
name to female name •.•. " 
In In 
It has been suggested that in the light of the aforegoing such cases, even 
in states where there is no express statutory provision for a change of 
name by the post-operative transsexual the courts may grant such requests 
with relative ease, to allow the transsexual to gain social acceptance in 
the new role. (
l9
)
However, despite the relative ease of the occurence of the change of name, 
an appropriate amendment to the birth certificate has proved an entirely 
different matter. Fifteen t (19) sta es have permitted the post-operative 
change of sex designation, although only three of· them have specifically 
. ( 20) 
provided by statute for this contingency. Illinois requires simply: 
"An affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation 
on a person, and that by reason of the operation the sex designation 
( 21)
on such birth re.cord should be changed. n · 
The Louisiana statute is more complex and provides inter alia that: 
"Any. person born · in Louisiana, who, after having been 
diagnosed as a transsexual or as a pseudo-hermaphrodite, 
has sustained sex reassignment or corrective surgery 
which has changed the anatomical structure of the sex 
of the individual. to that of the sex other than that 
which appears on the original birth certificate of the 
17. 64 Misc 2d 309 314 NYS 2d 668 (1970) at 314 NYS 2d 680. It is interesting
in this quote to note the patent avoidance of the personal gender
pronouns, as if the court was at a loss to place such a person, sexually.
This is however not really surprising because the who1e concept of
transsexualism was still judicially novel at this time.
18. Twardy op cit 260.
19. Alabama, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Texas, Tennessee, Iowa, Colorado
and Minnesota.
20 Ari Rev Stat Ann s 36-326 (West 1974); Ill Ann Stat ch 111½ s 73-77 
(Smith-Hurd 1966) and La Rev Stat s 40 : 336 (West 1976). 
21. Note 20 supra.
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"individual, may petition a court of competent 
. , 
d
. 
b . 
. . " ( 22)
Juris iction ••• to o tain a new certificate ••• 
Courts however have been opposed frequently, to permitting alterations in 
birth certificates of post-operative transsexuals. At present, there are 
(23) 
two leading cases on this issue, both of New York State. In Anonymous 
v Weiner, a male-female transsexual sought to have the sex designation on 
her birth record altered. In relying on a report from the committee on 
public health of the New York Academy of Medicine, the court denied the 
request. It set forth three state interests which it elicited in disallowing 
the amendment: 
1. in applying the·. chromosomal test in the birth certificate context, one
was ensuring the accuracy of public records.
"It is obvious · that the purpose of a birth certificate 
is to accurately set forth the information which· by 
. ( 24)
law it is required to contain." 
2. the protection against fraud. <
25
> The theory here is that the transsexual
is misrepresenting himself if his birth certificate designates him as 
belonging to the 'new' sex and his desire of concealment of his original
22. Note 20 supra. Thus it would appear, that whereas in Illinois the
decision is executive, it is a judicial one in Louisiana. Furthermore,
the Illinois statute is hesitant to use medical terms and as such is
rather vague, whereas the Louisiana statute is far more explicit. In 
Louisiana the original certificate is only available to the transsexual,
and then only on a court order. McColl Kennedy op cit 120 note 124,
cites an interesting practice in Minnesota which is not sanctioned
specifically by law but whereby a new birth certificate is issued with
a code nwnber which indicates that a previous certificate exists. This
practice prevents the possibility of fraud if the code is known to the
relevant agencies.
23. The first, and in fact, the first in the United States dealing with
transsexualism, is Anonymous v Weiner 50 Misc 2d 380, 382, 270 NYS 2d
319, 321 (1966). The second is Hartin v Dir.ector of Bureau of Records
and Statistics 75 Misc 2d 229, 347 NYS 2d 515 (1973).
24. At 270 NYS 321 of the report.
25. Ibid.
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. ' h d b bl' 1 · 
( 26) l' d 
. · 
t d ( 
27) ' -sex is outweig e y pu ic po icy. As an ear ier ecis1on no e ,. it 
is a greater ,fraud for a transsexual to have his original sex reflected 
in his birth certificate when he himself is living in the assumed role, 
with which this author is in agreement, In any event the court felt 
that any judicial intervention on its part would be a usurpation of 
h • r f • ( 28)t e executive s unction. 
3. the need to prevent laws and records from being used "as a means to
help psychologically ill persons in· their social adaptation" {sic). 
C29>
Thia statement was based. on the ultimate conclusion of the Academy. (JO)
26. It is submitted that this is a tenuous statement as the transsexual
has no conception of fraud or concealment as he believes that he is
in fact a member of the desired sex.
27. In Re Anonymous ( 1968) supra: "A male transsexual who submits to sex
reassignment is anatomically and psychologically a female in fact •••
It would seem to this court that the probability of fraud, if any, exists
to a much greater extent when the birth certificate is permitted, without
annotation of any type, to classify the individual as male, when in
fact the individual comports himself as a female."
28. At 270 NYS 2d 322 of the report.
29. �• It is submitted that it is reasonable to assume that any measures
not 1njurious to others, should be employed in alleviating the suffering
of others.
JO. Another state interest in forbidding amendments to birth certificates 
in the . case of transsexuals was expressed in the dissenting opinion 
in a case which, unlike Weiner did allow a transsexual to alter his 
birth certificate. In K v Dept of Human Resources 2601 App 311 316-
7 552 P 2d 840 845-6 ( 1976) the dissenting judge was of the opinion 
that a birth certificate is to be a record of certain facts about an 
individual at the time of his birth. Thus, even if the state were to 
recognise that the legal sex of the transsexual had changed since birth, 
the actual certificate should not be amended because the designation 
of the transsexual in his original sex would be accurate for the purposes 
of the certificate. It is submitted that this view not only ignores 
the fact that there could be ambiguities at the time of birth, but in 
fact evokes strictures in evaluating precisely when a transsexual becomes 
a victim of the phenomenon, which rules out the possibility of 
transsexualism having been predetermined before birth. As there is 
no definite proof regarding the onset of transsexualism, this intimation 
is inaccurate and unscientific. 
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(31) 
The criticism of Weiner in In Re Anonymous apparently went unrecognised, 
(32) 
as the Weiner decision was aff inned by the same court in Hartin' s case. 
The court re-echoed the same rationale and in addition, agreed with the 
Board of Health that 
"Surgery for the transsexual is an experimental form 
of psychotherapy by which mutilating surgery is conducted 
on a person with the intent of setting his mind at ease, 
and that nonetheless, does not change the body cells 
. ( 33) governing sexuality". 
In a more recent case, the New York court still refused the unqualified 
issuance of birth certificates reflecting the altered sex of the 
(34) post-operative transsexual. In Anomymous v Mellon the court held that 
"If reasonable grounds existed for refusal of the Bureau 
of . Vital Records of the City Department of Heal th to 
grant the request by the transsexual whose birth 
certificate designated sex as 'male' and who had become 
a woman after sex reassignment surgery, to show sex 
on the birth certificate as 'female', the court, no 
matter what its opinion, would not substitute its own 
for administrative determination. As to the transsexual 
who became a woman after sex reassignment surgery, the 
Bureau of Vital Records, •• did not act irrationally, 
artibrarily and without basis in issuing an amended 
birth certificate showing a female name where designated 
by the court order, but refusing to issue a birth 
certificate showing sex as 'female'." (35)
Although Weiner and Hartin reflect the judicial view of New York State 
regarding birth certificate changes, a 1975 federal district court held 
that the Conne::ti.cut Commissioner of Health must show a substantial state 
interest to justify the decision refusing to change birth certificates of 
post-operative transsexuals. 
31. Note 14 supra.
32. Note 23 supra.
33. The court also took into consideration the fact that Hartin, while serving
in the United states Navy as a male, married and fathered a child. He
was divorced in 1971.
34. 91 Misc 2d 375, 398 NYS 2d 99 (1977).
35. at 398 NYS 2d 99 of the report.
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(36) 
In Darnell v Lloyd, the complainant alleged that the Commissioner had 
violated her rights to equal protection in that he had granted other requests 
for birth certificate amendments. The Health Conunissioner in his motion, 
claimed that the complainant had not stated a cause of action. This was 
rejected by the Court and the dispute was ultimately settled by an agreement 
to adopt a new procedure by which a transsexual could obtain a change on 
his birth certificate to reflect his 'new' sex. Such change would be 
permitted if the transsexual submitted affidavits from a psychiatrist and 
a surgeon which attested to the patient's mental status and verified that 
sex reassignment surgery had been performed. 
Regarding secondary sources of identity, it would appear that post-operative 
transsexuals have had reasonable 
occupational licences 
success in 
and other 
having changes made on drivers' 
records. <
37
) According to Drlicences, 
Walker
(JB) 
many churches re-issue baptismal certificates with both name
and sex amendments while the armed services refer such requests to the 
Department of Defence, which apparently has become increasingly unreceptive 
(39)to such requests. 
36. 395 F Supp 1210 {D Conn 1975).
37. Twardy op cit 268. By 1971, the Catholic church had given its approval
for at least one operation on the ground that "this operation is necessary
for the mental and emotional heal th of a transsexual and as such is
required for him to live a normal life"·: Smith op cit 976. The Church
then issued a new certificate of baptism (ibid). In addition, a
Presbyterian minister underwent surgery and was granted a new certificate
in Iowa: Toronto Daily Star 1968 cited in Smith op cit 976. In Hartin
the Roman Catholic church re-issued the plaintiff with a new baptismal
certificate which reflected the change of name and sex.
38. Twardy op cit 268.
39. Ibid.
3. Canada
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Most provinces do not provide for an alteration of sex designation on birth 
certificates of post-operative 
h d h l . l . ( 41) ave passe sue egis ation. 
(40) 
transsexuals. 
Examples thererof 
In Alberta, the statute provides that 
However. five 
are as follows. 
"Where any person has had his anatomical sex structure 
changed to a sex other than that which appears on his 
birth certificate, the Director, on production to him 
of 
a) two affidavits of two duly qualified medical 
practitioners, each affidavit deposing that the anatomical 
sex of the person has changed, and 
b) evidence satisfactory to him as to the identity
of the person, shall 
c) if the sex of the person is registered in Alberta,
cause a notation of the change to be made on the 
registration thereof. and 
d) if the sex of the person is registered outside
Alberta, transmit to the office in charge of registration 
of births and mar;dages in that jurisdiction in which 
the person is registered, a copy of the proof of the 
change of sex produced to the Director. 
(2) Every birth or marriage certificate issued after
the making of a notation under this section, shall be 
issued as if the registration had been made with the 
sex as changed." 
In British Columbia, the statute declares that: 
"Where a person in respect of whom transsexual surgery 
has been performed is unmarried on the date he applies 
under this section, the Director shall upon application 
made to him in accordance with subsection (2) change 
the sex designation on the registration of birth of 
such person in a manner that the sex designation is 
consistent with the intended results of the transexual 
surgery 
40. Hawley op cit 137.
provinces 
41. Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba. Saskatchewan
is following suit.
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( 2) an application under subsection ( 1) shall be made
in the prescribed fortn by the person in respect of whom 
,, 
the transsexual surgery was performed and shall be 
accompanied by 
a) the certificate of a medical practitioner qualified
and licenced to practice medicine ••• explaining the 
surgical procedures carried out and certifying that 
he performed the transsexual surgery on the applicant ••• 
bl the certificate of a medical practitioner who did 
not perform the transsexual surgery but who is qualified 
and licenced to practice medicine in the province 
certifying that 
i) he examined the applicant;
ii) the results of his examination substantiate
the certificate of the practitioner who· performed the 
transsexual surgery; and 
iii) the results of the transsexual surgery are in
accordance with the requirements of the regulation. 
(3) Every birth certificate registered after the 
registration of birth is changed under this section 
shall be issued as if the original registration had 
been made showing the sex designation as changed under 
the section." 
New Brunswick too, has made provision for post-operative alteration of 
documents, amending its Health Act to read as follows: 
"52(1)(1) Where a person has undergone transsexual surgery 
and is unmarried at the time he makes an application 
under this section, that person may make an application 
to the Registrar to cause a notation to be made on the 
birth registration of that person so that the registration 
is consistent with the intended results of the surgery. 
(2) A person applying for a change under subsection
(1) may also apply to have his given name or names
changed. 
(3) The Registrar shall cause to be made a notation
of the changes referred to in subsections ( 1) and ( 2) 
where the application is made in the form prescribed 
by the Registrar and is accompanied by: 
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a) the certificates of two medical practitioners
certifying that:
i) they examined the applicant: and
ii) the results of the transsexual surgery are
in accordance with the requirements of the regulations, 
and 
a. evidence satisfactory to the Registrar as to the
identify of the person making the application.
(4) Every birth certificate issued after the making
of a notation under this section shall be issued as
if registration had been made with the sex designation
(42)
and names, changed." 
It is pertinent to rot e that the above examples stipulate the single status 
of the applicant, as a pre-requisite. This is not difficult to understand, 
as if it were otherwise, many legal problems would ensue. Furthermore, 
both stipulate that surgery must be· in accordance with regulations which 
means that the operation is strictly monitored by law, which is also a 
commendable and necessary measure. The effect of the change is retro-active 
as far as the appearance of the Registry is concerned, but obviously cannot 
be intended to be retro-active in respect of the events in the life of the 
individual before he underwent the corrective surgery. The result of this 
legislation therefore appears to be that persons who have undergone corrective 
surgery can be registered as a member of their 'new' sex as if they had 
always been of that sex for all purposes, subsequent to the change in 
registration. In the light of this it should be asswned that legal recognition 
(43)
is in toto. But this unfortunately does not appear to be the case. 
III SOUTH AFRICA 
The phenomemon of transsexualism is not recognised by our common law and 
neither is there a custom which supports even the vaguest notion of a 'sex
change'. 
42. Hawley op cit 132.
43. It has been suggested that the Corbett decision might be followed in
matrimonial issues: vide chapter eight infra.
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"Our common law relating to persons, property, contract, 
marriage, inheritance, delict and even crimes, was largely 
founded and developed on the concept of two basic and 
immutably detemined sexes. Were it otherwise, our 
common law regarding the status of the sexes would not 
have developed as it did."
(44> 
However, several male transsexuals have been allowed to re-register officially 
(45) 
as females after corrective surgery. In 1972, the apparently first
re-registration of a female-male transsexual was allowed. 
be dealt with now, briefly. 
This case shall 
The case of Fredrica x�
46
) Fredrica was born in 1939, the third child of 
parents who had lost a son in infancy and who already had a daughter two 
years older than the patient. Fredrica 's father had always wanted a son 
and therefore her birth was a great disappointment to him. Consequently, 
he unconsciously - and often consciously - treated her as a boy. From an 
early age, she herself had always preferred her father's company, showing 
an interest in his masculine pursuits and none whatsoever in the traditional 
f.eminine activities. <
4
1> In primary school, she associated with the boys,
and although forced to wear dresses to school, she voluntarily chose to 
wear trousers in her free time. She had a good relationship with her father, 
but resented her mother, who always tried to force her into feminine 
activities. She decided to take up nursing when she left school, as a method 
of getting away from home. 
In her first year, she discovered that she was emotionally attracted to 
females, which she did not regard as unnatural. Her friends and acquaintances 
treated her as a male throughout training, and during this period she dated 
several girls in her·role as a male. At this time, her physical development 
began to cause her great anxiety which led to severe bouts of depression, 
until she decided to seek psychiatric assistance. 
44 . Taitz op cit 69. 
45. Strauss (2) op cit 221.
46. All the information pertaining to this case is from Strauss ( 2), he
having obtained the facts from the patient himself.
47. Although the causes of transsexualism are by no means clear, it is
suggested that environmental factors to play an important role: chapter
three supra. This appears to be largely the case with Fredrica.
152 
Various tests were carried out to determine if there was any hormonal 
imbalance. The results were never made known to her, but it was suggested 
that she think about a 'sex change". After a few years, she again sought 
psychiatric help and this time was told that she was a homosexual, and would 
have to learn to adjust to and live with, the situation as there was nothing 
that could be done to alter it. Fredrica states: 
�r lived a completely double life, conforming where 
it was impossible to do otherwise, and living as a male 
socially. No one ever doubted or queried that I was 
a male, but when .I was dressed in female clothing, I 
was constantly subjected to ridicule, and have been 
thrown out of female toilets and accused of masquerading 
as a female." 
In 1967-69 she underwent psycho-analysis with a clinical psychologist. 
"I had given considerable thought to this (living as 
a male) and firmly believed that only in this way · would 
I be free and able to live a normal life. I had supported 
myself and accepted my responsibility since I had left 
. ( 48)home and did not consider myself to be neurotic." 
In 1971, she decided to have her breasts removed, "as these were a constant 
source of embarrassment to me, also limiting my recreation and manner of 
dress". Three months later, she underwent a hysterectomy and an oopheroctomy 
and was put on a maintenance dose of testosterone. 
At this stage, she sought legal advice on the question of re-registration 
as a male. This had the immediate practical results which she had hoped 
to achieve, and thus she officially became Mr Fredric x. He is now employed 
as a male nurse in the same institution in which he was working prior to 
re-registration and his colleagues and friends have, by and large, shown 
a sympathetic understanding to his situation. Strauss states that 
no one corning into contact with Frederic would have the slightest doubt 
that he is a male. He does not give any impression of either a mannish 
female or an effeminate male. 
48. Strauss (2) op cit 222.
49. Strauss (2) op cit 223.
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Frederic's application for re-registration was based on a statement by the 
patient supplemented by detailed certificates issued by the practitioners 
who attended her. A brief resume of these medical reports will be dealt 
with now, all of which substantiate the patient's conviction that he was 
always really a man. 
Clinical psychologist: He stated that 
was having 'departures' behaving in 
unconscious and dissociated manner. She 
when Fredrica consulted him, she
what appeared to be a totally 
was physically female but strongly 
resented her female characteristics. She was however, mannish in appearance, 
and her gestures were masculine. She had lesbian affairs which were unstable 
because of her anxiety at becoming emotionally involved. In the course 
of her therapy, the 'departures' ceased, although she feared that the therapy 
might change her masculine tendencies and she did her best to make the 
psychologist aware of her need to remain masculine. He regarded her need 
to be a man as a way of integrating her aggressive impulses into her 
personality. He also believed, that for her to have been so strongly male­
orientated, there must have been a constitutional and genetic predisposition 
in her personality. Given this predisposition and her family environment 
the total picture is of someone deeply dissatisfied with what life had given 
her, and trying her utmost to modify this in order to find some personal 
gratification and satisfaction. 
'I recommended that the final step legalising the change 
should be taken to enable her to live as closely as 
possible to the sexual identity of her choice and 
hopefully reduce many of the conflicts which had plagued 
her in the past... I therefore suggest that whatever 
action remains to be taken, be taken on humane grounds." 
General practitioner: 
"I associate myself with her application for a change 
in sexual status." 
His reasons were inter alia her masculine outlook, mannerisms, taste in 
clothing, hobbies and recreation. On physical examination, her general 
stature and hair distribution of trunk and head was more in keeping with 
those of a male than a female. Because of her mannerisms, she had been 
socially ostracised and this isolation had had severe psychological effects 
on her. He stated that he found her mentally and emotionally stable, but 
that the frustrations of her predicament had been the direct cause of severe 
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bouts of depression and introversion. He concluded that if Fredrica was 
recognised as a male person, she would be happier and lead a more contented 
life, free to follow her interests without ridicule. She would be freed 
from the obligation to conform to feminine behaviour and dress, which did 
not come naturally to her. Finally he stated that: 
"In my view, there is no ulterior or perverted motive 
in her desire to apply for a change of sex status." 
Surgeon: On performing the mastectomy, he discovered that Fredrica had 
fibro-adenosis, which in all probability, resulted from a hormonal imbalance. 
He too found that she was more masculine in her physique and hair 
distribution, than feminine. 
Medical Officer in his capacity as her employer: He noted that on engaging 
Fredrica, she had m-axJced male characteristics. He fully supported the change 
as it was obvious that the patient would fit into the community much more 
. (50) 
easily as a male. 
Psychiatrist: He had known Fredrica for more than ten years, during which 
time she had suffered traumatic episodes in which her femininity was 
challenged publicly. He insisted that in evaluating a sex status, one had 
to take into account seven factors: chromosomes; hormones; gonads; internal 
genital morphology; external genital morphology and psychological identity. 
Where there is ambiguity in any of the first 
directed towards the gender-role and not the 
five, medical treatment is 
. (51) 
physical determinates. 
As Fredrica had undergone sex reassignment surgery, it was deemed timely 
by him that her re-classification as a male be forthcoming, as this is the 
gender-role which she is fulfilling adequately. Her psychological 
identification and outlook had been those of a transsexual with a decided 
male gender-role, which was incompatible with her apparent feminine physical 
appearance at the time. He concluded that it would be in her best interests 
{52) 
to be accepted as a male. 
50. Strauss (2) op-cit 227.
51. Strauss (2) op cit 228. This is the only sensible method of sex 
designation as far as this author is concerned. 
52. The question of re-construction of male genitalia was di$cussed, but
due to various reasons it was decided not to undergo this. The patient
is therefore in all respects except external appearance of the genitalia,
decidely male.
Before Fredrica' s oaee., 
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there were no provisions in any Act, for 
re-registration. However, shortly afterwards, the Births, Marriages and 
Deaths Registration Act <
53> was amended C
54> 
to allow for re-registration
on applying to the Registrar of births and deaths in the Department of the 
Interior, The amended section now reads 
"The Director-General may, on the reconunendation of 
the. Secretary of Health, alter in the birth register 
of any person who has undergone a change of sex, the 
description of the sex of such person and may for this 
purpose. call for such medical reports and institute 
such investigations as he may deem necessary. 
n ( 55)
IV CRITICAL EVALUATION 
As we have seen from the above discussion, there have been instances of 
official refusal for re-registration - primarily in Britain and the United 
States. This refusal is on the grounds that the existing law only permits 
alteration in cases of error and as sex is determined by karyotype, there 
is no change of sex after corrective surgery, and therefore no need to alter 
the birth certificate. It is submitted that one should disregard the 
chromosomal test - which, as medical knowledge has shown, is both impractical 
and inaccurate - and apply instead the more rational assumed gender-anatomy 
test for the post-operative trsnssexual as was done in the case of Fredrica. 
It ie submitted further, that if this was done, it is clear that an alteration 
would in fact be necessary in order to reflect the true situation. When 
the transsexual used this certificate in society, it would be consistent 
with· his apparent sex, . whereas if the certificate remained unchanged, it 
would be in direct conflict with his social sex. But as long as the 
transsexual's sex is determined by pre-operative criteria and karyotype, 
there will rarely appear to be a mistake as to sex determination as far 
as the records are concerned, and therefore no possibility of later 
alteration. It is submitted that depending on how one views the phenomenon 
of transsexualism, it could be argued that there has in fact been a mistake 
of designation at birth. If one gives due weight to the psychological 
criterion, it could be said that such psychological sex might be predetermined 
53. Act 81 of 1963.
54, By section 1 of Births, Marriages and Deaths Amendment Act 51 of 1974. 
55. Section 7B as inserted by s l of Act 51 of 1974, as .amended by section
4 of Births, Marriaqes and Deathe Registration Amendment Act 35 of 1982.
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before birth, as it is certainly in evidence from a very early age. Therefore 
the birth certificate - which is not a medical record as it does not reflect 
the whole sex of the individual, but just the visually determined sex for 
the purposes of the law - should be subject to alteration when the child 
in fact develops according to his/her true sex. 
There are, as has been seen, several jurisdictions which do permit alteration 
of birth certificates, thereby tacitly rejecting the chromosomal test for 
sex determination in favour of the post-operative sex of the transsexual, 
which, it is submitted, is the only rational thing to do. All of these 
statutes require some type of medical testimony - although it is not a direct 
stipulation in the South African enactment, and is left to the discretion 
of the relevant official. 
The problem however, with these enactments - and more specifically the South 
African one - is that they only provide for alteration of birth certificates, 
and no more. Thus the ambit of application is unrealistically restricted. 
It may be argued that by acknowledging the possibility of the 'change of 
sex', Parliament has impliedly superceded the common law which is silent 
on this issue. However, 
"It is a well-known cannon of construction that we cannot 
infer that a statute intends to alter the common law. 
The statute must either explicitly say that it is the 
intention or the inference from the Ordinance must 
be such that we can come to no other conclusion than 
h h 1 . 1 . h 
. . " ( 56 ) 
t at t e egis ature did have sue an intention. 
It is the function of the legislature to enact law, and the function of 
the judiciary to administer and interpret that law. The courts can do no 
more than to seek and express the intention of the legis_lature and may not 
attribute to the legislation any meaning or effect not intended by the 
. ( 57) 
legislature. 
56. Casserley v Stubbs 1916 TPD 310 at 312 per Wessels J.
57. Harris v Law Society of Good Hope 1917 CPD 951.
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There are a number of factors to be ta.ken into account when trying to 
establish the intention of the legislature. One is the imprecision and 
ambiguity of the language. All statutes suffer to same extent, from vagueness 
and generality. This however is not the problem with section 7B of the 
South African Act. More applicable, is the Parliamentary process and poor 
draughtsmanship, in that it leaves the question of recognising sex changes 
in other spheres, untouched. Judges have suffered much from poor 
draughtsmanship. We find Lord Campbell bemoaning the fact regarding: 
" an ill-penned enactment putting judges into an 
embarrassing situation of being bound to make sense 
out of nonsense and to reconcile what is 
' ·1· bl 
" (SB) irreconci 1a e. 
It is with the greatest respect that this author submits that Nesdadt J 
did not appear to make sense out of nonsense, in refusing to extend the 
application of a 7B as regards the matrimonial sphere, in order that the 
law would not be made foolish and inconsistent, but that in fact, he achieved 
the reverse. The fact that Parliament had seen fit to provide a procedure 
of re-registration clearly indicates that it has recognised the concept 
of sex reassignment and although the section only deals with re-registration, 
it is logical-that the legislature should be seen to recognise such changes 
in toto. Smit (
S9) states that
"Die beslissing van Regter Nesdadt, wat op koue 
natuurwetenskaplike argument berus, is presies die 
teenoorgestelde van dit wat die wetgewer met Artikel 
7B beoog." 
The courts are free to adopt on� of three recognised approaches in 
interpreting a statute: 
58. Winchester Court Ltd v Miller 1944 KB 134.
59. P.C. Smit 'Juridiese Bepaling van Geslag' (1977) Tydskrif vir Regwetenskap
106 at 113.
158 
1. the mischief rule;
2. the golden or absurdity rule; and
3. the literal rule.
Although South African courts have tended towards the literal, strict approach
to interpretation probably because ours is a common law system with 
legislation interwoven (
60) - it is submitted that the first rule is to be
preferred as it represents a functional method of interpretation. 
In applying the mischief rule, (
6l) the interpreter must consider four 
premises: 
1. what the law was before the measure was passed;
2. what the defect/mischief was for which the law had not provided;
3. 
4. 
what remedy the legislature has now provided; 
(62}
the reason for the remedy. 
and
Taitz
(63) in applying the mischief rule to s 7B obtains the following results. 
l. prior to the enactment no law existed for the alteration of the sex
description of a person who had undergone a sex change;
2. the defect in the law was the absence of any statutory provision,
including procedure, for the alteration of the sex description in the
Birth Register of a person who had undergone a change of sex;
3. the remedy provided by the legislature was the authority to alter the
sex description and the administrative procedure to be followed by the
relevant official, the Secretary of the Interior; and
4. the reason for the remedy was to make possible the change of sex
description in the birth register of a person who had undergone a change
of sex.
60. Statutes therefore tend to be regarded with suspicion by the courts
and are consequently interpreted strictly with the judiciary either
having no power to correct errors or fill lacunae, or not wishing to
take such power upon itself. This attitude therefore has the disadvantage
in that it can operate to give nonsensical - as in W v w - or unduly
harsh results to legislation.
61. As formulated in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a at 7b.
62. Taitz op cit 71. See also Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1941 (l}
SA 842 (A) at 852, where it was cited with approval by Van den Heever
JA.
63. Op cit 71.
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Taitz comes to the conclusion from this analysis that the interpretation 
of section 7B as it stands, is correct. It is not possible to extend the 
words of the enactment to include other instances of recognition of a change 
of sex, (
6
-4) but it is submitted here, that this does not categorically rule
out the possibility of a judicial extension to the enactment, using the 
recognition of a change of sex accorded by section 7B as the foundation 
of the argument. For whichever way one wishes to interpret section 7B, 
it i6 nevertheless evident that the legislature does envisage the factual 
possibility of a 'sex change I and has gone so far as to accord it some 
recognition. If the section is not afforded legal recognition, then clearly 
the legislature has failed to achieve any purpose - save to give the post­
operative transsexual the empty spes that he/she may now recommence life 
according to his/her sexual adaptation. 
"Dit word te oorweging gegee dat dit wel die bedoeling 
van die wetgewer is dat n persoon se geslag, in sy 
allerdaagse sosiologiese (en nie sui'Wer
tegnies-biologiese) konteks gesien, kan verander. Om
vir so h gebeurtlikheid voorsiening te maak is Artikel 
(65)7B van ook op die wetboek geplaas." 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Taitz found support for the 
argument of a general recognition of sex change, in the Parliamentary debates 
preceding the pas�ing of section 7B:
( 66)
"The amending legislation ••• is required in order to 
give a legal foundation to an administrative practice 
which has been followed for some •time in respect of 
altering birth registers. For the past few years, the 
Department of the Interior has, on request, altered 
the person's sex description in his/her birth regis�er 
after such a person has undergone a change of sex as 
. ,  (67)
a result of.medical treatment ••• • 
65. Smit op cit 113.
66. Such debates however, may not be used to construe the intention of the
legislature, because this would be against all principles of construction:
Taitz op cit 72.
67. As per Deputy Minister of the Interior, House of Assembly Debates 4
October 1974.
160' 
V SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
It is submitted, that while it is !audible that south Africa is on a par 
with the more enlightened jurisdictions as regards granting re-registration, 
the enactment as it stands is too limited in scope to be of any real use. 
Section 7B was evidently enacted- by Parliament because it realised that 
the phenomenon of transsexualism was now ineffably part of modern medicine 
and therefore could be ignored by the law no longer. Considering that the 
operation has not been prohibited by law - and in fact should not be - it 
is clear that in this regard at least, the law is keeping up with medicine� 
As far as giving legal cognizance to the effect of the operation by allowing 
re-registration, the South African Parliament has taken a commendably 
progressive step in dealing with the transsexual problem. However, as the 
legislation stops short here, it offers no real solace to the post-operative 
transsexual. 
It is further submitted, that not only should re-registraiton specifically 
relate to unmarried transsexuals - as is required in the Canadian statutory 
examples given thereby avoiding legal problems inherent in the situation 
if the transsexual were still married at the time of his conversion, but 
that the enactment should be broadened to cover all spheres of law, including 
marriage - as has been the tacit implication with the Alberta Statute. It 
is submitted in conclusion, that in order to avoid all the possible anomalies, 
• (68) 
legislation such as that enacted in West Germany should be adopted and 
employed in South Africa as it is evident that the judiciary is not going 
to take any progressive steps. The legislature should now complete the 
good work it has begun and extend the application of section 7B to all areas 
of the post-operative transsexual's life. 
68. Gesetz "Uber die Ander.ung Der Vor narnen und Der Peststellung Der
Geschlechtszugehorigkett in Besonderen Fallen (Transsexuellen gesetz
- TSG) Nr 56 - Tag der Ausgabe Bonn den 16 Sept 1980 vorm 10. This
legislation will be dealt with in greater detail at the end of chapter
eight infra.
A. MARRIAGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
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C BAP TBR VI I I 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
"Let us not to the marriage of true minds, 
Admit impediments." (Shakespeare) 
Marriage is a ·desire of most people, and the transsexual is no exception. 
Al though re-registration in the 'new' role has been permitted in several 
jurisdictions - including South Africa- the status of the post-operative 
transsexual's marriage has had a far from satisfactory outcome. 
II COMPARATIVE LAW 
1. The United Kingdom.
The most celebrated case pertinent to the issue of the validity of the 
post-operative transsexual's marriage, is the English one of Corbett v 
Corbett. ( 
1
) This case revolved around the petition by a husband praying
for a declaration that the marriage ceremony in which he participated was 
null and void because the respondent at the time of the ceremony was a 
person of the male sex, or in the al tern a ti ve, for a decree of nullity 
on the ground of the non-consummation, owing to the incapacity or wilful 
( 2) 
refusal on the part of the respondent. 
The relevant facts of the ( 3) case are as follows. The respondent was born 
in 1935 in Liverpool, and registered at birth as a boy. 'He' was raised 
as a boy, and it had not been suggested at any time that there had been 
a mistake in the sex of the child, In 1951, at the age of six.teen years, 
'he' joined the Navy and at the age of seventeen, was referred to the 
psychiatric department of Wal ton Hospital where it was observed that 'he' 
presented a womanish appearance and "had little bodily and facial hair". 
After some six months treatment, the doctor in charge concluded that 
"This boy is a constitutional homosexual who says he 
wants to become a woman. He has had numerous homosexual 
experiences and his homosexuality is at the root of 
his depression. On examination, apart from his womanish 
appearance, there was no abnormal finding". <
4
>
1. (1970) 2 All ER 33.
2. Ibid.
3. At 35 of the report.
4. At 36 of the report. It must be remembered that very little was known
about the phenomenon of transsexualism at this time (1953).
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By 1956, the respondent had become a member of a troupe of female 
impersonators by which state 'he' was already taking oestrogen to encourage 
the development of breasts and a feminine physique. In May 1960, 'he' 
underwent corrective surgery in Casablanca. Following the operation, the 
respondent returned to London and began calling herself April Ashley and 
dressed and lived as a female. About six months later, she met the petitioner 
for the first time. In September 1963, the parties underwent a ceremony 
of marriage in Gibraltar at the time of which, the petitioner was aware 
that the respondent had undergone corrective surgery, 
together for no more than fourteen days. 
The parties lived 
The essence of the judgment is delivered by Judge Ormrod, who states that: 
''The case therefore .resolves itself into the primary 
issue of the validity of the marriage, which depends 
on the true sex of the respondent and the second issue 
of the incapacity of the parties, or their re spec ti ve 
willingness or unwill.ingnes to consumate the marriage 
• . " ( 5) IF there was a marriage to consumate . 
In the first instance, Ormrod J appeared to be favourably_ impressed with 
the petitioner's testimony. 
"In the witness box, he described bis sexual experience 
in considerable detail with apparent frankness and 
. h b ' mb (
6) H . f wit out o vious e arrassment. e was in act, an
5. At 35 of the report.
6. However, from the respondent's point of view, his testimony had another
aspect to it. "Suddenly I r·ealised what he {Arthur) was doing. So
did my medical and legal advisers. Arthur was emphatically presenting
himself as a deviate in vivid detail ••. By adopting this confessional
approach, by posing as a pervert since struck by contrition he
was able to convey the impression that our marriage was no more than
a squalid prank, some deliberate mockery of moral society perpetrated
by a couple of queers for their own twisted amusement. By implication,
I too was a deviate and no more than a deviate. He appeared to be
apologising in court, and sympathy was forthcoming. I was not 
apologising for being myself, and sympathy was not forthcoming. A
few. days into the case, Ormrod suddenly asked if it were necessary
to continue wasting the taxpayers' money- ••• In the face of his alarming
lack of interest in the debate, my counsel began to look very worried
indeed": Fallowell and Ashley £2. cit 216.
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unusually good witness, answering all the questions 
put to him carefully and without any attempt at 
• t' 
• b (7) 
prevarica ion or evasion . 
It is ironic therefore that when he came to describing his deviant behaviour, 
Ormrod J was suitably impressed, but when Corbett continued to declare 
that his feelings for the respondent had been that of a man for a woman, 
the learned judge dismissed this evidence as 'fantasies'. 
" soon he (Corbett) developed for her (Ashley) the 
interest of a man for a woman. He said she looked 
like a woman, dressed like a woman, and acted like 
a woman. He disclosed his true identity to the 
respondent to show that his feelings had become those 
of a full man in love with a girl, not those of a 
transvestite in love with a transsexual. He repeatedly 
said that he looked on the respondent as a woman, and 
was attracted to her as a woman While I accept 
his account of his sexual experience from a qualitative 
point of view, I am sceptical about the quantity of 
it but I have no difficulty in concluding that he is 
a man who is extremely prone to all kinds of sexual 
fantasies and practices. 
11 (8) 
He is an unreliable yardstick 
There was general agreement amongst the doctors as to the basic principles 
and facts, but there was a divergence of opinion as regards the 
classification of the respondent. 
"Dr Randell considered that the respondent is properly 
classified· as a male homosexual transsexualist. Prof 
Dewhurst agreed and said that the description 
'castrated male' would be correct. Dr Armstrong agreed 
that the · evidence was typical of a male transsexual, 
but he considered that there was also evidence that 
the respondent was not a physically normal male. He 
said that the respondent was an example of the condition 
called intersex •.• and should be assigned to the female 
7. At 37 of the report.
8. At 38 of the report.
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sex, mainly on account of the psychological abnormality 
of transsexualism. Prof Roth was prepared to regard 
the case as one of intersex, and thought that the 
respondent might be classified as a woman 'socially' • 
He would not recommend that the respondent should attempt 
to live in society as a male ••• I am, inclined to prefer 
the evidence of Dr Randell ( 
9
) my conclusion is 
that the respondent is correctly described as a male 
transsexual, possibly with some comparatively minor 
physical abnormality". (
lO) 
All the medical witnesses accepted that there are at least four criteria 
for assessing the sexual condition of an individual: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
chromosomal factors; 
gonadal factorsi 
genital factors; and 
. (11)
psychological factors. 
Ormrod J concluded that the r_espondent had shown a male karyotype and 
therefore was chromosomally male. He concluded further, that prior to 
the operation the respondent ha:l had '•ma.ie gonads and testicles - bearing 
in mind of course that the learned judge was ·not aware whether or not the 
gonads were normal, as such information was not forthcoming. The respondent 
therefore was held to be psychologically transsexual {sic) and that any_ 
operation had not affected 'her' status as male. Thus ' her ' sex for the 
purposes of marriage was not that of a biological female. 
"My conclusion therefore is that the respondent is not a woman 
for the purposes of marriage but is a biological male and has 
been so since birth".(
l2
)
9. At 43 of the report.
10. At 44 of the report.
12. At 49 of the report. The respondent states her contention at
207 of her autobiography: 0 since the scientific definition
of sex is not clearcut in all cases, and since marriage is also
a legal and social relationship between a man and a woman I should
be regarded as a woman for the purposes of marriage because, as
a result of my operation, I could function in no other way. The
judge confined his deliberation to my original, biological
classification, disregarding the psychological factor, and the
fundamental developments to which it gave rise, was the central
weakness of the case and the reason for its unsatisfactory outcome."
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In arriving at this decision, Orrnrod J discussed his idea of marriage. 
"Since marriage is essentially a .relationship between 
a man and a woman, the validity of the marriage in 
this case, depends in my judgment, upon whether the 
respondent is or is not a woman The question then 
becomes what is meant by the word 'woman' in the context 
of marriage, for I am not concerned to determine the 
(13) 
'legal sex' of the respondent at large. Having regard 
to the essentially heterosexual character of the 
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria 
must in my judgment, be biological For even the 
cannot most extreme degree of transsexualism 
reproduce ·a person who is naturally capable of performing 
. (14) 
the essential role of a woman in marriage" 
Conspicuously absent from this opinion is a description of this "essential 
role". This opens up several avenues of speculation. If, by this phrase, 
Ormrod J meant the ability to procreate, he would void innumerable marriages 
throughout the world. If he meant the ability to have sexual intercourse 
as a woman, then he ignored the uncontroverted evidence of the medical 
examiners who reported that there "is no impediment on 'her• part to sexual 
. ( 15) 
intercourse". If Ormrod J meant the ability to look like and act like 
a woman, he rebutted his own admission that Miss Ashley's outward appearance 
••• was convincingly feminine." 
The learned judge, ruling on the alternative held that even if the respondent 
were female at the time of the marriage, the marriage would be a nullity 
still, due to non-consummation. He based his findings on the ground that 
it was impossible for conswnmation to occur where a person has an artificial 
(16) 
vagina, because this could not amount to vera copula. 
13. This author wonders how many sexes a person in fact does have, if
he does not have a legal sex 'at large'?
14. At 48 of the report. (My underlining).
15. At 41 of the report. "April Coi:ibett had had an operation for the
construction of an artificial vagina, and the surgical result was
remarkable good" (ibid). In addition, Miss Ashley had testified to 
successful sexual relations with a·t least one man prior to her marriage
(at 37 of the report).
16. At 49 of the report.
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However, this point was found to be unsubstantiated in the earlier decision 
of S v S (
l7> , with which this author is in accord.
"For myself, I find it difficult to see why the 
enlargement of a vestigial vagina should be regarded 
as producing something different in kind from a 
. ( 18) 
vagina artificially created from nothing. The 
operation involved in either case is substantially 
the same ••. in either case there is no more than 
a cul-de-sac and there can be no possibility of 
a child being conceived ••• the inability to 
conceive a child is no ground for saying that the 
marriage cannot be consununated ••• what else, 
it may be asked, remains to differentiate between 
intercourse by means of a vagina artificially enlarged? 
(19)be regarded as amounting to vera copula a . 
All in all, i� is submitted that it is patently obvious from this 
judgment that 0rmrod J has gone out of his way to find any objection 
to  this marriage which he evidently finds distasteful and it is submitted 
further that none of his reasons hold much water.
2. Canada.
In Canada the definition of marriage as enunciated in Hyde 
· (20)
v Hyde and Woodmansee has been used: a voluntary consent of both parties
being of the opposite sex to each other. This was re-affirmed in the
1975 case of North v Matheson in which two men purported to marry one
another. They applied to have their 'marriage' registered at the Vital 
Statistics office. On application to court after official refusal of their
request, their claim was dismissed as the court held that the definition
in Hyde's case was the acceptable one. It was concluded that the ceremony
was not one of marriage so there was nothing to register, in effect.
17. S v S (otherwise W) (no 2) 1962 All ER 55.
18. or, it is submitted, from a previously male organ.
19. To start getting caught in the semantics involved is tantamount to
claiming that there is a standard size to which genitalia should conform
and anything less renders the person 'abnormal'.
20. (1866) LRP and D 130.
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The parties must also comply with the statutory regulations, and have the 
(21) 
necessary capacity. The status of the post-operative transsexual's marriage
in Canada is uncertain, and some authorities are of the opinion that if the 
question came up for �djudication, it would be decided along the lines of Corbett 
V Corbett. 
< 22J 
I ' · · ' th" P h" . R bk' f th n cr1.t1c1.s1.ng 1.s case, arc in- y in re ers to e case
(23) 
of D v A. She claims that the artificial vagina does permit a degree of 
penetration sufficient to complete the natura1 act of copulation. Taking 
into account also the decision in Miller v .Hillei
24
) it: is submitted that it 
would appear logical to assume that the post-operative tranesexual is capable 
of fulfilling the role of a woman and furthennore, the fact that sterility 
does not result in a dec1aration of nullity under Canadian law is further 
evidence that the inability of the transsexual to procreate is also no bar 
(25) 
against her capacity to marry. It is submitted that there is - in the
light of the aforegoing case and also in light of such statutes as the one 
in Alberta dealing with re-registration - no reason why Canadian judges should 
feel compelled to follow the Corbett decision, and it is hoped that this wil1 
not transpire. 
3. Australia.
To date, there is no case directly in issue on the marriage of the 
post-operative transsexual in Australia, but there has been one on the related 
topic of the marriage of an hermaphrodite. In the Corbett case Ormrod J 
specifically left this area open, but an Australian court had the opportunity 
of examining it in the case of The Marriage of C and D (falsely called C). <
25
)
Like the Corbett case it involved the purported marriage which lacked a supposed 
heterosexual character but unlike the former cases one of the parties was an 
21. Moss_ v Moss (1897) 263.
22. Hawley � cit1 O'Donovan .Q.E. cit 1.39.
23. 163 Eng Rep 1039 (Ecct Ct 1845).
24, (1947) 0. R 213 (CA).
25. Parschin�Rybkin � cit 586.
26. (1979) FLC 90(CCH)7 H.A. Finlay 'Sexual Identity and the Law of Nullity'
(1980) 54 Australian Law Journal 115.
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hermaphrodite� ( 
27
) the other - the applicant - was a woman. The husband
was unable to consummate the marriage and the wife sought to sever whatever 
legal bond there was between them. 
C was regarded at birth as a male with a gross phallic deformity. According 
to the current medical opinion such deformity could not be corrected until 
the boy had reached the age of sixteen years - presumably because normally 
all growth ceases at this age. Consequently, he grew up socially and 
psych�logically a male. On later investigation, he was found to have a right-
sided ovary and fallopian tube, which were subsequently removed. The next 
embarrassment were his well-formed breasts which were also surgically removed 
later. A chromosomal count was taken and in the cells examined the karyotype 
was female although the possibility of different patterns in cells not examined, 
(28) 
was left open. , Despite the several female characteristics he exhibited,
it was decided med�cally that he was definitely a male and his genitals were 
. 11 . d th 
C29> 
H ho d 
. 
1' di d f k' d surgica y improve en. e s  we no persona ity sor er o any in .
Thus, at the time he decided to marry the girl of his choice he was described 
as "an average-sized, non-athletic type of male" with hair growth on the upper 
lip but not on the cheeks. His voice was masculine and he a short phallus 
of reasonable girth, and one testicle - slightly smaller than average - on 
the left side. The marriage lasted for nine years, until 1978. Considering 
the inability of C to consllII1Illate the union it is surprising that the duration was 
27. There are four groups of cases in which there is a departure from the
nor:rnal sexual development, and the most uncommon is that of the true
hermaphrodite or gonadal intersex. Three main subgroups are distinguished
according to the anatomical distribution of the gonadal tissue. The
subgroup to which C belonged, is one of a "unilateral variety with a)
a gonad on one side, and b) on the other side, one or two ovatestes".
This subgroup is apparently the least common: a rarity in a rare condition:
Finlay .212. cit 115.
28. � chapter one supra.
29. This is a primary example of a case in which classification on karyotype
would have been ludicrous and was in fact not even considered medically.
The importance attributed to such a test - as in the case in the Corbett
decision - is misplaced. "In spite of the bisexual gonadal structure,
the female chromosomal arrangement there was no doubt in view ·of 
the assigned male sex, the male psycho-sexual orientation that he
should continue in the sex in which he had been reared": cited in Finlay
.212. cit 117.
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in fact of such a length, and it is submitted that this is a clear indication 
that the overriding importance of the sexual act, for the validity of marriage, 
is not of the strength it is purported to be, and it is refreshing to see 
that there are some people who do not rate sexual intercourse as being of 
paramount importance. It is this author's opinion that a marriage relationship 
should have more substance than that. 
The wife sought a declaration as to the validity of h�r marriage, pursuant 
to section 113 of the Family Law Act. <
3
o) However, Judge Bell rejected her 
application and indicated that the appropriate method of proceeding was by 
way of nullity. C
3l) The learned judge concluded that the ground for nullity
was the 'absence of consent' on the part of the applicant. 
II the wife was contemplating immediately prior to 
marriage and did in fact believe that she was marrying 
a male. She did not in fact marry a male but a combination 
of both �-ii1a1e and female, an·d notwithstanding that the husband 
exhibit'ed as a male, he was in fact not, and the wife 
was mistaken as to the identity of her husband"f
32> 
Thi h .. h ,.inl ( 
33
) . ' h h l d ' d b ds aut or concurs wit £ ay in suggesting t at t e earne JU ge ase 
his decision on a misconception of the word 'identity'. There was no suggestion 
that the person the applicant married was not the person she intended to marry. 
At most,it could be. said that there had been an error in subetantia which 
is no ground for nullity. This problem of error was discussed by Jeune P 
in Noss v Moss
<34> where it was held that there are four types of error: 
l. error of person;
2. error of condition (bondage or servitude);
3. error of fortune (financial endowment); and
4. error of quality {virginity, nobility, chastity),
None of the latter three are considered as vitiating consent, and the author
submits that they all fall under the general category of error in substantia.
30. Of 1975.
31. Finlay ,£g_ cit 117. Bell J instructed that the law to be applied was that
in existence at the time of the marriage which was the Matrimonial Causes
� at 1959. The grounds for a void marriage were contained in s 18 (1)
and the particular ground invoked in C and O was s 18(1 )(d), namely the
absence of consent due to the applicant's mistake "as to the identity
of the other party".
32. Finlay .£e.ill 117.
33. .!lli·
34. (1887) _263 at 271, quoting from Ayliffe's Parergon Juris Canonici, an
authority on canon law.
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The only error to have a nullifying effect is the error as to person. What 
this means is explained by Ayliffe: 
.. as when I have thoughts of marrying Ursula, yet by 
mistake of the person I have married Isobella. For an 
error of this kind is not only an impediment to a marriage 
contract, but it even dissolves the contract itself, through 
. (35)
a defect in consent of the person contracting". 
It is important to make a distinction between an error as to a person's 
identity, and an error as to his attributes or qualities. In C and D the 
error was to· the respondent's sex - if in reality there was such an error. 
Medical practitioners had defined him as male, and it is submitted with respect, 
that a judge has no right to argue with this authority. It is submitted 
further, that if one adopted. Bell J's reasoning that the respqndent was not 
in fact a male, then the · vitiating element is more fatal than error as to 
identity, for it goes to the very definition of the marriage, which is required 
to be heterosexual in character. Thus the issue at stake is whether an 
hermaphrodite who has undergone corrective surgery, can contract a valid 
marriage. As far back as canonical law, it was decided that if the sex drive 
of mature years is evident, an herm.aphrodi te can contract a valid marriage. 
Such a person must choose his sex and swear never to masquerade as the other 
(36)
sex. What sensible advice, even in those dark days. 
However, there has been an evolving judicial attitude in Australia, towards 
a progressive attitude of marriage, moving away from the more traditional 
one. A clear example involves the concept of living together. In In Re A 
Mi. c
37
l · ha h d h i . l' h nor Bridge J d el that t e ntention to 1.ve toget er was contrary
to proper standards of moral restraint, and that the court cannot and will 
not encourage such behaviour by suggesting approval or condemnation of the 
immoral behaviour involved. That was in 1964. In 1973, a different view 
was taken. <
39
> In Andrews v Parker <39> Stable J stated:
36. Freisen Geschichte des Kanonischen Eherechts 343-5 cited in Finlay .2£
cit 120.
37. (1964) 6 FLR 129. Here the Supreme Court of the Australian Territory
refused an application to set aside a refusal of parental consent in
terms of s 17 of the Marriage Act 1961.
38. There is at present in Australia, a lively debate on the issue regarding
de facto spouses as legal spouses for the purposes of the law.
39. (1973) QD R 933 at 1104.
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"Surely what is immoral must be judged by the current 
standards of morality of the community. What was apparently 
regarded with pious horror would, I observe, today 
hardly draw a raised eyebrow or a gentle 'tut tut' • It 
is notorious that there are many people living together 
as husband or wife without the benefit of the clergy. 
So much so, that in this century, Parliament in fact has 
extended social service benefits to whom in the legislation 
are called 'dependant females' ••• The point I have, perhaps 
too laboriously been trying to make is that social judgments 
today upon matters of 'immorality' are as different from 
those of last century as is the bikini from the.bustle.• 
This case represents a refreshing judicial awareness of social change in the 
matrimonial sphere but it is to be lamented that such clearsightedness is 
not pervasive throughout the whole area. It certainly does not touch on the 
one aspect . which is pertinent to this work: the 'one man and one woman' in 
, (40) 
marriage, as Lord Penzance put it. 
4. The United States of America.
In the light of increasing pressure for the recognition of civil rights of 
homosexuals - an issue peculiar to the United States due to their distinctive 
Constitution - as well as the rising incidence of corrective surgery, the 
question has been posed as to whether two persons of the same sex at birth 
may contract a marriage with each other. 
"Unlike in determining sex for the purposes of a birth 
certificate, where the court may feel that a little 
philosophising about sex and gender is a harmless exercise 
in futility, C
4l) the legal determination of sex for the
purpose of marriage touches on the most fundamental 
underpinings of society. As increasing numbers of 
homosexuals, transsexuals and bisexuals publicly de::lare 
their sexual affiliations, the courts are increasingly 
faced with questions whether nonheterosexuality should 
. (42)
be a barrier to marriage". 
40. Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee supra.
Certainly not to the transsexual concerned, and it is submitted that
41. no serious-minded court of law should or would adopt this attitude.
42. Twardy £E, ill 270.
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In all the American cases which have considered this point, the view has been 
held that since marriage is a relationship which involves the union of a man 
and a woman as husband and wife, there may be no valid marital contract entered 
into between persons of the srune sex. 
Affirming a judgment holding that two females were not entitled to have issued 
to them a licence to marry each other, the Kentucky court in Jones v 
Hallahan
(43)
stated that the relationship proposed by the females did not
authorise the issuance of a marriage certificate, because what was proposed 
by them was not a marriage. The court held that the females were prevented 
from marrying - not by a statute or refusal of the county clerk to issue them 
the licence - but rather by their own incapacity of entering into a marriage 
as that term was defined. Indeed, if the females had concealed from the clerk 
the fact that they were of the same sex, and he had issued a licence on the 
strength of this and a subsequent ceremony had been performed, the reeul ting 
relationship still would not constitute a marriage. It should be remembe.red 
for the record, that in this case both females were biological and psychological 
females and that no question of transsexualism was raised and there had been 
no attempt by either of them to undergo the necessary surgery to enable her 
to live as a man. 
In Baker v Nelson
(44>
the court in Minnesota held that a marriage of two persons
of the same sex was not authorised by state statutes. It was contended that 
the prohibition of 'same-sex marriages' denied the males concerned, a 
fundamental right guaranteed in the Ninth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
and also denied e9ual protection, Observing that the constitutional challenges 
were based on the content ion that the right to marry without regard to the 
sex of the parties was a fundamental right of all persons and that restricting 
marriage to only couples of the opposite sex was irrational(sic) and invidiously 
discriminatory, the court emphasised that it was· not persuaded by these 
contentions. It· is this author's opinion that it must be borne in mind that 
the people involved are at perfect liberty to· have a relationship with each 
other, but that relationship cannot be called 'marriage' by virtue of the 
very definition of the term, 
43, (1973 Ky) 501 SW 2d 588, 63 ALR 3d 1195, 
44. (1971) 291 Minn 310 191 NW 2d 185 63 ALR 3d 1195.
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(45) In Anonymous v Anonymous in an action in which the plaintiff male sought
a declaration as to the status of his marriage, the court declared that the 
ceremony in which the plaintiff and defendant took part, did not in fact of 
law, create a marriage contract, and that the parties were not, and never 
had been, husband and wife, or parties to a valid marriage. In this instance, 
the couple had married with the plaintiff male fully believing that his 'wife' 
was a female, only to discover on the wedding night that 'she' had male 
genitals. Notwithstanding the defendant I s assertions that he would undergo 
an operation involving corrective surgery, the plaintiff left, and the marriage 
was never consummated. The court concluded that the marriage ceremony was 
a nullity, and that no legal relationship could he created by it. Even if 
the defendant was a true transsexual it is submitted that it is easy to 
understand the court's finding that the defendant was in fact not female in 
spite of his psychological identification with femininity. If the defendant's 
body had been brought into balance with the psychological identification before 
the purported marriage, then, it is submitted further, the court should have 
had no problem iri ruling the marriage as heterosexual in nature and therefore 
valid. It is t.his author's opinion that a court cannot give credence to a 
pre-operative transsexual's gender identity, for practical reasons, but if 
that person had proven his belief in his feminine gender by undergoing 
corrective surgery, then the court should recognise the fait accompli and 
give sanction ot it. 
The first case in American law dealing with marriage of a post-operative 
transsexual was that of Frances B v Mark B. <
46
> This New York decision involved
a female-male transsexual, who subsequent· to corrective surgery married a 
biological woman. The wife brought an action for annulment on the ground 
that her spouse had defrauded her by not informing her of the operative 
intervention and that he was also unable to consummate the marriage. The 
defendant, although having undergone a hysterectomy and mastectomy, had not 
altered his female genitalia, and was consequently incapable of performing 
sexually as a male. While the inability to conswmnate the marriag_e would 
have been sufficient to justify the annulment the court maintained that the 
defendant was in fact still a woman. The court point out that New York neither 
specifically prohibited marriages between persons of the same sex, nor 
45. (1971) 67 Misc 2d 982, 325 NYS 2d 499, 63 ALR 3d 1196.
46. 78 Misc 2d 112, 355 NYS 2d 712 (1974) 63 ALR 3d 1197.
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authorised the issuance of the marriage licence. It also pointed out that 
marriage was, and always had been a contract between a man and a woman. Even 
if the defendant were a male trapped in a female body, the record indicated 
that the entrapped male had never successfully escaped to enable the 
defendant to perform as a male in marriage and that the surgery had not achieved 
this result. The court concluded that while the defendant might be able to 
function as a male in other relationships, he could not do so ae a husband, 
especially as regards procreation. 
"While it is possible that the defendant may function 
as a male in other situations and in other relationships, 
defendant cannot function as a husband . by assuming male 
duties and obligations inherent in the marriage relationship 
• • • Apparently hormone treatments and surgery have not
succeeded in supplying the necessary apparatus to enable 
defendant to function as a man for the purposes of 
, (47) procreation". 
Although this author believes that the ultimate decision as regards the nullity 
of the marriage, is correct, it is, however, submitted that the ratio therefor, 
is not. It is - as we have seen - arguable whether the function of marriage 
is solely procreation in this day and age. It is submitted that the view 
is anachronistic under the veil of changing conceptions and has been whitewashed 
effectively by social progress. It is submitted further that the defendant 
in this case is at a disadvantage in the legal arena in that he did not undergo 
complete surgery and have a male member constructed. This raises the issue 
of exactly what physicality one has to posseas as regards the visual sexual 
appearance because the court obviously regarded the defendant as a female 
still because the visual test did not reflect ·the necessary genitalia which 
preswnably would have enabled him to perform the elusive husbandly function 
alluded to. Impotence does not preclude the validity of a marriage per �• 
It is respectively subnitted that this case should have been decided on the 
fraud issue: not in that the husband had undergone corrective surgery and 
had not informed the wife, but that he was in fact impotent and sterile. 
Similarly, on the same reasoning as the previous cases, the court in Singer 
H 
(48) 
v ara, held that the Washington state marriage statute in effect prohibited 
47. At 118 of the report. The court cited the legal definition of marriage
as follows: "Marriage is the civil status, condition or relation of one
man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other
and the connnunity of the duties legally incumbered upon those whose
association is founded on the distinction of sex."
48. (1974) 11 Wash App 247 522 P 2d 1187 63 ALR 3d 1197.
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'same-sex marriages' and that the prohibition did not offend the state's equal 
rights amendment against sex discrimination, nor did it offend the amendments 
to the Constitution. Having reference to the fact that a prohibition against 
'same-sex marriages' did not discriminate any more against one sex or the 
other, the court rejected the analogous argument put forward by the Supreme 
C . . . i . ( 49) . f , k. . . ourt in Loving v Vl.rg n1a in support o stri .1.ng down anti-miscegenation 
statutes, that the fact that such statutes affected all races equally did 
not remove from them the taint of discrimination. The Washington court reasoned 
however, that it was not an impermissable sex discrimination which underlay 
the prohibition against 'same-sex marriages' but the very nature of the 
definition of marriage itself. 
The turning point in American case law, was the progressive decision of MT 
y___fl-. (SO) It iis the first court in history to hold that a transsexual's
marriage is valid. This New Jersey case had an inauspicious beginning when 
MT filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for support 
and maintenance. The legal issue was heightened significantly when JT 
interposed the defence that MT was a male and therefore the marriage was void 
and consequently he had no legal duty of support. 
MT testified that she was born a male, and as a youngster did not participate 
in sports and that at an early age she became interested in boys. At the age 
of fourteen she began dressing in a feminine manner and later began dating 
men. MT first met her future husband JT in 1964, and explained to him her 
feelings about being a woman. 
and in 1970 she consulted Dr 
Soon thereafter, she began living with him, 
(51) 
Ihlenfeld as regards corrective surgery. 
In 1971, upon the doctor's advice, she approached a surgeon who agreed to 
perform the operation which she underwent in May that year. The defendant 
paid for the operation, and in August 1972 the parties went through a ceremonial 
marriage in New York State and soon moved to New Jersey. They lived together 
as man and wife for two years during which time JT supported her. In October 
1974, he left the cormnunal home and also ceased to support her. 
At the trial court, MT called three medical witnesses who testified as to 
the aspects of transse,cualism, and the validity of the 'change of sex• • JT 
in his defence, called a medical witness - his adoptive father - to testify 
49. (1967)388 US 1. l8 LED 2d 1010, 87 S Ct 1817.
50. 140 NJ Super 77 355 A.2d 304 (1976) 63 ALR 3d 1197.
51. Dr Ihlenfeld appeared ae an expert witness in the case under mention.
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that MT was still a male because she had no female sex organs. The trial judge 
ruled that MT had been of the female psychological gender all her conscious 
life and that her anatomical change through surgery meant that she was now 
a female and therefore was a woman at the time of her marriage. The Superior 
Court affirmed this !audible decision. <
52
J
In its decision as to the validity of the post-operative transsexual's marriage, 
the court of appeal surveyed the Corbett case, noting its disagreement 
therewith. It recognised that there were several criteria which may be relevant 
in determining an individual's sex, in addition to the anatomical test. (SJ) 
It concluded on this point that it must 
" disagree with the conclusion reached in Corbett that, 
for the purposes of marriage sex is somehow irrevocably 
cast at the moment of birth, and that adjudicating the 
capacity to enter marriage, sex in its biological sense 
. (54)
should be the exclusive standard". 
The court went on to explain that its departure from the English decision 
stemmed from a fundamentally different understanding of what is meant by 'sex' 
for marital purposes. It continued to explain that the evidence and authority 
it examined, demonstrated that a person's sex embraces the gender and that 
" ••. indeed it · has been observed that the 'psychological 
sex of an individual' while not serviceable for all 
purposes, is practical, realistic and humane". <
55
>
The court further challenged the premise in Corbett that 'true' sex is 
ascertained by b,iological criteria, and in its stead, offered the dual test 
of anatomy-gender. It stated therefore that it was 
" compelled to the conclusion that ·for marital purposes if the 
anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made 
to conform to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex, 
then identity of sex must be governed by the congruence of these 
standards". ( 
56
)
52. At 207 of the report.
53. At 208 of the report.
54. At 209 of the report.
55. Ibid. It is submitted that the only forseeable instance in which
psychological sex will fail as a. test on its own, is the case of
pre-operative transsexual, but once- the surg�ry· has aligned· body
mind, it is just as serviceable as it is :for the 'normal' person.
56. Ibid.
the 
the 
and 
177 
The basis of this decision was 
" the tacit but valid assumption of the lower court 
and the experts upon whom reliance was placed, that for 
the purposes of marriage under the circumstances of this 
case, it is the sexual capacity of the individual which 
must be scrutinised. sexual capacity or sexuality in 
this frame of reference requires the coalescence of both 
the physical ability and the psychological and emotional 
orientation to engage in sexual intercourse as either 
a male or a female". 
(S?)
The court apparently was impressed by the fact that sexual intercourse can 
and did take place in the 'new' role: this therefore indicated some measure 
of congruence now between the anatomy and the gender of the individual, which 
could not be disregarded easily. The court was further untroubled by the 
fact - unlike the Corbett decision - that the physical ability was conferred 
(58) 
artificially and instead saw that the only logical stance to adopt was 
to give legal effect to a fait accompli. Thia high evaluation of the technical 
achievements, is one of the significant points of contrast with the English 
ruling, which only considered the given biological characteristics of the 
transsexual prior to . surgery. The other point of notable contrast was the 
American court's refusal to regard the transsexual's biological sex on its 
own. It is submitted that biological criteria cannot be considered as any 
kind of totality separate from the psyche and the only rational statement 
on mankind is one in which there is no divorce between the physical and the 
mental • 
.MT v JT made a cursory analysis of the previous case law dealing with the 
validity of a t ranssexual's marriage (
59
) et al, and in, summing up, stated
that 
57. Ibid.
II in this case the transsexual's gender and genitalia 
are no longer discordant; they have been harmonised through 
medical treatment. The plaintiff had become physically 
and psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual 
activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes 
of gender ·and anatomy. Consequently plaintiff should 
be considered as a member of the female sex for marital pur-
58. Such reasoning in .. fact echoes the Engi.tsh decision of S v S supra.
59. Particularly Frances B v Mark B supra. 
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poses. It follows that such an individual would have 
the capacity to enter into a valid marriage relationship 
with a person of the opposite sex, and did so here. In 
so ruling, we do no more than give legal effect to a ill!. 
accompli based upon medical judgment and actions which 
are irreversible. Such recognition will promote the 
individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness, 
while in no way disserving any societal interest, principle 
f bl . d f 1 · t 
" ( 60 )
o pu ic or er or precept o mora i y .  
III SOUTH AFRICA 
The first known case publicising the plight of the transsexual in South Africa 
revolved around divorce proceedings in which one of the parties had undergone 
corrective surgery prior to the marriage. It should be noted en passant, 
that a person who has undergone such surgery and who has subsequently obtained 
an amended birth certificate - which is permissible in South Africa - will 
encounter no difficulty in having his/her marriage solemnised. (
6l
) The marriage
officer is bound to accept the information contained in the official docwnent, 
unless he is convinced that he cannot rely thereon. As the post-operative 
transsexual looks just like anyone else in his/her assumed sex, there is very 
, (62)
little likelihood of his/her sex being challenged. 
In Jonker v Jonker (
63
) a man who had married a male-female post-operative
transsexual, was granted an order of restitution in lieu of the requested 
60 At 211 of the report. The author is in total accord with this reasoning. 
Not only is the legal recognition of the gender of a post-operative 
transsexual in no way harmful to society, but it has the added attraction 
of being beneficial to the sufferer. 
61. Taitz £E. ill 73.
62. One of the external requirements of a valid marriage is that it must
be solemnised by a competent marriage officer in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. A marriage officer may not
solemnise a marriage unless each of the two parties produces to him,
his/her identity docwnent or prescribed affidavit in terms of s 12. The
marriage comes into existence when the marriage officer indicates that
the parties are husband and wife in terms of s 30(1). (My underlining).
Even at common law, Consummation is not required for the coming into
existence of a binding marriage: Voet 23. 2. 93# Wientraub v Wientraub
1921 CPD 595. 
63. Reported in the Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 1 March 1�70.
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divorce order. <
64
) As the case is unreported - a startling fact considering
the novelty of this contentious area of law and the paucity of available legal 
information thereon - the reasons for the decision are open to speculation. 
The second South African case of W v w <65) has become a cause c�l�bre and 
has been criticised by most of South Africa's legal writers of note. (
66)This
case also considered the marital status of the post-operative transsexual. 
The plaintiff was described as an adult 'female' who had however been born 
and registered as a male. ( 
67
) In 1970, at the age of twenty seven years,
she underwent corrective surgery on psychiatric advise. Since then she has 
passed in society as a female and her sex description was altered on her birth 
certificate. Ber husband had been aware of her 'change of sex• before they 
were married so there was no question of fraud. 
relations. In fact Nesdadt J stated that 
'They had had normal sexual 
n her marriage to the defendant • • • was conswnmated 
and the parties had normal sexual relations. 'The breakdown 
in the marr iage was not due to any inadequacy as a woman 
h i ,. 
( .. -, ( 68)
on t e part of the pla ntiff. sic 
The plaintiff was seeking a divorce on the grounds of her husband's 
(69) 
adultery, only to find herself the object of unpleasant judicial probing.
The application for divorce was refused, and in its etead the court tentatively 
put forward the decision to annul the marriage. The language in which such 
decision wae couched is evident of the uncertainty in the mind of the learned 
judge as he made his pronouncement. 
"My finding the plaintiff was a male prior to the operation 
entitles me, I think, to annul the marriage and I would 
be prepared to make such an order, provided the swnmons 
is, on notice to the defendant appropriately amended. I 
do not consider that I can grant the relief under the 
claim for. alternative relief". (
70
)
64. See generally Taitz .2E. cit 73� Strauss (5) .2.E. cit 356.
65. 1976 (2) SA 308 (W).
66. Including c.P. Smit; s.A. Strauss; D.B. Van Niekerk and M.L. Lupton.
67. At 309H of the report.
68, At 310B of the report. 
69. As this case was· before the new Divorce Law of 1979, one of the grounds
for divorce which had to be proven was adultery.
70. At 315P of the report. That was that: no thought was given to incidental
matters arising out of such a decision, such as division of property
etcetera.
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In arriving at his ultimate decision, Nesdadt J applied the principles for 
. (71)sex determination· as enunciated in the English case of Corbett v Corbett, 
(72)
in preference to the New York decision of In Re Anonymous, where it was 
stated by Pecora J (
?J) 
"Where there is disharmony between psychological sex and 
the anatomical sex, the social sex or gender will be 
determined by anatomical sex. Where however, with or 
without medical intervention, the psychological sex and 
the anatomical sex are harmonised, then the social eex 
should be made to conform to the harmonised status of 
the individual ••• ".< 74>
Nesdadt J felt obliged to refute these views on the basis that their acceptance 
would 
n subvert the requirement of our law that a valid 
marriage requires the parties to be of the opposite 
,. ( 75)sex . 
He therefore concluded that 
"•·· imitation cannot be equated with actual transformation. 
If what I may call this pseudo-woman is, for the purposes 
of marriage properly to be regarded as female, then in 
the absence of medical evidence justifying such a finding, 
. (76)the intervention of the Legislature would be necessary" • 
. The learned judge continued to state that the issue was not whether, after 
the operation, the plaintiff was an effective female, nor whether she 
71. ( 1970) 2 All ER 33.
72. (1968) 57 Misc 2d 813; vide chapter seven supra for more details.
73. At 816 of the r�port.
74. This is a clear case of affording the post-operative transsexual his
new identity in law. It is submitted that once the surgery has been
performed, there is nothing one can do about it. If there is an objection
to the surgery, this should be raised at the outset, and therefore involve
the prohibition · of the corrective surgery itself. Nothing is gained
by closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.
75. At 314A of the report.
76. There are many references of the fact that transsexualism can only be
treated by surgery. "This condition has so far · proved intransigent
to every mode of psychiatric treatment ••• ": O'Donovan 21! cit 136.
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looked like a female, nor whether society had accepted her as a female, nor 
whether she was capable of sexual intercourse with a male - what more does 
he want? - the only issue was whether the plaintiff, at the time of her 
marriage, was a woman. He found no justification for concluding that a person 
' ( 77)in the plaintiff's position was a woman for the purposes of marriage. 
Applying the sex tests from Corbett he felt that although the operation had 
supplied the plaintiff with certain female characteristics - in fact everything 
except her chromosomal constitution was now female - the xY chromosomal pattern 
�hould be the deciding factor. . Both Judges O"t111rod. and Nesdadt relied 
heavily on the biological criteria and gave little weight to the psychological 
orientation,ofthe individual. 
B.DIVORCE.
I INTRODUCTION 
on the basis of the decisions which do not recognise the new sex role of the 
post-operative transsexual for the purposes of marriage, there will of course 
be difficulties in the event of a married transsexual subsequently undergoing 
corrective surgery. 
Green, in criticising the Corbett decision makes the telling point: 
" . . .. where a 'normal' marriage has taken place, and 
subsequently either spouse is discovered to be transsexual, 
the factual adaptation of the individual to the gender 
with which he identifies (corrective surgery) is in itself 
apparently of no significance. Despite the fact that 
in the case one may have effectively two men or two women 
married to each other, the law presumably shuts its eyes 
and regards the transsexual spouse as he is biologically 
identified". ( 
78
)
Let us also consider the question - hypothetical though it is - of a married 
couple both undergoing corrective surgery, and in effect, 'swopping roles', 
so to speak. 
77. McColl Kennedy .21!. cit 121. Vide chapter three supra dealing the the causes
of transsexualism.
78. D. Green 'Transsexualism and Marriage' (1970) 120 New Law Journal 210.
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This hypothesis is no more bizarre than that advocated by the Argentinian 
judge in 1966 ( 
79
) who held that to recognise the 'change of sex' operation
would be to jeopardise the future of the whole human race, on the premise 
(80) 
that everyone. would be wanting to undergo the surgery, and therefore no 
one would be able to procreate. In such a case, as this author is imagining, 
the marria9e could not be considered void on the grounds of homosexuality 
because in effect there would still be two parties of·· the same sex as the 
law does not recognise that any change of sex has occurred. The law would 
be constrained therefore, to consider the marriage valid, and would in effect 
be giving legal efficacy to the marriage of a post-operative transsexual, 
contrary to the Nesdadt. decision wherein· the post-operative transsexual cannot 
be a party to a valid marriage. 
79. Dr Ricardo San Martin 123 Le Ley 605 (Crim y Corec Argen 1966}.
BO. Many people to whom this author has spoken about transsexualism have 
the same unfounded fears, and also believe that to allow a change of 
sex would be to. encourage chaos as a person might make a habit of the 
practice. The author's response to this is simply to point out that 
such a fear is basically untenable because such operations are 
irreversible, and that the whole nature of the phenomenon disallows such 
action. Ordinarily, 'normal' men and women have no lasting desire to 
alternate sexes, so, it is submitted, why should a transsexual, who, 
as far as he himself is concerned, is and only ever has been of the one 
sex, and through the operation he is merely reconciling his body with 
his true gender identity. Furthermore, it is submitted that even if the 
operation were reversible it is hardly likely that a person's 'sense 
of adventure' would extend to such lengths of masochism as to-voluntarily 
undergo painful - and yes, expensive - trauma more than once. "In South 
Africa; there is a stigma attached to people who don I t conform exactly 
to society's norms: But I don I t feel any different to any other woman 
I want people to �nderstand from a human point of view that ·I am 
an ordinary human being like every other human being. I don't think that 
is a lot to ask ••• Some people think that corrective surgery is an easy
way out. It's not - it's the hard way out and it has got to be for real.u
scope Magazine (June l 1984) 41. 
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When first embarking on this study of transsexualism, the author was troubled 
by the possibility of a transsexual marrying in the pre-operative role. 
Did such action on the part of the transsexual indicate a weakness in his/her 
belief that he/she was a member of the opposite sex? ( 
81
) Would not any 
consideration of marriage to a person of the same psychological sex not 
be repugnant to him/ her? Or was the whole basis the eternal struggle for 
recognition of one's desired gender, as well as the very real problem of 
the financial constraint that drives people to accept the superficial role 
of their anatomical sex, in order to achieve some semblance of normality 
. (82) 
in society? In reading ConundrWll the author was able to find most of 
the answers to these questions. 
Nothing in the world would make me abandon my gender, 
concealed from everyone though it remained ••• Yet I 
was not indifferent to the magnetisms of the body ••• 
In short, I see now that I wished very much that I could 
one day be a mother ••• When, later in life, I reached 
the putative age of maternity, finding myself still 
incapable of the role, I did the next best thing and 
. (83)
became a father instead." 
Morris was in her early twenties when she first started trudging the long 
road of treatment. She decided, after being inspired by Wegener's sad 
tale (S
4
) that she too would rather die young than live a long life of 
falsehood. On retrospection she realised that not one of the medical persons 
whom she consulted knew anything about the matter at all, and in the state 
of medical awareness of the time - the 1950' s - it must have been baffling 
to have been confronted by a healthy, and evidently sane man, declaring 
81. Many doctors consider the prior marriage in the original sex to be an
indication that the individual is not a true transsexual: Smith op cit
1008.
82. The autobiography of Jan Morris.
83. Morris op cit 150. Al though the author realises that this book is not
by any means a legal authority, its point of view is included for the
personal_ touch� After all, we are dealing with people here arid not just
legal principles.
84. � chapter four supra for details of this case.
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that he wanud to be a woman. British psychiatry had t.:raditionally leant 
towards physical explanations for mental disturbances. Even decades later, 
practitioners seldom seemed to grasp the idea and regarded the treatment 
of transsexuals simply as a means of enabling them to live with their 
delusi. ons. ( 
85
) Th f. t h t h h d d d h e ire person t a s e met w o seeme to un erstan er
bl D B . . h 1 d 
' 
h . 
· 
t 
· ( 86 ) pro em, was r enJanu.n w o was a rea y 1.n is six ies. He insisted
that a change of body must be the last resort, and urged Morris to try and 
live like ·a man, and achieve an· equilibrium. Morris accepted the advice, 
believing that possibly there were facets to her problem which she could 
. ( 87) 
not yet perceive. The existence was necessarily a confused one, and
the only alleviating factor was that she fell in love and subsequently married 
in her pre-operative role. 
"I have enjoyed one particular love of an intensity 
so different from all the rest ••• that it overrode, 
from the start all my sexual ambiguities, and acted 
like a key to the latch of my conundrum... It was a 
marriage that had no right to work, yet it worked like 
a dream, living . testimony one might say, to the power 
of mind over matter... For my part, in performing the 
sexual act with Elizabeth, I felt I was consummating 
a trust, and with luck giving ourselves the incomparable 
gift of children... We could scarcely call our sexual 
relationship a satisfactory one, since I would have 
been perfrectly content without any sexual relationship 
at ali'... It was apparent to Elizabeth sooner than it 
was to me, that one day I must appease my conflicts ••• 
I honoured though, an unspoken obligation to our marriage: 
that until my family was safely in the world and Elizabeth 
fulfilled as a mother, if not a wife, I would bide my 
t. " ( 88). ·ime. 
85. Morris op cit 48.
86. Dr Benjamin - an endocrinologist - had come late in life to the study
of seX1.1al anxieties. It was he who formally recognised the existence
of transsexualism people whose problems lay deeper than physical
medicine and deeper even than 'curative' surgery: Morris op cit 49.
87. Morris op cit 51.
BB. Morris op cit 57-61.
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This author had felt on certain occasions the difficulty in reconciling 
the transsexual's belief with the action of marrying pre-operatively, 
especially if the transsexual had remained in his original state for many 
(89) 
years. But then it was realised that the author was also falling into 
the trap of considering transsexualism as a sex-related syndrome. 
Transsexualism, it is submitted, is not sex based as a sexuiil deviance is, 
but rather, is gender based, as in identity. So of course it is perfectly 
feasible to understand how two people can have a deep strong union without 
the act of sexual intercourse taking first priority. Sexual intercourse 
is important to a marriage but it is certainly not the �be all and end all" 
thereof. 
"I knew it (sex) at once to be a different thing from 
gender - or rather, a different thing from the inner 
factor which I identified in myself as femaleness. This 
seemed to me, while germane in human relationships, 
almost incidental... To me, gender· is not physical at 
all, but is altogether insubstantial. It is soul 
perhaps ••• It is more truly life and love than any 
combination of genitals, ovaries and hormones. It is 
the essentialness of onesself, the psyche, the fragment 
. (90) 
of uni.ty." 
89. For example, the case reported in The Natal Nitnees 16 June 1984. A 
seventy year old World War JI fighter pilot was to undergo corrective 
surgery in England. He had been married twice, and now wished to remarry 
- as a woman. A television reporter stated that the patient already 
wore woman's clothing: .,Re simply looks like a granny. There is no 
doubt in his mind that he wants to undergo the operation." These 
operations are seldom perfoaned on people over fifty five years, and 
this man could be the oldest person to undergo corrective surgery. This 
author finds this case extremely difficult to reconcile with the 
voluminous literature on the subject in which transsexual 1 s have held 
their conviction of confused gender identity from a very young age. 
This author cannot help surmising that perhaps this man is giving way 
to an adventurous caprice - particularly taking into account the relative 
tameness of his life in comparison to his 'fighter pilot days'. Perhaps 
this is an attempt to alleviate the boredom of old age. However, this 
may be a misjudgment of his motives, and he could have suffered from 
similar drawbacks as Morris did as regards the expense of surgery and 
the inexperience of the techniques available. 
90. Morris op cit 28.
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It must also be remembered that in spite of the fact that the syndrome has 
been in existence since perhaps time immemorial, (
9ll 
it has been identified 
only very recently in the medical field, and such investigation into its 
nature is still very much in the embryonic stage. Thus, through ignorance, 
and believing perhaps that his is only deviant behaviour, - or for reasons 
of fear, conservatism, terror of ostracism - the transsexual has had to 
suppress his inner desire to express himself truly, in a valiant attempt 
to conform in society. Any marriage which might ensue is an extension of 
that desire to be accepted. With the advances of medical science, the problem 
becomes clear and in lieu of continuing the life of mockery and charade, 
the transsexual - even at a late time in life - decides to take the final 
step and give precedence to the conviction of true gender. 
"Still, for· forty years, a sexual purpose dominated, 
distracted and tormented my life: the tragic and 
irrational ambition, instinctively formulated, but 
deliberately pursued, to escape from maleness into 
womanhood... As I gre.'fi older my conflict became more 
explicit to me, and I began to feel that I was living 
in a falsehood. I was in masquerade, my female reality, 
which I had no words to define, clothed in a male 
pretence. Psychiatrists have often asked if this gave 
me a sense of guilt, but the opposite is true. I felt, 
that in wishing so fervently and so ceaselessly to be 
transsplanted into a girl's body, I was aiming at a 
d. i d' ' i 'li · " < 92> more iv ne con �tion, an nner reconci ation. 
The divorce laws in many jurisdictions will, in all probability, provide 
grounds for dissolution of the marriage should the contingency of a married 
transsexual who decides to undergo corrective surgery, arise. 
91. .!!?.!£.
92. Morris op cit 16.
II COMPARATIVE LAW 
1. The United States of America
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In the United States, grounds for divorce are purely statutory for each
State. ( 
93
) R f b f l t . l . h lit e erence y way o ana ogy o cases 1.nvo v1.ng omosexua y
however, indicates that questions as to sexual identity strike so deeply
at one of the most basic elements of marriage - the exclusive sexual bond
between the spouses - that courts are not reluctant to dissolve marriages
in which serious problems of sexual identity arise. The court in the 
following case, found little difficulty in holding that the transsexualism
of the one spouse was sufficiently detrimental to the marriage relationship
- particularly in the light of the mental anguish imposed on the heterosexual
. . f d. h d f 1 i 
· 
d 
· · · { 94)
spouse - to 1ust1 y 1.vorce on t e groun o crue t es or in 1.gn1t1es. 
In Steinke v Steinke ( 
95
) the court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, had
dismissed the claim of a wife for divorce, holding that the purported grounds 
were not established since the husband's conduct of wearing woman's clothing 
and adopting woman's attributes with the aid of hormones was due to the 
compulsion of a psychiatric disorder. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
however, reversed the decision and granted the decree of divorce holding 
that the husband's transsexual behaviour justified the granting of the divorce 
and that such conduct could not be excused as being symptomatic of mental 
illness in the absence of evidence to corroborate the husband's testimony 
that he suffered from a· mental disease. The ground for divorce was therefore 
indignities offered by the husband, to the wife. 
93. In States which have enacted some form of 'no fault' divorce statute,
the question whether transsexualism constitutes grounds for divorce
may be avoided since the heterosexual spouse can seek a divorce without
establishing . any fault on the part of the transsexual spouse, and is
probably likely to happen in order to avoid publicity.
94. See also P v P (1972) 121 NJ Super 368, 297 A 2d which held that a spouse
had grounds for divorce because of her husband 1 s transvestitism. It
is submitted that this ground for divorce will not be necessary in those
states in which a change of sex is recognised, because the marriage
would be annulled rather, on the basis of its homosexual nature.
95 (1975) 238 Pa Super 74 357 A 2d 674, 82 ALR 3d 705. 
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The parties had met in 1971 when the appellant was sixteen years old, and 
the respondent, twenty. They eloped to Maryland and were married. Shortly 
after this the respondent claimed that he never wanted to grow up and started 
wearing nappies and waterproofs. In 1972, when their daughter was born, 
he ceased this _activity and decided instead, that he wished to be a woman. 
To this end, he began taking hormones. As the situation persisted, the 
appellant took her husband to a psychiatrist, but after a few visits, he 
refused to keep the appointments. He went instead, to a doctor who began 
guiding him in a six month program leading to corrective surgery. He also 
began to assume the total identity and appearance of a woman, and the 
situation became known for the first time, to family and friends. The 
appellant demanded that the respondent leave home, which he did, and continued 
living as a woman. When the doctors informed him in 1974 that he was not 
a fit patient for the surgery, he had already come to the conclusion himself 
- this is a perfect demonstration of how vital pre-operative screening is,
and how fortunate that it was performed in this case. The respondent ceased
his hormone treatment, felt himself 'cured' and resumed life as a male.
At this time, the appellant filed for a divorce, and the court ruled that
there were insufficient groWldS because the husband• s conduct stemmed from
a psychotic disorder.(
96
) The appropriate Divorce Act
<97l allows the
innocent and injured partner to a marriage to obtain a divorce from the
bond of matrimony where the other spouse "shall have offered such indignities
to the person of the injured and innocent spouse as to render his/her
condition intolerable and life burdensome." 'Indignities' has not been
defined by 
indignities 
law, but rather, conduct 
has been evaluated. in each 
alleged to 
(98) 
case. 
be productive of such
It has generally been
decided that such conduct must constitute a course of behaviour which is 
humiliating and degrading to the injured spouse, making life intolerable.
such conduct is understood to manifest the· spirit of malevolence and
. (99)
estrangement, which has come to replace natural affection in the marriage. 
The Superior Court found that the appellant considered life intolerable,
and recognised that un·natural sexual conduct represented indignities. Where
such conduct has been established, it had been held that divorce is
(100)
appropriately granted. 
96. See also Dougherty v Dougherty 235 Pa super 122, 33g A 2d 81 {1975);
Barr v Barr 232 Pa Super 9 331 A 2d 774 (1974).
97. The Divorce Act of 2 May 1929 P L 1237 s lO(l)(f) as amended, 23 PS 
s lO(l))f).
98. Boyer v Boyer 183 Pa Super 260 130 A 2d 265 (1957).
99. Barr v Barr supra.
100. Crissman v Crissman 220 Pa Super 387 281 A 2d 719 {1971) dealing with
homosexual conduot on the part of the husband, as a ground for divorce.
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The court of appeal noted the correctness of the lower court's decision 
that conduct arising from mental ill health cannot constitute indignities 
because it must be regarded as Wlintentional and lacking in the spirit of 
h t h. h . th h f th h f . d' 't. 
( lOl) 
B t . d. d a e w 1c is e eart o e c arge o in igni ies. u 1t 1 not 
believe that the conduct on -the part of the respondent was in fact due to 
mental illness. 
"In this day of growing acceptance of transvestite and 
homosexual behaviour, with sex change operations a common 
place occurrence •.• we hesitate to ac.cept the view that 
mental imbalance is displayed when an individual 
experiments with one of these concepts ••. We remain 
unconvinced by the husband's unsubstantiated testimony 
that he was compelled by mental illness to adopt the 
patterns of living he displayed... As _such, it cannot 
excuse the indignities complained of, and can constitute 
grounds . for divorce. Although the appellee's conduct 
had a destructive impact on his marriage, he managed 
other aspects of his life ••• successfully ••• •. 
In certain special situations, legislation in Pennsylvania has provided 
that a marriage may be dissolved for functional reasons, that is, although 
neither spouse has done anything wrong, the marriage cannot work, and 
therefore should be discontinued. Thus a divorce may be obtained where 
the defendant 
or incapable 
spouse · "was and still is 
. (102) of procreation." The 
naturally 
use of the 
and incurably impotent 
(103) 
word 'naturally' 
is pertinent here. Should a marriage involving a post-operative transsexual 
he allowed in Pennsylvania, it is submitted that this section could not 
he invoked as a ground for divorce, becauae the impotence - if any - and 
the inability to procreate would not be 'natural' hut would have been 
artificially caused. Similarly, this groWld it is submitted, could not 
he invoked in the instance of a married person subsequently undergoing 
corrective surgery. It would appear then that in this case the only ground 
for divorce would be indignities. 
101. Barr v Barr supra
102. s l(a) of the Divorce Law of 1g29.
103. My underlining.
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Apart from this provision - which also includes the ground of insanity, 
and a marriage 
l t. h. 
(104) 
re a ions ip 
contracted between two people of 
a divorce may not be obtained 
prohibited degrees of 
in Pennsylvania unless
the plaintiff spouse is "innocent and injured" and the defendant has done 
. (105) something that he/she knew was wrong. It is therefore submitted that
it is important to establish from whose point of view the situation must 
be looked -· from . the wife's view that she suffered indignities, or from 
the husband's view that he knew he had done something wrong. If the latter, 
then it is submitted that a problem arises when a genuine transsexual wishes 
to undergo surgery, believing it to be in his best interests and the only 
thing he can do. Thus, he has no conception that what he is doing is wrong. 
It is submitted that a spouse should be entitled to the divorce in this 
instance in that she has suffered indignities, but that the knowledge of 
wrongfulness only extends its scope to the fact that the defendant was not 
mentally incompetent and could appreciate his act even if he does not believe 
it to be wrong. It is respectfully submitted that what the concurring judge 
in Steinke said cannot be accepted as correct: 
" the right to obtain a divorce in Pennsylvania is 
defined in putative terms ••• one who commits any of 
the certain enumerated wrongs may be punished by being 
divorced by his/her spouse."
(lOG) 
In Saucier v Saucier ( 
107
) it was held that persistent denial of sexual
intercourse to one's spouse was a legal ground for separation, therefore 
it is submitted that a spouse who has undergone corrective surgery could 
be divorced on this ground, assuming of course that the law in the state 
of Louisiana does not recognise the change of sex post-operatively, because 
if it did, then there. would be an action for annullment not divorce. However, 
along these lines, it was held in New York State ( l
08
) that mere cessation
of intercourse without demand for sex by the one spouse and refusal by the 
other, is not sufficient grounds for divorce, thus it is a technicality 
as to whether inability could amount to refusal for the purposes of this 
case. 
104. Divorce Act of 22 September 1972 P L  880 No. 202 s 1, 23 Pa cs.
105. My underlining. s 10 (l)(f) 23 P s.
106. ALR 3d at 717.
107. (1978 La App) 357 So 2d 1378 s 4.
108. Nicholson v Nicholson (1982 2d Dept) 87 App Div 2d 645, 449 NYS 2d 4.
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Most states have laws which allow for annullment if one of the parties is 
incapable of consummating the marriage, and if the other spouse was unaware 
. (109) of the sexual incapacity at the time of the marr 1.age. In California, 
the statute is silent as to whether the non-incapacitated spouse need know 
, (llO) 
of the incapacity at the time of the marriage. It is submitted therefore 
that a marriage in California can be annulled even if both parties were 
aware of the sexual incapacity at the time of the marriage. This would 
leave the sexually incapacitated spouse in a precarious position because 
his partner could void the marriage any time . . d h . /h 
( lll ) 
In it suite 1m er. 
such a jurisdiction, the sexual capacity of a spouse becomes significant 
' 
f h h i . "d t 
( 112) 
h h t in terms o whet er t e marr age is voi or no . In t e ot er s atutes 
the requirement of knowledge of the sexual incapacity is the deciding factor. 
Although the ability to consummate a marriage is fundamental to the 
institution, when a person is aware of his partner's incapacity and 
nevertheless is willing to marry that person, then the state should - and 
1 d . h i l'd 
(ll3) 
to a arge extent oes - recogn1.se t e marr age as va i .
2. Canada
The divorce law of Canada is regulated by the Divorce Act of 1970 which 
applies throughout the country. There are only three grou.p.ds which possibly 
could be affected directly by the problem of sex determination: 
1. if one party to a marriage suffered from and practised transvestitism
which rendered future cohabitation intolerable to the other spouse,
. (114)grounds for cruelty would exist. It is submitted that transsexualism
109. For example Del Code tit 13 s 1551 (1953).
110. Cal Civ Code s 4425 (West 1970).
111. Scott Cole op cit 349.
112. It is submitted that a male-female transsexual would be relatively safe
from annullment, but a female-male transsexual - because the procedure
has not been perfected - would be in grave danger of having his marriage
annulled at any time •. This is hardly a credit for judicial consistency.
113. It is submitted that the state has no interest in � recognising a
marriage between two persons who willingly marry, despite the sexual
incapacity of the one. Thus, the capability or not of consummation
should in effect have no application to the transsexual marriage, in
which the other spouse has full knowledge regarding the true position.
114. Divorce Act RSC 1970 CD 8 s 3(d); see also .f._y£ (1971) 1 RFL 127 (NBQB)
and the Englieh case of T v T (1961) 105 SJ 935.
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could also be a ground for divorce here where it rendered the continued 
cohabitation of the spouses intolerable. In determining the exact extent 
S d(ll5) of the cruelty to be proved, Oppal LJ in Saad v aa stated that 
ncare must be exercised in applying the standard set 
forth in section 3(d) that conduct - relied upon to 
establish cruelty is not a trivial act, but one of a 
'grave and weighty nature', and not merely conduct which 
can be characterised as little more than a manifestation 
of an incompatibility of temperament between the spouses." 
In this case, the petitioner sought a divorce on the allegations of cruelty 
pursuant to section 3 ( d). The wife had refused to undergo treatment which 
would render her capable of procreation, even though she was aware that 
her husband wanted children. Due to her decision, her husband had become 
severely depressed. On this basis, Oppal LJ regarded the need of the husband 
to have children and the wife's subsequent refusal therein as grounds for 
cruelty, as the wife's decision had had an adverse effect on the husband. 
It is submitted that a decision to undergo corrective surgery could be viewed 
as cruelty under this section, as not only would it be a denial of 
procreation, but also a denial of conjugal rights. 
{llG)
2. Non consummation because of disability for a period of one year,
gives rise to grounds of divorce. U
l 
7) It is submitted that the post­
operative transsexual male would be covered by this section, as due
to the imperfection of the operation in this case, he would be unable
to consummate the marriage.
115. 14 Dominion LR (4th) 1985 76, quoting from Schroeder JA in Knoll v Knoll
1970 10 DLR (3d) 199.
116. See also Lauder v Lauder (1949) 1 All ER 76.
117. Divorce Act s 4(l)(d).
3. It might be 
(118) 
adultery 
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possible to obtain
or a homosexual 
grounds 
t
(119)
ac 
for 
if 
intercourse with a post-operative transsexual. 
divorce on the basis of 
one spouse has sexual 
It has been suggested 
that the sex of the co-respondent would not be called into question 
because adultery or homosexual conduct could be pleaded on alternative 
(120) 
grounds. Regardless of how the court determined the sex of the 
co-respondent, one of the grounds would apply since adultery has been 
defined as including "mutual intercourse" which can be less than 
. (121) 
penetration and a homosexual act has been defined as including 
"mutual fondling which results in sexual climax". 
(122) 
On this basis,
it is submitted that almost any sexual act can be classified within 
these broad tenets and give rise to a ground for divo.rce. It is also 
grounds for possible that 
(123)
cruelty. 
such sexual conduct could constitute 
It has also been suggested that where a married transsexual undergoes 
corrective surgery, this could be viewed as presuming that the 
pre-ope.rative transsexual is now dead, 
. 
t 
" ( 124) 
Sh t ta exis s • e goes on o s te, 
"for in fact, that body no longer 
that prior to the ope.ration, . the
transsexual could be required to execute a document disposing of his 
assets among his wife and children - if he were male-female - and his 
(1 25) 
"post-operative counterpart0 • To remedy a failure to make adequate
provision for the family, the legislature could deem them to be dependants 
within the terms ·of the Dependants Relief Act!
126
). There has been 
a case recently dealing with a homosexual relationship and marriage. 
118, Divorce Act s 3{a), 
119. Divorce Acts 3(b),
120, Hawley op cit 137.
121. Sapsford v Sapsford and Furtado (1954) 394.
122. M v M (1972) 24 DLR (2d) 114 (P.E,I.s.c.).
123. Countway v Countway (1968) 70 DLR (2d) 73 (NS) Div Ct. Here the grounds
for cruelty were proven when the husband turned homosexual.
124, Parschin-Rybkin op cit 587, 
125. Ibid,
126. Ont Rev Stat C 126 (1970).
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(127) 
In Anderson v Luoma the parties, who were lesbians, entered into what 
they characterised as a common law relationship in 1975, pooling their incomes 
and agreeing to have children by artificial insemination. Two children were 
subsequently born, but after eight years the relationship deteriorated and 
the defendant threatened to evict the plaintiff and the children. The 
plaintiff therefore applied for interim maintenance and possession of the 
'matrimonial ' home. Wallace J held that the Family Relations Act (
l2S) 
does
not purport to affect the legal responsibilities which homosexuals have 
to. each other or to children born of them through artificial insemination. 
Accordingly the plaintiff was not entitled to receive interim payments for 
herse�f and her children. 
< 129 > 
Section 1 of the Family Relations Act defines 'spouse' as a husband and 
wife, and includes 
h(c) except under part three, a man or woman, not married 
to each other who lived together as husband or wife 
(my underlining) for a period not less than two years 
where an application made under this Act is made by 
one of them against the other, not more than one year 
after the date they ceased living together as husband 
and wife." 
The judge therefore stated that all the plaintiff could do was claim damages 
for breach of contract of mutual support. She was not entitled to specific 
performance under common law, and certainly not under the Family Relations 
Act. 
Taking this judgment into account, it would appear at first blush, that 
if the marriage of the post-operative transsexual were decided along the 
Corbett lines, there would be no relief under the Family Relations Act either, 
as such union would be regarded as homosexual in nature. However, it is 
this author's submission that as far as the wording of section 1 ( c) goes, 
it could be argued that as the transsexual and his/her spouse are living 
as husband and wife they are covered by this Act and therefore entitled 
to the relief thereunder. In any event, if the Corbett decision is not 
followed in Canada, there will be no problem, as the transsexual and his/her 
partner would be bona fide spouses. 
127. 14 DLR 1985 749.
128. RS BC 1979 c 121.
129. See also Masai Minerals Ltd et al v Heritage Resources Ltd et al (1981)
119 DLR (3d) 389.
III SOUTH AFRICA 
Before the 1979 divorce reform., the grounds for divorce included adultery. 
At the time of the w v W decision the grounds which applied were those under 
the old law. 
one's notice. 
With regard to this said decision, a curious point comes to 
Al though Nesdadt J required the plaintiff transsexual to 
prove the existence of a valid marriage - in spite of the evidence in her 
f 
(130) 
avour - he made a ruling on the point of the alleged adultery to the
effect that 
"That they (the plaintiff and defendant) satisfied me 
tf;lat this court has jurisdiction and that the defendant 
. (131)comJt1itted the adultery as alleged." 
This statement is blatantly incongruous with the ratio of the case. Adultery, 
by its very definition, demands the existence of a valid marriage. 
"Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married 
person with a person of the 
the lawful spouse of the married 
opposite sex other 
person. 
,.(132)
Yet in spite of this, Nesdadt J held that the plaintiff had 
h . f 1 . d . ( 
1
33 ) t e existence o a va i marriage. It is submitted 
than 
failed to 
therefore, 
prove 
that 
on this premise it would be impossible for the learned judge to have found 
that adultery was proven. Furthermore, it is submitted that such a decision 
by the court is contra bonos mores: the defendant who willingly, and with 
full knowledge as to the circumstances, contracted a marriage with the 
plaintiff, yet he is exonerated from his 'extra marital affairs' because 
there is supposedly no marriage in existence, even though the court saw 
fit to hold that he had committed adultery. It woul.d be interesting to 
see the thrust of legal decisions were adultery still a crime. However, 
at least in this regard, the law has kept pace with the changes in societal 
130. Plaintiff handed in a marriage certificate which reflected that a properly
solemnised marriage had been entered into between herself and the
defendant. H' R Hahlo South African Law of Husband and Wife 515
states that "the proof (of a marriage} must be the best available which
means that normally an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate
must be produced (my underlining)". See also Anderson v Anderson 1942
WLD 86; Wittekind v Wittekind 1948 (1) SA 826 (W).
131. At 
3
09F of the report.
132. Concise Oxford Dictionary (ed. Fowler and Fowler); Bartholomew op cit
108 argues that since, in relation to adultery there must be penetration,
the possession by the one part of an organ capable of being penetrated,
and by the other of an organ capable of penetrating would be sufficient
for the purpose of the law relating to adultery, without any further
question as to the sex of the parties. The author is in total agreement
with this argument, which also ·reflects the sentiments put forward by
the English case of S v S (1962) 3 All ER 55.
133. At 315F of the report.
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. t· 
(134) 
convic ions. It ie submitted further that a corrollary to this 
unfortunate position is the situation of the innocent spouse who could not 
be granted relief as a result of her husband's adulterous relations with 
a post-operative female - such as the plaintiff in W v W - because she is 
not regarded as a member of the opposite sex. 
It is submitted that under the old divorce law it would have been difficult 
to dissolve a marriage in which one of the spouses underwent corrective 
surgery while still married, because by and large the divorce had to be 
proved on fault grounds, as is still the case in American states. However 
now under the new divorce law, it is possible for unilateral divorce if 
the plai,ntiff can prove that there has been irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage, which is presumably the case because the spouses would no longer 
be able to have normal sexual relations. 
IV CRITICAL EVALUATION 
The cases in which it is ruled that the marriage of a post-operative 
transsexual is invalid, all do so on the basis of the sex of an individual 
as determined pre-operatively and therefore exclusively on karyotype. Ormrod J 
- subsequently followed by the South African and Australian judges - set
out his criteria for determining sex, concluding that if these biological 
factors are congruent, there is no problem with sex determination. It is 
submitted that he therefore disregards the possibility of ambiguity between 
biological factors and the psychological factor, being any type of problem. 
This intimation is grossly unrealistic. Such a person, as has been proven 
cannot simply accept his plight stoically and attempt to live happily 
according to a sex with which he fails to ide.nt�fy, purely because it seems 
judicially easier to ignore the importance of the psyche. Despite their 
erudition, Judges Ormrod, Nesdadt Bell and those of New York State, give no 
effect to the psychological sex of an individual. It. is submitted that if a 
system of sex classification is adopted, which is at variance with prevailing 
134. Green v Pitzqerald 1914 (AD) 88. However, under the Natal Code of
Bantu Law (contained in schedule to the law no. 19 of 1891 (Natal)
as amended and· substituted by Proc no.. R 195 of 1967 l , adultery is
still an offence where the marriage is by a customary union. It is
incongruous therefore that in · the case of such a putative marriage
a person can be punished for adultery, but not in the case of a valid
one.
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medical views, strong justification therefor, 
even went so far as to state that 
is d d (135)nee e .  
"We do not determine sex - in medicine we determine 
the sex in which it is best for the individual to 
1
. ,.(136)
1ve.
Dewhurst 
Ormrod J had intimated that he was in accord with this statement, thereby 
implying that there are other criteria over and above the one's he used. 
Yet he failed to mention these and even went so far as to limit his enquiry, 
by concluding that the psychological factor had no weight, despite the fact 
that the medical evidence supported the view that when the two standards 
clash, the only effective treatment is to try and reconcile the discord 
in ·favour of the assumed role. In ignoring the psychological factor it 
is submitted that Judge Ormrod assumes that there is a distinction between 
biological and psychological and that the former is ordained whereas the 
latter is chosen... It is submitted that this view overlooks the fact that 
the transsexual is living proof of the actuality whereby the psyche may 
operate in defiance of 'biological truths' despite what the law says it 
sho1,1ld do, and furthermore it is not conclusively proven that the psyche 
is entirely chosen, and may in itsself, be pre-determined before birth. 
It was also contended that the biological features are fixed at birth at 
( 136a l 
the latest, and cannot be changed. such a fatalistic approach ignores 
the subtle but nevertheless human social and physical development. It excludes 
that essence of human existence: the ability to affect one's own destiny. 
. (136b) It reduces life to a "collection of mere physical events". The author 
is of the opinion that such an important decision as sex classification 
should not be made rigidly and unalterably. at birth. 
circumstance, be conclusive in the case of the intersex. 
It cannot in any 
It is submitted 
further that if Orrorod J was only interested in the sex of an individual 
for the purposes of marriage as he claimed, he should have been satisfied 
with the sex role at the time of the marriage as this is the relevant time 
one would imagine. 
135. The issue is not how many criteria there are, but the fact that they
may not all point to the same conclusion. Thus, the more criteria one
recognises, the greater the likelihood of divergence and the stronger
the case for allowing the psyche of the individual to prevail.
136. At 44 of the report.
136a. At 47 of the report.
136b. Smith op cit 1007. 
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The South Afr!cap j�dge quoted O;i:mrod J in stating that the ultimate purpose 
of the operation is · not to change the patient's sex, but to relieve the 
. (137) 
patient's symptoms. This author submits that the former contention is 
not claimed to be true: the law persists in asking the wrong question. A 
transsexual does not consider that he is changing sex - by simple definition 
of the syndrome. Pre-operatively, he is hetween two extremes. The operation 
is merely the . method of rectifying an abnormality. It is submitted further 
that the raison d'etre of �he surgery is fundamentally therapeutic in 
reconciling the errant body with the dominant mind, and allowing the operation 
to take place at all, is necessarily giving precedence to the psychological 
factor of sex determination. Thus it is the author's submission that if the 
surgery is performed the classification of sex should remain in accordance 
with the gender identity of the patient and not suddenly revert to biological 
standards. It is also submitted that it is totally illogical to ignore the 
operative intervention. It is a fait accompli - a patent demonstration of 
the person's desired sex. To ignore the operation is tantamount to enjoining 
one to ignore reality because it is distasteful or difficult to comprehend. 
This is hardly a commendable stance for an emminent jurist to adopt. As the 
respondent in the Corbett stated, 
" these operations did not take place for the hell 
of it, they are not a branch of light entertainment 
and yet Ormrod persisted in viewing the operation as a 
. (138) kind of wantonness on my part n . 
The judicial trend to ignore the psyche and the operative intervention, has 
not found much favour with commentators on the subject. Several South African 
writers have criticised Nesdadt J's decision - and by implication such criticism 
includes other judges who have decided along similar lines. 
137. At 311G of the report.
138. Fallowell and Ashley � cit 228. Miss Ashley went on to state that she 
felt that "ormrod didn't like me ••• I knew that Ormrod was disconcerted 
by me. He never once looked me straight in the eye but glanced furtively 
in my direction and mumbled his references to me as if they were 
distasteful to him. His behaviour towards me was contemptuous. Judges 
are the absolute rulers of their domain, and can play at being God, a 
temptation they do not always resist" (at 217). 
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Smit 
139 
comments that
"Die oortuiging word egter uitgespreek dat die reg ten 
aansien van geslagsbepaling, nie die vraag, en ook nie 
die antwoord daarop, vanui t 'n suiwer tegniese-biologiese 
stand punt moet benader nie. Geslag gesien in sy 
sosiologiese konteks, word nie in die alledaagse gang 
van sake op hierdie wyse bepaal nie. Veel eerder word 
gekyk na die totale beeld van alle faktore wat 'n rol by 
geslagsbepaling kan speel.n 
Lupton' s objection to the Nesdadt decision is also to do with the fact that 
more emphasis should have been given to the psychological attitude of the 
(140) 
person concerned. In conclusion, he states that the learned judge
" ••• failed to seize an opportunity to hand down a humane, 
't bl d . · d t" 
(l4l)
equi a e an progressive JU gernen • 
T ' 0 
42 ) · 
d . ' ' h h b . ' d h . h 1 aitz in i sagreeing wit t ese su missions conten s t  at the court rig t y
found that the plaintiff had not proved that at the time of her marriage, 
she was female. He bases this on the fact that the plaintiff did not call 
any medical witnesses and therefore the judge, on the given biological facts 
had to rule that the plaintiff was male. 
"It would have been improper for Nesdadt J to refer to 
the opinions of psychiatrists which had not been introduced 
through the ordinary rules of evidence. No expert medical 
witnesses were called by the plaintiff"!
143) 
In answer to this, it is submitted that the fact that the plaintiff had 
(144) 
undergone corrective surgery which was regarded ae a "complete success" 
. · f h (l
45
> ' . d h is evidence o er true sex. Furthermore, it is submitte that er
139. £Q. .£!..! 111.
140. M.L. Lupton 'The Validity of Post-operative Transsexual Marriages' (1976)
93 South African Law Journal 385.
141. Lupton .2.Q. cit 389.
142. Taitz £12. cit 75.
143. Ibid.
144. w v w supra at 310A.
145. It is submitted that a pre-operative transsexual is not totally of
one sex, but requires the operation to perfect the real sex, not to change
sex.
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'change of sex' has been reflected in her birth certificate and thereby has 
been given legal recognition by the executive through the support of the 
legislature. It would seem therefore that the judiciary is outnumbered in 
its decision to . ignore the change of sex. Nesdadt J also states (l.
4
G) that
. (147)
the "breakdown of the marriage was not due to any inadequacy as a woman 
on the part of the plaintiff." Thus it is submitted that if she was an 
adequate woman in marriage, she should logically be regarded as an adequate 
woman� marriage. 
Tait% also disagrees with Lupton's suggestion that Nesdadt J failed to "seize 
an opportunity to hand down a humane ••• judgment" and claims that this would 
be to bely the "function of the judiciary". He states that although from 
time to time the Bench goes beyond its basic function of "interpreting and 
applying th� law'' it certainly would not do eo in regard to an issue that 
is as controversial as a change of sex� Thus for Nesdadt J to have flown 
in the face of accepted convention - particularly in the absence of expert 
. ( 148 lmedical opinion - would not only be "incorrect, but quite improper". 
It is the author's submission, in response to this, that f.irstly, the court 
in being 'humane' is not necessarily going beyond its function: on the 
contrary, it is giving due respect to the field of medicine by recognising 
that a medical issue such as the detennination of sex, should be left to 
the auspices of the proper discipline and not be a matter for judicial 
adjudication. Judicial .notice should in fact be taken of the medical 
assessments · for sex. In any event, it is submitted further, that the fact 
that the plaintiff called no expert medical witnesses, should have posed 
no problem. Not only is a judge at perfect liberty to call witnesses himself 
and to request other particulars mero motu in the interests of justice, but 
as he relied solely_ on the biological facts deposed by the parties 
(149) 
themselves, this author sees no reason why he could not have just as
easily, relied on the psychological facts supplied by the parties themselves, 
and give such facts. legal cognizance too. .After all, the plaintiff is the 
best judge of the way she feels psychologically. Secondly, it is submitted, 
146. At 310B of the report.
147. My underlining.
148. Taitz _2£ cit 76.
149 • .At 312 of the report.
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that since there is no definite law on the "controversial" subject of 
transsexualism, Nesdadt could hardly be regarded as "flying in the face of 
convention" by taking the provisions of section 7B into account and logically 
extending their application. The court would not be making law in such 
circumstances, but merely following the example of the legislature. 
All the post-operative transsexuals in the cases which did not recognise 
the change· of sex, were consequently unable to be regarded as female for 
the purposes of a valid marriage. It has been and still remains i,nportant 
to the Christian understanding of marriage, that it be a contract between 
. ( 150) two people of opposite sexes. 
"Harriage fulfills and so makes sense of a feature of 
our common biological nature. Human beings came into 
existence with a dimorphically differentiated sexuality, 
clearly. ordered at the biological level towards the 
heterosexual union as the human .mode of procreation-�· 
What marri�ge can do which other relationships cannot 
do is to disclose the goodness of biological nature, 
by elevating it to its teleological fulfillment in personal 
relationships. Other relationships, however important 
in themselves and however rich in intimacy and fidelity, 
do not disclose the meaning of biological nature in this 
., ( 151)
way . 
In the light of this passage, can the marriage of the post-operative 
transsexual fit into this definition? It is the author's submission that 
the idea does not prirna facie challenge the Christian insistence on heterosex-
150. hWhat then is the nature of this institution as understood in Christendom?
I conceive that marriage may for this purpose be defined as
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion
of all others" per Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde· and Woodmansee (1866)
LR pand D130 at 133. This author agrees with this contention, but submits
that the requirement of heterosexuality does not mean exclusively that
the parties be biologically bipolar. It is submitted that there is
little reason why the sex determination of a person should not be gauged
on the gender-anatomy identity. In none of the traditional precedences
on marriage is there an insistence on the biological criteria. Considering
that they are hardly infallible in themselves, this is not surprising.
151. o'Donovan 2£. .£!:.! 141.
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uality. The transsexual unlike the homosexua� wishes to be cornmi tted to 
just such a union of man and woman as the church claims marriage to be. He/she 
intends to belong to the marriage entirely as a member of the assumed sex, 
to complement the other party both sexually and socially. 
"Society has no business wanting to know what a person's 
real sex is. It is enough for it to accept prime facie 
the role she (a transsexual under discussion here) assumes 
and any deeper· knowledge should be left to her and her 
spouse. We (the Church) expect that the candidates for 
marriage should be believing Christians, and so we require 
that they should have been baptised; but we know well 
enough that the sign of baptism does not ensure the reality 
of faith for which . we look. We explain to candidates 
the nature of the vows they are to take, and demand their 
explicit 'I will' and yet often suspect that a couple 
may be promising themsel vea divorce 'if it doesn't work 
out', even as they forswear the thought before the altar. 
We do not try to probe too deep, but are prepared to 
live with a measure of public illusion in this sphere; 
why then should the fact of 'artificial v natural sex' 
interest anyone except the participating spouses, so 
1 h "th th ' t· ?,.
(l52) 
ong ae t ey are content wi e situa ion. 
It is submitted that the operative word in the passage is 'spouse', thereby 
denoting a marriage relationship, because it has been said that this point 
of view would sanction a homosexual 'marriage'. It is submitted that this 
is of course a contradiction in terms. Marriage by its very nature is between 
two people . of the opposite sex, and 
and his/her spouse are arguably of 
whereas the post-operative transsexual 
(153) 
opposite sexes, homosexuals, by 
definition never are, nor do they desire to be of different sexes. The essence 
of the latter union revolves around the desire to have sexual relations with 
a person of the same sex. For this reason it is submitted that a homosexual 
union can never be let in through the back door and be regarded as a marriage. 
Thus, it is submitted there is little danger of the value of marriage being 
subverted. 
152. O'Donovan �ill 141.
153. It is submitted that this is so because not only the unswerving belief
in the desired sex, but now also the anatomical transformation render
him/her a member of the opposite sex to that of his spouse.
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Both Judges Ormrod and Nesdadt insist on the 'essential role of a woman in 
marriage' which they state precludes the post-operative transsexual from 
. (154} marrying. But what this essential role is, this author is at a loss 
to ascertain, for the following reasons. Firstly, Ormrod J insists that 
"It (marriage) is the institution upon which a family 
is bui.lt, and in which the capacity for natural, 
h 1 . i t· 1 l u (155)eterosexua intercourse s an essen ia e ement . 
If this is to be regarded as fact, then it bodes ill for those elderly people 
who marry for companionship and love, and certainly not to acquire a family, 
It is ridiculous to presume that such marriages are judicially invalid. It 
is submitted that the same can be said of those marriages in which one spouse 
is impotent or sterile either from the outset, or due to an accident, These 
. 
b d d h. b 
. { 156) unions too cannot e regar e as open to annullment on t is asis. 
"Procreation is, after all, not the only aim of marriage 
d th · f · t t 1.'s allowed
(i57> 
an as e marriage o impo en persona 
there seems to be no logical moral, social or legal reason 
which militates against a marriage of this kind under 
d o • II 
(158) 
l.SCUSsion • 
It is submitted that it is logical to hold that a post-operative transsexual 
should not have his marriage annulled on the grounds of impotence if his 
spouse was aware of the situation at the time of the marriage. In any event 
most successful operations involving corrective surgery - at least those 
involving the change from male-female - do not nullify sexual potency. 
154. Corbett v Corbett supra at 48.
155. Ibid.
156, It is submitted that if the spurious excuse is introduced that these 
are rare occurrences, and therefore the exceptional contingency which 
makes the rule, then the same excuse can be used in support of the 
transsexual marriage. What is just for the legal goose must necessarily 
be so for the legal gander, anti-discrimination being the basis of the 
sauce. 
157. One instance where such a marriage may be set aside is of course that
which inyolves concealment of the fact by one of the parties that he
is. impotent, The marriage will be voidable at the instance of the
innocent spouse if she can prove that ·she was unaware of her partner's
impotence at the time of the marriage. Wells v Dean-Wilcocks 1924 CPD
89. The plaintiff· cannot succeed if she were aware of the fact: Smith
v Smith 1961 3 SA 359 (SR). See generally Hahlo .£E. cit 500 et seg.
158. D.B. Van Niekerk '$ex Change Operations and the Law' (1970) 87 South
African Law Journal 239 at 241.
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Impotence too, must be distinguished from sterility, the latter be.ing the 
inability to conceive children although able to participate in sexual 
intercourse. It is not the mere presence of sterility which constitutes the 
ground for action, but rather the fraudulent concealment of such fact from 
(159) 
the other spouse. Therefore it is submitted that the post-operative
transsexual who has apprised his partner of the situation could not - in 
South African law at least - have his marriage annulled on the ground of 
i mpotence or sterility. This fact has failed to impress the judiciary . 
.c 060) 
Thus the notion that marriage is solely for procreation is pass_,,. In 
fact, depending on one's definition of marriage it is submitted that marriage 
is not only a biological relationship. The biological relationship is called 
coitus. Taking this fact into account, any attempt to define a man and a 
woman for the purposes of marriage purely on biological criteria, is a E.2!2_ 
sequitur. For example 
"It (marriage) has of course many other characteristics 
of which companionship and mutual support is an important 
one, but the characteristics which distinguish it from 
all other relationship can only be met by two persons 
. (161) 
of the opposite sex". 
Marriage in contemporary parlance can be perceived as a secular or sacred 
cultural institution: the fulfilment of a contract satisfied by solemnisation. 
The consent of the parties is the germain factor, the ability or inability 
159. Venter v Venter 1949 (4} SA 123 (W). In this case the impression was
given that if one party fraudulently conceals that he/she is sterile
the other party may have the marriage set aside. Here the wife was
aware of the fact that, aa a result of an operation, she was sterile,
but she concealed the fact from her husband, When he applied to have
the marriage set aside his application was refused because he had not
alleged in his pleadings that his wife had been fraudulent in her
concealment.
160. See for example Venter v Venter supra.
161. Both transsexuals in the English and South African cases demonstrated
not only the ability for companionship and mutual support, but also
the ability to engage in sexual relations. Yet both were denied
recognition of their assumed female sex.
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per se does not make or break a marriage. 
William Scott stated 
I . d B 1 
· . (162) . n Lin o v e l.sar1.o Sl.r
"It is a present and perfect consent, the which alone 
maket h matrimony without either public solemnisation 
or carnal copulation, for neither is the one nor the 
other the essence of matrimony, but consent only.• 
Only an error as to the nature of the ceremony - error in negotio or to the 
identity of the other person - error in persona - or to the sexual potency 
of the other party, renders the marriage voidable at 
th and not Vol..d. 
(163)
A . t t' o er party, mi srepresen a 1.on -
the instance of the 
even of a fraudulent
nature which does not result in one of the above-mentioned categories of 
. (164)
iusti errores - �as no effect whatsoever upon the validity of the marriage. 
The approach of our courts then is conservative in this respect: only an 
extremely serious misrepresentation will· give rise to an action of 
nullity. 
065
} It has always therefore been difficult to find grounds for
annun.ment especially when both parties were fully in consensus. It is 
therefore hard to equate the instance of annun.ment in w v w with these rigid 
rules of our comm.on law. 
<166)
162. ( 1795) l Hag Con 215 at 230. .Marriage is a sui generis agreement in
terms of family law and therefore the normal contractual principles
concerning the effects of factors excluding consensus are not fully
applicable: Lee and Honore Family, Things and Succession (2nd ed Erasmus,
Van der Merwe and Van Wyk 1983) 36.
163. Vpet- 23.2.6; Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk .·1959 (4) SA 658 (W) at 665.
164. Voet 23.2.6.1 Stander v Stander 1929 �D') 349.
165. Stander v Stander supra.
166. It is sUbmitted that one must decide from the outset whether marriage
is for the people, or people for marriage. If the former, then personal
happiness will be afforded precedence over the rigid sustaining of the
social institution. If the latter, then at the risk of jeopardising
personal gratification one is obliged to affirm the status quo. It
is the author's submission that the former tenet must be favoured. If
it is not, then many people would be disqualified automatically from
ever contracting a valid marriage. Thus, it is submitted, one should view
marriage as a means of atta ining stability; creating a secure relationship
and limiting occurrences of disorganised breakdown in society. On this
basis,. there is no_ mer:i,.�ed reason for disallowing the post-operative trans­
sexual the right to marry, too.
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Thirdly and finally as regards the essential. role of the woman in marriage 
it must be noted that terms such as 'natural' and 'unnatural' in relation 
to sexual behaviour have been specifically rejected in England at least, 
by the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 
"for they depend for their force upon certain explicit 
theological or philosophical interpretations and without 
these interpretations their use imparts an approving 
or condemnatory note into a discussion where dispassionate 
thought and statement should not be hindered by adherence 
. l . 11 
(167) 
to particu ar preconceptions . 
On the aforegoing submissions, the author is of the opinion that there is 
not one valid instance to vitiate the sex of the transsexuals in the English 
and South African cases as that of a woman. Both not only filled every 
requirement of the essential role of the woman in marriage, they also were 
quite capable of fulfilling the personal consequences of marriage, inter 
. (168) 
alia, consortium. Furthermore, the evidence in the English case regarding
the supposed non-consummation was not conclusively proven. In any event, 
this does not detract from the fact that the respondent was capable of 
consum,mati.ng the marriage, albeit in a physically artificial manner: the 
psychological feminine sway was certainly present and that is of great 
(169) 
importance. Dr Benjamin has commented upon the Corbett case to the effect 
that, 
167, Crnnd 247, p�ra 35 17.
168. Despite the fact that the respondent in the Corbett case could not be
regarded as a woman for the purposes of marriage, she was considered
just that for social purposes, and had been granted a national insurance
card in her role as a woman (at 38 of the report). To be regarded as
female for some social purposes, and male for others is preposterous
and it is submitted, arises from the attempt of the law to usurp the
function of medicine in determining the sex of the individual.
169. Illlll\ediately after the Corbett judgment, on 2 February 1970, a court
in Grasse, France ruled in the case of H�lene Hautiere - a post-operative
female transsexual - that she was a female for legal purposes and could
marry as she wished because "she possesses external genitalia of a
feminine type and because her psychological behaviour is without a doubt,
that of a woman.": cited in Fallowell and Ashley £12. cit 227. It is
submitted that this was indeed an admirable ratio. Prof Mills, who
was one of Miss Ashley's medical witnesses remarked that "there is a
great deal of snobbery in this case ( Corbett v Corbett)": Fallowell
and Ashley £12. cit 216. By this he meant that not only was there a
prejudice against transsexuals but also perhaps the subconscious
intransigence and hauteur of educated men who had no intention of revising
fixed notions such as the definitions of marriage, man and woman (ibid).
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" the judge's ruling is terribly illogical, It is 
a very inhuman decision ••• While we should be very car�ful 
and conservative in advising the operation, once it has 
been done, we should do all in our power to make life 
easier for them Chromosomal tests are a purely 
technical thing and of no practical value, but could 
nobody see this?" (
l70) 
(171)
And then the erudite comment of Dr Jones. 
"The sex an individual considers himself to be is an 
equally important factor it is not the operation 
that changes sex. The operation merely enforces a decision 
that has been made. One who is familiar with this 
particular problem soon comes to the conclusion that 
you cannot disregard the fact that someone believes he 
is a female". 
Cl72l
In passing it must be noted that in England after the Corbett case, Parliament 
passed the Nullity of Marriages Amendment Act, <1
73
> However it does nothing
to clarity matters ae the section merely provides that a marriage is void 
·t . h f ' " . 1 l d f 1 " (l74 l h' 1 e1 t er o the part1.es are not respect1 ve y rna e an ema e • T 1.s
section was in fact enacted contrary to the recommendation of the Law 
. (175) Commission in its report on The Nullity of Marriages. The Commission
was of the opinion that the Corbett decision should not remain law, and that 
matrimonial relief - possible if a decree of nullity is granted - "is not 
appropriate". It was conceded however that "the question involved is an issue 
of social policy on which Parliament will be the judge n . <
176
) Parliament
duly judged and decided to allow the parties in these "tragic cases" the 
170. Fallowell and Ashley .2E. cit 227.
171. Of Johns Hopkins Medical School, Baltimore.
172. Fallowell and Ashley .Q.E. cit 227.
173. 1971 chapter 44 section l(c).
174. McColl Kennedy .2E. cit 125.
175. Law Commission No. 3 H.M.s.o. 1970 paras. J0-32 15-6.
176. McColl Kennedy .21?.lli 6 note 44.
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dignity of a degree of nullity, so that if deemed appropriate - provision 
for ancillary relief could be made by the court, and the unsavoury 
examination of their sexuality - rendered necessary if the only course was 
a declaration as to status - could be avoided. 
The neutral terms of 'male' and 'female' used by Parliament are supposedly 
justified by the view that it would be an open matter left for a court at 
a later stage, to determine sex in the light of further medical evidence 
and possibly reach a conclusion other than the one arrived at by Judge Ormrod. 
The Solicitor-General however, considered the amendment "out of consonance 
with reality"
(l77I 
and the author concurs with this sentiment. It is therefore
submitted that if by using neutral terms the legislature is allowing for 
a· possible change in the future from the view held by Ornu:od J then it is 
in fact tacitly implying that it will countenance a classification of sex 
not on Judge Ormrod' s biological criteria but presumably, on the gender-
identity tests. If this is so, it is submitted that Parliament should have 
simply enacted this itself, considering that it i a to be the judge of such 
issues o . .f "social policy". It is further submitted that the effect of the 
amendment is that it purports to uphold the Corbett decision, yet recognises 
that this decision might be incorrect, which is a blatant contradiction in 
terms. 
Lyons MP demonstrates lucidly the confusion in the minds of the legislators: 
"The way that a judge decides the sex of a particular 
person, is and always will remain a question· of fact. 
It is a question of fact which will change with the change 
in medical opinion If medical opinion were that the 
mere sex . change operation were enough to change a pereon 
from ·a man into a woman, or a woman into a man, that 
would be the end of the case • • • If in the end, medical 
opinion is able to state with greater certainty who is 
male and who is female on tests which were not applied 
in the Corbett case, then some new court can apply these 
tests because the evidence will have changed and the 
. (178) 
question of fact therefore would also have changed". 
177. Hansard cols 1838.
178. Hansard cols 1832-3.
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It is submitted that the decisions which disallow a post-operative change 
of sex for the purposes of marriage, do nothing to offer a solution to the 
problem of the person who does not slot into the conventional norm of 
sexuality. The judges have, in their short-sighted and tenacious insistence 
of sex-determination by pre-operative criteria, created in effect, a class 
of non-people. At the moment, on the basis of these decisions, a transsexual 
who undergoes the legal corrective surgery, remains, for the purposes of 
the law, as a member of his original sex and therefore a person who has 
undergone irreversible surgical mutilation. All this has been based on the 
very unreliable factor of karyotype, which has been shown time and time again, 
to be completely fallible. Judge Ormrod set the pace by setting up a legal 
scale for weighing the relative importance of medical criteria, without, 
it is . submitted, offering any convincing �ustification for his choice and 
despite· the fact that the expert medical opinion would have him avoid such 
an inflexible stance. These tests where then categorically set out and 
slavishly followed in South Africa and Australia. In respect of this, it 
should be pointed out that this practice on the part of the South African 
judge, was erroneous, in that Nesdadt J could not adopt the evidence placed 
b f h E l i h ' d 
. f' d. f 1 
( 179) F th e ore t e ng s JU ge as it was not a 1.n 1ng o aw. ur ermore,
he did not take into account advances made in the medical field since 1970. 
The chromosomal test is not regarded highly by medical experts, and more 
(180) 
weight is being attributed to the psychological factor. It is therefore 
submitted that Nesdadt J not only overlooked the doctrine of stare deciais
(
lB
l)
in hie tenacious acceptance of the Corbett ratio but it appears that any 
considerations of common sense and policy eluded him. He states that 
n1 agree with the observation that it is not for 
the jurist to solve the problem of what a person's sex 
is. It is essentially a question of fact in regard to 
which the courts ought to be guided by the opinions of 
experts in the field of medicine 11 .< 192>
This statement is very laudible, except that totally to the contrary he did 
in fact decide the issue without any such expert guidance. The plaintiff 
who had sought recourse to a court of law, in all good faith, from her 
husband's adulterous action little realised that she would not be able to 
179. See also Strauss ( 5) .2.E.ill 348 and Van Niekerk 2.E.ill 239.
lBO. For example, by R. Green, J. Money, H. Benjamin. Vide chapters one to
four supra. 
181. Tai tz .2E. cit 75.
182. At 311B of the report.
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rely on her marriage certificate and that the 'matrimonial I state in which 
she had lived for a number of years, had in fact never existed in the eyes 
of the law.
Although the Nesdadt decision in following Ormrod J is considered unequitable, 
the stance adopted by Bell in Australia is even worse, in which it was held 
that the respondent hermaphrodite was neither male nor female and therefore 
could not qualify for marriage. It is submitted that not only does this 
bizarre judgment demonstrate· a lamentable lack of medical knowledge but also 
shows to what lengths a judge will go in order to avoid facing issues that 
are 'out of the ordinary' and therefore obviously distasteful to him. It 
is submitted further that Bell J could have decided the whole question on 
the issue of non-consummation, which would have at least left the respondent 
with some vestige of dignity, and also allowed him to contemplate marriage 
again in the future. Bell J simply adopted the three test approach as 
enunciated in the Corbett decision, and failed to make mention of the fact 
. (183)
that Ormrod J had specifically left the question of ambiguous sex open. 
At least the post-operative in England · and South Africa are judicially -
if not practically - free to marry in the future whereas the respondent 
in Australia can never marry because according to the learned judge he is 
neither male nor female. 
"Nobody with an awareness of the psychological difficulties 
facing transsexuals in their attempts to lead a normal 
1. f d h. 1 . th 
· i 11 <194)1. e can regar t 1.s resu t w1 equanim ty . 
It is submitted that it is indeed inconceivable that anyone - let alone a 
judge - can inflict such catastrophic punishment upon someone for a 'crime' 
which nature has conunitted. 
"The right to marry is one of the fundamental civil rights 
f " (185)o man . 
The desire of the poet-operative transsexual to exercise this right, is 
183. The factors were _congruent in the English case, but of course incongruent
in the Australian q�se. See also El1ison Khan 'The True Hermaphrodite
Of No Sex?' (19B1)89 South African La�_Journal lll at 112.
184. R Bailey 'Recent Cases' ( 1979) , 53 Australian Law Journal 659.
185. Loving v Virginia (1967) 388 us l, 12.
perfectly 
impossible 
natural 
(186) 
211. 
but most jurisdictions have rendered 
To date the only case which has adopted a 
this an 
realistic 
view of the transsexual dilemma and has not ignored operative intervention 
or the psychological gender identity of the individual is the American one 
of MT v JT. The significance of this decision is obvious: it is precedence 
for the proposition that the post-operative transsexual has, in effect, altered 
his sex from the erroneous anatomical one, to that of his assumed sex, while 
also fulfilling the general requirement of heterosexuality in marriage. This
decision - while expressly excluding the purported marriages of pre-operative 
transsexuals in their assumed roles ( 
187) 
furthers the cause of ensuring the
right to marry. Al though the United States Supreme Court has never expressly 
recognised a constitutional right to marry, it has been arguably implied 
t ·t1 
(188)
aci. y. 
Despite this !audible decision however, there is no guarantee that the New 
Jersey court will be followed in other jurisdictions. At least one commentator 
has criticised the decision for 
II wandering far from the issue being litigated and 
( for the) degree of personal conviction some judges are 
willing to write into opinions dealing with complex issues 
(189)
to wh .. ich there appear to be no clearcut answers''. 
186. Ellison Khan � cit 113 puts forward tentative suggestions as to what
a South Africap court would do in the case of an hermaphrodite's marriage.
He states that both grounds of the ruling of Bell J rest on the conclusion
that the respondent was not a male. Assuming that this is correct,
he suggests that our courts would be prepared to set aside the union
on the ground of operative error. He doubts though, that such an action
based on error would be brought because an action could be brought on 
the basis that a marriage between two people of the same sex is null
and void. Hahlo £2.£.!!. 66 states that this is in fact our law.
187. For reasons of common sense and policy.
188. For exampl�., Loving v Virginia 388 us l, 12 (1967) in which the court
held invalid a Virginia statute which forbad interracial marriages.
Speaking for the majority, Warren CJ stated "marriage is one of the
basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and
survival." Even though the state is justified in regulating marriage,
this power is limited to those aspects of marriage which might adversely
affect society as a whole: Reynolds v � 98 US 145 (1978) in which the
court upheld Utah's law prohibiting polygamous marriages.
189. Twardy £2 cit 249.
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It is submitted in answer to this, that this case is certainly not the only 
one guilty of applying personal opinion - if this was in fact the case here 
- as the Corbett decision is just as much to blame for this, and this is
simply a factor which has to be taken into account whenever one has to deal 
with an issue of law in which there is a paucity of decisions. However, 
it is further submitted by this author that in the case of MT v JT the judge 
can be excused on the basis that his supposed 'personal convictions' are 
progressive and humane, whereas those of the other judges under mention are 
not, and therefore have no justification. 
Although MT v JT deals solely with the matrimonial sphere, it is submitted 
that there is no reason why it should not be applied to all spheres 
especially considering that judges have been more lenient in other regards, 
such as alteration of documents. 
" . . . it is the opinion of the court that if the 
psychological choice of a person is medically sound and 
not a mere whim, and irreversible sex reassignment surgery 
has been performed, society has no right from prohibiting 
the transsexual from leading a normal life. Are we to 
look upon a person as an exhibit in a circus side-show? 
What harm had said person done to society? The entire 
area of transsexualism is repugnant to the nature of 
many persons within our society. However, this should 
· (190) 
not govern the legal acceptance of the fact". 
The author submits .that despite the criticisms of this decision, it is the 
only stance to be adopted which does not close its eyes to reality and in 
fact has offered a great deal of assistance to the transsexual in his post­
operative adjustment and ultimate attainment of contentment. 
V SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS. 
On the aforegoing, there can be only one solution to the iniquitous injustice 
as regard, the legal position of the validity of post-operative transsexual 
marriages. The courts - except for the one in New Jersey - have not seen 
fit to give due weight to medical guidance to accept the very real fact that 
190. At 207 of the report. It is the author's contention that society should
be educated rather and made aware of these contingencies, and that the
jurists should guide the way.
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the phenomenon of transsexualism. exists and so does the corrective surgery. 
One curious point about the South African decision was the decision to conduct 
(191) (192) . the proceedings in camera. The Supreme Court Act provides: 
"Save as is otherwise provided in any law, all proceedings 
in any court of a di vision shall, except in so far as 
such court may in special cases otherwise direct, he 
carried on in open court." 
The court in W v W accepted the argum.ent that the interests of the community 
did not demand that this norIM.l rule apply. (
l93l 
It is therefore this author's
submission that if it is not in the interests of the community to have the 
fact that the· plaintiff is a transsexual, publicised then this is tantamount 
to claiming that. the issue -is a private one between the spouses only. It 
is further submitted that if the only 'interested parties concerned regard 
their. marriage as a valid one, then this should be left to them, and not 
be unnecessarily tampered with by an overzealous judiciary. In fact the court 
should uphold the institution of marriage wherever possible, this relationship 
being the bedrock of our civilised society. 
"That the state has always taken an interest in the 
institution of marriage, is obvious, but there should 
certainly be limits upon the state's right of intervention 
in a sphere such as the m.arital relationship, which is 
so intimately private and personal. It is difficult, 
nay impossible, to see how the interests of society at 
large can be detrimentally affected if a union between 
a person who had � successfully' undergone a sex change 
operation, and a member of the ostensibly opposite sex, 
. held" (194) is up • 
It is therefore this author's contention that the personal issue of marriage 
be left to . the privacy of the people concerned. Unfortunately the courts 
have been given the opportunity to interfere, and have left their indelible 
print on this area of family law. Even though in South Africa, Nesdadt J 
did acknowledge that the legislature had recognised the factual possibility 
of a change of sex, he gave no effect to it, preferring instead 
191. At 3088 of the report.
192. 59 of 1959 at s 16.
193. At 310C of the report.
194. Van Niekerk 22, cit 241.
to follow the English case.
judiciary saw fit to take 
tolerated. 
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What the legislature had apparently given, the 
away. Such inconstantia juris should not be 
As the courts therefore have been of no assistance in this area, in general, 
it is submitted that the legislature now step in and rectify the inequitable 
position and grant to the post-operative transsexual, those rights which 
are common cause among 'normal I people. It is submitted that to judge the 
post-operative transsexual on his pre-operative sex of chromosomes and 
genitalia, is unrealistic as both his mind, and now his body are along the 
assumed gender identity. 
It is therefore suggested that in south Africa, section 7B should be extended 
to provide for post-operative legal recognition in all spheres, and that 
legislation such as that in West Germany should be followed. 
In con cl us ion it must be mentioned that· all the cases dealing with marriages 
could have - if there was a need for dissolution - and should have been 
dissolved by divorce. In each case there was a substantial ground for the 
divorce for example, adultery in the South African case, and presumably 
cruelty in the English case due to wilful refusal to consummate. It must 
be remembered that in South Africa at least, there are very few grounds for 
the annullment of a marriage and in most instances, such marriage is only 
voidable and not void ab initio. It is argued therefore that if the sex 
of the post-operative transsexual is taken at the only relevant time - post­
operatively there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the 
marriage. This sensible acceptance of the 'new' sex of the post-operative 
transsexual would also obviate the anomalies which arise when a person is 
regarded as different sexes for different purposes. It will also prevent 
the problems which could occur if a married transsexual subsequently decides 
to undergo corrective surgery. As it stands, in South Africa - and other 
jurisdictions - there will have been no legal change of sex and therefore 
the marriage, al though farcical, would still be in existence. It is evident 
that the possibility of this has occurred, as with the Morris case. In such 
situations, it is submitted, there would be presumably· grounds for divorce 
- in South Africa, irretrievable breakdown due to impossibility of performance;
in the United States, due to indignities and cruelty. It is submitted though, 
that there could be. no possibility of annul lrnent in those jurisdictions which 
do not recognise the post-operative change of sex, as there is then no question 
2·15 
of homosexuality. In certain jurisdictions - England being one - the unmarried 
status of the pre-operative transsexual was a pre-requisite to treatment 
which necessitates the need for the patient to file for divorce in the advent 
of him/her being married. It is submitted that not only does this entail 
expensive litigation, but the possibility might arise that insufficient grounds 
- on the existing grounds of divorce in a country, especially one with the
'fault' principle, might be pleaded. 
It is this author's submission then that the only solution to all these 
problems would be to follow the example set by West Germany in which the 
legislation not only provides for total recognition in the post-operative 
role, but also provide for the automatic dissolution of an existing marriage, 
on re-registation in the post-operative role. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that the suggestions Parschin-Rybldn the execution of a document pre-
operatively, to provide for the family - should also be adopted, thereby 
ensuring that the family is in no way financially neglected. It is submitted 
therefore that such provisions as have been outlined above, should be expressly 
enacted by Parliament and therefore become enforceable law in South Africa. 
(195) 
Under the 1980 legislation in West Germany, a transsexual legally belongs 
to his/her chosen sex and attracts the rights and dutiea of that sex. This 
legislation allows the post-operative transsexual to revise his/her birth 
if . t f . h h . /h ho 
<l 96)
cert ica e to con orm wit is er c sen sex.
To obtain the necessary declaration, the transsexual must: 
a) be over twenty one:
b) usually have had corrective surgery, but if , for medical reasons, this
is not possible, then treatJnent which renders it impossible for the trans­
sexual to revert to his/her original role, is sufficient, and
c) be capable no longer of .procreation.
The transsexual however, retains hie/her original sex in relation to any 
children, so that maintenance obligations remain unaltered. 
195. Gesetz Ober Die Anderung Der Vornamen und Der Feststellung Der Geschlechts­
zugehJngket:.t in Besondereri Pall�n · (.Transsexuellangesz) Nr 56 To·g Der Ausgabe:
Bonn den 16 Sept 1980 vorm 10. 
196. This legislation is similar to that in �taly and France: The Guardian (3
October 1981).
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CHAPTER IX 
MARRIAGE-RELATED ISSUES
I INTRODUCTION. 
"Do not do unto others as you would that they should 
do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same." 
George Bernard Shaw 
This chapter is devoted to those areas of law which are affected by the 
marital status of an individual directly. It consists - almost exclusively 
-of this author's extrapolations on these areas as they pertain to the
post-operative transsexual as a consequence of the decision of the South
African case of W v W. Where there are examples from other jurisdictions
available, they will be drawn on to give a comparative study, where possible.
The W v W, Nesdadt J ruled that a m�.rriage contracted between a 
post-operative transsexual and a person of the opposite sex is invalid 
and void. ab ini tio. He regards a post-operative transsexual as remaining 
in his birth-designated sex and it is common cause that persons of the 
. (1) 
same sex cannot marry each other. A marriage which is void ab initio, 
produces none of the legal incidents of marriage. ( 
2
) The woman does not
acquire her husband's domicile;
(3) 
there are no reciprocal duties of support; 
the parties do not . succeed each other ab intestato i children born of the 
union are illegitimate and the parties are entitled to contract a lawful 
marriage with someone else. 
The nullity of a void marriage is 
(4) 
absolute. It may be relied upon by 
either of the parties, even after the death of the other, or by an interested 
third party, even after the death of both of them, In accordance with 
the maxim guod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescet, 
a void marriage cannot be ratified, nor does it gain validity with the 
passage of time. (
5
)
1. Lee and Honore .£P. .ill_ 15; Hahlo The South Afrcan Law of Husband and
Wife (4th ed 1975) 66.
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
Lee and Honore .£P. cit 91; Hable .2E. cit 487; Wells v Dean-Willocks
1924 CPD 89 at 92; Ex Parte Strachan 1946 NPD 592.
Hahlo .£P. cit 488.
Ibid.
Wells v Dean-Willcocks supra at 92.
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1 b . . d (6) No annu ment y a  court is require . The effect of a decree of nullity 
in respect of void marriages is purely declaratory and not - like a decree 
of divorce - constitutive. It does not change the status of the parties, 
(7)
but merely places on record that they are not married to each other. 
Bearing this in mind, it is evident that a post-operative transsexual, since 
1976, who contemplates marriage, should be aware that he/she does not have 
the capacity to marry, but the situation regarding those marriages already 
entered into before 1976, is far from clear. It would appear that a couple 
who married in good faith in the belief that the marriage was valid and 
who have no inclination to terminate such a union, would have nothing to 
prevent them from continuing to represent themselves as husband and wife. 
If such people did not come forward to declare their legal position, it 
seems unlikely that anyone else would, or that such 'concealment' would 
be to the detriment of society. With this 'informal' situation regarding 
annulment, there would be no pressing duty on the parties to admit the non-
existence of their marriage. In fact, it is suhnitted that human nature 
dictates otherwise. Despite fractious elements in society, man - for what­
ever personal reasons - is, on the whole, conservative and moral as regards 
marriage and therefore in all probability, would prefer not to represent 
himself suddenly as not ma.rried, but would rather maintain the status quo, 
by silence. Furthermore, juristic act_s aimed at the discouragement of 
marriage - which relationship is the bedrock of our society - or the en­
couragement of the dissolution of marriage, are contrary to public policy. (
9
)
So too, an agreement prohibiting a person from marrying at all, is contra 
bonus mores and void. <
9
} It is suhnitted therefore that a judicial decision
which has the same effect as such an agreement, should be regarded as contra 
bonos mores also. The decision in W v w effectively prohibits the post-
operative transsexual from marrying at all - he cannot marry legally in 
his new role and also cannot marry in his original role for practical and 
psychological reasons. 
6. Lee and Honore�� 28; Hahlo op cit 487.
7. Ibid; Ex Parte Marais 1942 CPD 242; Ex Parte Oxton 1948 (1) SA 1011 (CJ. In
most continental systems, even a void marriage must be annulled formally,
which seems emminently more sensible.
8. voet 24.2.2; voet 23.4.16; Middleton v Carr 1949 {2) SA 374 (A) at 388.
9. Voet 2.14.21; F.dgecombe v Hodgson 1092 19 SC 226.
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There is also in our law, the presumption of lawful marriage where it is 
proved that two persons went through a form of marriage and subsequently 
1. d t th d . f 
(lO) 
h b' 
' 
h ha d . f ive oge er as man an w1. e. Mere co a itat1.on as us nd an wi e
- if the parties were considered and reputed to be married by those who
. (11) 
knew them - is also sufficient to raise such a presumption. It is sub-
mitted therefore, that to all . intents and purposes a marriage involving
a post-oper.ative transsexual could continue as a valid marriage for as long
as the parties wished, with no one being any the wiser and with no one being
affected by the situation adversely, and the longer the situation prevails
the more difficult it will be to unravel the legal tangles eventually.
It is in instances. of ignoring the legal presumption as to the validity. of the
marriage, that problems manifest themselves and these will be dealt with 
now by this author.
II THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY.
What is the position in a void marriage of the property acquired during 
that union? Whenever a marriage takes place in community of property, all 
the property of each spouse, rests ipso jure in that community. Consequently, 
as soon as the marriage takes place, each spouse becomes owner of an un-
(12) 
divided half-share of that property. If the marriage involved a post-
operative transsexual - prior to the 1976 ruling - how would one determine 
the proprietary rights of each party? Restitutio in integrum is blatantly 
impossible, as it is unlikely that the property would be in its original 
form still. The assets could not divest according to principles of the dis­
solution of a partnership, as a partnership is a legal relationship between 
two or more persons who carry on a lawful business to which. each contributes 
something, with the object of making a profit and of sharing it between 
th (
1
3) em. By 'business• , is meant any activity which occupies 
. (14) and attention of a person for the purpose of making a profit. 
the time
The author
contends that such a description does not fit the definition of marriage 
which usually is not viewed as a business enterprise for profit-making. 
10. Ochberg v Ochberg's Estate 1941 CPD 15.
11. Voet·23,2.5.; Levine v Levine 1939 CPD 246.
12. voet 23.2.68.: Rosenberg v Dry's Executors 1911 AO 688.
13. Grotius 3. 21.l; Voet 17. 2 .1; Rhodesian Railways v Cormnissioner of Taxes
1925 AD 465. MiihlIJ1..anri V. Milnlm�rul 1984 (3) ;1.02 (Al the court held
that it would not btfer easily, a relationship of partnership between
spouses.
14. Platt v Commissioner of In.land Revenue 1922 AD 32.
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A tentative solution has been proffered that where it is only discovered 
sometime after the 'marriage' that the spouses are of one sex, it may lead 
to inequitable results if the marriage is treated as null and void ad initio. 
Thus the termination of the union should be considered as a dissolution 
(15) 
analogous to the death of one partner. It is submitted that this solution 
is unacceptable as it appears to acknowledge the existence of a valid 
marriage, only to terminate such marriage in the following breath, so as 
to remain in accord with the current judicial trend. Obviously, the only 
solution is to recognise the validity of the marriage of the post-operative 
transsexual. However, as this. unfortunately is not the position at the 
moment, this author wishes to offer a personal suggestion, which possibly 
could militate against inequitable division of property, in the light of 
the law as it stands at present. 
Th f t . t th 1 th t 
. 
1· s · d b ' · t 
· (lG)
ere are a ew excep ions o e ru e a a marriage voi a l.111 10. 
If one or both of the parties were bona fide, the court could declare -
at the instance of the innocent party/parties - that certain consequences 
f 1. d 
. 
h th ' . ' · · t 
· (l7) 
o a va 1 marriage attac to e marriage : matrimonium pu at1vum. Inter
alia, such consequences include proprietary rights. If both parties were 
bona fide and they had not entered into an antenuptial contract, it must 
be assumed that they intended a universal partnership. If they had lived 
together for a length of time, the court may decree that their combined 
party was bona h 
(18) 
property be shared equally between t em. If only one 
fide, community of property takes place if it is to the advantage of the 
. t b t t th . (l 9) Where innocen spouse, u no o erwise. the parties were married
under an ante nuptial contract and both were in good faith, the contract
is binding on them both. 
(20l 
If only one was in good faith, the contract
1. Hahlo ££ cit 487.
16. Hahlo op cit 488�
17. Ibid. The requirement for a putative marriage is 'good faith'; Naicker
vNaidoo 1959. (3} SA 768 (DJ; Vather v Seedat 1973 (3) SA 389 (N).
One or both of the spouses must have been ignorant of the impediment
to their marriage. This would hold true then for the marriage of the
post-operative transsexual contracted before 1976. Furthermore, the
marriage cannot be putative unless there was at least the appearance
of a marriage ceremony: Hahlo � cit 495; Moola and Others v Aulsbrook
NO and Others 1983 (1) SA 687 (N),
18. Hahlo 9-e cit 497.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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can be enforced by the innocent party only. It is therefore this author's 
submission as regards the present legal position, that a marriage involving 
a post-operative transsexual - at least for the purposes of property division 
- should be regarded as putative. Obvious1-y - as previously stated - none
of these problems would arise if the marriage were sanctioned by law from
the outset.
f h . . l 
(22)
In terms o T e  Matri.monia Property Act, 
". • . every marriage out of community of property in 
terms of an antenuptial contract which is entered 
into after the commencement of this Act, is subject 
to the accrual system specified in the chapter except 
where expressly excluded in the antenuptial contract 
3 (1) At the dissolution of a marriage subject to the 
. (23} 
accrual system - by divorce/death a spouse whose es-
tate shows no accrual or a small accrual has a claim 
against the other spouse for an amount equal to half 
the difference between the accrual of the respective 
estates." 
This section can have no effect on the division of property of the marriage 
of the post-operative transsexual because, not only might the marriage be 
in community of property or not specifically acording to the accrual regime, 
but in any event, the section only comes into operation on "divorce/death". 
As the transsexual's marriage is null and void ab initio, this section is 
of no assistance here. 
III THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY. 
As none of the legal consequences of a valid marriage obtain, it is clear 
that prior to 1984, the prohibition of donation between spouses was of no 
e ffect. (
23
) The purpose of tbis prohibition was to protect a spouse against
21. Hahlo 2£ �t498.
22. Act 88 of 1984, chapter 1 (2).
23. My underlining.
24. Kilburn v Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501. In Foot NO v Voster 1-983 (3) 179
(0) it was he·ld that evidence given by an insolvent at an interrogation 
in terms of section 65 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, is not admis­
sable against his wife in an application in connection with immovable
property registered in her name. It would appear that there is no
such protection for the post..:operative transsexual and his 'spouse'
as they are not legal spouses.
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exploitation by the other spouse, <
25
> but in conjunction with section 
( 26) 
21 of the Insolvency Act, it also served to safe-guard creditors against 
collusion by spouses. The post-operative transsexual and his partner, there­
fore could have continued to represent themselves as married, but would 
have had a perfect right to make donations to each other, thus possibly 
defrauding creditors. However now, in terms of section 22 of The Matrimonial 
(27) 
Property Act, donations between spouses are permissible so this problem
is of academic interest only. 
Since the inability to pay debts is normally the fault of the debtor himself, 
the chief result of an insolvency order is to protect other persons from 
the insolvent. If the insolvent is married in cononunity of property, 
h. h . h . f f . . f h 
(2B) • 
w ic is t e mis ortune o one, is the misfortune o bot . Spouse' 
that 
for 
this purpose includes a 'reputed. spouse' and in fact means a legal spouse, 
a person married according to. any law or custom and also a woman living 
with a man as his wife. (
29) However, one could not - in the light of the
Nesdadt decision - regard the couple in that case as 'reputed spouses' be­
cause this would be tantamount to saying that people of the same sex who 
are living together can be regarded as married for the purposes of the 
Insolvency Act. It is submitted that this definitely would not meet with 
judicial approval. If however, such a marriage involving a post-operative 
transsexual were - in the name of equity - to be given legal sanction for 
the purpose of this Act, then this stance already undermines the strength 
and supposed justification of the Nesdadt judgment and begins to reveal 
the very unstable foundations upon which it is built. 
25. Voet 24.1.1; Lee and Honore� cit 46.
26. Act 24 of 1936.
27. Act 88 of 1984.
28. With marriages out of community of property, the assets of the solvent
spouse also vest in the trustee, until such time as that spouse proves
that such property is his/hers alone. on doing so, he/she may reclaim
such property: section 21 (1) of the Insolvency Act; Conrad v Conrad's
Trustee 1930 NLR: Kilburn v Kilburn's Estate supra at 507.
28. Section 21 (1) of the :rnsolvency A_ct � Chaplin v Gregory 1950 SA (C) :
"By introducing this subsection the legislature quite cbviously intended
to bring into the net, persons who, while not legally married, were
occupying the de facto position of husband and wife."
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Furthennore, it would be unjust to 
give legal recognition to the marriage only in order to protect third 
parties, to the detriment of the transsexual himself. It is submitted that 
this is almost as if a person is being punished for a condition over which 
he has no control. 
Another problem arising in. the sphere of insolvency, law, is the question 
of trusteeship. Persons disqualified from such a position in tenns of 
section 55 of the Insolvency Act include, inter alia, persons related to 
the insolvent by consanguinity or affinity, within the third degree. This 
is so, in order that a relationship of the utmost bona fides can be main­
tained, because such excluded persons clearly woul d have an interest opposed 
to the general body of creditors. However, in the wake of �• a spouse 
of a transsexual marriage would not be disqualified, even though his/her 
relationship has been on a par with that of a husband/wife. It is submitted 
that in view of the inequity of this, an interpretation of the statute in 
all probability would be invoked so as not to render the transsexual spouse 
an exception. If this occurs, yet another instance will be provided in 
which the transsexual's marriage is deemed legal for the sake of equity. ()O)
IV THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(31) 
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, the spouse of an accused is not 
. ( 32) 
competent in law to give evidence for the prosecution. Furthermore, there 
is a privilege arising out of the marital state. Section 198 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act provides that: 
30. A similar situation would arise in connection with any other offices
which normally would preclude spouses and family, for example, directors
of companies.
31. Act 51 of 1977, at section 198.
32. This section is subject to the exceptions set out in section 195 (1) ,
viz: That where one spouse is charged with any of the following
offences, the other spouse will be compellable as a witness: a) any
offence committed against the person of either of them, or a child
of either of them; b) any contraventions of the Maintenance Act 23 
of 1963; c) bigamy; d) incest; e) abduction; f) certain contraventions
of the Immorality Act 23 of 1957; g) perjury committed in connection
with, or for the purpose of any judicial proceedings instituted or 
to be instituted or contemplated by one of them against the other.
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"(1) A husband shall not be compelled to disclose any 
communication made to him by his wife during the 
marriage, and a wife shall not be compelled to disclose 
any communication made to her by her husband during 
the marriage; 
(2) A person whose marriage has been dissolved or annul­
led by a competent court shall not be compelled to give
evidence as to any matter or thing which occurred during
the subsistence of the marriage, and as to which he or
she could not have been compelled to give evidence if
the marriage were subsisting."
h . i d . d f lh En l . h . d d A ( 
3 3 l d h 
. . 1 T is s erive ram e g is Ev1 ence Amen ment ct an t e privi ege
. (34)may be claimed by the spouse to whom the communication was made only. 
A spouse is. allowed to refuse to answer any question in any circumstances in 
which his/her spouse would be allowed to claim privilege.(
35
> Principally, 
the right to refuse to disclose communications from one spouse to the 
other during a marriage, is restricted to current spouses but it is also 
extended by section 198 (2} as seen above, so that spouses of a marriage 
which has been dissolved or annulled by a competent court shall not be 
compelled to give evidence as to any matter which occurred during the 
subsistence of the marriage. From this, it would appear that only a divorced 
spouse, or a spouse of a judicially annulled marriage, can claim this 
. (36) 
privilege and not a widow nor a spouse whose marriage has been dissolved 
33. Of 1956. at section 3. In South Africa,
for civil procedure in section 10 of
Act 25 of 1965.
34. H.M. Advocate v H.D. 1953 SC (Scotl.and).
there is a similar provision 
the ·civil Procedure Evidence 
35. Section 199 · of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which provides
that "No person shall at criminal procedure be compelled to answer
any question· or to give any evidence .if the question or evidence
is such that under the circumstances the husband or wife of such 
person if under examination as a witness may lawfully refuse · and 
cannot be compelled to answer."
36. In England, it was decided that the privilege conferred on spouses
in respect of communications during the . marriage comes to an end
when the marriage is· terminated, therefore a widow could not refuse
to disclose a communication from her late husband: Shanton v Tyler
(1934) All ER AC.
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· d. · 11 <
37
>extra-Ju icia y. 
It is presumed therefore that this privilege under the Criminal Procedure 
Act would not extend to a transsexua1 'spouse' as the marriage in question 
is void ab initio and therefore does not require a court to annul it. 
The principal reason for the marital privilege is that public opinion 
would find it unacceptable if the spouses were forced to disclose communi­
cations between each other (
3
B) and society should endanger the marital re-
lationship in no way. A further point raised is that it could encourage 
perjury if one spouse was forced to incriminate the other. It is sub-
mitted therefore, that to disallow people this privilege because the marriage 
they entered into - in all good faith - is void, is grossly unjust. The 
confidences shared between a transsexual and his partner in reality are 
no different from those between other spouses. 
"So much of the happiness of human life may fai�ly be 
said to depend on the inviolability of domestic con-
fidence, that the alann and unhappiness occasioned 
to society by invading its sanctity, and compelling 
the disclosure of confidential communications between 
husband and wife, would be a far greater evil than 
the disadvantage which may occasionally arise �rom 
the loss of the light which such revelations might 
, (39)throw on questions in dispute". 
37. For example, by legislation: Russ v Russ 1962 All E R. Under the
Civil Procedure Act however, such privilege does extend to marriages
annulled by extra-judicial means and this privilege only applies
to"a ,matter or thing which occurred during the subsistence of the 
marriage".
38. Rumpling v DPP 1962 (3) All E R 256 at 261B. Viscount Radcliffe (at
260) expressed the view that the principle of common law was to prevent
not only a testimonial confrontation between spouses, but went further
to protect marital confidences as such. The common law rule in England,
of the unity of spouses has now been incorporated in section 2 (2) (a)
of our Criminal Procedure Act so that a husband and wife cannot be 
convicted of the crime of conspiracy if they are the only parties
thereto. It is sul::mitted that· probably this rule would not apply
to the transsexual's marriage - yet another instance of the detri­
mental invocation of the law.
39. Per Viscount Radcliffe (at 264F) quoting from the second report of 
the Commissioner's enquiry into the process, practice and system
of pleading in the superior Court, dealing with communications of
spouses inter se.
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The communications in any relationship accorded the status of marriage 
originate in confidence, as those communications in valid marriages do. 
It is suhni tted that there is no substantial difference. That confidence 
is essential to the relationship and such relationship is one which ought 
to be encouraged by the law and the injury that would inure to it by dis­
closure, is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the 
. d" . l ' t· t' of th"e truth. (
4
D) H 't . ubm"tt d th t b JU 1c1a inves iga ion owever, 1 is s 1 e a y 
making the transsexual an exception to this !audible principle, the bene­
ficial aim of the provision loses some of its veracity and impetus. 
V THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 
. (41) 
Under the succession Act rights of succession ab intestate were con-
. . (42) 
. . . d d ferred upon a surviving -spouse.· A spouse is entitle to succee on 
intestacy now only if married 
. <
43) 1·f h 
. 
. marriage. t e surviving
t h h l . h . (
4
4)o t e w o e  in eritance. 
to the 
spouse is 
deceased 
the only 
by a 
heir, 
valid, monogamous 
he/she is entitled 
A transsexual spouse. under this legislation would be denied all rights of 
inheritance ab intestato as the marriage is considered invalid. It is sub-
rnitted that this would be unjust,. especially taking into consideration the 
fact that the parties believed that they were legally husband and wife. 
If the deceased had not executed a will - in the belief that his spouse 
would inherit nevertheless - and therefore made no provision for his partner, 
the latter would not be entitled to a cent. Supposing that the inheritance 
had devolved in fact before the 1976 judgmen�.what recourse would the 'right-
ful' heir under intestacy have, in reclaiming his/her inheritance? Such 
40. D. Zefferet 'Confidentiality and the courts• (1974) 91 South African
Law Journal 432 at 443.
41. Act 13 of 1934 as amended.
42. Formerly under the Schepensdarnrecht, a surviving spouse had no rights
of succession ab intestate.
43. Section 1 (l} {a) as amended by the Succession Amendment Act 44 of 1982.
A surviving spouse, married in community of property, is entitled to
a child's share or so much as together with the survivor's share in
the joint estate, does not exceed RSO 000 in value, whichever is the
greater. In terms of section l (1) (b) , if the spouses are married out
of community of property the survivor is entitled to a child's share
or so much as does not exceed RSO 000 in value, whichever is the greater
44. Section 1(1) (d).
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intestate devolution to the surviving 'spouse' would be spurious now in 
the light of W v W and this would involve a tedious hunt for the supposed 
rightful heir. Public sense of decency revolts against sucb a denial of 
inheritance to the 'spouse'. Many people die intestate and even more are 
unaware of the ramifications of the law, As ooth mistake of fact and mistake 
of law are defences in the law, (
45
> it is su.bnitted that two people who
erred in their belief that their marriage was valid - and therefore expected 
all the normal consequences to ensue - should be given the benefit of the 
doubt. The root of the problem is not the statutory provision of course. 
It is yet again, the case law which appears to be in existence · with no 
apparent thought applied to its 
it stands at present prevents 
intestate. 
(46 J
creation. Be that as it may, our law as 
a transsexual 'spouse' from inheriting ab 
As far as testate inheritance goes, problems arise in . the event of sex 
designations in the will. If the testator specifies that the bequest is 
to go to "my husband/wife" does this bequest become invalid if there is 
no valid marital relationship? It is submitted that the answer to this 
would be in the negative. The principle object of a court in interpreting 
(4 7) a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator, from the language 
used as far as can be gathered, from the will itself and from such extrinsic 
evidence as is admissible. (
49
> In the interpretation of a will, the court
is entitled to have regard to the material facts and 
to the testator, when he executed the will. <
49
) It is 
45. S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (AD).
circumstances known 
presumed therefore
46. Hahlo op cit 498 states that in applying the principles regarding
property rights in a putative marriage to succession, it would appear
that a ' spouse' in good faith does succeed his/her partner, if the
latter dies intestate before the marriage is annulled. There is no
case law in support of this but if it were adopted, it is submitted
that at least there would be some measure of justice meted out. Never­
theless·, this still does not assist the spouse whose partner dies in­
testate after annulment. It must be remembered that once a party
becomes aware of the true position, he is no longer in good faith if
he continues to ignore the true facts.
4 7. Gordon's Bay Estates v Smuts 1923 AD 160, re-affirmed in Ex Parte Sadie 
1 940 AD 26 • 
48. '"' ... the golden rule for the interpreting of testaments is to ascertain
the wishes of the testator from the language used"; Robertson v Robert­
sons Executors 1914 AD 503.
49. Allen No v Estate Bloch 1976(2)519 376{C).
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that what the testator meant at the time of executing the will, is the impor­
tant issue: at the time of execution he bequeathed to whom he believed was his 
husband/wife, even if it was discovered subsequently that there was no valid 
marriage. Thus it is submitted that for this purpose the heir would be re­
garded as the spouse of the testator and entitled to his/her inheritance. 
Furthermore, while on the subject of testate succession, problems might arise 
also if there is a bequest involving a sex-related term but no name, for in­
stance a bequest to "my son", which son has undergone corrective surgery subse-
quent to the execution of the will. The important issue here again is the 
intention of the testator: thus the bequest must devolve upon the person whom 
he believed to be his I son •. It is su:brnitted that this is similar to the 
case· in which a person bequeaths to his "wife, Jane" and subsequently obtains 
a divorce. If he does not alter his will, ·such bequest will still go to Jane 
despite the fact that she is no longer his 'wife'. The germain time in issue 
is the date of execution of the will and not the date of demise of the testator. 
So although the transsexual has altered his gender identity, he is still the 
same person: the person whom the testator intended to benefit. 
Of course, if the decision in W v W were followed, there would be no problem 
because the 'son' would still be the 'son' in spite of having - undergone 
corrective surgery; possibly the only instance in which adhering to the Nesdadt 
decision would be to the advantage of the transsexual. But even if the de-
cision were not followed and the change were given effect to and the operative 
intervention recognised, it is subnitted that no court would rule that the 
beneficiary would forfeit his inheritance if transsexed, because this would 
be c ontrary to the testator's express wishes, so it is evident that we can well 
do without this one instance where the decision in W v W if followed, works 
to the advantage of the post-operative transsexual • 
. .
VI THE LAW OF INSURANCE
The Amendment Act (
SO) to the CornpulsoryM:rtor Vehicle Insurance Act
(Sl) 
reduces
the potential liability of the driver and the liability of the third party 
50. Act 23 of 1980, · sections 2 and 3 amending sections 22 and 23 of the
principal Act. These amendments were implemented partially on the recom­
mendation of the Wessels Commission of .Inquiry, to reduce limitations
and exclusions available to the authorised insurer. The effect is that all
passengers are entitled to •either limited or unlimited compensation, except
for a select group, including the members of the household, or persons
responsible in law for the maintenance of the driver of the insured vehicle.
51. Act 56 of 1972.
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insurer is excluded entirely, if the passenger is a "member of the household 
of the driver". Therefore, under the Act, a spouse of the driver would be 
1 d d f . d . (
52) h bj f exc u e rom thir party insurance. . T e o ect o the provision is to
prevent fraud and exploitation. However, what in fact constitutes a •house-
hold' is unclear from the legislation. The stance could be taken that the 
spouse of a transsexual marriage would not be excluded · from claiming from 
her 'husband's' insurer for example, because according to � she is not 
a legal spouse. However it is submitted that as in the case of maintaining 
the veracity of the intention of other legislative enactments - such as the 
Insolvency Act - an exception would have to be made yet again as to the 
legality of the marriage in order to protect third parties involved, thereby 
effectively ignoring the Nesdadt decision in the name of equity, but to the 
disadvantage of the transsexual. 
To continue with the law of insurance, it is common cause that a :E_>erson has 
an insurable interest in his own life to an unlimited extent and a husband/­
wife has an insurable interest in the life of his/her spouse to an unlimited 
extent as well. (S)) In these cases, the interest is presumed and no proof 
of its existence __ is necessary. However, if a person is not ·-a legal spouse -
would an insurer have a justifiable interest in the former? It could be argued 
that as the marriage is invalid, the insurer has no legal relationship with 
the other person and therefore should not suffer any pecuniary loss as a result 
of his/her death. However it is sut:xnitted that the· moral conviction of the 
community differs from this approach. The Government in fact encourages 
savings through life insurance, by allowing tax relief on premiums paid to 
(54) insure the life of the tax payer or his/her spouse. It would appear there-
fore that the perpetuation of the policy is in the best interests of society, 
so that its validity in the case of a transsexual's marriage would not be 
challenged, but instead, another _exception to the W v W ruling would be 
effected. 
52. Delport v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd and Others 1984 (3) 191
{D). Here it was held that a wife had no claim against the insurer of
her husband's motor cycle on which she was a passenger and injured,
according to section 2(l)A of Act 23 of 1980.
53. Griffiths v Fleming 1909 KB. Under the Gambling Act of 1774 'insurable
interest' is defined as pecuniary interest and is limited therefore to
the interest capable of valuation in money. In other words, a person
has an interest in anyone whose death ·will cause the insurer financial
loss. See also the Insurance Act 27 of 194 3 as amended. In Phillips
v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd it was held that a husband also
has an insurable interest in his wife's jewellry.
54. E;llison Khan and c. Forsyth (eds) Readerl;s Digest Family Guide to the Law
in South· Africa (1982) 45. 
VII THE LAW OF DELICT
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As corrective surgery is not recognised in the marital sphere, a 'spouse' 
with the necessary .1.ntention, could never be guilty of adultery. A person 
who has willingly and voluntarily entered into a marriage involving a post­
operative transsexual, could - and has, as evidenced in W v W - have 'extra­
marital' affairs with impunity and the aggrieved spouse would have no delictual 
action to recover for the harm perpetrated against him/her. After all a single 
person generally is at perfect liberty to have sexual relations with whomsoever 
he/she choses and a person with no legal claim against him/her can do nothing 
about it. 
"It is a rule of South African law, that neither spouse to 
a marriage which is valid according to South African law 
is entitled to an interdict prohibiting the other from 
committing adultery Adultery is a matrimonial offence 
which may provide the aggrieved spouse with grounds 
for divorce. This is her only remedy". (
55
)
It would appear therefore, that the transsexual 'spouse' has no right of action 
even in delict for purportea adultery and damages incurred - even though the 
court did find in w v w that adultery had been committed. 
(56) 
There is nonnally an action in delict against the co-respondent in adultery. 
This action is a two-fold one: 
1. for the payment of patrimonial damages arising out of the loss of consortium
of the adulterous spouse; and
2. for the payment of solatium for the contumelia suffered by the plaintiff. {S
7
)
The amount of solatium recoverable is in the court's discretion ana in assess-
ing the amount of the patrimonial damage, the court should take the plaintiff's
(58) 
proven loss into account. There is no justifiable reason to consider that
a plaintiff in a transsexual marriage would suffer any less in the case of
adultery than a plaintiff to a valid marriage. Yet it is certain that there
can be no action in the case of an invalid marriage - even though the court
in� managed this strange anomaly.
55. Osman v Osman 1983 {2) 706 (D & CLD) (my underlining) .
56. Ex Parte AB 1910 TPD 1332: Rosenbaum v Margolis 1944 WLD 147 at 155.
5 7. Viviers v Kilian 1927 AD 449 at 455: Woodwiss v Woodwiss 1958 {3) SA 
609 {D} at 618; Smit v Arthur 1976(3) SA 378 (A) 386. 
58. Smit v Arthur supra at 388.
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It is submitted that for the purposes of recovery for the negligent causation 
of death of a spouse, a transsexual's marriage could be regarded as putative 
as it is in a customary union. In Fortuin v Commercial union Insurance Co 
of South Africa (S
9
) it was held that a widow was entitled to damages for loss
of support through the negligent death of her husband. This then is the case 
in a valid marriage, but does it hold true for a putative marriage? In Msomi 
(60) . (61)
NO v Nzusa and Another it was held that a widow to a customary union 
which is not a valid· marriage according to South African law - is entitled 
to damages for the loss of support. On the basis of this, it is submitted 
that there should be no reason why a spouse in a transsexual marriage could 
not claim for loss of support in the event of her 'husband' dying, in spite 
of the fact that there is no legal tie. However, this would entail the giving 
of legal status to the transsexual's marriage yet again. 
59. 1983 (2) 444 (C).
60. 1983(3) 939 (D).
61. Blacks in South Africa can chose whether they wish to be married by cus­
tomary union or common law. The former is not recognised as a legally
valid marriage. The latter differs from the civil/Christian marriage
contracted between whites as a result of the legislation governing it,
to prevent Blacks from being taken unawares by legal consequences with
which they might be unfamiliar. With Blacks then the automatic prq:e:r.ty
regime is not one of community of property but such community ·of property
and profit and loss is excluded automatically by the Black Administration
Act 38 of 1927. This was introduced because there is no concept of 
community of property in Black customary law. A customary union creates
a legal relationship between two people and two families and the woman 
remains a perpetual minor, either primarily under the guardianship of
her father or subsequently under the guardianship of her husband. Except
in Natal, a customary union can be dissolved without- the parties going
to court - the same as the transsexual marriage. It is submitted that
as the customary union is not a valid marriage, the decision in W v W
has no bearing upon the parties and therefore the change of status should
be recognised as the legislation envisaged. Thus a female-male would
no longer be a perpetual minor and the post-operative transsexual should
be allowed to marry in the post-operative role in the case of a customary
union. If this is so, it is ridiculous that a post-operative transsexual
could qualify for a customary union in the post-operative role - albeit
a putative marriage - but if the same parties were contemplating marriage
according to ci vi]/ Christian law, they would be debarred from proceeding.
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VIII THE LAW OF TAXATION 
For revenue purposes, whilst the marriage of the post-operative transsexual 
and his/her partner was in existence - before the W v W judgment - the couple 
would have been taxed as married persons. This taxation differs from that 
. (62) of a single person and therefore on discovery ·that the marriage has never
been in existence, an amendment of the tax paid should be necessitated. 
'married' person - as defined by section 1 of the Income Tax Act {
63) _ is 
A 
en-
. tl d d d 1 . f d. 1 
(64) 
1 ti e to e uct a arger maxunum or me ica expenses, or a arger standard
deduction under section 24E and is also entitled to higher primary rebates. 
(6S)
As the marriage involving the post-operative transsexual is null and void 
ab initio the parties concerned have been taxed as single persons and there­
fore all taxation that has occurred in respect of them, would be erroneous 
and open to amendment. Such an upheaval would bode ill for the administration 
and consequently incur a great deal of unnecessary work for the Department 
of Inland Revenue. (
66
) It might be suggested that in such a case the spouses 
would be treated as having been divorced thereby bypassing the necessity of 
the _ amendments for the previous years in which they were taxed as married 
people. It is subnitted that this not only would be unfair on the persons 
involved who cannot regard their marriage as valid and therefore should not 
have been taxed as married people, but regarding the annulment. as a 'divorce' 
would be saying that the marriage is once again exulted to the status of 
validity. It is submitted that it would be easier and more equitable simply 
to regard these marriages as valid. 
62. In terms of the Tax Table for provisional rax Payers, a married couple
in which both spouses are earning invariably will pay more income tax
than two people separately, as single tax payers. Furthermore, rebates
for single and married people differ as well.
63. Act 58 of 1962.
64. Section 8.87.
65. Section 109.
66. There is an onus upon the taxpayer to keep records for the previous five
years and therefore • should the department in fact consider affording
the parties in question the necessary_ amendments in their income tax
returns, this could only be considered for those five years, as all other
records would, in all probability have long since been destroyed.
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IX THE CRIMINAL LAW 
The South African courts accepted at l (
6 7
) . ha " . h i an ear y stage t t in Sout Afr ca
the English view of the essentials of the crime of bigamy has 
. {68}
prevailed". 
E ··1 · h l (
69) . ' . d b In ng is aw bigamy 1.s conunitte y:
"Whosoever being married· shall marry any other person 
during the life of the former' s husband or wife, whether 
the s·econd marriage shall have taken place in England, 
Ireland or elsewhere •.• ". 
However, there is a proviso to the effect that the accused is not liable, 
where, at the date of the second marriage, the first has been dissolved by 
divorce or annulment. (
7
0)
The South African courts have followed their English counterparts on the first 
two essentials of the crime namely: 
1. a valid marriage which subsists. 
crime. 
. (71)
If it is void or polygamous there is no 
2. The accused must have gone through the 'form and ceremony' of marriage
(72)
w ith another person which means a fonn of marriage known and recognised 
by the lex loci as capable of producing a valid marriage. If the form 
- though sufficient in principle - does not· apply to the parties for some
reason personal to themselves, it crime of 
. (73) bigamy. Moreover, if the second 
reason of some essential (non-formal) 
marriage for the purpose of the crime 
still suffices for the 
marriage would have been 
d f 
(74) . . 
d e ect 1.t 1s regar ed
invalid by
as a second 
nevertheless. <
75
>
The South African courts however, do not follow the English r ules as regards 
{76) 
mens rea. Although there are early decisions requiring the mistake of 
67. R v Mdiya. Lutuli (1902) 23 NLR 253 at 255; R v McIntyre 1904 T 804 at 898;
.R v Jacobs 1926 OPD 184.
68. R v McIntyre supra at 808.
69. In terms of section 57 of the Offences Against the person Act of 1861.
70. Milton � cit 242. ·
71. R v Sarwan Singh 19_62 (3) All ER 612.
72. R v Allen (1872) LR l CCR 367; R v Robinson (1938) l All ER 301.
73. R v Robinson supra; Milton� cit 243.
74. Such as a too-close relationship: R v Brown (1843) 1 Car and Kir 144;
R v Allen supra.
75. Milton QE. cit 243; R v Allen supra.
76. Milton op E!..!: 243
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of the accused to be both bona fide and reasonable, Milton states that these 
are attributable to the objective approach to· intent, which was employed then 
sometimes. Now that it is clear that the test is always subjective, it is 
plain that there cannot be the requirement of reasonableness. 
The rationes underlying the crime of bigamy were stated by Cockburn CJ in 
R v Allen <
77
l as follows:
"It involves an outrage on public decency and morals, 
and creates a public scandal by the prostitution of a 
solemn ceremony which the law allows to be applied only 
to a legitimate union, to a marriage at best colorable 
and fictitious and which may be made, and too often is 
made by means of the most cruel and wicked deception." 
Something of the same idea was expressed by some of the Roman-Dutch writers (
7Bl 
who considered bigamy as a breach of trust in regard to the subsisting marriage 
and a profanation of the Christian marriage ceremony.· It ·is submitted by 
Milton <
79
> that bigamy is punished in south Africa, partly as a crime against 
the cormnunity - in that it offends the principle of monogamy which is regarded 
. (80) 
as the corner-stone of our society and it is also considered an abuse 
(Bl) 
of a solemn am i.mportant ceremony - and partly a crime against the person 
- as it may lead to "the most cruel and wicked deceptions" and to highly on­
j ectionable consequences for any unfortunate children of the second (or even
th f. ) 
. (82)
e irst marriage. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
ffi. 
(1972} LR l CCR 367 at 374-5. 
For example, Matthaeus 48.3.1.13;7.8.
Glanville-Wil).iams (1945) 61 Law Quarterly Review 76, citeg. j.n Milton op 
cir.243. 
Glanville-Williams however attacks this idea and states at 78 that "the 
crime of bigamy as it now stands • • . does not make sense except on the 
supposition that the marriage ceremony is a magic form of words that 
has to be protected from profanation at almost any cost in human suffer­
ing". 
82. As Glanville-Williams (op cit 78) states, this is often the case. There
are also situations in which the other party is a soccius and the ceremony
is no more than a "pathetic attempt to give . a veneer of respectability
to what is in law, an adulterous association".
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Bigamy in South Africa then is defined by Milton:
83) 
"Bigamy consists in unlawfully and intentionally entering 
into what purports to be a lawful marriage ceremony with 
one person while lawfully married to another." 
Like all other common law crimes, bigamy requires mens :c-ea. For this, the 
accused must intend to enter into a 'second' marriage: he must know, or. at 
least foresee the possibility at the time of the 'second' marriage, that the 
'first' marriage subsists, yet go ahead and marry again. If he bona fide 
believes that the'firse marriage was null and void ab initio, he lacks mens 
�84) (85) 
--
rea.. The burden of proving mens rea rests upon the state. If the state 
therefore leads evidence from which it may be inferred reasonably that the 
accused had mens rea, the latter may run the risk of conviction if he fails 
to adduce evidence of bona fide error. 
If we take as our first marriage one such as that in W v W, which is invalid, 
a spouse in this marriage - who was aware of the Nesdadt ruling - escapes 
. (86) 
liability for the crime of bigamy on subsequently marrying, even though 
his action would be heinous as regards his first spouse, who might believe 
. f h h. /h 
' 
l'd (B
7
l . . . d ha . . t1.n act t at 1.s er marriage was va i • Bearing in min t t .1. t 1.s no 
necessary for the parties to go to court for a declaratory order, it is not 
impossible that one spouse at least, is unaware of the invalidity of his/her 
marriage. If in fact, the 'bigamist' is unaware of the.invalidity as well, it 
is submitted that this would suffice as proof of mens rea. 
83. Op cit 245.
84. Ev. King (1964) l QB 285; (1963) 2 All ER 561.
85. Milton £e. cit 247.
However, this 
86. The traditional reasoning in regard to bigamy is that if the 'first'
marriage is void it is utterly ineffective in law and does not qualify
as the 'first' marriage for the purposes of the crime: Milton £e_ cit 248.
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the onus of proving
the invalidity of the 'first' marriage rests on the accused (section
237(1)).
87. S v De Blom 1977 {3) SA 513 AD.
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iS not the end of the matter, as the other elements of the crime will have 
to be proven also. As the requirement relating to -the existence of a valid 
first marriage would not have been satisfied, a person with all the necessary 
intention and unlawfulness, would escape liability for what society believes 
- as has been mentioned above - to be morally reprehensible conduct, because
the law will not consider that a crime has been committed in fact. Pace(88)
with whom this author agrees - suggests that a transsexual or his 'spouse'
who contracts another marriage should be guilty of bigamy, although, according
to law, the first marriage is void. Thus the view is expressed that the 
transsexual ·marriage - for moral purposes - should be given legal recognition
in this regard, making yet another notable exception to the W v W ruling.
As has been stated above, for the crime of bigamy, it is immaterial whether 
the second marriage is open to attack for some personal reason as long as 
there are the prescribed formalities of marriage. In South Africa, this means 
. 'l h . . ' (B
9
) h h ld h . . d ub a civi or C risti.an marriage. T us, s ou a person w o is marri.e , s -
sequently go through the prescribed formalities of marriage with a post­
operative transsexual, such second marriage would be deemed a valid marriage 
for the purposes of bigamy and if all the other requirements are met, then 
the accused would be convicted. (
9
0)
It is submitted that it is totally ludicrous that a transsexual marriage 
will be recognised for the purposes of bigamy if it is the second marriage, 
but not if it is the first. How can one type of marriage be both valid and 
invalid at the same time, within the same crime? Thus, as the law stands, 
one spouse from the W v W case would not be convicted of bigamy if he/she 
entered into a subsequent marriage, . but any married person who subsequently 
married the plaintiff 'W', would be convicted of bigamy. 
88. P.C. Pace 'Sexual Identity and the Criminal Law' (May 1983) Criminal 
Law Review 317. 
89. R v Shasha 1948 (2) SA 996 (0) at 998.
90. R v Jacobs 1926 OPD 184. Here, the second marriage was invalid on the 
grounds that the clergyman was not a solemnised officer in terms of
Article 4 of Law 26 of 1.899 (that is, the form was wrong). therefore there
could be no crime of bigamy. Furthermore a bigamous marriage has been
given the status of a putative marriage in order to legitimate the
children; Ngubane v Ngubane 1983 (2) 770 (T).
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As the law concerning bigamy relates to the present law on marriage in South 
Africa, the courts would be obliged to follow the w v w decision in deciding 
the validity of a marriage and therefore could not reach 
solution which would arise if the legislation were followed. 
the equitable 
As it stands 
the law concerning post-operative transsexuals and the crime of bigamy is 
extremely anomalous and unsa�isfactory. 
In Snyman v Snyman (
9l
) the court held that an action for damages under 
the actio· injuriarum for the impainnent of dignity and reputation is available 
to a 'wife' who has been induced to enter into a void marriage with a man 
who, unbeknown to her, has committed bigamy and is a party to an existing 
marriage. This is the first case in which a claim for damages arising out 
of bigamy, has been filed. It is submitted that if the plaintiff were a 
transsexual spouse, she would succeed in her action as Mrs Snyman did, even 
though the marriage is void · on personal grounds as well. However, it is 
submitted that no similar action would lie for the transsexual spouse of 
the 'first• marriage in the event of her husband deserting her and entering 
into another marriage, because under these circumstances, he would be at 
perfect liberty ta marry as there would be no legal bond between him and 
the transsexual. It is submitted that the injuria which Mrs S nyman suffered 
would be no different from that which the transsexual spouse of the 'first' 
marriage would suffer. There is no justification in treating a transsexual 
woman as having any less feeling and sensitivity than a 'biological' wom�n 
- in fact, due to her special circumstances, she probably would be far more
sensitive about the issue than any other woman.
In passing, it need be noted that a party to a marriage involving a post­
operative transsexual in which there are children whether by previous 
marriage, adoption or artificial insemination (
92
> _ could not be convicted
of incest with such child because there would be no legally recognised degree 
f ff · · ( 
9 3 
) h h h 
' 
ld b bl 1o a inity, even t oug sue action wou e unaccepta e on mora 
grounds and possibly detrimental to the child" <
94
l The definition of incest
offered by Milton is: 
91. 1984 (4} 262 (W).
92. Vide the Canadian case of Anderson v Luo�a 14 Dominion Law Report. 1985
747 supra.
93. For more details on the crime of incest, vide Milton op cit 257ff 6 
94" obviously if the female child were under the legal age, the crime 
committed would be rape in this case, but if she is of age, and consents, 
there is no crime. 
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"Incest consists of unlawful and intentional sexual inter­
course between two persons, who, on account of-consanguinity, 
affinity or adoptive relationship may not marry one 
another". <
95
)
Thus, following the decision in � there would be no unlawfulness on the 
part of a person in a transsexual 'marriage' and therefore no legal restriction 
on having sexual intercourse with a child of that union. 
X CUSTODY AND CHILD CARE 
While discussing the marital status 
deal with the transsexual as a parent. 
of the transsexual, 
(96) 
Strauss believes 
it is 
that 
necessary to 
to sanction 
the operation for a pre-operative, married transsexual would be justified 
only if it were in the best interests of the children of that marriage and 
was necessary to avert any anti-social tendencies. There has been one case 
to date dealing with the 
. . 
d 11·· <
97
> ln Christian v Ran a 
issue of fitness of the transsexual as 
a thirty-eight year old female-male 
a parent. 
transsexual
underwent corr ective surgery and married a woman.· The transsexual's former 
husband petitioned for custody of his four teenage daughters, alleging that 
the mother was an unfit guardian because her change in sex adversely affected 
the emotional development of the children. The court of appeal held that 
there was no evidence to this effect and noted the girls' scholastic success 
and generally well-adjusted lives. 
Morris too, relates her own personal experienc� with her children. (98 ) 
"How to tell the children what was happening was the hardest 
of all our problems. That something . was happening was 
very apparent: . • • We were not too afraid of their own 
reactions: they were past the most vulnerable years of 
their childhood · More distressing, we thought, was 
the danger that they might be teased or mocked 'at school 
Qelped along the way by sensitive teachers they seemed 
to have escaped the miseries of school taunting, and the 
more feminine I became, the more closer to my own reality, 
the closer I felt to them too •.. the process was infinitely 
95 • Mil ton op cit 25 7.
96. Strauss (3) � cit 215.
97. 33 Colo App 129 615 P 2d �32 (1973).
98. Morris S2 cit 150. After the operation, she had to devise a new ·overt
relationship with her family and decided on being her wife's 'sister­
in-law' in order that she might retain her kinship with the family,
as an 'adoring aunt'. 
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slow and subtle and through it all anyway . . • I remained 
my same affectionate self . . • It was not such a terrible 
thing after all. They (the children) had not witnessed 
the collapse of love, the betrayal of parentage, desertion 
or dislike. What they had watched was a troubled soul 
achieving serenity, and I hoped that in time they would 
come to see ••. my strange life as I had seen it 
It would appear that in all probability the occurrence of a parent undergoing 
corrective surgery would not affect the parent's ability to care for his/her 
child/children. In fact it is submitted that in being granted a release 
from a bondage would improve the well-being of the transsexual, which would 
affect beneficially, any relationship with others. The aim of an order of 
custody is to provide the child with its true needs, thus the main consideration 
in deciding the suitability or otherwise of the parent to be custodian is 
of course what would be in the child's best interests. Both at common law (
99
>
and under the Matrimonial Affairs Act 
(lOO) 
the interests of the child are of
paramount importance. Logically, a change of sex should make no difference 
to the competence or otherwise of a parent and it is submitted, that if any 
alteration in the relationship is recorded it will be a positive one in that 
the parent finally attained peace of mind. 
Whether or not a post-operative transsexual can become a parent by adoJ;,tion 
( 
has not as yet, been the subject of litigation, but it is this author's sub-
mission that transsexualism per se should not be a bar to parental competency. 
h . 'ld (
lOl) . ' 
l' th h' ld b d t d T e  Chi Care Act provides inter a ia at a c i may e a op e ,
"(b) with the consent of the Minister, by a widower or 
widow or unmarried or divorced person if the child is 
not born of him or her'. 
This subsection effectively covers all single people and therefore is no 
direct bar against the transsexual. Section 4 (a) of the Act provides further 
that the applicant/s must be possessed of adequate means to maintain and 
99. Shawzin v Laufer 1968 (4) SA 657 (AD); Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA
130 (AD).
100. Act 37 of 1953. Section 5 (1) provides that the court may "(b) on the
application of either parent of a minor whose parents are divorced or
living apart, if it is proved that it would· he in the interests of the
minor to do so, grant either parent the sole guardianship • . . or sole
custody of the minor ••. ".
101. Act 74 of 1983, chapter 4 section 17. The Child Care Act repealed the
childrens Act 33 of 1960, which in turn had repealed the Adoption of
Children Act 25 of 192.3.
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educate the child and subsection (b) states that the applicant must be 
of good repute and a person fit and proper to be entrusted with the custody 
of the child and· furthermore, that the proposed adoption will serve the 
interests and be conducive to the welfare of the child. 
It is submitted therefore, that there is no reason why a person merely by 
virtue of his transsexualism, would not make a good parent. There are many 
'normal' people in society who make appalling guardians and good parenthood 
is dependant on one's gender identity or sex in no way. 
It is submitted in conclusion, that in all the areas of law covered in this 
chapter, there is no example which justifies the decision of Nesdadt J in 
W V W. On the contrary, there is such a maze of ridiculous and anomalous 
situations that the whole decision is rendered meaningless. Even if W V  W 
was followed only for marital purposes, we would still be faced with the 
dilemma of a person having two sexes for different purposes, which would 
in effect, render life for the individual concerned, just as unbearable as 
life before the operative intervention. It is submitted further that it 
is inconceivable to this author how anyone - especially a person with the 
fate of others in his hands - could pe'rpetrate such an inhuman and criminal 
action on an individual, for� justifiable reason. 
A. THE CRIMINAL LAW
I INTRODUCTION
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C HAP TER X 
OTHER AREAS OF LAW 
"Life is a test and this world a place of trial. 
Always the problems - or it may be the same problem -
will be presented to every generation in different 
forms". 
(Winston Churchill). 
Certain aspects of the criminal law are affected directly by the sex 
of an individual. It is the purpose of this chapter to deal with those 
areas and where possible to offer case studies on the particular topics. 
II COMPARATIVE LAW 
1. The United Kingdom.
(1) In England, as a result of the decision in R v Tan and Others, the status 
of the post-operative transsexual has fonnd no legal recognition in the 
criminal law, because the court saw fit to• follow the decision arrived 
. -�(2) 
at in Corbett v Corbett. In the former case, the accused was one Gloria 
Greaves who had undergone corrective surgery · and thereafter had lived 
as a woman. She appealed against a conviction for inter alia, living 
on immoral earnings, contrary to the provisions of the Sexual Offences 
(3) Act .. · The appeal was based on the contention that the statutory 
provision expressly made the crime in question one capable of being 
committed by a male only; the effect of the operation had been to make 
'him' a woman and thereby precluded conviction. The court of appeal 
unanimously rejected this argument by applying the judgment in the Corbett 
case. The court was of the opinion that, 
"Common sense and the desirability of certainty and 
consistency demanded (that) Corbett should apply." 
Therefore, despite operative intervention, Greaves remained a man and 
her present sex was no bar to conviction. It is interesting to note 
that Greaves however had been released from a woman's prison on bail, 
pending appeal. This action was totally inconsistent with the emphatic 
statement of the court that Greaves had never changed sex. 
1. (1983) 3 WLR 361.
2. (1970) 2 All ER 33.
3. Of 1956, section 30.
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The decision in Tan and Others will be followed in other laws relating 
to crime in which sex is a salient factor, and therefore it �uld appear 
that the post-operative transsexual can neither rape nor be raped. 
2. canada.
There are no direct cases in issue in Canada, but it would appear that 
if one gives due weight to the Criminal Code and subsequent cases such
as Regina v John� and Miller v Miller, 
(4
) on the definition of penetration
therein, a post-operative transsexual could. be regarded as qualifying
as a victim for the crime of rape. In R v Ramos
(5)
a man who had touched
a woman's breasts and had kissed her in the nape of . her neck was charged
with sexual assault, contrary to section 246(1) (b ) of the Criminal Code.
" •.. above · all the .courts should deal with conunon 
sense and· basic societal values. Here, the accused's 
conduct amounted to a gender-based assault on a woman 
This was the kind of conduct that the legislature 
had sought to prohibit". {
6
)
l't is submitted therefore that in terms of this wording, a post-operative 
woman would be considered as a woman. for the purposes of rape because 
if the mere touching of the breast constitutes a sexual assault, the 
invasion of the body can be seen as "gender-based" too and obviously 
the type of conduct which "the legislature has sought to prohibit". 
Of course there is the danger that the Corbett decision might be followed 
here, but it is trusted that the Canadian courts will give more weight 
to the cases already decided in their jurisdiction and apply the same 
principles to the post-operative transsexual. 
III SOUTH AFRICA 
It is submitted that in south Africa, if an accused who is charged 
with a sexual offence - attempts a defence that the victim was not of 
the required sex for the definition of that crime, but was in fact an 
intersex or a post-operative transsexual, the court could do one of three 
things: 
4. (1947) OR 213 CA.
5. NNT Ct 370 45 (1985) Crim Repts 3rd series.
6. See also Carignan v Master Craft Publications Ltd (1984) 5 CH RPO 2282
(BC Brd of Inquiry); R v Dave BC Co Ct Cashman Co Ct J (24 May 1984).
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1. it -can follow the line of reasoning raised by the defence, thereby
following the decision in W v W and ignoring operative intervention;
2. it may convict the accused of one of the lesser offences that may
apply, such as gross indecency; or
3. it may convict the accused for the offence charged, thereby giving
substance to the 1974 legislation and recognising the change and the
operative intervention.
Let us take rape for instance. The crime of rape consists in intentional, 
(7) unlawful, sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. In general 
it is not unlawful for a man to force his wife to have intercourse with 
him. It follows that, if, by mistake of fact, X believes Y to be his 
wife, he does not foresee the possibility that his conduct may be unlawfu1!
8
'
The rule that a husband cannot rape his wife was formulated in English 
law by Lord Hale and approved of and adopted by several English courts. 
It was also adopted by South African courts. (
9
) Lord Hale stated that,
"The husband cannot be guilty of the rape committed 
by him upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent the wife has given up herself 
in this kind unto her husband which she cannot re-
tract". 
(10}
This dictum is not altogether satisfactory because a woman, in consenting 
to have sexual intercourse in marriage, does not consent to force or 
violence necessarily. Furthermore, a wife is entitled - under certain 
legal circumstances - to refuse to have 
h ba d 
(ll) ' 
. b h us n . It 1.s also possi le t at a 
sexual 
husband 
intercourse with 
may be convicted
her 
of 
assault in forcing his wife, even though not of actual rape, which is 
(12)
inconsistent to say the least. 
7. Milton op cit 435.
8. Milton op cit 437.
9. R v Mosago 1935 AD 32 at 24; R v Gumede 1946 (l} PHH 68 {N).
10. In Milton op cit 437.
11. For example, when he is suffering from contagious venereal disease:
Ains-bury v Ainsbury 1929- � 109 at 11:7-8.
12. R v Miller (1945) 2 QB 282 at 292; (1954) 2 All ER 529 at 533.
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It is submitted therefore by Milton 
(l
J) and others that this rule be
abolished. (l
4
)
For the crime of h b 
. (15) 
rape t ere must e penetration but it suffices if 
(16) 
the male organ is, in the slightest degree, within the female's body. It
is not necessary that the hymen should be ruptured in the case of a 
. .  (17) 
b 't ed 
(18)
virgin, or that semen e emi t . A man cannot- be raped and 
neither can a woman rape. 
(19)
Thus, on the ruling of W V  W a post-operative male-female transsexual 
cannot be raped because she has not changed to the female sex, even though 
she may have undergone the bodily invasion necessary and the attendant 
psychological trauma. 
As Taitz: points out (
2
0) there are other laws peculiar to South Africa
for the protection of South African women, which invol.ve sexual offences. 
Under the Immorality Act <
21
) these provisions are against, inter alia:
"(a) the procuring of or attempting to procure any 
female to have unlawful carnal intercourse with 
any person other than the procurer, or in any way 
13. Op cit 438. 
14. In a case reported in the Jerusalem Post International F.dition
(28 September 1980), it was held that a man was guilty of the crime
of rape against his wife. It was held further that the English
common law in this regard, which treats the marriage relationship
as conferring upon the husband the right to impose his sexual will
on his wife, is inapplicable to Jewish residents in Israel. It
was found that this doctrine of submission was sufficient to outrage
human conscience and reason "in an enlightened country in our times":
'Current Topics' (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 60.
15. Van Leeuwen CF 1.5.23.12; R v Theron 1924 EDL 204; R v V 1960 (1) 
SA '117 (T); R v E 1960 (2) SA 691 (FC) at 692.
16. R v Lines (1844) 1 C & K 39.
17. S v K 1972 (2) SA 898 {AD) at 900C.
18. Sexual Offences Act of 1956: "intercourse shall be deemed complete
upon proof of penetration only".
19. Milton op cit 441.
20. J. Tai tz 'Some Criminal Law Anomalies Brought about by a Sex Change'
(February 1985) THRHR 97,,
21. Act 23 of 195 7.
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. (22) 
assisting to bring about such intercourse; 
(b) the inveigling or enticing of any female to a brothel
for the purpose of unlawful carnal intercourse or prosti­
tution, or the concealing in any house or place any
. (23)
female so inveigled or enticed; 
(cl the procuring or attempting to procure any female
to become a common prostitute or to become an inmate
of a brothel."( 
24
)
It would appear that none of these provisions are available to the post-
operative transsexual female. Following on this then, a post-operative 
transsexual can avoid prosecution for prostitution by assuming her 'legal' 
f h d · . . l (
2
5)sex or t e uration of the tria . 
P rosti tut ion - which is usually defined as 'the offering by a woman of her 
. (26) 
body for hire' - is a form of sexual immorality which is partially pro-
hibited by the criminal law. <
27
> As a profession it is
it involves solicitation then it becomes an offence. (
29
) In
tolerated, but 
South Africa 
if 
the 
accused must be proven to be a 'common' prostitute, which is one who habitually 
1. h d 
.
.. f . . <
29
> . 1 ff f p ies t e tra e o
. 
prostitution. It 2.s a so an o ence or any person
k . 1 · . ff h · f · · (JO) to nowingly ive o t e earnings o prostitution. 
22. Section lO(a) of the Immorality Act.
23. Section lO(b) of the Immorality Act.
24. Sections lO(c) and (d) of the Immorality Act.
25. The prosecution, it is submitted, could. not enter an alternative charge
of homosexual conduct because that and the crime of prostitution are
mutually ex.elusive. It would be tantamount to declaring that a person
is being prosecuted for being female, and failing that, in the alterna­
tive, for being male. This is clearly asinine.
26. R v De Munck (1918) 1 KB 635.
27. J.R. Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure volume III (1971) 343.
28. Report of the Wolfenden Committee of Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
{1957) para 247 at 257; Police Offences Act 1882 (Capel and the Police
Offences Ordinance No. 21 of 1902 (OFS).
29. R v Doingo 1944 EDC 161.
30. R v Kafakarotwe 1951 (2) PHH 96 (SR) 27.
B. INCARCERATION.
I INTRODUCTION. 
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There is the possible problem regarding the incarceration of the transsexual 
either during treatment or after surgery, in the event of a criminal convic­
tion, if the change of sex is not recognised legally. 
II COMPARATIVE LAW 
1. The United States of America
There are a number of cases in this area, on the treatment in prison of ,.both 
- ·. ( 31)
pre-operative ana post-operative transsexuals. In Mostyn v State of cali-
the petitioner wished ·to be treated as a special case, as she claimed· that he� 
life would be in danger if housed with men. She obtained a _preliminary 
injunction to be kept out of the general male population of any prison and 
the district Judge recommended that 
" ... she be kept in an administrative segregation unit in 
a hospital setting where she_ could continue her hormone 
treatments". 
Similarly, an inmate of the all-male Penitentiary in Iowa is suing the State 
t bt . t· h.l t . . C
32
> h't 11 that· ·t· . o o ain correc ive surgery w 1 s in prison. W J. e a  eges i is 
"cruel and unusual punishment" for prison officials to deny this surgery. 
A third instance, is the unreported case of one Rickie Bruce C
33> who was senten­
ced to five years for theft •. The judge concerned offered to recommend that 
the Department of Corrections "seriously consider" providing the prisoner 
with corrective surgery if he so requests. The judge added that he considered 
the funds for the operation would "be money well spent by the State of 
Illinois". 
There has_ also been a case in which the transsexual did not receive such 
humane treatment as the above cases. Here a pre-operative transsexual 
whose physique was so feminine that 'she' earned 'her' living as a topless 
dancer - was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment for robbery. 'She' 
was incarcerated in an all-male prison and consequently subjected to much 
sexual abuse. 
C34l
31. Reported in UPI 14 April 1983.
32 ♦ - White v state of Iowa UPI 4 April 1984 .
33. Reported by UPI Peoria, Illinois 24 June 1983.
34. Unreported case cited in · McColl Kennedy op cit 123.
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2. The United Kingdom.
In England, when faced with the dilemma of incarcerating a post-operative 
transsexual, the· court adopted the sensible· stance and gave effect to the 
t t. t t {JS) d' (
3
G) h' 1 ' pos -opera l.ve s a us. Accor ing to Morton t is was unusua practice
because the transsexual in England is normally remanded to the prison o_f 
the original sex and may, ·at the discretion of the prison doctor, have the 
hormone treatment discontinued. In any event, this was a phyrric victory 
for the transsexual because as the judgment demonstrated, the post-operative 
status was ignored for the purposes of conviction as the court followed 
the decision in Corbett v Corbett. 
III SOUTH AFRICA 
South African authorities have been confronted also with the dilemma of 
the transsexual sentenced to imprisonment, but they neatly side-stepped 
the issue by granting bail in circumstances which would not warrant such 
procedure normally. (37)
"In Germiston, a man undergoing a sex change operation 
was granted bail yesterday by a Germiston Regional Court 
magistrate because of the difficulty of holding him 
in custody. Because of his condition, Mr Lang was kept 
in isolation at the New Johannesburg Prison. 
and exercised separately." 
He ate 
It must also be remembered that a female cannot be subjected to corporal 
. (38) punishment. If the post-operative status were not recognised in this 
regard the transsexual would be distinguished from the biological woman 
and be subject to this harsh - and it is submitted, barbaric treatment 
despite the fact that she would have attained full sexual identity as a 
female, through operative intervention. 
35. R v Tan and Others (1983) 3 WLD 161, in which Gloria Greaves was impriso�­
ed in a female prison pending bail.
36. op cit 621.
37. The Daily News (March 1984}.
38. Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act 8 of 1959.
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There are several areas of law in which a person might be discriminated 
against - either beneficially or detrimentally - on account of his/her sex. 
It is important therefore to decide legally to which sex the post-operative 
transsexual belongs for these purposes. 
II COMPARATIVE LAW
1. The United States of America.
The majority of recent court decisions have rules that title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as amended which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex, does not apply to the transsexual. In Voyles v Davies Medical 
{39) Center, a female transsexual who planned to undergo corrective surgery 
was dismissed from her employment as a technician at the Medical Centre. 
The employer conceded that her dismissal was grounded on the fact that she 
wished to be transsexed and stated that such change might have an adverse 
effect on patients and co-workers. The plaintiff claimed that she was the 
object of sex discrimination, based on on her transsexualism, and that this 
discrimination was prohibited by civil right. 
for a remedy. 
"Situations involving transsexuals 
The court felt at a loss 
were simply not 
considered, and from the void the court is not permitted 
to fashion its own judicial interdictions". 
Another case involving equal protection arguments in the context of employ­
ment discrimination is that of In Re Tenure Hearing of Grossrnan (
40) which con­
sidered as well, the issue of the effect of transsexualism on young children. 
Paula Grossman was a male-female transse.xual who had taught music as a male 
at an elementary school for fourteen years. .While in his fifties, he underwent 
corrective surgery. Afterwards, she was summarily dismissed on the grounds 
of "her incapacity" to continue teaching. The. New York Superior Court upheld 
the dismissal, reasoning that it was not her unfitness to engage in the 
teaching profession which constituted her inqapacity, but rather it was 
her inability to present an acceptable psychological model to elementary 
students at the school because of the knowledge of her change of sex. It 
was held that Miss Grossman's presence would have an adverse mental effect 
upon the ten year old students. Miss Grossman was however offered another 
post at another school in her new sex role. However, it would appear that 
the civil rights protection clauses have been of little if no avail to the 
transsexual. 
39. 403 F Supp 456 (ND Cal 1975).
40. 127 N J  Super 13, 316 A 2d 39 (1974).
248 
2. The United Kingdom.
In England, the Equal Pay Act of 1970 and the sex Discrimination Act of 1975 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex in inter alia the employment 
(41) 
sphere. . The statutes employ the terms 'a man' and 'a woman' and the 
question has arisen as to how these words are to be defined. In White v 
. (42) 
British Sugar Corporation a female transsexual who had not undergone full 
surgery had obtained employment with a corporation which was under the im-
pression that she was a man. When her male colleagues discovered that she 
was female they lodged a complaint with their employer who . felt compelled to 
dismiss her. White brought an action under the Sex Discrimination Act stating 
that the employer was treating her "less favourably" than he would a man. 
The employer in his turn contended that inter alia the Act in question was 
inapplicable because the plaintiff was a man. The industrial tribunal rejected 
the defence and held that the biological test as enunciated in the Corbett 
decision should be used to define 'a man' and 'a woman' for the purposes of 
the Act. Therefore, although the plaintiff regarded herself as male, dressed 
as a male and had been treated by the relevant authorities as a male she was 
a biological female and therefore a woman for the purposes of the Act. The 
ambit of the statute was applicable therefore; and the tribunal had jurisdic-
tion. However, the tribunal went on to hold that the transsexual had not 
been dismissed because of her sex, but because of the fact . that she had mis-
represented herself to her employer. It is submitted that the rationes in 
respect to the misrep1;esentation was correct in so far as the transsexual
had perpetrated a fraud upon the employer, "but•·it is submitted further that 
· should have made no. effect, because whether the transsexual was male or female
should have made no difference to her obtaining the job. If it did then there
is clearly a case of discrimination.
(43) Mason reports of another instance of sex discrimination in the vocational
field. Since the law does not recognise him in his post-operative role as
a male, the established Church will recognise him in this way only and there-
fore will not permit him to offer himself for Ordination as a priest. At the
same time, because of his masculine appearance, the possibility of him becoming
. (44} a deaconess, is remote. 
41" Armstrong op cit 94. 
42. 1977 1 RLR 121.
4 3 . � , Cit 88: 
44. Ibid.
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"this is especially galling when collegues go on to theo­
logical colleges whilst I remain an unemployed graduate 
... Whilst being grateful for the love shown me by people, 
I am totally disillusioned with the Anglican Church as 
, , , II (45)an institution . 
Unlike potential women priests, he cannot make a fuss about the refusal to 
ordain women and he is accepted as a male server in the cathedrals - which 
(46) 
is most incongruous to say the least. Furthermore, as a legal woman he is
entitled to retire at sixty which it is sulmitted would be unfair to other 
males as Mason regards himself as much a male as any biological male. 
3. Canada.
Generally, the law of delict does not distinguish between males and females,
but in certain cases this has occurred in .Canada. In personal injury awards
occasionally men have received higher damages than women for similar injuries •
. (4 7) In Du Bocquet v Caron $12 000 was awarded to a male for a fractured tibia
. (48) 
and fibula, while in Therrien et al v Whi.te only $4 400 was awarded to
a female for fractures to the lower leg and collarbone, which in addition
had caused bad scarring which necessitated further surgery. Since courts
normally accept persons on their external appearances for the purposes of
delictual matters, it would appear that the post-operative transsexual would
be treated in the post-operative role. However, it is submitted that where
it would be to the advantage of the transsexual to claim that she is in fact
a man on the grounds of her chromosomal constitution the court would ignore
this contention in this case, even though the post-operative transsexual would
in all probability not be afforded legal recognition in other spheres such
as the marital sphere.
III SOUTH AFRICA 
Under the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act C
49
>movement of Blacks is re­
stricted. Section 10(1) states that 
"No black shall remain for more than 72 hours in a pre­
scribed area unless he produces proof in the manner pre-
45. There would appear to be no ethical preventitive to the recognition of
the post-operative role when taking into consideration tpe fact that
many men of the cloth have condoned the_ corrective surgery: Smith op
cit 976.
46. Mason op cit 88.
47. (1975) 12 NBR (2d) 283 (NBQJ.
48. (1975) 12 NBR (2d) 541 (NBSC).
49. Act 25 of 1945 as amended.
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scribed that (bl he has worked continuously in such 
area for one employer for the period of not less than 
10 year.s or has lawfully resided continuously in such 
(50)
area for a period of not less than 15 years". 
Therefore, not only does the· Act specifically preclude females from being 
in the area - except. for those mentioned in subsection (c), being the wife 
or unmarried daughter of the aforementioned black, (
5l
} but even if it did
extend to females it could be argued that a post-operative transsexual female 
now has a new identity and therefore does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (b) as the time period would. be broken by the change of sex. 
There has in fact been such a case. A Zulu waiter in a Durban hotel underwent 
cqrrective surgery and afterwards wished to remain employed in the said hotel 
in her capacity as a waitress. The hotel management was prepared to oblige, 
but the transsexual fell foul of section l.0 as the post-operative role was 
recognised and as a woman, the transsexual could no longer remain in the pre­
scribed area. This is one instance in which operative intervention was recog­
nised, but it is submitted, possibly because it was to the detriment of the 
. (52) 
post-operative transsexual. 
In South Africa too, there is compulsory conscrfption for mil.itary service 
in the case of males but not in the case of females. If, in the instance 
of a post-operative female, W v W were followed,_ then this female would be 
obliged to undergo military training as a man. Either she would be sent to 
an ordinary military camp - and therefore subject to similar harrassment as 
in the case of incarceration7:'·_ or she would be sent to an all-female camp 
to avoid this problem. Not onl.y would the latter course of action be a contra­
diction in terms because this woul.d in effect be giving recognition to the 
female status, but at the moment at least there is no compulsory conscription 
for females so why should a female transsexual be obligated to undergo 
training? It is submitted that the decision in W v W would not be followed 
for the purposes of military training, but only on the ground that a post­
operative male - who chose to be male - should suffer the liabilities of that 
sex, as well as reap its benefits, another instance of doing what is in the 
least interest of the transsexual. 
50. Subsection (b) was substituted by section 3 of Act 97 of 1978.
51. Amended by section 6 of Act 16 of 1979.
52. This infonnati�n was supplied to this author by an Influx Control Officer
of the Kwa Mashu Administration Board.
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IV CRITICAL E.VALUATION 
As far as the post-operative transsexual's stance in the criminal law goes, 
it is evident that whatever function the crime of rape may have fulfilled 
in earlier times, its modern function is understood to be that of protecting 
women from sexual abuse. In other words, it is not so much the fact that 
rape involves unlawful sexual intercourse as the fact that it involves an 
invasion of the integrity of a woman's person and an invasion of her personal 
dignitas which renders the act punishable. (53) If one were to ignore operative 
intervention on the part of the post-operative transsexual, it is submitted 
that this would be a blatant disregard of the · object of the crime of rape. 
It is submitted further that the psychological - and now also the physical 
- woman has just as much entitlement to the protection afforded by the law in
this regard, as does a biological woman. Not to recognise this protection
is to deny the fact that the transsexual is a human being, since - regardless
of her post-operative appearance and her 'life long conviction' - the law
ignores her sexual identity and her bodily integrity and privacy are open
to gross violation with no real relief for the physical abuse and mental
anguish. {S
4
) Granted, the abuse of the body could be regarded as an assault
but this does not detract from the fact that the transsexual had been violated
sexually. The assault could not even amount to sodomy as intercourse involving
an artificial vagina in no way could be regarded as anal intercourse. It
is suanitted that a charge under the lesser crime of assault hardly assuages
the victim's suffering and a transsexual should not have to be grateful for
'small mercies' and forced to settle for second best.
"It makes no sense at all to tell an attractive transsexual 
employed as a secretary, possessed of all the necessary 
documentation of her sex change, and all the physical 
attributes of her new sex: breasts, female figure, and 
vagina (albeit a constructed one) that she can pass as 
. (55 l 
a woman but cannot be raped because she is a man". 
53. As rape is· a species of assault, it is classified as a crime against bodily
security rather than· a crime against morality such as incest: bigamy and
sodomy: Milton op cit 434.
54. There are the lesser· charges .of assault or gross indecency, but all
elements must be_ proven: if a person has the intention to rape he has not
necessarily the requisite intention to assault.
55. McColl Kennedy op� 123.
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A corollary to the above premise of course is that a post-operative male -
who manages to penetrate a woman without her consent - would escape criminal 
liability for rape in that, on following � 'he' was· still a woman and 
as such could not commit rape. It is submitted that this is totally objection-
able and contra bonos mores. It is easy to imagine the added psychological 
shock of a victim when told that in fact she had not been raped according 
to the law, but at most, has been •assaulted only. 
"in any system of criminal law, the problem is 1 ikely 
to arise of how best to reconcile the importance of en­
forcing proper standards, regarded objectively, with the 
. f 
. 
h . d. ·a 1 f . 1 " <
56
)importance o treating t e in ivi ua air y . 
It is submitted that there is no fairness in disregarding operative inter­
vention because in doing so, one is disregarding the individual's psyche which 
could be damaged irreparably. The transsexual should not be denied that peace 
of mind and the protection which biological females claim as a right. As 
the Wolfenden Report·stated, 
.. the function of the criminal law is to preserve order 
and decency, to protect citizens from what is offensive 
or injurious ..• ". 
Milton (S
7
) has stated that save for a wife, "there are no women in respect
of whom rape cannot in law be committed", but in· following the decision in 
W v W a whole category of women is created who are barred from protection. 
It would appear from the cases on sex discrimination, that where it is to 
the detriment of the transsexual to be discriminated against, this has 
occurred. Although it is of course essential for courts to strike a balance 
between the interests of the transsexual and other parties who might be 
affected - and it would be illogical to advocate that the transsexual's 
personal interests should always prevail - it is submitted that where the 
other party_ is an adult, no averse discrimination should be made against the 
transsexual and that it is for the adult society to be more tolerant and less 
bigoted. Furthermore, despite the fact that young children may be affected 
adversely by confrontation with transsexualism - as was held in the case of 
Grossman - it has not always been seen this way - as Christian v Randell demon­
strated - and further-more the child should be made aware of the phenomenon 
as early as !X)Ssible and not be hidden from reality. 
56. R v Krull 1959 (3) AD, per Schreiner JA.
57. � Cit 441.
It is submitted that 
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to bring the child within the ambit of the problem will be to make for a more 
compassionate adult which is necessary to break down convention. 
Transsexualism is not an evil: it is a fact of life and the sooner this is 
realised. the better for all. It is sutxnitted that the heavy reliance on 
the chromosomal test - as the above cases have indicated - is a medical in­
accuracy and therefore a legal sine qua non. The type of chromosomal consti­
tution which a person possesses has no relation to the ability to perform in 
and contribute·.to, society. 
V SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS. 
· Even though other courts of law are not obliged to follow the Nesdadt decision
in other fields of law, in South Africa, it is submitted that this will, in
all probability occur, as it did in England, with the criminal case of Tan
following the civil one of Corbett. It is submitted however, that the only
equitable solution for the· transsexual would be to ignore the W v W judgm'ent
and accord the post-operative transsexual full recognition in the legal sphere
in his desired role. If this occurs then it is evident that a post-operative
female will be capable of being raped, and as a woman, will be afforded the
full protection of the criminal law, as all other women are. It is submitted
therefore that if a post-operative transsexual is capable of being raped,
she is surely capable of being a woman for the purposes of marriage. In the
. (58 l Canadian case of Miller v Miller, it was held that penetration for con-
summation was less than that required for rape. It is patently idiotic there­
fore to consider a transsexual as capable of being raped - which action is
a crime - but incapable of marrying - which action is a private, consensual
matter. The ludicracy of the situation is demonstrated by the following quote: 
"Thus, if penetration is necessary and sufficient condition 
for carrying out the act, whether for the purpose of con­
summation, adulte.ry or rape, the act may be accomplished
provided only that the necessary organs are possessed 
by both parties, and if the parties do possess such organs 
then it may be taken that there is a sufficient degree 
. (59) of sexual differentiation for that particular purpose". 
It is submitted that the decision in W v W should not be accorded any recog­
nition in other fields of law, and that the post-operative transsexual should 
be recognised legally in the desired rolea TO ensure this the legislature should 
58. 1947 OR 213 (CA).
59. Finlay op cit 125.
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provide for complete legal coverage in the new role, as has been done in West 
Germany. The ultimate goal of the post-operative transsexual is total 
acceptance in society as a member of the new sex and, it is submitted that 
this is a basic right which should not be denied him. 
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THE CONCLUSION 
"And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the 
soul so that in each of us two powers preside, one 
male 1 and in the man's brain the man predominates over 
the woman and in the woman's brain the woman predominates 
over the man. The normal and comfortable state of 
being is when the two live in harmony together, 
spiritually co-operating. If one is a man, still the 
woman part of the brain must have effect1 and a woman 
must also have intercourse with the man in her. 
Coleridge perhaps meant this when he said that a great 
mind is and rogenous 
place that the mind 
its faculties." 
is 
It is when this fusion takes 
fully fertilised and uses all 
(Virginia Woolf: A Room of one's Own) 
All in all, the law regarding transsexualism as a whole is unsatisfactory 
to say the least. This author wishes to offer a few suggested solutions 
which may facilitate a unified and therefore, equitable view of the dilemma. 
The term 'sex' is a very nebulous one and the law only recognises the 
polarities of male and female. As each of us is a combination of both 
- so much so that in order to produce testosterone, one must have present
the female hormones, initially - it is strictly inaccurate to claim that 
we are one to the exclusion of the other. However, most 'normal' people 
show a marked preponderance for the one, with the other manifesting itself 
in a less noticeable way. 
by our actions, thoughts, 
Thus, for all intents and purposes, we appear 
behaviours and anatomies - to be either male 
or female. But it must not be forgotten that there are those people in 
whom this dominance by the one 'sex type' is not . so marked and in fact, 
is in fluctuation, or those people whose dominant sex is not the apparent, 
physical one. In these case�, it is ludicrous to try and classify the 
individual by visual biological means, into male or female. There should 
in fact be a third categoi::y of intersex, but at this moment in time, when 
the law only recognises male and female one must slot 'these people who 
do not conform, into the sex-typing most suited to their needs. 
The basis on which the sex of an infant is determined is, it is submitted, 
also unsatisfactory. The chromosomal test must be regarded as the least 
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important and the visual genitalia test as far from infallible. It is 
submitted, however, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
physical sex of the infant should be used as a temporary determinant of 
the individual's sex. This necessarily indicates that the birth certificate 
of a person should be a temporary document, subject to later alteration. 
In the event of contradictory manifestation of sexual identity at a later 
developmental stage, the birth certificate should be altered and at this 
instance in which the sexual identity of the individual is now certain, 
should then be made a permanent legal document. Obviously, if a test is 
found which is as infallible. as human error permits, for determining the 
sex of the individual at birth or before - as the H_Y antigen or gene probe 
tests may prove - then such temporary measures could be dispensed with. 
With the temporary birth certificate system, once the transsexual has been 
diagnosed, his temporary birth certificate can be amended to reflect the 
true position and the document will then become a permanent one. If the 
corrective surgery is required, then it should be performed as soon as 
feasible to allow the individual to live in his desired role from as early 
an age · as possible. The operation cannot . be seen as a change of sex in 
this case. The true sex is merely re-affirmed. It is not a case of the 
creation of a new individual, but rather the process of metamorphosis: 
the life of the pre-operative transsexual is a cacooned one and on emergence 
therefrom - through the aid of the surgery - the real, self-contained 
individual is revealed. 
If however, the suggestion of the temporary birth certificate - which will 
dispense with all legal problems rel a ting to transsexuals in their post­
operative roles - is not acceptable then· it remains to be stated that in 
this controversial area the law must follow the guidance of the medical 
profession. Not only is sex a medical term - nowhere is it legally defined.: 
the law speaks of man and woman, but cannot agree as to what these terms 
really mean - but the classification of sex-types - including the phenomenon 
of gender dysphoria - are necessarily medical issues. There is no strict 
bipolarity of sex in medicine as there is in law: intersex plays a very 
large part in medicine: it has no part in law. Regarding transsexualism, 
it is not surprising that there is so little correlation between medical 
advancement and legal judgments. As Strauss puts it, 
"··• there is a certain amount of legal suspicion between 
the science of law and psychiatry 11 !1> . 
1. Strauss (2) £E. cit 79
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Courts have at times - probably through ignorance - shown a certain amount 
of scepticism towards expert psychiatric evidence. In R v Von Zell <
2
>
Van den Heever JA refer.red t9 psychiatry as, 
II an empirical and speculative science ,with rather 
elastic notation and terminology which is usually wise 
after the event." 
Jurists in turn, have been accused by psychiatrists of over-simplification 
and being unscientific. The latter sentiment is one with which this author 
concurs: we have seen how judges tenaciousl3 hold onto the chromosomal test 
for sex, despite the fact that medical science has long since proved its 
ineptness. 
"To disregard modern, scientific knowledge in the reform 
and practice of law would be al together shortsighted 
and unjustifiable. If this is done, the law · would 
run the risk of degenerating into some kind of 
intellectual game unrelated to the realities of life,·" (
3
�
It is more than obvious that gender dysphoria is here to stay - and has, 
in all probability, been with us since time immemorial, but has not been 
classified as such. The battle between the physical and the mental is 
no new one either, which is not surprising as every human being is a duality 
of both. To this author, the ultimate attainment of the enlightened human 
being is a state of spirituality - a oneness with the whole creation. But 
until such time as this goal can be reached feasibly, we are living here 
and now on the physical plane of this earth. We have been endowed with 
mental capabilities and by reason of this, are supposedly superior to 
animals, who live by instina.t and physicality alone. Thus, it is logical 
to assume that the mental state is superior to the physical state: the 
mind dominant over the body. With this tenet no one can argue. Therefore, 
it is submitted that there is no reason why the mind should not continue 
its dominance in the case of the transsexual. Why should transsexualism 
be viewed as the 'heal thy body v the obsessed mind'? Why is the mind not 
the healthy element and the body the mistake? There are of course, many 
cases of wrong diagnosis, but so too, are there many cases of true 
transsexuals. In such cases as the latter, the mind should be afforded 
2. 1953(3( SA 301 {A) at 311.
3. Strauss :(2) op cr,t 102.
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its rightful precedence and the subservient body altered accordingly, if 
so desired. Simply because surgical procedures are not as yet fully advanced 
is no reason to state that alignment of the body to the mind, is wrong. 
If we all had to wait for things to be perfect before we considered them, 
there would be lamentably little progress anywhere. This is not to say 
that doctors may experiment unrestrainedly. The transsexual makes the 
ultimate decision to undergo surgery, with the full knowledge that such 
procedures are· as yet imperfect, but also with the knowledge that he was 
perhaps taking a momentous move in the right direction. 
One major drawback at the moment, is the lack of regulatory procedure for 
the operation. Pre-operative screening is vital in order to eliminate 
possible mistakes and incorrect diagnoses. At present, there is no extensive 
evaluation in South Africa, as there is in the reputable clinics in the 
United States. 
"I think many people who've had corrective surgery, 
really only needed good psychology to get them rig_ht. 
At the moment it is far too easy to have corrective 
surgery performed in South· Africa. All you basically 
need is a report from a psychiatrist and psychologist, 
and a gynaecologist will perform the operation. In 
a country like Britain you have to wait for years 
the lengthy process whittles down all but the most 
determined patients - and even then about 60% are turned 
d n (4) own • 
The procedures adopted should be designed to ensure that the patient is 
transsexual; that recourse to the surgery is the only beneficial treatment 
available; that the patient is completely aware of the possibilities and. 
limitations inherent in the procedure and that the surgery has a strong 
probability of improving the patient's condition. (S) 
Furthermore, in order for clinical guidelines to be effective, one would 
have to ensure that surgery was performed by skilled surgeons only, in 
4. Scope Magazine (1 June 1984) 40,
5. Smith .QE. cit 974
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highly select clinics which could provide follow-up. It is clear that 
the current abuse comes from the wide-spread availability of the surgery. 
Another important factor insisted on by most clinics, is the unmarried 
status of the transsexual, which obviates all the legal difficulties that 
would ensue, should the transsexual be married. The observance of cautious 
pre-operati�e procedures also creates a strong presumption that the operation 
is performed for therapeutic purposes. The results of the surgery are 
too severe and too permanent to allow its unfettered use, therefore strict 
evaluation measured by the standards of the Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association and others, should be the legal prerequisite 
and those doctors who do not follow such procedures, should be answerable 
in either criminal or civil proceedings. In this way, the possibility 
of error and regret must be minimised and the jurist will feel secure in 
the knowledge that such drastic surgery is available only to those who 
h d. d h h 
. {G) . 
l ave been a Judge t oroug ly, to warrant it. This author strong y
recommends therefore that such procedures as outlined above, be enforced 
by legislation and only when they have been satisfied, should the qualifying 
patient be permitted to proceed with the irreversible surgery. 
But this choice on the part of the transsexual would be meaningless, if 
legal effect was · not given to it. The law governs most actions of an 
individual in society and as such, has the power to give life to, or take 
life away from him. This, the author means in the literal sense and also 
in the sense of enabling a person simply to exist as himself without being 
pressured to live as another person. The law therefore, has a. very real 
duty to the citizens within its legal system, ·to allow them to live peaceably 
and without harassment. It is. therefore imperative that the law remove 
the shackles of conservatism and give full legal effect to the post-operative 
status of the transsexual. Half_;_hearted legal effect is just as injurious 
as none at all, because the individual is ·still compelled to live a 
schizophrenic existence. Logic demands that the state accept a person 
as belonging to one sex for all purposes. But the law to date, has not 
felt obliged to follow such rational simplicity. 
It has been te.ndered, that one could compare- the position of the post­
operative transsexual in society, to the treatment of minors, in terms 
6. Smith .2E. cit 975.
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of their limited legal capacity to engage in sundry activities. { 
7
) The
author regards this comparison as deficient·in insight. Not only· is a minor's 
capitus diminutio a temporary drawback - whereas the transsexual's position 
is permanent - but at least a minor is at liberty to obtain consent or 
ratification from some source - be it guardian or court - for any activity 
in which he may wish to participate. The transsexual, on the other hand, 
is not so fortunate as to have a benevolent 'godfather' to facilitate his 
ability to engage in those activities legally denied him. Thia approach 
to the transsexual's dilemma cannot be countenanced. It is essential 
for all practical purposes that a balance between medicine and law is 
found and it is lamentable that this has as yet, not been the case. The 
law bas atrophied in its view of transsexualism and has entrenched - in 
South Africa at least - an attitude of dogmatic, impractical non-realism, 
by such decisions as W v w.
It is therefore fervently entreated that in the absence of enlightened 
judicial decisions in South Africa, the Legislature step in and complete 
the !audible work it commenced and extend the provisions of section 7B, 
to include all spheres of law, thereby al1owing the post-operative 
transsexual recognition for all purposes in his·assumed sex role. 
On a wide front, the law has been lagging behind positive morality and 
progress in other fields. This is partly due to its inherent conservatism. 
"The endeavour of .the law to impart a certain amount 
of cqntinui ty and stability to the social order, gives 
it, . to some extent, the anti-dynamic property of 
inertia". {B) 
However, there have been instances of legal involvement to alleviate 
injustice and rectify anachronistic principles. We have evidenced such 
an instance with the Matrimonial Property Act of 1984. It is submitted 
that there is no reason why the same progressive attitude could not be 
adopted in another sphere of private law, namely the status of the post-
operative transsexual. The over-ruling of the com on law is not a rare 
7. McCqll Kennedy � cit 112.
8. Bodenheimer cited in Hahlo and Khan The South African Legal System
and its background ( 2nd ed. 1973) 10. 
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phenomenon. With the requisite legislative intervention, the education of 
the general public is made more possible, which is necessary, because the 
awareness of the community is a very important factor in social adaptation 
and acceptance. The law, however, should set the pace so that legal 
acceptance and social mores are not at different ends of the rope. 
If the Legislature cannot see its way clear to a general enactment 
sanctioning the post-operative status of the t;ransaexual - and there would 
(9) 
appear to be no bar.to this as the legislation in West Germany has proved 
- th�n it must take the only alternative open to it and prohibit the
corrective su;rgery. There can be no justification for allowing a person 
to undergo the surgery, only to pretend it never occurred. We have seen 
in South Africa and other jurisdictions, the anomalous situations which 
arise when the operation is permitted, but little effect given thereto. 
This inconsistency is clearly unacceptable and undermines the veracity 
and plausibility of the legal system. 
Onfortunately, if the Legislature were to adopt this alternative measure, 
it would be retrogressing and would be totally out of consonance with the 
field of medicine. 
"I do not believe that we as lawyers should be trying 
to have law that sabotages the work which surgeons 
and psychiatrists are doing to enable a person happily 
to become more reconciled to her fate .•• "
(lO) 
However, out of this Robson's choice it is submitted that it would be 
preferable to be denied the surgery - and therefore know exactly what one's 
legal position is - than to undergo the painful and expensive operation 
and be plunged into an abyss in which one legally is neither male nor female 
and furthermore, denied the right to marry: in effect, a non-person. As 
it is, instability - with its consequent personal and social price - haunts 
the lives of the socially 'abn�rmal'. 
The pressures and prejudices which attend their activities only exacerbate 
their insecurity. To offer a means of amelioration is more than justified 
9. Gesetz fibe;r die anderung der Vornamen und die Festatelling der Gesch­
lechtszugehorigkei t in Besonderen Fallen (Transsexuellengesetz- TSG)
Nrs6 Tag der Augabe: Bonn den 16 Sep. 1980 vorm 10.
10. Per Abse MP: Hansard Col 1842, commenting on Corbett v Corbett.
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for the invaluable service as it will be affording this 'so cially ill' 
person and hence society itself. 
This author therefore earnestly entreats that our Legislature re-inforce 
a good example and follow in the wake of the 1980 enactment in West 
(11) 
Germany, and accord the post-operative transsexual full legal status 
in his desired role. 
ll. For a detailed account of this legislation, vide chapter seven supra.
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